Internal Assessments and Extended Essays Relating to The Cold War

Thesis Question: To what extent was George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram responsible for shaping American foreign policies of containment during the Cold War from 1946-1949?

A: Plan of Investigation

 “Rarely in the course of diplomacy is it given to one individual to express within the compass of a single document, ideas of such force and persuasion that they immediately change the direction of a nation’s foreign policy. That was the effect, though, of the 8,000 word telegram dispatched from Moscow by Kennan on February 22, 1946.”[1]  
This investigation shall seek to assess the validity of this claim by answering the question “To what extent was George F. Keenan’s Long Telegram responsible for shaping American foreign policies of Containment [2] from 1946-49?” Calling attention to suggestions of Containment that had already taken root in American politics years before Kennan’s document was received in Washington, I will conclude that Kennan’s telegraphic analysis was not the singular catalyst for a change in US foreign policies with the support of three realities; (1) The inevitability of the course of action on account of conflicting ideologies that, with the global power vacuum after World War II and the elimination of a common enemy (Germany), guaranteed Soviet-American conflict; (2) Containment had in fact already been set into action under Roosevelt’s leadership and (3) Truman’s instatement in 1945 marked an evident shift in American diplomatic conduct towards the Soviet Union.  
This analysis will be predominately based on the primary source document, The Long Telegram and Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis’ “Strategies of Containment” which provides an elaborate critical analysis of Kennan's original strategy of containment[3]. For the purpose of exactitude my scope will be limited to the inceptive years of the Cold War known as “The Great Turn”[4], where a recognizable shift in American foreign policy is unmistakable.

Word Count 217

B: Summary of Evidence

1) John Lewis Gaddis draws attention to the fact that Containment policies were already being circulated among wartime policy-makers as early as 1941 during Roosevelt’s incumbency. American aims during the Second World War were aimed not only towards defeating Nazi Germany but equally at ensuring Soviet containment in a post-war Europe[5]:  “…Containment was much on the minds of Washington officials from 1941 on; the difficulty was to mesh that long-term concern with the more immediate imperative of defeating the Axis.”[6]  In 1943, William C. Bullitt[7], advocated initiatives to “introduce American forces into Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for the purpose, first, of defeating the Germans, but second, to bar the Red Army from Europe.” [8]  Roosevelt demonstrated considerable interest in Churchill’s suggestions for Anglo-American military maneuvers to combat Soviet aggrandizement. He emphasized in 1943, the need to “get to Berlin as soon as the Russians did in the event of a sudden German collapse.”[9]  Roosevelt initiated policies of Soviet “Containment by exhaustion”[10]:  In 1941, Roosevelt sanctioned Truman’s recommendation to “let Russians and Germans kill each other off”[11]. Gaddis proposes that Roosevelt in fact sanctioned this “tactic of ensuring both full Russian participation in the war and the postwar containment of the Soviet Union, not by denying that country territory or resources, but by forcing it to exhaust itself.”[12]  Roosevelt’s Second Front Strategy (1943) endorsed Soviet suspicions that the U.S. was executing methods of containment by exhaustion[13]. That same month the Red Army began constructing defensive installations in Central Europe.”[14]

2) Dissatisfaction with previous methods of Roosevelt’s ‘openhanded’[15] diplomacy made strategies of Containment a natural alternative:  “Whatever Roosevelt’s intentions were for after the war, dissatisfaction with the strategy he was following during it had become widespread within the government by the end of 1944.”[16]  In 1944, officials such as W. Averell Harriman[17] and General John Deane[18] became doubtful about Roosevelt’s strategy of unconditional aid, voicing strong and influential reservations about Roosevelt’s open-handedness[19]: “Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication that the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved.”[20]

3) American resentment towards the Soviet Union had already taken root in American politics before the Long Telegram was written:  “American military chiefs and Lend-Lease administrators resented the Russians’ increasingly importunate demands on their limited resources, made with little understanding of supply problems or logistics, and with infrequent expressions of gratitude.” [21]

4) Incompatible ideologies and competition for political hegemony made policies of Containment inescapable:  As early as 1925, Stalin stated that a “conflict of interests are growing…collision is becoming inevitable”[22]  In 1925, Stalin expressed his fears that already the “Capitalist states are making preparations…for a hostile encirclement of our Union” describing these “methods of encirclement” as a “system of military conferences, agreements and support for the measures taken by governments against the USSR”[23], strategies, that, inexorably reflect the rudiments of Containment.

5) Truman’s inauguration in 1945 marked an unmistakable change in American-Soviet relations[24], which followed a political course comparable to that expressed in the Long Telegram a year later:  “F.D.R.’s death cleared the way for a revision of strategy he himself would probably have executed in time…” [25]  “Truman harboured a skepticism toward all totalitarian states: ideology, he thought, whether communist or fascist, was simply an excuse for dictatorial rule.” [26]  Truman’s administration believed it possessed leverage over the Russians in several aspects. W. Harriman stressed, in 1945, the “importance of postwar reconstruction, which the United States would be able to control…”[27]

6) The power-play had already begun before World War II had even ended. The dropping of the atomic bomb was the first act of Containment [28]:  “…the ultimate sanction of the atomic bomb: Byrnes…believed that the simple presence of this awesome weapon in the American arsenal would make the Russians more manageable than in the past…”[29]  Henry Stimson expresses his uncertainty that the bombs were necessary: “Japan had no allies; its navy was almost destroyed; its islands were under a naval blockade; and its cities were undergoing concentrated air attacks.”[30]  P.M.S. Blankett[31] reasoned in July 1945 that “the dropping of the atomic bomb was not so much the lst military act of World War II, but the first act of the cold diplomatic war now in progress[32].  Blankett attributes Truman’s initiation of the Cold War to his desire to gain a decisive power advantage over the Soviet Union[33], which was a manifestation of the principles of Machtpolitik[34].

Word Count: 746

C: Evaluation of Sources

Kennan, George F. "The Long Telegram." Letter to President Truman. 22 Feb. 1946. George Kennan's Long Telegram.

The purpose of the Long Telegram was initially a private report to be shared only with immediately influential government officials [35]. The legitimacy of the document is therefore not tainted by aims to inspire mass crowds or evoke nationalism among US populations.  Limitations of the source lie in Kennan’s ambiguous portrayal of his verdicts[36]. Though Kennan was the architect of containment, he was also its biggest contender, claiming to have been misunderstood[37]. This draws attention to the limitations of the Way of Knowing; Language. Kennan enunciates the importance of preventing the spread of “world communism,” that bears resemblance to a “malignant parasite, which feeds only on diseased tissue”. [38] The use of emotional language suggests not only partisanship but also racism, thus undermining its value.  Having lived in Russia for 7 years, Kennan became known as a “professionally trained Russian expert” [39], making him a valuable interpreter of Russian cultural paradigms and political stratagem, however his judgments hardly compare to those of a Russian native. Kennan’s American origin and western perspective may have affected his analysis of Russian society and political aims as well as swayed his judgments on America’s necessary course of action.

 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.  John Lewis Gaddis, widely acclaimed as the preeminent American historian of our time[40], has published over 10 esteemed books about the Cold War, and has been awarded numerous prizes for his work. Howard Lentner articulates that Gaddis “employs new findings and admirably addresses these matters in this excellent narrative and analysis of the early Cold War”[41], providing a critical analysis of Kennan's original strategy of containment[42]. Published in 1982, Gaddis’ work is merited with the benefit of hindsight on the initial period of the Cold War in question. Born in 1941, Gaddis’ life spanned the entirety of the Cold War, giving value to his first hand insights and argumentation. On the other hand, this same line of reasoning may be reversed to contend Gaddis’ objectivity. If Gaddis experienced Soviet-American hostility first hand, his outlook may have been swayed by his emotional involvement in the issue[43]. Having been born in Texas, and pursued his career in the United States, Gaddis’ perspective is criticized to represent a foremost American centric account of the Cold War[44].

Word count: 372

D: Analysis

Kennan’s Long Telegram intelligibly reflects American policies of containing Soviet and communist expansion from 1946-49, through means of indirect force. A focal point of the document was to combat Soviet advancement through nourishing internal economic and political circumstances. The United States did so through the Federal Employee Loyalty Program (1947), prosecuting 11 leaders of the Communist Party by 1949[45]. Soviet influence in Europe was restrained through the Morgenthau Plan (1946) and the Marshall Plan (1947)[46]. The formation of NATO[47] (1949) provided security against potential Soviet aggression[48]. Though the parallel between Kennan’s Telegram and American foreign policies is undeniable, the question of whether the document provided the scaffolding whereupon Containment strategy was built is debatable because such conventions were seemingly already in progress.  
Contestably, the veer in policy from isolationist to interventionist may be attributed to Truman’s inauguration in April 1945[49]. This shift in power marked a correspondent shift in American-Soviet diplomacy, which now, fell under the ideals of a president whose anti-communist beliefs were far more extreme than Roosevelt’s[50]. Truman’s objectives were East-European concessions from Russia with America’s economic supremacy and atomic monopoly[51]. With this change in leadership it is contentious that Kennan can assume responsibility for shaping American conduct towards the USSR.  
Strategies of Containment are also observable as early as 1941 during Roosevelt’s incumbency. Though Roosevelt’s jurisdiction is distinguished as conciliatory towards the U.S.S.R.[52], dissatisfaction with such methods enforced strategies of Containment to be carried out during World War II. Though Kennan’s pronouncement was as late as 1947, Gaddis argues the problem of containing Russia “hung like a sword of Damocles over the entire war effort, particularly since Roosevelt could ill afford to antagonize the Russians too deeply”[53].  It can also be suggested that opposing ideologies and a mutual however competitive desire for global ideological, political and economic hegemony made peacefully coexistence impossible[54]. Historian Peter Kallaway argues that conflict was guaranteed since Lenin’s April Thesis in 1917[55], which expressed that the social revolution would be no isolated national event[56], posing an imminent threat to the United States and its political dominion that needed to be suppressed.[57] This argument attributes responsibility for the emergence of interventionist policies to the defeat of the common German enemy that enabled the countries to engage in confrontation.[58]  Post-Revisionist historians and international-relations theorists put primary emphasis on the role of geopolitics, the structure of the international system that influenced American foreign policy[59]. Similarly, the Corporatists argumentation stresses the importance of sectoral economic divisions to justify American endeavors to reshape the global economic and political order.[60] Gaddis comparably argues that policies of Containment perhaps did not emerge as a consequence of Kennan’s suggestions or any other document, but were simply "a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of World War II”[61], thus accrediting responsibility for shaping policies of Containment not to the Kennan, but to the historical and political constructs of the time.

Word count: 493

Conclusion:

Though the Long Telegram indicates direct correlation with American-Soviet relations, it is questionable whether the document truly shaped policies or simply verbalized what was already established. Expressing the anti-communist sentiment and strategic plans that had already accumulated and clearly taken foothold in American society and politics, Kennan’s telegram appeared too late to be considered the consequential determinant that shaped foreign political relations. With Truman’s election and former unsympathetic relations between the United States and the USSR that date back to as early as 1917, there are too many variables that discredit the extent of influence Kennan’s propagations had on the American course of action.

Therefore, this investigation will conclude, that the Long Telegram cannot be accredited as the sole catalyst of a shift in foreign policy, however is nevertheless a valuable source in reflecting the American-Soviet relationship of the time. Kennan’s Long Telegram was a significant document in the development of the Cold War, providing a rationale for the course upon which the Truman administration had already embarked.

Word count: 168

Works Cited:

Federal Archives:

Kennan, George F.,  National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709.

Books:

Asgarov, Asgar. Reporting from the Frontlines of the First Cold War: American Diplomatic Despatches about the Internal Conditions in the Soviet Union, 1917-1933. Saarbrücken: Lap Lambert Academic, 2010. Print.

Blackett, P. M. S. Fear, War, and the Bomb Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book, 1949. Print.

Cox, Michael, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicolas Bouchet. US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

Frazier, Robert. "3 Frazier Kennan, “ Universa L Ism, ” an D T H E T Ruman Doctrine Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine." MIT Press Journals, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2016. .

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.

Goodall, Alex. Loyalty and Liberty: American Countersubversion from World War I to the McCarthy Era. N.p.: U of Illinois, 2013. Print.

Howard H. Lentner. Review of Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. H-Teachpol, H-Net Reviews. February, 1998.s

Jacobson, Jon. When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics. Berkeley: U of California, 1994. Print.

Kallaway, Peter, and Jean Bottaro. History Alive, Standard 10. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter, 1988. Print.

Kennan, George F. "The Long Telegram." Letter to President Truman. 22 Feb. 1946. George Kennan's Long Telegram.

Larson, Deborah Welch. "Origins of Containment." : Deborah Welch Larson : 9780691023038. Princeton University Press, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2016. .

McCauley, Martin. The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949. London: Longman, 1995. Print.

Mitchell, Franklin D. Harry S. Truman and the News Media: Contentious Relations, Belated Respect. Columbia: U of Missouri, 1998. Print.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Liberal Theories of World Politics." (2010): n. pag. Princeton University. Web. 

Müller, Jan-Werner. Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the past. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print.

Statler, Kathryn. H-Diplo Article Review: Statler on Jervis, JCWS 8.4 (Fall 2006) (n.d.): n. pag. “Contai Nment Strategies in Perspective ”. Journal of Cold War Studies , 8:4 (Fall 2006): 92 - 97. University of San Diego, 03 Feb. 2007. Web. 21 Mar. 2016.

Wainstock, Dennis. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. New York: Enigma, 2011. Print.

Websites:

                        "Kennan and Containment, 1947 - 1945–1952 - Milestones - Office of the Historian." Kennan and Containment, 1947 - 1945–1952 - Milestones - Office of the Historian. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2016. .

            "Merriam Webster Dictionary." Definition of Machtpolitik. N.p., n.d. Web. .

                        "Revelations from the Russian ArchivesThe Soviet Union and the United States." The Soviet Union and the United States. Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2016. .

                        "Strategies of Containment." Oxford University Press, 2013. Web. .

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Footnotes:   [1] Gaddis, 21  [2] For the purpose of this exploration “containment” shall be defined by preventative conduct that is aimed towards "restraining and confining" Soviet influence (Kennan, Part IV) and expansive tendencies (Gaddis, 67) using diplomatic and political intervention instead of direct military opposition.  [3] Web. “Strategies of Containment”  [4] Jacobson, 270  [5] Gaddis, 8  [6] Gaddis, 5  [7] Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union  [8] Gaddis, 5  [9] Gaddis, 6  [10] Gaddis, 12  [11] Truman, June 1941: ‘If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible.’” (Gaddis, 4)  [12] Gaddis, 8  [13] Gaddis, 12  [14] Gaddis, 12  [15] Gaddis, 14  [16] Gaddis, 13  [17] United States ambassador in Moscow since 1943  [18] Head of the American military mission in Moscow  [19] Gaddis, 14  [20] Gaddis, 14  [21] Gaddis, 13  [22] Jacobson, 146  [23] Jacobson, 146  [24] Mitchell, 85  [25] Gaddis, 15  [26] Gaddis, 15  [27] Gaddis 16  [28] Blankett, 2  [29] Gaddis 18  [30] Wainstock, 28  [31] British nuclear physicist  [32] Blankett, 2  [33] Larson, 6  [34] Machtpolitik: a doctrine in political theory advocating the use of power and especially of physical force by a political state in the attainment of its objectives (Web. “Merriam Webster”)  [35] Frazier, 4  [36] Frazier, 3  [37] Web. “Kennan and Containment”  [38] Kennan, Part V  [39] Asgarov, 227  [40] Howard, 23  [41] Howard, 24  [42] Web. “Strategies of Containment”  [43] Statler, 1  [44] Statler, 1  [45] Goodall, 251  [46] McCauley, 89  [47] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization  [48] McCauley, 102  [49] Mitchell, 85  [50] Cox, Lynch and Bouchet, 23  [51] Truman ended the Lend-Lease Act and adjusted Russia’s initial $6 billion loan request to $2 billion, limiting Russia’s financial power.  [52] Gaddis, 14  [53] Müller, 90  [54] Web. “Revelations from the Russian Archives”  [55] Kallaway, 177  [56] Jacobson, 14  [57] Jacobson, 262  [58] Jacobson, 262  [59] Moravcsik, 4  [60] Moravcsik, 5  [61] Gaddis, 4

To what extent did George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram shape American foreign policy during the Cold War?

This essay was awarded 23/25 IB points.

Part A: Plan of the Investigation (133)

 The purpose of this investigation is to establish the extent to which George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram played a role in shaping American foreign policy during the Cold War. It will examine the antagonism of Soviet Russia in the Department of the State, developments in foreign policy-making, and the extension of these policies from 1946-1947. This investigation will be conducted through the use of primary and secondary sources, and two sources to be evaluated include John Lewis Gaddis’s The United States and the Origins of the Cold War and George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram.              

The Long Telegram provided the conceptual framework for American foreign policy during the Cold War. Furthermore, it prompted for a policy of containment towards the USSR. The Long Telegram laid the foundation for anti-Soviet policy in the United States.

Part B: Summary of Evidence (492)

Prior to the publication of the Long Telegram, Secretary of State James Byrnes described a position of “patience with firmness” in American foreign policy.[1] Recent developments with the USSR included Josef Stalin’s speech to Moscow on February 9, which outlined the incompatibility of capitalism and communism; and conflict regarding Soviet aggression in Iran resulting from a defiance of the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal of military occupation in Azerbaijan.[2] The dispatch of the Telegram on February 22 1946 coupled with American-Soviet conflict allowed for the shift away from Byrne’s described policy.[3]  On February 20 1947, the American government was informed that aid to Greece and Turkey could no longer be provided by the British Treasury.[4]  Britain was providing aid to help suppress Kremlin-instigated insurgency in Greece and resist Soviet pressures for border realignment in Turkey.[5] On February 27, President Harry Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson addressed Congress to the importance of continued assistance to Greece and Turkey.[6] Acheson led the demonstration by describing a “polarization of power” and the need “for the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion”.[7]  Resonance by the cautionary in the Telegram was demonstrated among a number of key members in the State Department and containment was integrated into all further policy-making.[8] After prompting by Acheson, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee developed a constituency for aid programs to Europe in 1947 and established a team to conduct studies of areas in need of aid.[9] The SWNCC along with the Policy Planning Staff reported that “co-ordination of economic policy in [Soviet] occupied areas, particularly Germany and Japan, with general objectives in Europe and the Far East” was of key interest to America.[10] Programs to stimulate European production of coal were also proposed,[11] to which Kennan added that “the improvement of economic conditions and revival of productive capacity in the west of Germany be given top priority”.[12]  On March 12 1947, the Truman Doctrine was presented as the formulation of America’s response to the Greek-Turkish situation.[13] Truman declared the initiative as a moral struggle between two ways of living –“one way of life is based upon the will of the majority ...the second ...based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.” [14]  After Truman’s announcement of American intentions to support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures,” Congress allocated $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey.[15]              

Containment was extended with the Marshall Plan on June 5 1947.[16] It was a program for European economic revival, and General Marshall assured that “any government willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation by the United States”.[17] It was accepted by many nations, extending its impact to 270 000 000 people.[18] When the Eastern Bloc nations of Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted to claim Marshall aid, Stalin intervened with political and financial pressure to prevent this.[19]

Part C: Evaluation of Sources (566)

The first source to be evaluated is John Lewis Gaddis’ The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, published in 1972. Gaddis, the Professor Military and Naval History at Yale University, provides in his book an analysis on the steps leading to the Cold War for an academic audience. His preface states that “if there is a single theme which runs through this book, it is the narrow range of alternatives open to American leaders during this period”.[20] Therefore, Gaddis asserts in his thesis that conflicting attempts at peace by the United States and the Soviets led to the Cold War.[21]  Gaddis is effective in his portrayal of the events from the period as they appeared to the policy-makers of the time. He states in his preface that “I have not hesitated to express judgements critical of American policy-makers, but in doing so have tried to keep in mind the constraints, both external and internal, which limited their options”.[22] Gaddis’ consideration of various influencing factors provides the reader with a number of perspectives for a single event, and thus a better understanding of situations.  Gaddis provides an extensive collection of sources in the bibliography of this book. It encompasses works from notable historians and the archives of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, government records such as the State Department’s Documents on American Foreign Relations, and other such credible sources.  A limitation of this book presented by Timothy J. White is that “by focusing on the role of personality, misperception, and bureaucratic decision-making, Gaddis failed to emphasize the fundamentally diverging interests of the Soviets and Americans after the war.”[23] White asserts that Gaddis’ presentation of facts inaccurately imply to a reader that improved diplomacy may have prevented the Cold War.[24]  

George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram, the second source to be evaluated, was sent to Washington from Moscow on February 22 1946. Since its dispatch, Kennan elevated in power in the State Department and was named “the father of containment”.[25]  The Telegram was sent for the purpose of providing an answer to the Soviet problem to a specific audience -President Truman and the State Department. His thesis states that “the USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”.[26]  The Long Telegram is a primary document of vital importance to the Cold War, and its usefulness as a source rests in its effect on policy-making in the period. Though detailed justification to this assertion is provided in the body of the investigation, another example would be the impression it left on Navy Secretary James Forrestal. Forrestal made the Telegram a required reading among high-ranking officials in the Naval War College in Washington.[27]  Kennan clearly outlines the intellectual motivation for adopting containment in American foreign policy. He gives insight to abstract concepts to ensure the readers’ understanding of the doctrine. This is seen in his analysis that Soviet views on global affairs are “not based on any analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders ...it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war”.[28]  Wilson D. Miscamble writes that Kennan was “more of an analyst and theoretician than his fellow diplomats”. [29]  Kennan therefore provides a lack of factual support or context beyond assertions such as “at bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is ...instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”.[30]

 Part D: Analysis (716) 
 By 1946, Soviet aggression became apparent. Secretary Byrnes believed he had secured Soviet agreements for self-determination and revival of the world economy with his recent activity in foreign conferences, but Soviet conduct suggested nothing of this.[31] Stalin’s speech dispelled notions of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism in the post-war world, for the Soviets had readopted tactics of promoting worldwide revolution and the ideological expansion of communism. At the same time, Soviets attempted to assume spheres of influence over areas such as Iran. Kennan asserted in the Telegram that the root of Soviet conduct lay deep within the foundation of the Soviet system, and no concessions from the outside world, including the United States, could effectively resolve conflicts with Russia.[32] The publication of the Telegram reinforced that appeasement of Stalin was futile, and that the Soviets would have to be approached from a position of strength.  From this, containment would become policy.   With the end of British economic aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman and his administration agreed that assistance should be provided to these nations.[33] They feared that the Marxist insurgency would overtake Athens as it had in the Balkans if aid was not forthcoming.[34] Also, if the USSR recovered from its post-war condition, its militarization would cause a subdued Greek government to forfeit its mainland for the creation of a Soviet military base.[35] A collapse of Greece would disparage morale of the neighbouring non-Marxist nation, Turkey. The fall of Turkey and Greece would be felt throughout Europe and the Middle East, specifically in Iran, Iraq, and Palestine, and communism would assume a domino effect over the area.[36] America intervention in the affairs of nations beyond inter-American borders was unprecedented during times of peace. The policy of containment outlined in the Long Telegram allowed for an appropriate means of initiating peacetime intervention.  Since the economic fall of Britain, a vacuum of power was left behind in Europe.[37] Acheson related to Congress the fear that Stalin would assume position over this vacuum if a stronger force did not intervene for the containment of communist expansion. Assistance to Greece and Turkey would mark America’s acceptance of the historic British responsibility of protecting Europe from Soviet aggression.[38]                
Reports by the SWNCC and PPS reinforced the idea that communism thrived in areas of instability and despair, and thus initiatives were directed towards programs of economic relief. Kennan outlined in the Telegram that Soviet intentions included the “exploiting of …conflicts between capitalist powers,” therefore economic restoration was integral to the unification of non-Marxists states.[39] Urgency was put to areas under direct Soviet influence and particularly to Germany, since German coal mines offered promise for the industrialization and economic revival of the area.               
 The Truman Doctrine defined American intentions to provide political, economic, and military support for the defence of anti-Communist governments under a firm policy of containment.[40] In his speech, Truman assumed the traditional American integration of principle with cause, and adopted the message behind Kennan’s Telegram to present the Greek-Turkish situation as a struggle between democracy and despotism.[41] This solidified American commitment to communist suppression by morally tying America to the issue, and therefore left Stalin no room for reciprocal concessions with the United States.                 
The Marshall Plan committed the United States to the task of alleviating the social and economic instability that bred communism for all areas that were in need of aid. Kennan stated that “it should be a cardinal point of our policy to see to it that elements of independent power are developed on the Eurasian land mass as rapidly as possible to create a multi-polar international order.”[42] The Marshall Plan effectively divided Europe between East, under the Soviet Union, and West, under the leadership of the United States, while unifying anti-communist governments and raising morale of the public.[43] This allowed for the rejection of authoritarian influences and the successful containment of communism. The Plan intended to cut links between the Soviets and its satellite states by elevating them towards economic independence.[44] This would deprive the USSR of manpower, natural resources, and ability in agricultural and industrial production. The Marshall Plan was also successful in demonstrating Soviets aggression; Stalin’s rejection to American offers of aid directed much of the blame for the partition of Europe towards the USSR.[45] Containment was effective in the Marshall Plan. 


Part E: Conclusion (93)
The extent to which Kennan’s Long Telegram shaped foreign policy was demonstrated by its provision of intellectual justification for a program of containment, and extended with the accommodation of this program in the American government.  The Long Telegram played an integral role in transforming American foreign policy during the Cold War. For these reasons, the Long Telegram acted as the blueprint for American conduct –with Kennan its architect, in a generation of global affairs. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, “the world must be made safe for democracy”.[46] Kennan’s containment provided this security.  

Part F: Bibliography

Footnotes: [1] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 284.  [2] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 310.  [3] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 114.  [4] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 83.  [5] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.  [6] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.  [7] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.  [8] Frederick F. Travis, George F. Kennan and the American-Russian Relationship: 1865-1942. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990). 18.  [9] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.  [10] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.  [11] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.  [12] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 89.  [13] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 79.  [14] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 118.  [15] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.  [16] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 119.  [17] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 119.  [18] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 92.  [19] Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Marshall Plan: lessons learned for the 21st century. (France: OECD Publishing, 2008). 47.  [20] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). vii.  [21] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.  [22] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). vii.  [23] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.  [24] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.  [25] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 85.  [26] “The Long Telegram,” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries  [27] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 298.  [28] “The Long Telegram” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries  [29] Wilson D. Miscamble, Kennan Through His Texts. (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 305.  [30] “The Long Telegram” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries  [31] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 283.  [32] “The Long Telegram,” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries  [33] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.  [34] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.  [35] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.  [36] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.  [37] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 298.  [38] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 116.  [39] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 89.  [40] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 86.  [41] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.  [42] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.  [43] Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Marshall Plan: lessons learned for the 21st century. (France: OECD Publishing, 2008). 47.  [44] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.  [45] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.  [46] Amos Perlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracy: A century of Wilsonianism. (New York: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 19.

How can our understanding of the origins of the Cold War be aided by a study of different schools of thought on its origins?

A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
i Subject of the investigation:
How can our understanding of the origins of the Cold War be aided by a study of different schools of thought on its origins?
ii Methods:
a. Research for bibliography about the origins of the Cold War. Instrument: Internet. Three main sites were particularly helpful: CNN the Cold War, Cold War Policies, Cold War History Project. The main criteria used for selection were: reliability of the sources and how recently they were written/updated.
b. Writing of an annotated bibliography about the topic.
c. Selection and reading of a book about the origins of the Cold War. Criteria: the most comprehensive and recommended.
d. Search, selection and reading of the authors which represent the main schools of thought.
e. Analysis of their main arguments.

B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
The origins of the Cold War is one of the most controversial historiographical issues. However, among the multiple interpretations and assessments about the topic it is clear or rather clear that some main schools of thought can be identified: the orthodox or traditional, the revisionist and the post-revisionist. The orthodox or traditional interpretation argued that the origins of the Cold War were due to the aggressive Soviet policy of expansion in the immediate post-war years. Two of the proponents of this theory are: Thomas Bailey (1950) and Arthur Schlesinger (1967). Willaim Appleman Williams (1959) and Walter LaFeber (1997) are revisionist historians who support the thesis that the United States had been primarily to blame for the Cold War. Post-revisionist scholarship has searched for a balance and argued that the Cold War was caused by misperceptions of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler (1991) and John Lewis Gaddis (1997) are exponents of this view.1

 C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Two of the sources selected for evaluation are Walter LaFeber’s America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1996 and John Lewis Gaddis’s We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History. Both of them are secondary sources and make use of the latest research about the Cold War and, particularly, the new Soviet and Chinese materials which have only recently become available. Both have long been recognized, by the public and colleagues, as specialists in Cold War history and their work and information are used almost in all the works about the topic. Both are representatives of two main schools of thought about the Cold War. LaFeber is, and has been, one of the most articulate proponents of the revisionist approach, while Gaddis is accepted as one of the most, if not the most, distinguished historian of the post-revisionist perspective. Both LaFeber’s and Gaddis’s works are their most recent productions: LaFeber’s is its 8th edition, the first was in 1967. Gaddis’s is from 1997, although he has written numerous books and articles about the Cold War. Both are American historians who have been dedicated to the academic life and scholarly pursuits. LaFeber is Professor of History at Cornell University, while Gaddis is Professor of History at Yale University. Their works are addressed to both their colleagues and students. LaFeber’s views are considered as a representative of the “New Left” while Gaddis has been perceived as of more mainstream or conservative bent. Both authors’ ideological inclinations and approaches, however, are not new and had been portrayed in their previous works. What has emerged from the analysis of new archival materials is a better knowledge of Soviet and Chinese policies which previously had been unavailable to Western historians. Although their approaches might present some limitations in terms of the perspective they present, their value for understanding some historiographic arguments is undeniable.
 
D Analysis (5 marks)
The study of different schools of thought about the Cold War provides an interesting perspective not only about the conflict itself but also about the ideas and developments of the United States at the time. Thus, the “New Left” and the revisionist school emerged in the 1960s largely in reaction to the Vietnam War and its arguments affected much of the US historiography and academic life until the early 1980s. The new thinking reflected the findings of the opening of the American archives covering the 1940s. It also mirrored disillusionment with Johnson’s justification of the Vietnam War which seemed rather similar to Truman’s use of communist fear in his appeal for aid to Greece and Turkey.2 The revisionist school analyses the economic and domestic forces conditioning American foreign policy, and critically examines claims of American goodwill in the world. In LaFeber’s view, American officials were afraid of a recurrence of the Great Depression of the 1930s. They believed that American prosperity and the survival of capitalism depended upon the creation of an international economic system that would secure and guarantee the principle of the “open door”.3 This aim clashed with Stalin’s security considerations. His desire for protection provided by buffer states resulted in the formation of a Soviet “closed” sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The Truman administration sought to keep the region open by exerting diplomatic and economic pressures. These were the conflicts and contradictions that the US faced. That neither Roosevelt or Truman was able to resolve them “was a major cause of the Cold War.”4
Furthermore, as the US government opposed the Soviet sphere of interest in Europe, it continued to strengthen its own sphere of influence in Europe, England and France, through economic loans in exchange for favourable market conditions for the US, and in Latin America through hemispheric organizations and agreements that secured “collective self-defence” in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. The Americans “thought that they had obtained the best of the two worlds: exclusive American power in the New and the right to exert American power in the Old”.5 Thus, American expansionism compelled Stalin to consolidate his control over Eastern Europe and was therefore responsible for the Cold War.
Opposing the orthodox argument that the United States had no chance to avoid a cold war since it was dealing with Stalin who was described as “paranoid” and “mentally ill”, LaFeber sees Stalin’s policies as realistic and pragmatic. “That interpretation neatly avoids confronting the complex cause of the Cold War but is wholly insufficient to explain these causes.”6
Interestingly enough in the 1990s this argument is also part of the post-revisionist explanation of the origins of the Cold War. The post- revisionist school appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s and reflected the “New Right” ideas of the time: the demise of liberalism and collapse of the Soviet Union.7 Gaddis claims that recent works based on newly opened archives in former Communist nations have proven that Soviet aggression, conditioned by Stalin’s personality and Russian authoritarianism, made the Cold War inevitable and compromise impossible.8,9 Gaddis essentially accepts US European policy while separating it from US Third World policies. He accepts some US responsibility for the Cold War and is critical of US intervention in the developing nations, for example, yet finds the Soviet threat in Europe and Japan credible.10
Gaddis’s work suggests insights taken from psychological decision- making and literature in political science. There is also some emphasis on consistent “misperception” of political power realities for all concerned. Unintentionally or not, Gaddis revives some of the arguments which made the orthodox school valid. And for the time being his views are the virtual canon among many in the field.
 
E Conclusion (2 marks)
The study of the historiography of the Cold War is a very rewarding exercise for the understanding of the conflict. The Cold War may or may not be over but it is undeniable that it is one of the most significant episodes of the twentieth century. It affected and physically and psychologically transformed the world in which we live today. To analyse the different theories and schools helps us get closer to the truth—a rather elusive quest that seems to be neglected in the pursuit of historical knowledge and education. History might be an instrument used to promote conformist attitudes and acceptance of one particular or “official” view. Controversy allows us to see different angles of the same episode and enhance our knowledge about it. It is also interesting to see how historians who doubted the reliability of any Soviet or Chinese sources now accept them as true and reliable. Thus controversy provides us with insights about the times in which we live, its ideas and perceptions.
The revisionist school offers a view of a generation very critical of the US policies and the effects of its economic expansionism. But the point is that they experienced and saw first hand the effects of the Vietnam War both nationally and internationally. It is quite possible that their approach toward Stalin and Communism might be somehow distorted by their views. But it is also true that in the case of LaFeber his scholarship is superb and supported by a myriad of reliable sources and facts in his assessment of Stalin’s foreign policy. The main issue is that this school is out of “fashion”.
The post-revisionist approach, it is true, allows other options and seeks to strike a “balance” of responsibility. However, it does not emphasize economic issues and tends to return to the traditional assessment of Stalin and Communism. Again, it is a reflection of our times: the Soviet Union collapsed, the West won. The question is: do we really know now?
 
F List of sources (2 marks)
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1997. We Now Know. Oxford. Clarendon Press. McCauley, Martin. 1995. The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949.
(2nd ed.). London. Longman.
LaFeber, Walter. 1997. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–
1996. (8th ed.). New York. The Mcgraw-Hill Companies Inc. Smith, Joseph. 1998. The Cold War, 1945–1991. (2nd ed.).
London. Blackwell Publishers.

To what extent was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 a result of the AVO’S violent regime in Hungary? 

This investigation aims to cover the events leading up to and after the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and to see whether or not the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police) were responsible for the swift break out of protesting that occurred among Hungarian workers, students and normal citizens. The main body of the essay describes and gives evidence of the AVO’S actions towards the Hungarian people and why they were such an influential force in pushing the people towards revolution. The essay will also show direct accounts of normal Hungarian people and important national figures that were victims of the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police). A brief history of the AVO will be presented, so as the reader can see for themselves why the Hungarian people revolted and lived in constant fear of the AVO. The two main sources, George Paloczi-Horvath’s account of his arrest by the Hungarian Secret police, published in the Daily Herald (11th December 1956) and Peter Fryer, Hungarian Tragedy (1956) will be both assessed in terms of their value, origins and purpose.
 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

When Hungary was among the defeated countries after the Second World War (1945), the USSR in their words liberated the country and introduced their form of Stalinism to Hungary and other Eastern European countries. Unfortunately this so-called liberation was the complete opposite of freedom. Now Hungary was a puppet regime of the strong Soviet Union and the people were then subjected to no rights, no freedom of speech and constant food shortages. The oppression, which had been supervised by the communist Soviet Union-in the defeated and occupied Hungary-was one of the most cruel and dreadful 50 years of coercion in Hungarian History. The communist regime had trampled underfoot all the human and constitutional rights of the once democratic Hungary. Russia and its communist ideology were feared by most of the European nations, but not all the countries enjoyed distinctive attention. To realize the attention towards Hungary, The Russians started to emerge into Hungary’s life and political system from several sides; one side was of the development of the AVO (Allamvedelmi Osztaly).
The AVO, later named the AVH was founded in 1945. The AVO was organized in accordance with Soviet principles back home. Each satellite country must have a secret police in order to maintain the works of Soviet Communism. From the very beginning of power the AVO succeeded in turning the once democratic Hungary into a strict Communist regime controlled between the Government’s of Moscow and Hungary. As Endre Martin an honest witness of all these events said, “The AVH was organized in accordance with the Soviet Pattern”. To ensure complete power within Hungary, The communist party along with the Hungarian Secret Police prepared it’s plan in detail: “ The essential tasks of the new political system became the eradication of dissent and the mobilization of mass support. To promote these goals they developed an exceedingly high regulative capability which rested in the first instance on the secret police”(Vali 180). The AVO had their own cause completely supported and had detailed records of every citizen and highly effective ways of interrogating and torturing victims and prisoners. All of these aspects caused deep fear and resentment towards the AVO.
Under Stalin, Hungary became a Soviet Satellite against the will of the majority. Those who openly objected were either jailed or subjected to torture under the AVO. In many cases the families of those brave enough to voice their own opinions were also dragged into this mess of Soviet Solutions. It is in this way that the AVO ruled over the people with an iron fist and the people had no choice but to surrender to Soviet Rule.
Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who had bravely opposed the German Nazi’s and the Hungarian Fascist’s in World War II was arrested by the AVO in December 1948 and was falsely accused of treason. After 5 weeks of brutal torture by the AVO he confessed to the charges put against him and was condemned to life imprisonment. The protest churches were also purged and their leaders were replaced by those remaining to stay loyal to Rakosi’s government.
Most people who entered the AVO were social outcasts or rejects of society. They had few friends and often-felt hate towards the rest of the population. The communist officials would know who these certain people were, seek them out; force them to be candidates to the AVO and them train them to be members of the AVO. After the training, these people eventually became the most brutal of interrogators and torturers.
Often, if you were taken as a prisoner by the AVO, you would be brought into a room with several other prisoners and made to stand in front of a line of AVO guards. The guards then proceeded asking each prisoner which metal pole they would like to be beaten with today. The guards would beat them until completely exhausted and then through the bodies in a bath of acid. In some cases the prisoners would still be conscious upon being thrown into the bath of an acid.
With 30,000 members forming the AVO organization, it is not hard to see why the Hungarian people lived in constant fear of these people. If anyone were even suspected of saying anything against the government they would be tortured until they confessed and then killed.
 
EVALUATION OF THE SOURCES 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect was published in 1977 and was written by Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, who both lived and worked in Hungary for quite a few years. They’re knowledge of Hungarian history is very extensive and the fact that this book was written nearly 20 years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 makes this quite a reliable source. The fact that since 1956 new findings about the Hungarian revolution have come out so therefore they’re knowledge of this event would be more extensive than a book that was written say the year or the year after this event took place. The purpose of this book is to give a detailed account of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect. The book covers certain areas of the Hungarian people’s struggle for freedom and outlines areas such as intellectual aspects of the Hungarian revolution, economic aspects of the Hungarian revolution, political aspects of the Hungarian Revolution, international aspects of the Hungarian revolution and military aspects of the Hungarian revolution. These aspects show how the Hungarian people were deprived of their freedom in many areas and the AVO are specifically talked about in connection with most of these aspects. Bela K. Kiraly, P.H.d, is professor of history, Brooklyn College and Graduate school, City university of New York. In 1956 with the rank of major general, he was commander in chief, national Guard of Hungary; commandant of Budapest; and chairman revolutionary Council of national defence. Paul Jonas, PhD, is professor of economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. The two joint authors positions make them a very valuable source because of their experience with Hungarian affairs and the actual time they worked in Hungary is very influential as the time coincides with the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution.
The Hungarian Secret Police arrested George Paloczi-Horvath in 1949. He wrote about his experiences in the daily herald on 11th of December 1956. His source is very valuable because it gives an eyewitness account into the atrocities committed by the AVO and reading it from someone who was arrested and tortured by the AVO gives the source no limitations what so ever. The fact that this account was published in 1956 directly after the revolution gives the observer a clearer idea as to why the AVO were the ones most responsible for making the Hungarian people’s life a living hell. He gives eyewitness accounts of how he was tortured by the AVO and forced to own up to a crime that he never committed. Like thousands of innocent Hungarian’s, he was a helpless victim of the AVO and their torture chambers.
The Hungarian Tragedy by Peter Fryer was published in December of 1956 and gives a detailed account of the events that happened throughout the Hungarian Revolution. This source is very reliable as it was written by a noted expert on Hungarian affairs and was also published only a short while after the revolution took place. The book is very detailed and has eyewitness accounts of events that the author had witnessed while in Hungary. The fact that the author was in Hungary make the events more clear to the reader because they have not been filtered over and over and had the actual events inaccurately published.
 
ANALYSIS
One of the difficulties about analyzing the events of the Hungarian revolution, or in this case the
AVO’S role in instigating the speed of which the revolution broke out is that there are many sources available, but difficulty in finding which one is reliable or not to the reader. Some sources have been published by Hungarian writers who give their accounts of what happened and some by western writers who witnessed all these events on a television screen in the comfort of their own home. There is a chance that some works published by Hungarians could contain bias nature because of the Hungarian people’s loathing for the Soviet Government and the AVO (Hungarian secret police). Sources published in Hungary may also be subject to censorship or falsification as the government keep a watchful eye on what is being published in a hard line communist country such as Hungary.
There is definite evidence to support the argument that the AVO was most responsible for the Hungarian’s revolting when they did. Had they’re been no Secret Police the people would still have been living under a communist government but what not have to fear opening their mouths or getting falsely convicted of a crime they did not commit. George Paloczi-Horvath states in his article about the AVO published in the Daily Herald that “ Like many others, I was arrested by the AVO in 1949” “ I believed that we would be able to assert our innocence. But I soon found out that our fate was worse than if we had been found guilty, because we had nothing to give away in the torture chambers. I was thrown into an icy cell cubicle 3 yards by four. There was a wooden plank for a bed, and a bright naked light glared in my face day and night. Later, it was a great relief to return to this bleak place” This is evidence of the Hungarians hatred towards the AVO. They would show up unexpectedly at people’s houses and take who ever they thought may be guilty. The person/person’s captured would be tortured both physically and mentally until they confessed to crimes they never committed. The reason the Hungarian people needed to revolt against the government was that they were living each day petrified of what might happen to them or their family and this aspect I believe, left them no choice but to revolt in 1956.

CONCLUSION
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was to a very large extent a direct result of the AVO’S actions towards their own citizens. If a person wakes up every day wondering when their time will come for arrest and torture it will destroy the human mind more so than having little food or no proper shelter to live in. A person’s greatest fear is that of death and more so of a painful death, which the AVO were most notorious for. This organization killed people every day and no trouble with it, so in this case the Hungarians were victims of their tyranny upon a nation. It is this compelling fear of the AVO that I believe so swiftly instigated the revolt against the Hungarian Government and the AVO.

When the Soviet Union dominated Eastern Europe during the 1940s, many countries, including Hungary, were plundered for resources and their economies geared toward the benefit of the USSR. Because of this, the people of Hungary had long been dissatisfied with Russian despotism. An attempted revolution occurred in 1956 with a loss of around 27,000 lives. Although the role of the USSR is was significant in initiating the events in Hungary, and thus causing the consequential deaths and destruction, it can be argued that the West was actually responsible for what took place in Hungary. Through negligence, broken promises, and refusal of assistance, the situation in Hungary worsened and revolution was unsuccessful. Hungary could only be freed from the tyranny of the USSR over thirty years later.
At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the West gave power over Hungary to the USSR, the first instance where the West predetermined Hungary¡¯'s fate. During the 1940s and 1950s, US foreign policy had hardened, introducing policies of containment and later rollback to control the stop spread of communism. The year that Hungary had fallen to Soviet control, 1947, was the same year that the Truman Doctrine was announced. US president Harry Truman said, ¡°"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¡± Yet the US had done nothing to stop the USSR's takeover of Eastern Europe. It seemed that the Truman Doctrine, containment, and Iron Fist approach were all meaningless terms. The US said they would bear the responsibility of keeping free nations from turning communist, but they did not keep to their word.
In Hungary, a number of reasons contributed to the uprising in 1956. One reason was the Hungarians thought the West or UN would be able to assist them in the revolution. Such a presumption is not unjustified, for the Truman Doctrine had stated that it was the duty of the US to help countries against attack of communism. Hungary had been incorporating capitalist ideas - in 1956 the new government had introduced democracy and freedoms (freedom of speech and freedom of religion). It is understandable that they would expect assistance from the largest, wealthiest capitalist country in the world, the US. Yet the US again ignored the Truman Doctrine and did not go in to help Hungary when revolution broke out. Without support the West had promised, Hungary seemed to stand alone to face the USSR.
When the Soviet Red Army entered Hungary, Imre Nagy appealed to the West for help - but the West again refused. Eisenhower didn¡¯'t think Hungary was worth starting a possible world war. In addition, Great Britain and France were preoccupied with the Suez Crisis. A website remarks: "The world was too busy with the Suez Canal Crisis to care much. Oil was apparently regarded as much more valuable than the blood of thousands of Hungarian youths. What is the price of a young life compared to the market value of gasoline?" Hungary's only other hope, the United Nations, was rendered useless since both China and the USSR vetoed any suggestion for action.
The factors above prove that the West played a significant role in determining the fate of Hungary. Hungary was given to the USSR at Yalta; nothing was done when the USSR took over the country by using salami tactics from 1945-1947; and the West refused to aid Hungary in revolution against Soviet domination in 1947. Thus, it can be argued that the West was more responsible for the events that occurred in Hungary, leading to death and suffering and marking Hungary's fate for years to come.



Why did the coup d’état on Mohammad Mossadegh on the 19th of August 1953 succeed?

2014 IBDP Extended Essay for History

Abstract
To answer the question “Why did the coup d’état on Mohammad Mossadegh on the 19th of August 1953 succeed?” research was conducted in sources ranging from subject specific books, dissertations and newly released CIA documents on the coup are discussed. These sources range in the nationalities of their authors and in their times written to provide a more global and holistic view as well as hindsight in comparison to sentiment in the moment. A brief summary of the background of the coup d’état, the leaders and countries involved and the events of the coup d’état on the 15th of August and again on the 19th of August provide a more comprehensive setting for the arguments and conclusion presented in this essay. The arguments debated are the factors involved in the coup and their influence on the success/failure of the coup, these being: the National Front, the Embargo, the Tudeh and Kashani. The essay will conclude that the National Front and Embargo did not assist towards the coups success and even allowed it to fail, whilst the Tudeh’s absence and Kashani’s followers’ inclusion in the second attempt allowed the CIA’s success.
Word count: 186





Introduction
Sixty years ago today, on the 19th of August 1953 the first and only democratically elected leader Iran has had to this day was overthrown and replaced by the Shah. Instrumented by the MI6 and CIA this coup d’état has poisoned Iran’s relation with the United States since. Currently we see much hostility and distrust between the Iranians and the West in their discussions regarding nuclear power, however it is important to realize why Iranians act in the defensive way they do nowadays in regard towards world powers. To the Iranian people Mossadegh was “a beloved nationalist hero” describes Shirin Ebadi the Iranian Nobel Laureate. So substantial was this support that on the 16th of August 1953 the coup d’état was declared to have “failed” in the hands of Kermit Roosevelt the CIA operation’s leader. How is it possible that three days later on the 19th of August 1953 the coup d’état did succeed, Mossadegh was arrested and the Shah was brought back into power? Top Secret Documents released on the 60th anniversary of the coup d’état by the National Archives and Records Administration dismisses the economic sanctions on Iran as a reason for the coup d’état to succeed. In 2011 however sociologists Nepstad and Kurtz blame the same sanctions for having “made way for [the] CIA-devised coup”. In document 4 the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party was not seen as a threat to the coup d’état either whilst more recently historians such as Ambrose believed that back up from the Tudeh party might have hindered the coup. The anti-Mossadegh uprisings are even labeled as “largely spontaneous” by the historian Stephen T. Hosmer. Analyzing these and further factors will address the question “Why did the coup d’état on Mohammad Mossadegh on the 19th of August 1953 succeed?”
Word count: 622

Background to the Coup d’état
Britain and the United States
Under the rule of Mohammad Mossadegh, the Iranian parliament nationalized oil in March of 1951. This was the oil that formerly belonged to the AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, established by the Anglo-Persian agreement. The British instantaneously responded to this, putting an oil-embargo on Iran on the 22nd of August the same year, as well as stopping the export of sugar and steel from Britain to Iran. The United States however was not involved in these relations, and although Cold War tensions were rising as the Korean War had begun at the time as well, Truman maintained a friendly relationship with Iran and Mossadegh even inviting him to the White House a few times even expressing support for him through American media. At this time the United States was against the British reaction towards Mossadegh and advised them not to invade, however without Truman’s knowledge the CIA forces in Iran were already researching into the coup d’état since 1952. Once Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected, he formally yet secretly accept the MI6’s suggestion and set up TPAJAX, the Tudeh Party Ajax mission, that planned to take Mossadegh from power and bring back Reza Shah. Eisenhower argued that "rising internal tensions and continued deterioration ... might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Iran's well organized Tudeh communist party” or in other words “to prevent Iran from falling to communism”.
Word count: 255


Mohammad Mossadegh
Mohammad Mossadegh was an intriguing figure, born to close relatives of the Qajar Dynasty he was raised in the elite. He had many careers, working as a lawyer and author, as well as in administration and in the parliament. Impressively enough he was the only Iranian at the time that had received a PhD in law from a European University. Mossadegh became a member of the parliament in Isfahan at age 24, although since he had already been involved in politics as a tax auditor since he was 16. He moved to the West for short periods in protest of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 that gave Britain control of Iran’s oil splitting the profit at an 85:15 percent ratio that Stephen Kinzer argues in his book about the coup d’état “effectively reduced Iran to the status of a British protectorate”. Upon his return he occupied several different positions, ranging from: finance minister, minister of justice and foreign minister to governor of different provinces and the foundation and leadership of the National Front Organization (The National Front Organization was a coalition of political parties led by the Iran party, National Party, Toilers party and the Tehran Association of Bazaar Trade and Craft Guild). On the 28th of April 1951 he was voted in as prime minister of Iran. He won with a majority of 79-12 votes in the parliament. Not only did the parliament support him, but also the people of Iran. “Mossadegh was a man of the people,” asserts former Iranian head of education Mohammad Ali Navab, who was a 28-year-old principal of a school at the time of the coup d’état. This opinion is shared amongst the Iranian population to this day.
Word count: 307


The Central Intelligence Agency
Operation AJAX was led by Kermit Roosevelt the grandson of Theodor Roosevelt, head of the CIA’s Near East and African Division. In Hastedt’s Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: A-J it is written that Roosevelt claimed to have been approached about planning the coup d’état “as early as mid-1951”.  After having been given orders to end the coup d’état on the 16th of August 1953, Roosevelt “did not give up” and “organized a second coup”. The CIA “bought army officers, they bought intelligence…they organized rental mobs to go through the streets shouting against Mossadegh and so on, they pumped up the opposition” explains Thomas Mangold, a war correspondent, in a documentary about the 1953 coup d’état. These mobs were made up of “street thugs”, which the CIA bribed to stir up violence on behalf of the communist party and against Mossadegh “creating the false impression that Mossadegh was unpopular and inept”. Since the 1940s the CIA poured money into news agencies in Iran and the West in order to spread negative propaganda about the Tudeh Party and Mossadegh through another CIA operation named TPBEDAMN, Tudeh Party Be Damn.
Word count: 203


Executing the Coup
On the 9th of June 1953 CIA, British and Iranian collaborators assembled in Tehran to discuss the details of the plan to overthrow Mossadegh’s government. Iranian agents “including some who had formerly been in the employ of the British Secret Intelligence Service” were hired by Roosevelt to assist with the planning. General Zahedi was “handpicked” to be the predecessor of Mossadegh once this coup was to be successful, and the Shah’s “reluctant support” was ensured by Roosevelt in preparation for the coup. Donald Wilber, another CIA member, took charge of “psychological warfare” with his team to spread anti-Mossadegh mentality, whilst the “CIA Art Team” drew cartoons as a form of propaganda. Initially the coup was to be carried out on the night of the 15th of August, when Colonel Nasiri “escorted by three truckloads full of soldiers and four armored cars” presented Mossadegh with a firman, which was “a royal decree from the Shah… [that] would establish Mossadegh’s removal from the Prime Ministerial post.” They then planned “to arrest Mossadegh”, however “word leaked out to Mossadegh” and he had Colonel Nasiri arrested instead.  Except the leader of the National Front the coup planners did not manage to arrest any other major leaders working with Mossadegh, whilst Mossadegh’s forces arrested fourteen suspects and disarmed the Imperial Guard. General Zahedi went into hiding and the Shah fled to Baghdad. In the following days in Tehran “full-scale rioting broke out” and Operation TPAJAX was “called off” by CIA headquarters. The CIA hired “thugs to pose as Tudeh demonstrators and act in an incendiary manner” mixing into the crowds of pro-Mossadegh demonstrators. In response to this Mossadegh called for the removal of these violent gangs from the streets and the restoration of order such that the next day on August the 19th Mossadegh’s supporters stayed in their homes. Simultaneously “a large and rowdy crowd” of pro-Shah demonstrators filled Tehran violently protesting against Mossadegh. The army joined these groups and eventually Mossadegh and the main politicians and army officers in his support were arrested. Upon hearing this news the Shah returned from Italy and paraded through the streets; Operation Ajax was declared a victory.
Word count: 398

Factors that led to Failure
National Front
Next to the Tudeh party, the National Front party had the highest amount of affiliates in Iran as well as “a large number of unaffiliated individuals” who were in their support. Although the CIA had employed their own street fighter, they had underestimated the strength of the pro-Mossadegh opposition. The National Front whose members fought against the pro-Shah demonstrates that the CIA had installed came in masses with the support of the Tudeh “and in three days of bloodshed, forced the shah… to recall Mossadegh”. Not only this, but on the same night as this defeat the Shah fled to Baghdad. Though the CIA had won over pro-Shah generals in the military such as General Zahedi, Mossadegh’s political supporters within the army overwhelmed” these. On this night the coup d’état “failed”. Before leaving the country however the Shah publically dismissed Mossadegh and appointed General Zahedi as new Prime Minister in response to which the CIA once again got to the streets spreading this news amongst the National Front, Tudeh and other protesters. Kinzer argues that these decrees allowed the CIA to give the coup “an air of legitimacy” once again turning the situation around for the eventual success.
Word count: 216

Embargo
In Document 4 released by the CIA the economic situation in Iran despite the embargo set on them by Britain is described as “in balance” and meeting “its fiscal needs,” After all, despite these sanctions the Iranians were able to hinder the first attempt of the coup d’état. However, already a year into these sanctions the embargo had transformed into a “full-fledged blockade” causing a "worsening economic crisis" from which many citizens were suffering by 1953.
 The Iranian economist Dadkhah now labels the idea that Mossadegh had control of the economy as a “mythology” exclaiming that economic conditions were “deteriorating” and this caused Mossadegh to rule in “martial law”. In fact on the 28th of May 1953 Mossadegh had sent a letter to Eisenhower asking for “prompt and effective aid… or else [it] might well be too late”. This aid was not received though and the economy continued to plummet leaving causing further rises in unemployment. In fact by 1953 the Iran had lost around 220 million dollars in oil revenue. Takeyh a previous official of the United States of State and senior fellow of the Council of Foreign relations wrote for the 60th anniversary of the coup d’état a revised account of what occurred. He raised the idea that the “economic crisis” caused for mass unpopularity of Mossadegh amongst Iranians. According to him the middle class, merchant class, intelligentsia and professional class all gradually lost interest in him as the economic situation severed and Mossadegh’s rule became “increasingly autocratic”. A newspaper article in the Plattsburgh Republic-Press from August 12th 1952 claims that Mossadegh was proposing a real estate tax that “will be very unpopular” as well. It is important to note however, that sources from the United States’ media at the time are known to have been strongly reinforcing the idea that Iran’s nationalism was “communist-inspired” and that Mossadegh was “a dictatorial madman”. Though the media at the time delivered its own specific biases, it is valuable to note the sentiment in America at the time about Mossadegh, after all the United States is a country of free-press. The internationality and time range amongst the sources used makes it difficult to determine an exact extent to which the oil-embargo assisted in the overthrow of Mossadegh; however through all these sources it can be deducted that the oil-embargo alone was not effective enough. Professor Paul Stevens, an expert in petroleum policies and economics, argues that “oil embargoes simply do not work” because the coup d’état did happen after all. Thus, though the wrecking of the Iranian economy may have assisted in decreasing Mossadegh’s popularity amongst the people, the embargo alone “failed to remove Mossadeq from office”.
Word count: 482

Factors that led to Success
Tudeh Party

Another long debated factor in the success of the coup d’état is the absence of the Tudeh Party from August 17th. According to the Iranian historian Abrahamian on top of its “20 000 members” the Tudeh Party had "10,000s of sympathizers in its youth and women's organizations, and 100,000s of sympathizers in its labour and craft unions." As explained above the Tudeh party and National Front successfully fought off the anti-Mossadegh demonstrators in the first attempt of the coup d’état. However, on the day of the 2nd coup d’état the 19th of August due to pressure from the United States Mossadegh ordered the army to “clear the streets”. Thus the supporter of the National Front and Tudeh who were the main pro-Mossadegh demonstrators asked their members to “stay off the streets”. In a Time article published twelve days after the coup this is described as Mossadegh’s “fatal mistake”. Indeed many historians agree with this argument, such as Gasiorowski and Byrne in their book Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Written half a century after the coup with the advantage of some released documents by the CIA the two have concluded that the coup was “successful only on the narrowest of margins”, thus they suggest that counter-action from the government or the Tudeh “could have prevented its success”. Maugeri an economist specialized in energy supports the view that the coup d’état on the 16th failed due to “the unexpected reaction of Mossadegh’s loyalists”. Historian Peter L. Hahn a research scholar specialized in relations between the Middle East and the United States suggests that Mossadegh had become slightly “dependent” on political support from the Tudeh. Thus without the loyal Tudeh who had provided a large amount of Mossadegh’s support in collaboration with the National Front to hinder the first revolution attempt the second revolution attempt may have been more difficult to combat. On the other hand a document written by the Central Intelligence Agency a year before the coup titled as a Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq in Iran reports that the Tudeh is “almost certainly incapable by itself of overthrowing the government” moving on to explain their lack of “legal status and power in the Majlis”. Although this does not directly relate to the situation of fighting against anti-Mossadegh forces in the second coup, it does indicate the Tudeh’s political instability thus demonstrating that perhaps even with their help success in combating the coup for a second time may not have been definitive. One must also take into account however that the situation for the Tudeh may have changed within that year, and also that the CIA may not have been very accurate in their estimations about the parties within Iran. Gasiorowski also argues that the Tudeh “retaliated” by calling their members off the streets, thus making way for the coup d’état. This raises the argument that perhaps Mossadegh’s popularity within the Tudeh was not as strong as anticipated either, the CIA document backs this up believing that the Tudeh would “probably support Kashani” as apparently they could benefit more from his government than Mossadegh’s.
Word count: 557

Kashani

Kashani’s support added a whole new factor to the success of the coup d’état. Through operation TPBEDAMN where anti-Tudeh and anti-Mossadegh propaganda was being spread the CIA had even bribed some clergy to “attack the Tudeh in sermons”. Religious followers generally did not support the Tudeh because of its secularity, however as the leading religious figure at the time Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi was “opposed to the clergy’s participation in politics” only few clergy’s played a political role in the 1953 coup d’état. Kashani however was one of these few clergy who played a “major role” in the coup. Although not having sounded his discontent about Mossadegh previously when the coup d’état was in process he “came out against Mossadegh”. The CIA paid him a “ten thousand dollar bribe” that he used in order to mobilize his followers. In documents released by the CIA it is often mentioned “if Kashani should come to power” what the situation would be, as they were afraid that he might even have enough power and support to do so.  Takeyh explains in his article that Kashani had the ability to “galvanize the populace” and believes that  “the clergy was instrumental in orchestrating the demonstrations”. However Takeyh’s theory has received criticism from Arash Norouzi an Iranian co-founder of the “Mossadegh Project” who argues Takeyh plays up the clergy’s role and downplays the role of the United States. Halliday, a writer and specialist in International Relations specifically regarding the Middle East portrays the Islamic clergy’s role in the success of the coup d’état differently as he simply states that they “did not oppose” the overthrowing of Mossadegh. Roosevelt took it even further, in his opinion “They were not friendly. They were not on the same side as we were. They were on their own side.” Be it as it may, the strength of the Islamic clergy is made clearer through the aftermath of the coup d’état. “The coup of 1953 made the Islamic Revolution of 1979 possible, even predictable,” argues Takeyh in his book Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. His argument is made on the basis that the 1953 coup instigated the solidification of the Islamic clergy’s networking, as they required this in order to mobilize their followers all over Iran to demonstrate against Mossadegh. As over the next two decades their network was the only that remained untouched from the Shah’s censorship the power of their stability and popularity was demonstrated when they took over Iran in 1979.
Word count: 442

Conclusion
Taking into account the sheer amount of books written about the 1953 coup d’état on Mossadegh, its causes and consequences, it is difficult to terminate with a definite answer to the question “Why did the coup d’état on Mohammad Mossadegh on the 19th of August 1953 succeed?” Nonetheless, based on the information evaluated in this essay it is easier to comprehend what factors had a larger influence than others. The National Front for example, as powerful and popular as it may have been at the time was not strong enough to hinder the coup on its own and no longer exists as a party in Iran. The oil embargo on the other hand though unable to serve its own purpose did feed to the rising unpopularity of Mossadegh, as any government’s popularity would do if their economy was in such a bad shape as the economy under Mossadegh. Even so this unpopularity was not enough to topple Mossadegh on its own as is explained through the analysis in this essay, after all on the 15th of August 1953 despite the embargo the first attempt at a coup d’état still failed. Thus we can determine that the Tudeh party’s absence and the addition of Kashani’s followers to the crowd of demonstrators in Tehran on the 19th of August were the key factors in achieving the success of the coup on this day. Perplexingly these factors seem to be co-dependent when assessing each of their contributions. Had the Tudeh been involved on August 19th historians have argued that the coup may not have succeeded, however how do we distinguish this if Kashani’s followers had been added to the opposition on the same day? Could we ever establish whether the Tudeh would have defeated anti-Mossadegh forces even so? The same controversy goes for the addition of Kashani supporters as anti-Mossadegh forces on the 19th of August, had the Tudeh still been involved on the coup on this day, would their participation have made a difference in achieving the success or failure of the coup? Though these questions cannot be answered at the moment, given the opportunity, resources and time it would have been intriguing to research further into this question and perhaps attempt to theoretically simulate what would have occurred on the 19th of August if both these groups had been on the streets. Such a study may find which of these two factors was ultimately the most vital one. Until such findings have been made, we can confidently conclude that both these factors simultaneously in action were one of the major aspects that enabled the coup d’état on Mossadegh on the 19th of August 1953 succeed. We can on the other hand firmly deduce that this event played a seminal role in U.S. and Iranian relations to this day. Even in their political policy the Iranian government today referred to this coup d’état; “We are not liberals like Allende (and Mossadeq) whom the CIA can snuff out,” announced the current supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei on the 14th anniversary of Mossadegh’s death. Yet this historical tension seems to be decreasing, only two days ago on the 24th of November 2013 Iran finally made an agreement with the P5+1 to regulate their nuclear energy in return the sanction on Iran are being gradually lifted. Perhaps in our life times we will see the conflict caused by this “tragic mistake for American foreign policy” committed on the 19th of August 1953 slowly be resolved.
Word count: 585
Total word count: 3856
 
Bibliography
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Print.  Kazemzadeh, Masoud. The 50th Anniversary of the CIA Coup in Iran. Diss. Utah Valley State College, 2003. N.p.: Iranianscope, 2003. Print.  Kinzer, Stephen. "Inside Iran's Fury." Smithsonian Oct. 2008: 2-6. Smithsonian Institution. Web. 2 Nov. 2013.  Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003. Print.  Kressin, Wolfgang K. Prime Minister Mossadegh and Ayatullah Kashani from Unity to Enmity: As Viewed from the American Embassy in Tehran, June 1950-August 1953. Diss. University of Texas, 1991. Austin: AFIT/ CI '' Wright-Patterson AFB OH, 1991. Print.  Krieger, Joel. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.  Mattair, Thomas R. Global Security Watch--Iran: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Print.  Maugeri, Leonardo. The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006. Print.  Milani, Abbas. Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941 - 1979. New York, NY: Persian World, n.d. Print.  Milani, Abbas. The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution: A Biography. Washington, D.C.: Mage, 2000. Print. Mir, Ferrukh. Half Truth. [S.l.]: Iuniverse, 2011. Print.  Moghimi, Farshid. Evaluation of a Pilot Online Learning Community Analyzing 20th-century Iranian Leaders. N.p.: ProQuest, UMI Dissertation, 2011. Print.  Mossadegh, Mohammad. "Mossadegh's Second Message To President Eisenhower." Letter to President Dwight Eisenhower. 28 May 1953. MS. United States of America, Washington DC.  Nepstad, Sharon Erickson., and Lester R. Kurtz. Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance. Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2012. Print.  Norouzi, Arash. "Letter to the Editor." Letter to Ray Takeyh. 22 Aug. 2010. MS. N.p.  Painter, David. The United States, Great Britain and Mossadegh. Diss. Georgetown University, 1993. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1993. Print.   Parsa, Misagh. States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2000. Print.  Pfefferle, Tim. Iran, the United States and the CIA: The Implications of the 1953 Coup D'état. N.p.: Grin Verlag, 2013. Print.  Petherick, Christopher. The CIA in Iran: The 1953 Coup and the Origins of the US-Iran Divide. Washington, DC: American Free, 2007. Print.  Ruehsen, Moraya De Moraes. Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 29. London: Frank Cass, 1993. Print.  Stevens, Paul. An Embargo on Iranian Crude Oil Exports: How Likely and with What Impact? Diss. Chatham House, 2011. London: Chatham House, 2012. Print.  Takeyh, Ray. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. New York: Times, 2006. Print.  Takeyh, Ray. "Clerics Responsible for Iran's Failed Attempts at Democracy." Washington Post 18 Aug. 2010: 1. Print.  Tertzakian, Peter. A Thousand Barrels a Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy Dependent World. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. Print.  The Front Page, 1887-1992. Paris: International Herald Tribune, 1992. Print.  Thornburg, Max Weston. People and Policy in the Middle East; a Study of Social and Political Change as a Basis for the United States Policy. New York: Norton, 1964. Print.  Tripathi, Deepak. Imperial Designs: War, Humiliation & the Making of History. N.p.: Potomac, 2013. Print.  United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Iran. Proposed Course of Action with Respect to Iran. By Undisclosed. N.p.: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 1953. Print.  Vassiliou, M. S. Historical Dictionary of the Petroleum Industry. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print.  Weir, Stephen. Historys Worst Decisions and the People Who Made Them. Millers Point, N.S.W.: Pier 9, 2005. Print.  Wilber, Donald Newton. 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To what extent was the involvement of the United States government and the CIA responsible for the downfall of Salvador Allende?

A Plan of Investigation
To what extent was the involvement of the United States government and the CIA responsible for the downfall of Salvador Allende?
The aim of this investigation is to evaluate the degree to which American clandestine operations in Chile contributed to the downfall of that country’s President, Salvador Allende, in 1973. The investigation focuses on the tactics used by the 40 Committee and CIA to keep Allende from gaining political power (1958-1970), and those used to destabilize his government after his election (1970-1973). The contribution of Allende’s own political performance to his downfall is also considered. In the section entitled Evaluation of Sources, two sources used for this investigation [Staff Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities: Covert Actions in Chile and The Lawless State: The Crimes of the US. Intelligence Agencies] are evaluated according to their values, limitations, origins, and purposes.
 
B Summary of Evidence
On September 11th, 1973, a coup d’etat led by Augusto Pinochet overthrew the government of democratically elected President Salvador Allende. Chile’s political history had until this time been mostly free of violent upheaval. The country’s democratic tradition dated back to 1818 “with only three brief exceptions, the last in 1932.”1 The exception to the Latin American ‘rule’ of political turmoil, Chile’s political stability was considerably greater than that of its neighbours.
The 40 Committee, set up to control American secret action around the world, directed the offensives against the Allende government: with authorization from the Committee, the CIA was able to carry out extensive covert action in Chile. (It is important to keep in mind that the legislative branches of government, and thus the American people, were not aware of the actions of the Committee.) The operations against Allende were divided into two components: Track I consisted of employing constitutional methods to keep Allende from power; Track II
was initiated by President Nixon... when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d’etat in Chile2
However, “the 40 Committee never discussed this direct CIA role [and]. . . the Agency was to report. . . to the White House.”3
As a part of Track I, for the 1964 Chilean presidential elections, during which the US supported Christian Democrat candidate Eduardo Frei, the CIA “mounted a massive anti- communism campaign. Extensive use was made of the [media]”4 and included posters of “Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads”5. The campaign was principally a religion-based scare tactic. It threatened “godless-atheist communism”6 in the case of a Marxist win, but provided an alternative: that “[for this not to happen, we must elect Eduardo Frei as president”. Of course, the American government also funded the Christian Democratic Party. A subsequent CIA study concluded that Frei’s majority win was a direct result of thy campaign.7 
The attempted kidnapping and eventual assassination of General René Schneider was a Track II tactic. Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Schneider “insisted the constitutional process be followed”8 insofar as the army’s political affiliation was concerned. As he was the greatest obstacle to a military coup, the CIA assured “[t]hose Chileans inclined to stage a coup... of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. government”9 boldened by this promise, two attempts at kidnapping (supported by the CIA) were made by officers; Schneider was finally shot and killed in another botched attempt on October 22nd. It is inconclusive whether the weapons used in the assassination been provided by the CIA10.
Despite continuous efforts against him, Allende secured a plurality victory and officially became president on October 24th. In the US, a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was held two weeks later11. It was recognized that an “economic squeeze” would put such strain on Chile that “economic troubles [would] generate [enough] public dissatisfaction”12 to bring about Allende’s downfall. Nixon determined to give Chile “cold Turkey” on the economic front: as its economy was largely export-based, with copper accounting for 80 per cent of exports, it was decided that the US use its economic superiority to influence world copper prices to Chile’s disadvantage.13 Moreover, between 1969 and 1970, total American economic aid to Chile dropped from 80.8 to 29.6 million dollars—a change of 63 per cent; in 1972, it totalled a mere 7.4 million14 (See Appendix A). Furthermore, America also influenced the international community to “[deny]... credits to Chile”15.
During his brief time in power, Allende nationalised Chilean industry and established relations with numerous socialist countries16, as he had promised he would. He carried out economic reforms that (in the short term) were of benefit to Chile’s economy.17 However, his rule was plagued by strikes of the mining and transportation sectors of the workforce. Still, American involvement was present here as well:
[many] leaders of... trade associations... received free training.., from the American Institute for Free Labour... which. . . was set up under the control of the CIA. While the 40 Committee turned down specific CIA proposals for direct support of two truckers’ strikes.., in 1972 and 1973... the CIA passed money onto private-sector-groups which, in turn, with the agency’s knowledge, funded the truckers.18
The Senate Report agrees that “the two... strikes could not have been maintained on the basis of union funds”19 The Allende government never managed to put an end to the three month long truckers’ strike of 1973.
Finally, on September 11th, the long-awaited coup went as planned, and the will of Pinochet descended upon Chile.

C Evaluation of Sources
The Lawless State: The Crimes of the US. Intelligence Agencies, written by Morton Halperin (et al) is a critical look at the misdeeds of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and IRS, devoting an entire chapter to the case against Allende. The purpose of the chapter is to clarify to the general public the involvement of the United States in the downfall of Allende. Its values lie in that its author was heavily involved in politics at the national level (in fact he was a senior staff member of the NSC), giving him a more intimate knowledge of the political system of which he writes. Also, as he is an American, he maintains a higher degree of understanding of the politics of his country. The major limitation of this work is that it was published in 1976, only three years into Pinochet’s rule; thus it does not have the advantage of a greater historical context. Also, this was well before the October 2000 release of 9A records of covert operations in Chile.

Covert Actions in Chile, 1963-19 73 is a report to the United States Senate of undercover actions in Chile. Its purpose was to make known to the Senate the extent of American involvement in Chilean affairs, especially those taken against Allende. The values of this document are that it is a primary source, and that it is a direct and concrete summary of actions in Chile. Limitations include the fact that, as it is a government publication of the wrongdoings of the government, it may have excluded information that was particularly incriminating. Also, it deals with top-secret information, some of which had not been ~ declassified by its 1975 publication.


D Analysis
Salvador Allende was, as a politician, a prime target for American antagonism. His Marxism, something that, in the Cold War era of the 1970s, was synonymous with the communism of Russia and Cuba, had doomed him fro the start. Allende was, in a socialist, and as such was even considered moderate by other Chilean socialists.20 The fact that Allende also established diplomatic relations with other socialist countries alarmed America, particularly as he was also a “personal friend”21 of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. This affiliation would have been a dangerous one at the best of times, but at the height of the Cold War, it was diplomatic suicide.
Allende further antagonised the United States by daring to assert his country’s economic independence, that is, by nationalizing Chilean industry, much of which had been owned by foreign (mainly American) companies. In particular, Chile’s copper industry was largely owned by American mining companies, and its nationalization was not favourable to American international commercial investments.22
Allende’s biggest offence, however, was that he was a committed democrat. The very fact that Allende had won 36.5 per cent of votes demonstrated that a Marxist had found favour in the eyes of a population, and that the massive American use of anti-socialism propaganda in Chile had not succeeded.
The American campaign in Chile did exactly what it had set out to do: it “ma[d]e [Chile’s] economy scream”.23 Withholding financial aid wreaked havoc on the country’s fragile economy. It is interesting to note that, even as American monetary aid to Chile subsided, its aid to the country’s military increased.24 This and the murder of General René Schneider contributed to Chile’s traditionally apolitical military turning on the government it was expected to protect.
However, as much as Allende brought the wrath of the USA onto himself, he also brought upon himself the wrath of his own country. After the initial success of his economic policy of “consumption to stimulate... economy”25 the yearl973 brought soaring inflation, “reaching 360 percent over the year”26. The government’s inability to deal effectively with the miners’ strike in 1972 and trucker’s strike in 1973 showed Allende’s party to be little more than political amateurs.
Perhaps his economic reforms came too swiftly for the fragile Chilean economy to support, destabilizing his own regime and making him lose favour in the eyes of the public. Even though he seemed popular, the very fact that army officers were plotting against him as early as October 1970 (before his formal inauguration!) casts doubts upon how long he/ would have remained president, even without American intervention against him. The very fact that miners and transportation officials went on strike so often demonstrates public dissatisfaction with Allende’ s regime.
Perhaps Fidel Castro was correct in stating that because “[e]veryone had the right to conspire... the result was that they overthrew Allende”.27 Perhaps in the very nature of the Chilean, democratic, path to socialism were sown the seeds of a military coup. After all, all states long established as socialist (USSR) or communist (China) did not gain this status through democratic means: why would it work any differently for Chile? Allende’s vision of democracy and Marxism, completely antithetical institutions to the North American Cold War psyche, was perhaps too suddenly imposed on Chile and too much worked against to ever truly be possible. Allende was doomed to failure as soon as he chose to pursue Chilean socialism through a democratic path.
 
E Conclusion
The statement that the United States was in no way, shape, or form involved in helping Pinochet gain power in 1973 is untrue. It is highly unlikely that a government that had spent three years and an enormous amount of money to destabilise Allende had nothing to do with a military coup for which they had been hoping for since 1970. America welcomed the new dictator, providing him in the first three years of rule with nearly thirteen times the direct economic aid given to Allende’s government.28 However, as the evidence of American implication in the coup is only circumstantial, it becomes necessary to consider Allende’s own role in the coup. His policies failed miserable earning him the disfavour of his subjects.
It is not correct to say that it was solely American invasiveness and political aggression, or Allende’s economic blunders that were responsible for his ultimate downfall. One would not have been caused sufficient problems without the other. With proper American and international financial aid, it is possible that Allende’s reforms may have worked. Conversely, if Allende’s changes had been implemented more gradually, American covert action may have proven to be nothing more than an inconvenience. As it the two elements fed off each other, culminating in the rule of a fascist dictator, and years of terror imposed on the Chilean people, who were, after all, the innocent victims of the CIA, Allende, and finally Pinochet.
 
F Sources
Bizzaro, Salvatore. Historical Dictionary of Chile. Metuchen, N.J. : Scarecrow Press, 1987.
Blum, William. The CIA: A Forgotten History: US Global Interventions Since World War. New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1986.
Halperin, Morton H. ,et al. The Lawless State: Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies. New York: Penguin Books, 1976.
Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

Mares, David R. and Francisco Rojas Aravena. Coming in from the Cold: The United States and Chile. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Minutes of the 40 Committee Meeting, 8 September 1970, September 9, 1970.
http://www. gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/news/2000 111 3/700909.pdf
Memorandum of Conversation, NSC Meeting - Chile (NSSM 97), November 6, 1970. http://www. gwu. Edu/~nsarchiv/news/2000 1113/7011 06.pdf
Nutter, John Jacob. The CIA’s Black Opps: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy. New York: Prometheus Books, 2000.
Staff Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, “Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973”. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
 

Case study on the Marshall Plan

What were the American motives behind the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe between 1947 and 1952?

History Internal Assessment
Word count: 2,198
 

Evaluation of Sources

What were the American motives behind the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe between 1947 and 1952?

To deconstruct the American motives behind the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe, both the economic context in which they were operating alongside their foreign policy strategy will be the focus through the works, in particular, of two acknowledged authorities.

Source one: Alan S. Milward, “The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51”, Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1984

Alan Milward, an influential historian of European affairs published “The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51” in 1984 which implies that it was written in retrospect of the implementation of the Marshal Plan which means he was able to study the progression Western Europe made over 36 years. Accordingly, he is able to deconstruct and evaluate how the multicultural trade system has developed as a result. Contrarily, 36 years may not be a sufficient time period to assess the full impact of the Marshall Plan on the reconstruction of Europe. Milward is an economic historian – he has great understanding of the functions of economies and can recognize the signs of both a strong and weak economies. The Times Literary Supplement describes Milward as “widely – and justly – regarded as one of the half-dozen leading economic historians of our time” to which Christopher Smout added, “His histories of the Second World War profoundly shaped our awareness, his insight into the forces that shaped contemporary Europe upturning many a cosy apple-cart”.[1][2] Nevertheless, a crucial limitation is that he writes from a British perspective from the country that received the lion’s share of aid, it could be criticised as bias towards its successes thereof. Naturally he credits the Marshall Plan as the key to the reconstruction of the ravaged continent. Yet in spite of this, Maier recalled that he and Milward, while not wishing to reduce the plan to insignificance, “Examined the Marshall Plan soberly and without sentimentality”, ruling out any bias within the analysis.[3]  

Source two: Bruce Jones, “The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American Strategy”, Strobe Talbott, Brookings Institution Press, February 28, 2017

The Brookings institution was pivotal in the adoption of the Marshall Plan. This book has great value for historians studying the Marshall plan because Strobe Talbott reviews the global context in which the Truman administration pushed the Marshall Plan through Congress and given he is the President of the Brookings institution, provides insight of Brookings’ role in that process. Talbott has experience and great understanding of American foreign policy. Therefore, his analysis will be valuable given that his standpoint will be from the American perspective which may provide more detailed insight to American foreign policy which in turn will be beneficiary for the understanding of American motives. Furthermore, he had access to archives and files, which he illustrates in his book, providing evidence of economic progression in Europe. The New York Times describe him “having ferocious archive-based specificity, lucid intelligence, and remorseless questioning of accepted pieties”, suggesting that his access to archives and official economic documents provide value and credibility to his arguments.[4] Such archived information includes Marshall’s landmark speech at Harvard which lays out the rationale of the plan. Nevertheless, a crucial limitation is that given his US diplomacy; naturally he will defend the US and hail the Marshall Plan for being the key to the reconstruction of Europe. If Talbott were to substantially criticise the Marshall Plan in his book it would be considered ‘A stab in the back’. Furthermore, the book lacks critical analysis of the functions of the Marshall Plan itself, focusing rather specifically its impact.

Investigation

The Marshall Plan was a pivotal undertaking in America’s emergence as a global power and protector of its fellow democracies on the far side of the Atlantic.[5] Winston Churchill famously hailed it as “the most unsordid act it history”. Norman Davies was less grandiloquent, but more concise in identifying the motive behind the U.S investment of $13 billion in the rehabilitation of European economies, calling it “an act of the most enlightened self-interest in History”.[6] Davies believes this act was an example of American opportunism, as they tried to gain an advantage by pursing economic investment, without regard for potential repercussions.  The public law act ‘Chapter 169 April 3, 1948’ stated the Marshall plan was “[t]o promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States”.[7] The proposal was made by Marshall in a speech at Harvard on 5 June, 1947 who proposed the offer of financial aid for economic recovery given that the European governments would initiate collaboration. With the wisdom of hindsight, the Marshall Plan deserves another accolade; it transformed Europe into a transatlantic community based on shared interests and values that was the ‘bedrock’ of the world order for decades to come.[8] In 1947, they organized a conference in Paris to set up the O.E.E.C (organization for European Economic Cooperation), which represented eighteen countries including the United States and Canada.[9] Between 1948 and 1952, the Marshall Plan administrated $13 billion through the O.E.E.C, more than any enterprise aiding Europe’s recovery following the war.  Alan Milward challenges Churchill to argue that it is not an act of self-interest, as the O.E.E.C represented America’s ambition for economic collaboration in Europe. 
However, the Marshall plan was only able to aid Western European countries in postwar reconstruction due to the fact the USSR rejected the opportunity to be incorporated in the European Recovery program because Molotov believed the treaty was anti-Communism.[10] The perceived the treaty as an attempt to weaken Soviet interest in their satellite states, by making beneficiary countries economically dependent on the them [11]. The Marshall Plan was characterized as a generous foreign-aid scheme by the US government to rebuild Western Europe after World War II, with peace with idealism: America at its best.[12] Armin Grünbacher, modern history lecturer at the University of Birmingham, argued “the originally propagated view that the Marshall Plan was an altruistic endeavor through which the US saved Europe from collapse and starvation has long been dismissed and replaced with a more realistic approach to international affairs… Realpolitik and the perception of the evermore menacing Cold War made it inevitable that Marshall Plan aid… would become a weapon”.[13] It is seen as a new form of Soviet containment; Postwar conservatives were leery of fighting the Cold War on these terms. James Burnham continues this argument by believing that mere containment of Communism was passive and immoral.[14] Containment doctrine too readily acceded to the Cold War standoff and the permanent coexistence of both sides of the Iron Curtain.[15] Economic collaboration would have been more successful if the West was willing to negotiate, rather than contain the communist states. In this respect, the American motives were to limit the spread of Communism within Europe. 
Contrarily, the potential for repercussions to which Norman Davies refers to is that of Soviet retaliation.[16] Burnham and Grünbacher believe the Marshall Plan is responsible for the division of Europe.[17][18] George Kennan, a career Foreign Officer, argued the Russians feared Western penetration, their response to the Marshall Plan being “indicative of a Soviet desire to seize the substantial industrial and human recourses of Europe”[19] suggesting it was not in fact the Americans attempting to limit communist expansion, rather, Stalin fearing Western penetration.[20] Kennan formulated a policy called ‘containment’; the American approach to fighting the Cold War with the Soviet Union.[21] It was clear that Soviet desire for power was dividing Europe, and, the Marshall plan would only partially succeed if Russia continually refused aid.[22] One could argue the term ‘Europe’ is a false generalization for Marshall aid. It is seen that aggressive American foreign policy ravages Cold War, as containment and Marshall Plans acted as counters of Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe.[23] The Soviet motives to prevent Western influence caused tensions instead of Americans seeking to make Europe economically dependent on them.[24] In that sense, the Marshall Plan is characterized as aggressive foreign policy which its aims being to limit the expansion of Communism in Europe.

In spite of this, the focus of the economic reconstruction of Europe, to which most energy and attention was given and which still awakens the most interest, is the impact of the European Recovery Programme. [25]Milward suggests that the Marshall plan marked an acceptance by the US that, because its real interests were the creation of multilateral world trading systems, it must act consistently as a creditor country and recycle dollars or gold into the international economy. [26] He believes the rate of inflation became a priority of American policy in 1948 and remained so. This was supported by the pressures of several Western European governments in the OEEC; the ‘interim report’ at the end of 1948 insisted on balanced budgets as a condition of the European Recovery Programme.[27]The most striking example was that between 1945 and 1948 where about two thirds of all imports into the Western occupation zones of Germany were financed by American aid, despite European Recovery Program being only a contributory factor.[28] In 1949 the proportion was about 39 percent, about 22 percent financed under the GARIOA programme.[29] So low was the level of food supply in West Germany and the population more rapidly increasing than elsewhere in Western Europe, that it is obvious that the main contribution of Marshall Aid was providing the necessary imports to sustain the population.[30] Marshall aid was, for its first two years, primarily a supplementation of relief despite its more far-reaching objectives.[31] By 1949, it was amounted to $723.3 million, of which $569.3 million was food and agricultural commodities under the ERP[32]. Due to such drastic German investment, there was a delay in the ERP, as countries like Germany did not initially have stable economies.[33] In Germany's case, the European Recovery Program is fulfilling its plan of economic restoration. The series of loans given to Germany aided its re-industrialization and economic progression.[34] The Marshall plan played a large role in the re-development of Germany post World War II. According to Millward, the true motive of the United States was to restore Germany’s economy.[35]  In conclusion the Marshall Plan was a crucial event regarding the US and its rise to global power and the protection of European democracies. Had it not been for the Marshall Plan, Europe may have continued to lie in ruin with no economic foundation. Accordingly, it is determined that the true motive was to reconstruct Europe, establish a global trading system and rebuild Germany’s economy. The United States understood the only form of global economic progression was through trans-Atlantic trade, which was seen as an act of self-interest on America’s behalf. Major political tensions were caused by Russian retaliation of the Marshall plan, due to fear of Western influence and penetration. The Cold War cannot have been caused by the Marshall plan, as the motives were not to contain Soviet expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. Europe’s reconstruction benefitted from the Marshall plan economically, as it established industries and international trade in Europe through the OEEC. The American motives behind its implementation was to establish a trade system and re-build Germany’s economy.    

Reflection

This historical investigation has allowed me to use a variety of research methods and through which I have experienced the specific challenges historians face in their investigations. In this investigation specifically, looking at primary sources, although extremely valuable, was challenging at times. Complex documents such as Chapter 169 of the Marshall plan which laid out the rationale of the plan included foreign policy ambitions and economic stand points which for me were tricky to interpret. Furthermore, Alan Millwards’ book The Reconstruction of Western Europe contained economic spreadsheets and statistics to provide evidence that the Marshall plan was bringing economic prosperity to Europe. This was also the case in Bruce Jones’ book The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American Strategy. They both included calculations, and economic terminology, which for me were very hard to understand given that I am not an economist. Furthermore, some of the stats were not justified or had no explanation. This mean that given my lack of economic knowledge, I am not able to tell whether those stats were good or bad.

Focus was crucial in the investigation. The Marshall Plan was implemented at the beginning of the Cold War between the West and the East. In that sense, the fact that there are thousands of sources on the given subject, one must always keep focus in perspective. To provide an example, I would find that when I would discuss the impact the Marshall Plan was having on the USSR, the investigation would drift away from its focus and start discussing the impact of the Molotov plan. The investigation was to focus on American motives, not the Russian responses and foreign policy. I also had to pay attention to the relative historians I was using.  It was crucial that I used historians with some sort of economic understanding to provide my investigation with credibility.

The identification of historical events’ significance is a rigorous process. I found it difficult to establish what events are considered significant in relevance to proceeding outcomes. In theory, significance will deviate, depending on the topic of analysis, highlighting the importance of generating a specific research question to identify significant events of relevance. The evaluation of proof in history can be difficult; I needed to understand that the versions of history are equally acceptable – the investigation’s balance was vital, and had consider both sides of the argument.

FOOTNOTES:  [1] Central European History, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 16, No. 4, p.409  [2] Christopher Smout, Economic historian celebrated for his analysis of the post-war European project, The Independent, December 6 2010  [3] Charles S Maier, Economic historian celebrated for his analysis of the post-war European project, The Independent, December 6 2010  [4] Beschloss, Michael, and Strobe Talbott. At the highest levels: The inside story of the end of the Cold War. New York Times, 2016.  [5] McMahon J. Robert, “The Cold War; Very short introductions” Oxford University Press, March            17, 2003, p. 30  [6] Jones, Bruce, The Marshall plan and the Shaping of American strategy, p. 41.  [7] 80TH CONG., 2n SESS.-CH. 169-APR. 3, 1948  [8] Milward, Alan, The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51 p. 4.  [9] Campbell C. John, “The United States in World Affairs”, 1947, p. 500  [10] Armin Grünbacher, Cold-War Economics, Vol. 45. No. 4, p. 697  [11] Roberts, Brad, The New Democracies: Global Change and the US policy, MIT Press, p. 97  [12] Richard M. Bissel, Reflections of a cold Warrior, Yale University Press, p. 186  [13] Armin Grünbacher, Cold-War Economics, Vol. 45. No. 4, p. 716.  [14] John F. Diggins, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 496  [15] Nash, Nightmare in Red, chap 4  [16] Jones, Bruce, The Marshall plan and the Shaping of American strategy, p. 41  [17] Armin Grünbacher, Cold-War Economics, Vol. 45. No. 4, p. 697  [18] John F. Diggins, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 496  [19]  George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950  [20] George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950  [21] Milward, Alan, The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51 p. 27.  [22] John F. Diggins, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 496  [23] George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950  [24] Jones, Bruce, The Marshall plan and the Shaping of American strategy, p. 41.  [25] Milward, Alan, The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51 p. 68.  [26] Milward, Alan, The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51 p. 71.  [27] OEEC, Interim Report on the European recovery Programme (Paris, December 1948), vol. 1.  [28] Jones, Bruce, The Marshall plan and the Shaping of American strategy, p. 41.  [29] ‘The ECA, in its general financial policy, introduced strict bankers’ criteria of balanced budgets, stable currencies, high profits to entice investment, and low wages to discourage consumption.’ J. and G.Kolko, Limits of Power, p. 429.  [30] Guinnane W. Timothy, “Financial Vergangenheitsbewältigung” 1953 London debt         agreement, p.17  [31] John F. Diggins, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 496  [32] “European Economy since 1945; Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond”, 2008, p. 73  [33] John F. Diggins, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 489  [34] Guinnane W. Timothy, “Financial Vergangenheitsbewältigung” 1953 London debt         agreement, p.17     [35] Milward, Alan, The reconstruction of western Europe 1945-51 p. 27.

 

 

In which way did Ostpolitik provide a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany?

A Plan of the investigation

This investigation seeks to evaluate the change in West German foreign policy in the period from 1969 to 1974 analysing the central document of the West German policy in regards to East Germany, the Basic Treaty of 1972, and in particular Heinrich August Winkler’s interpretation of Ostpolitik in his study “Germany. The Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990”. Following Winkler’s analysis, this investigation will focus on the political aspect and the international policy at that time. In B, the main source will be put in the broader context of German foreign policy since 1955 and the other main treaties of Ostpolitik presenting in which way Brandt’s new approach constituted a dramatic change in Germany’s foreign policy. After the evaluation of the Treaty and Winkler’s broader interpretation of Ostpolitk in part C, they will be analysed in part D under the focus of the importance of US foreign policy for the Ostpolitik leading to a conclusion of the central question in E.

B Summary of evidence
The dramatic change of German foreign policy in the period from 1969-1974 can only be understood in the context of German foreign policy since 1955 when West Germany officially became a sovereign state and the main doctrine of West German policy, the Hallstein Doctrine, was formulated. It declared that “every country which has diplomatic relations with the GDR will not be allowed to have diplomatic relations with the FRG”. West Germany was regarded as the only legitimate state presenting Germany as a whole. Proving successful in 1957, when West Germany cut off its ties with Yugoslavia who had officially recognized East Germany as a separate state, East Germany was forced to tie its alignment with the USSR. But there was another side to the Hallstein Doctrine, which prevented an open policy towards other East European states. The Warsaw Pact states had recognized the GDR in 1949-50 and therefore West Germany was refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with those countries.
In the meantime during the 1960s, the relations between the two superpowers had changed. After the Berlin crises in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy started to promote a new approach in US foreign policy towards the USSR looking for a way of cooperation. In a speech at the American University of Washington in June 1963, Kennedy emphasized to look for a strategy of peace between the USA and the USSR. The leading opposition party of West Germany, the Social Democrats, who opposed the Hallstein Doctrine, developed a new foreign policy concept “Change through Rapprochement”. It sought to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state by putting aside the idea of German unification for the near future. The main idea was that changes in East Germany could only be made in a long term through numerous little steps which were necessary for the reunification of both German states emphasizing on stronger cooperation with the goal of dismantling the status quo in the long run.
This concept became a political reality after Brandt had been elected Chancellor in 1969. He immediately began talks with leaders from East Germany and East European countries meeting with the East German prime-minister Willi Stoph. These talks were the first direct talks between top German politicians since 1948 taking place in West and East Germany in 1970. Even so Brandt refused to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state, communication lines were opened. 
After policy goals were made with the United States, Brandt entered negotiations with the USSR in which both countries renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no territorial claims recognizing the borders in Eastern Europe. TheTreaty with Moscow was the first treaty of the Ostpolitik signed on August 12th 1970. It followed the Warsaw Treaty four month later with a similar content towards Poland. This policy was backed by the USA who had started negotiations about the status of Berlin leading to the Agreement on Berlin on 3rd September 1971 with France, England and the USSR, marking a relaxation of tension in East-West relations, in particular since it guaranteed civil communications between West Berlin and the FRG. It was the Treaty with East Berlin (Basic Treaty) however that proved to be the central and controversial document of Ostpolitik. Both states had committed themselves in the treaty to develop normal relations on the basis of equality. Recognizing each other’s independence and sovereignty as well as territorial integrity, both sides agreed to exchange permanent missions in Bonn and East Berlin avoiding the pivotal question of German unification. Brandt faced tough opposition. Many of his conservative critics feared that by neglecting the goal of unification he was selling out to the Communists. When West and East Germany became members of the UN in 1973, the new reality of two German states had become a fact. West Germany had lost his right to be the only sovereign speaking for Germany as a whole and therefore the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished. This new policy of direct talks, negotiations and treaties with the USSR, Poland and GDR and later on with Czechoslovakia in December 1973 was backed by the USA. In this regard, Brandt’s approach “Change though Rapprochement” led from a foreign policy of isolation of the GDR to a policy of cooperation and legal recognition overcoming the Cold War situation between the two German states which had dominated their relation under the Hallstein Doctrine.
 

C Evaluation of the sources
The Basic treaty was the most controversial of all treaties signed during Ostpolitik and has to be seen in the context of the other treaties. Its purpose was to regulate the relationship between the two Germanys on a mutual agreement that would make it possible to facilitate regulations concerning the improvement of having economical, cultural and political exchanges with de facto recognition to the GDR. Instead of embassies permanent legations were opened in both German states as it was stressed in supplementary text leading the way open to a later reunification. Its value lies in the fact that numerous improvements followed the treaty such as the “Besucherregelung”, which allowed West German Citizens to visit East Germany and also facilitated family reunions for East German Citizens aged over 60 years to travel to West Germany. However, the limitation lied in the unresolved question of German unity leading to the concept of two German states within one German nation. East Germany stressed the idea that it had become a sovereign state, while West Germany continued to claim that the German question was not resolved finally.
Winkler’s leading question is, why Germany, much later than Great Britain and France, became a national state and even later a democracy. It is under this perspective that he focuses on the Ostpolitik. His two volumes of Germany.The Long Road West which were published 10 years after the German reunification are a major source for modern German history. The value of this book is that Winkler argues clearly under a central question, leaving room for critical remarks. He analysis the Ostpolitik in the second volume (279-290 and 296-314) mainly in the context of international politics rejecting the idea that it was mainly a European or German question. Arguing this way, Winkler is convinced that external factors dominated German foreign policy at that time and that the Ostpolitik was not a reaction to the changes within the German society.
The purpose of this source is the argument that Ostpolitik lead to a new political reality in Germany and Europe. By recognizing the political sovereignty, both German states became more independent in their political decisions and it seemed a new reality had come true: a Europe with two German states. Winkler focuses on the importance of the US foreign policy under Kennedy and Nixon to show that Ostpolitik depended heavenly on the changes of US foreign policy. In this regard Ostpolitik has to be studied mainly in the context of international politics rather than in the context of German or European history. The limitation of Winkler’s analysis may lie in a too one sided focus on US policy as the main factor of the Ostpolitik. Historians like Jürgen Kocka strengthen the point that the events of 1989 and in that regard the Ostpolitik should be seen in the context of historical continuities in European history. Winkler’s point of view is linked to his conviction that the Western Alliance under the guidance of the USA is the best solution to the German question leaving little room for alternative analysis of the Ostpolitik in the framework of a European history.

D Analysis

The dramatic changes of German foreign policy from 1969-1974 have to be put into the context of the German foreign policy since 1955. The Hallstein Doctrine was a typical approach of foreign policy during the first period of the Cold War until the Berlin and Cuba Missile Crises. Germany and Berlin which had been the major battleground of the Cold War in Europe were the division line between West and East. Adenauer’s intention was clear from the beginning: integration of FRG into the Western world renouncing to the immediate reunification of Germany. The changes of international politics in particular of the US administration under President Kennedy made this policy unreasonable. In this context a new approach of German foreign policy could be formulated. The new concept “Change through Rapprochement” reflected much better the intentions of the Kennedy administration than the Hallstein Doctrine.
There is no serious disagreement about the fact that “Challenge through Rapprochement” abolished the Hallstein Doctrine. Even revisionist historians like Hillgruber during the period before the German Reunification did not put this fact into question.
Concerning the question in which way it came to this change in German foreign policy, many historians in recent years emphasize on the external factors. While Winkler strongly focuses on Kennedy’s state visit to Germany in 1963 emphasizing the importance of US foreign policy during the whole period of the Ostpolitik, historians like Görtemaker argue that Ostpolitik became an engine of change in 1970 and has to be seen from that year on in the context of European policy. The immediate impact was not only the improvement of inner German relations but that this policy resulted directly in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe beginning in November 1972 and ending in August 1975. Ostpolitik in that regard developed much more into a European policy leading to the Helsinki agreement giving space for human right activists in East Europe.

The Ostpolitik overcame the Cold War mentality between the two German states, but did not resolved in any way the German question. This policy was in the interest of the US foreign policy and in this regard is as much their product as a new approach by Chancellor Brandt. It was in both interests that the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished leading to a policy of cooperation between the two German states.

E Conclusion

When it comes to the question in which way Ostpolitik provided a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany, the answer seems to be clear. The improving relations between the two German states following the Ostpolitik and the Basic Treaty overcame years of a non dialogue between the two German sides and little improvements for family affairs and visiting rights took place. It helped to overcome the Cold War mentality. “Change through Rapprochement” was therefore a dramatic change in the way that German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe focused on dialogue instead of isolating the GDR. The Basic treaty recognized the existence of two German states and made therefore an end to the Hallstein Doctrine. Winkler’s analysis supports this idea by making clear that Ostpolitik opened a new chapter of dialogue between the two German states. By putting the Ostpolitk in the context of American foreign policy, Winkler makes clear, that West German foreign policy depended heavily on American policy.

Words: 2000

F List of sources
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