Was America’s enactment on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution justified?
Extended Essay in History
_______________________________________________________ CANDIDATE NUMBER – gpz118
WORD COUNT – 3990
Introduction
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was drafted in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents which occurred on the 2nd and 4th of August. The final incident that led to American retaliation on North Vietnam occurred on August 4th, in which two American destroyers (Turner Joy & Maddox) were subject to ‘imminent attacks’ after they received intelligence of incoming strikes from North Vietnamese submarines. John J. Herrick, the Captain of the Maddox, was at first hesitant to act on the threat, and instead retreated the ships further out to sea. However, only a few hours later, three North Vietnamese patrol boats began quickly approaching the ships, after which Captain Herrick ordered the ship’s guns to fire, resulting in one completely destroyed boat and the other two heavily damaged. The next day, both destroyers received intelligence that another attack was imminent, and at around 21:00 ICT Maddox reported spotting unidentified vessels, after which both destroyers engaged in high speed maneuvers to avoid confrontation. During this, Maddox reported multiple torpedo attacks as well as automatic weapon fire, which led to both ships returning fire at the “enemy”.1
Navy Commander James Stockdale, who had overseen the air defense of Maddox and was flying recognizance throughout the Gulf doubted the legitimacy of the attack, and stated; “Our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets... There were no (North Vietnamese) boats there... There was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”2 Captain Herrick later too questioned what his crew had seen and reported, and believed the incoming missile reports to have been an error on behalf of the crew members.
However, by the time this opposing perspective was received government officials in Washington D.C. had already began moving towards retaliating, which included informing the press on the situation and telling the public of their intentions. By the 7th of August Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson only days later. This marked the beginning of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, as the resolution entailed increased military presence in Vietnam. Months later, the US officially launched Operation Rolling Thunder, which authorized large-scale bombing runs in North Vietnam and began deployment of American troops to directly combat the Viet Cong.
Although there were numerous factors that contributed to the drafting of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the two consecutive ‘attacks’ on the Turner Joy and Maddox were the most significant, and as stated by Lyndon B. Johnson himself drove the US to finally take action on Vietnam after the numerous years of tension between the nations. This essay will study the two main schools of thought; the argument that the United States intentionally lied about or exaggerated the events that took place in the Gulf of Tonkin, or whether America’s actions were politically justified and the attacks weren’t faked or mispresented, meaning the US had valid reason to draft the resolution and increase their involvement in Vietnam.
Investigation
The First Attack – August 2nd, 1964 | USS Maddox
Map Chart of USS Maddox Patrol Route, 1964. |
The image above is a map chart depicting the patrol route of the USS Maddox and Turner Joy, dating from July 30th to August 2nd, 1964. On the 31st of July, the USS Maddox embarked into the Gulf of Tonkin on a path nearing the North-Vietnamese coast further North towards the Tanh Hóa province. The black dots situated on the progressing direction line represent her location on a date and time, which is outlined every 24 hours. On August 2nd the Maddox continued back South of the Gulf when it was claimed to have been attacked by 3 PT boats at 16:07. PT boats, short for patrol torpedo boats, were torpedo-armed attack vessels used by both North Vietnam and the United States during the conflict, due to their maneuverability and inexpensive production4. The Maddox engaged with gun crews firing heavy shells at the perusing boats, who responded with two missed torpedoes and the first boat, being the only one equipped with external weaponry opened fire with low-caliber guns at the destroyer. The Maddox promptly retreated South and contacted the nearby USS Ticonderoga, an American aircraft carrier that promptly deployed four F8 fighter jets with orders to “attack and destroy the PT boats”5. 2 of the 3 fleeing boats maneuvered evasively yet still suffering from heavy damages, whilst the last was left dead in the water engulfed in flames after the numerous firing runs carried out by the F8’s.
Contextual understanding of the USS Maddox’s actions
Opposers
of the resolution amongst the American public believed there was
malintent on the US side as the first shots fired in the confrontation
were by the destroyer. However, in response to the intel received from
the earlier SIGINT message, Captain Herrick “ordered gun crews to open
fire if the fast-approaching trio closed to within 10,000 yards of the
destroyer”6, as he was aware of North Vietnamese intent due to the
hostility towards the US following the OPLAN 34A raid on Hon Me. It is
important to analyse the smaller details of the conflict such as the
Captain’s orders to his crew, as they could provide information that can
help better understand the intentions of the countries involved. In a
discussion with an ex-naval officer Joseph A. Doyle, who served 9 years
in the US navy, I received perspective on US naval procedures and
operations that can help better contextualize the situation that
unfolded in the Gulf. Mr. Doyle mentions that in the context of naval
operations, 10,000 yards is a relatively short distance for two military
ships to be in from each other, and commonly US ships would set a much
larger distance to open fire in the interest of the crew’s safety, in
order to attack before the threat can get in a dangerous range. In the
context of the actual conflict involving the destroyer and the PT boats
the danger of the short distance becomes even more prominent, as 10,000 yards
was certainly in range for the Vietnamese boats’ torpedoes. Herrick’s
orders could therefore be perceived having been made with tremendous
caution, as the short proximity of the ordered firing distance implies
that Herrick was well aware of the political consequences that would
follow an engagement with the Vietnamese patrol boats, and was willing
to put himself and his crew at an increased risk to avoid conflict. This
is further supported by the numerous warning shots the USS Maddox gave
before attacking, giving the patrol boats plentiful time to avoid the
conflict.
Was the North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox justified?
The
two destroyers were not deployed with intent to ensure the safety of
the other ships or act as a threat to North Vietnam, but instead were
set to patrol for recognizance as a part of Operation Plan 34A. OPLAN
34A was a highly classified program that consisted of covert actions
against the DRV involving naval sabotage operations7, which primarily
consisted of South Vietnamese raids on DRV outposts that ran radar
transmitters and controlled communications with Viet Cong naval
supplies. These raids were crucial for South Vietnam’s coastal and
maritime control, however their forces suffered heavy casualties from
these operations and often resulted in raiders being captured or killed.
The United States, whilst not directly deploying units in aid of OPLAN
34A used their destroyers to intercept DRV signals (SIGINT gathering) in
DESOTO patrols, which were patrols with the tactical purpose to
intercept North Vietnamese communications to then relay it to South
Vietnam. An extremely sensitive document which was only declassified in
2005 outlined the orders to the DESOTO patrols: “Locate and identify all
coastal radar transmitters, note all navigation aids along the DVR’s
(Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s) coastline, and monitor the Vietnamese
junk fleet for a possible connection to DRV/Viet Cong maritime supply
and infiltration routes”8. The United States only ran recognizance, and
did not directly involve themselves with the operation as it would be
perceived as collusion with South Vietnam, which would have resulted in
substantial consequences and would have compromised numerous other
secret operations. However, the confidentiality of the United States’
involvement with OPLAN
34A was compromised on the night of July 30th, as the USS Maddox
continued its DESOTO patrols along the North Vietnamese coast when it
got caught in the vicinity of a South Vietnamese raid on the island of
Hon Me.
Following the attack, North Vietnam filed a complaint with
the International Control Commission that “The US and South Vietnamese
administrations sent two naval vessels to shell Hon Ngu and Hon Me
islands”, and deemed the DESOTO patrols having been an “enemy incursion
into the Gulf of Tonkin”9. The US justified the patrols as its assertion
of the right of freedom of the seas, however this premise was certainly
not supported by the US’ actions in the gulf. The Maddox’s patrol
course drove entirely through the coast of North Vietnam, which was not
confirmed to have been in international waters. Having said this, the
territorial laws were quite ambiguous, as each side perceived them
differently. The map above illustrates the conflicting territorial
claims that took place during the crisis, which is an important issue to
address as both sides used their differing claims to justify their
actions. Neither the Maddox nor the Turner Joy approached closer than 4
miles from the islands, or 8 miles from the mainland. The US assumed
that North Vietnams territorial waters only extended three miles; in
which case, no violations took place. However, if North Vietnam claimed
twelve miles, like China and the Soviet Union, then in the eyes of the
DRV there were indeed violations. Although North Vietnam did not appear
to have made any formal claims regarding the extent of their territorial
waters before August in 1964, a week before the Gulf incidents there
was a complaint on South Vietnamese warships violating North Vietnamese
territories, which were located about 9 miles off the mainland10. Whilst
the US did not seem to have been infringing on any established
territorial claims due to the lack thereof, the American ships were
still knowingly adding to the sensitivity of an already fragile
conflict. Additionally, America’s involvement with OPLAN 34A certainly
justifies the attacks, as they were supporting South Vietnamese raids on
DRV outposts that crippled their radar transmitters and naval
communications. Whilst the North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox may
not have been the optimum decision in the
interest of reducing political conflict, it was still justified as
America’s secret operations and collusion with South Vietnam imposed a
significant threat to North Vietnam.
Did the United States intentionally provoke the Gulf of Tonkin incident?
One
controversial yet not uncommon perspective entails the US having
purposely provoked North Vietnam with their hostile naval presence in
the Gulf, as a means to get further involved in Vietnam whilst avoiding
diplomatic backlash they most certainly would have received had Vietnam
not been ‘painted’ as an aggressive threat in need of control. An
example supporting this statement can be taken from the OPLAN
operations. As stated by military historian Robert J. Hanyok; “The OPLAN
reflected the current American strategy of escalation of the war
through graduated response. The U.S. established four levels of actions;
It began with harassment attacks and operations, whose cumulative
effect, though labeled "unspectacular," was to make Hanoi aware of them
to the extent it would allocate forces to counter them”11. US
involvement was to be kept minimal in the early stages of the OPLAN
operation, in order to achieve the “non-attribution” status in case
North Vietnam publicized the raids. Therefore, no Americans were allowed
to participate in the actual raids, and only provided external
support12. On August 1st, 1964, the naval intercept site in the
Philippines reported that a DRV naval base informed their naval units
(what is understood to have been one of the attacking PT boats) of the
Maddox’s patrols on the coast, and that it had been “decided to fight
the enemy tonight when you receive directing orders”13. Captain Herrick
of the USS Maddox was informed of the DRV communication, and was warned
of a potential attack. Herrick then immediately requested the Seventh
Fleet for the termination of the Desoto mission, that “if the
intelligence was correct, continuing was an unacceptable risk”14. He was
however overruled by admirals Moorer and Sharp, and ordered to resume
the operation. The behavior of the naval commanders and divide between
Captain Herrick
and his superior leaders of the operation further supports the premise
that the US intended on provoking a conflict with North Vietnam. An
attack on the Maddox would allow the US to dig its claws deeper into
Vietnam, whilst still holding a “non- attribution” status as further
involvement could be deemed necessary retaliation to the attack.
Throughout the night (after the original warning) DRV communications
were continuously monitored. Intercepted communist messages informed
that the North Vietnamese continued to track the destroyer. The next
morning, the DRV ordered numerous PT patrol boats to begin concentrating
towards the Maddox’s position, all of which supplied by the Soviet
Union and armed with 12.7mm machine guns and primed torpedoes. Having
received this intercepted information, the NSA sent a message to the
MACV and Commander 7th informing on the new intelligence and warning an
imminent attack. The Maddox, however, was not on the distribution of
this message, and never received these critical warnings before the
attack15. It was crucial for the United States to appear uninvolved, as
launching a campaign against North Vietnam without a justified cause
would be a political nightmare and would have yielded little public
support. In an interview on BBC’s War, Lies, and Audiotape, Historian
Frederik Logevall discussed the United States’ necessity to win public
opinion: “(President Lyndon B.) Johnson said in the spring of ’64; You
can have all the military power in the world, but if you can’t win the
thing politically then you’re not going to
succeed”16. It wasn’t only historians that were suspicious of America’s
intentions in the Gulf; many American politicians were similarly
skeptical.
In an archived newsletter from The New York Times September
19th, 1964, the incident was first reported to the American public. The
article makes mention of skepticism from political figureheads; Senator
Barry Goldwater, the Republican Presidential candidate, was said at
first to have endorsed the retaliation. Later, however, he referred to
the “so-called” crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin and accused the Democrats
of having arranged crisis for political profit17. This article provides
crucial context on American political behavior. This newsletter was
published over a month and a half after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, yet
contains very little information on the conflict as “The Administration
limited itself to a brief statement acknowledging that an action has
occurred involving American warships”18. The NSA heavily restricting and limiting information on the incident even months later further exhibits their drive to control public opinion.New York Times Newsletter, September 19th 1964.
International
public being made aware of the United States’ true involvement in
Vietnam with the OPLAN operations would result in serious political
consequences for America. Public skepticism of the GoT incident can also
be seen in The New York Times’s
newsletter simply by its content; much of the article focuses on
suspicion towards President Johnson and his actions in the gulf. Whilst
this alone provides us with key information on the American political
climate at the time, understanding the political context further
supports the claim of American deceit in the Gulf; The New York Times
was (and still is) a democratic newspaper. For them to publicly
criticize and condemn President Johnson, who, not only was a democrat,
but was also heavily endorsed by the NYT during his campaign, shows how
skeptical and mistrusting even the ‘famously patriotic’ American public
was of the US’s justification for their actions in the Gulf of Tonkin19.
The
United States was well aware of how North Vietnam would react to their
operations. On August 4th, two days after the attack, the CIA’s John
McCone bluntly told President Johnson, “The North Vietnamese are
reacting defensively to our attacks on their off-shore islands”20. In an
archived audio tape of a conversation with President Johnson, secretary
of defense McNamara discusses how their covert operations managed to
successfully provoke a North Vietnamese reaction:
I think I should
also, Mr. President, explain these covert operations. There's no
question of what that has bearing on us. Friday night, as you probably
know, we had four boats manned by Vietnamese or other nationals attack
two islands. We probably shot up a radar station with a few other
miscellaneous buildings and the following 24 hours after that with this
destroyer in the same area undoubtedly led them to connect the two
events. (see appendix 1)
Furthermore, what then later became the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution was drafted by the Johnson administration in
Honolulu two months before any incident took place21. It is almost
implausible to fully confirm that the United States truly did
intentionally provoke the incident on the 2nd of August, 1964. However,
given the now accessible audio
files of President Johnson’s conversations, the publicized OPLAN
operations and aggregate support from historians, it can be said that
the United States likely provoked the incident intentionally to further
fuel its campaign against North Vietnam, by gaining public support and
political immunity.
The Second Attack – August 4th, 1964 | Turner Joy
The August 4th Attack: Was it Faked?
Today
there are two main premises of the incident that are undisputed; The
first attack on the Maddox did occur, the second did not. We now know of
the misunderstanding that took place on the 4th of August with NSA
files called the Pentagon Papers (declassified in 2011) stating an
attack never took place, with the panic being a product of faulty radars
and poor communication. This information however is not necessarily new
or significant. The vital question here is; did the US fabricate the
event to justify their advances against North Vietnam? Or was it truly
just a negligent misunderstanding? With hundreds of classified files
from the NSA being released in the past few years, the overall consensus
leans towards the former; it was fabricated. While McNamara claimed the
SIGNIT intelligence intercepted North Vietnamese messages involving
planned attacks against the destroyer, we now know this is far from the
truth. Robert J. Hanyok, military historian who reviewed these
intercepted DRV messages, found that none of the Vietnamese boats were
ordered to attack the destroyers; they were simply given towing missions
to retrieve the destroyed PT boats from the prior incident on the 2nd.
“So in reality”, says Hanyok, “none of the boats named in the original
Marine warning participated in anything but salvage efforts”22.
Additionally, even if the incident was not fabricated, US officials were
still well aware that the attack never occurred long before drafting
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (which the US said was the result of the
attack on August 4th). In a recently declassified file of the Pentagon
Papers from the office of the secretary of defense, Robert McNamara
notes how confirming evidence of the attack being nonexistent was
received before the US reprisal was launched (see appendix 2). This
meant that the US Congress, including President Johnson and secretary of
defense Robert McNamara, were well aware that there was indeed no attack
on the 4th of August, yet still sought to push their Gulf of Tonkin
resolution using the ‘phantom attack’ as a means of obtaining both
public and international support. Although the intercepted DRV messages
still indicate that the attack was indeed fabricated, the Pentagon
Papers still show that Congress would have used any means necessary to
adopt the resolution, whether by purposely ignoring evidence of the
attack having not occurred, or faking it all together.
Conclusion
The
events that took place in the Gulf of Tonkin can be compared to the
Gleiwitz incident that occurred in August 1939; a false flag operation
staged by Nazi Germany for a justification to invade Poland. This
investigation has sought to understand if the US had justified reason to
adopt the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The evidence and arguments
considered has led me to the conclusion that America was, indeed, not
justified to adopt the resolution. This is supported by North Vietnam’s
attack on the USS Maddox being legitimate instance of defense, whereas
America’s patrols and retaliation were evidently planned to provoke a
reaction from the DRV. Furthermore, even if the attack was not
fabricated, US officials were well aware that the attack on August 4th
never occurred weeks before the resolution was presented, further
indicating that the US Congress wanted retribution against North Vietnam
to give President Johnson authority to enter Vietnam’s civil war.
As
described by Hanyok, the GoT incident reflected the American strategy
of escalation of the war through graduated response. The incident
happening over 50 years ago does not rob it from its value, as it gives
valuable insight on modern American politics. Like Barack Obama with
Syria, Lyndon B. Johnson was a president who felt “the fierce urgency of
now” to act on global dilemmas that conflict with the American
ideology. Historian Frederik Logevall quoting President Johnson, “I
don’t think we can win in Vietnam and I don’t think we can get out. You
can have all the military power in the world, but if you can’t win the
thing politically then you’re not going to succeed”23. Whilst we now
know the truth behind the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it makes us question
today’s conflicts that America is hiding behind. Fifty years later we know that the spark for the Vietnam war was a façade. Will it be another fifty before we know the truth about Iraq?
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Reality. 10 Radio Hanoi, 28 July 1964 (New York, Rand McNally, 1969).
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Center, 1986).
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DESTROYERS OPEN FIRE AGAIN IN TONKIN GULF; TARGETS VANISH; No American
Losses In Clash Off Coast of North Vietnam.” The New York Times, 19
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Appendices
Appendix 124
Partial Audio Tape of Johnson & McNamara Transcript:
August, 1964
Washington D.C., United States
McNamara:
I think I should also, Mr. President, explain these covert operations.
There's no question of what that has bearing on us. Friday night, as you
probably know, we had four boats manned by Vietnamese or other
nationals attack two islands. We probably shot up a radar station with a
few other miscellaneous buildings and the following 24 hours after that
with this destroyer in the same area undoubtedly led them to connect
the two events.
Appendix 2
Declassified Pentagon Papers “Vietnam Task Force” Office of the Secretary of Defense:
Created: 1967
Declassified: 2011
The Pentagon, Virginia, United States
“While
there was some momentary uncertainty about the actuality of the second
attack on August 4th, confirming evidence of the attack was received
before the U.S. reprisal was launched.” – R.M.
Why did the US Intervene in the Vietnam War between 1946 and 1956?
Militarily, following up by the defeat of French, the French was compelled to leave Vietnam which would leave a power void for Ho Chi Minh, a communist, to take over easily. In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, 1954, 16,000 French troops were either killed or captured by the Viet Minh. It convinced the French government to leave Indochina as soon as possible. It was like handed the part of Vietnam which was under French's control to Communism, and the US would not allow it because of the Truman Doctrine--Containment. Also, the US was heavily involved in the French military financially, even the Viet Minh Supreme Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap said during a interview in 1996, "We see the Dien Bien Phu victory as the victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of the Americans --because in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 80 percent of the war expenditures were spent by the Americans...So the Dien Bien Phu defeat was a defeat for both the French and the Americans...When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it." For both of the sake of containment and honour, the US intervened in that Civil War in 1954.
Internationally, the USA was very unhappy with the Geneva Agreement of 1954. It declared the ceasefire between the French and the Viet Minh, Laos and Cambodia became independent state and Vietnam was divided into north and south temporarily by the 17th parallel. An election would be held in two years which would unit the north and south again. The North was ruled by a communist and the south was ruled by a dictator. Between these two, the USA chose to support the dictator. However, the population of the North was already outnumbered the South's, and a lot of South Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh. The threat of Communism took over Vietnam increased dramatically. Thus, the US set its mind to help the South.
Politically, President Eisenhower issued the 'Domino Theory' in 1954, which showed why the US thought that Vietnam must not become a Communist country. Eisenhower said, "You
have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly." The first domino was S. Vietnam, then Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and India. It was just like the dominos of the Korean War, Korea, Japan, Philippines. That was why the US determined to get involved, because it could not afford the first domino to fall. As the Secretary of Defence at that time, Robert McNamara, said during a interview in June 1996 , "[The domino theory] was the primary factor motivating the actions of both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations, without any qualification. It was put forward by President Eisenhower in 1954, very succinctly: If the West loses control of Vietnam, the security of the West will be in danger. "The dominoes will fall," in Eisenhower's words...The loss of Vietnam would trigger the loss of Southeast Asia, and conceivably even the loss of India, and would strengthen the Chinese and the Soviet position across the world, weakening the security of Western Europe and weakening the security of North America. This was the way we viewed it." This clearly shows the reason why the US intervened in the War, it was because of the fear to the accretion of the Communism.
From the political, military and international views, they all showed that the reason why the US intervened in the Vietnam War was because it was afraid of the spreading of the Communism and wanted to put a stop to it, contain it.
Escalation of the US-Vietnam Conflict.
Why did US citizens change their opinion on the Vietnam War as it progressed?
Tet Offensive : In 1968, the National Liberation Front and Vietcong launched a surprise attack against American and South Vietnamese forces on the eve of the lunar New Year's Day. This surprise attack is known as the Tet Offensive and many people viewed this as a turning point in the Vietnam War.
Militarily, the Tet Offensive showed the significance of Vietcong/Vietminh's military power and nowhere in South Vietnam was safe. On 31st of January 1968, the simultaneous attack the towns and cities in South Vietnam began and this went on for 3 days. Over 35 towns and cities including 13 provincial capitals were seized and shockingly, the US embassy in Saigon was invaded. The National Liberation Front and Vietcong sent more than 80,000 soldiers for the Tet Offensive and after 3days, more than half of its soldiers killed so they had to move back to North Vietnam to retreat itself. Although, Vietminh failed to remove the US troops out of Vietnam but, they showed their military power and it showed that nowhere in Vietnam was safe including the US embassy in Saigon.
Politically, the Tet Offensive made the Vietnam War more significant in US that it became one of the key issues in US politics during the presidential election year. The US politics were basically divided into two sides, the one for withdrawing troops out of Vietnam and the other for giving more support to the Vietnam War. In March 1968, one month after the Tet Offensive, the president Johnson announced that he wouldn't seek re-election, which left Robert Kennedy and Humphrey as a candidate for the Democratic side for the presidential election. Then in June 1968, Robert Kennedy was assassinated and McCarthy replaced his place. However, McCarthy failed to deliver his speech for his candidacy that Humphrey became the candidate for Democrats. On the other hand, Nixon was a candidate for the Republican side for the presidential election. Humphrey had an idea of continuing Johnson's policy of commitment to the war and Nixon had an idea of withdrawing troops out of Vietnam. Nixon won the election in November by a slight difference. The Tet Offensive made the Vietnam War so big issue that it became one of the most important topics in the US politics.
Socially, many people viewed the Tet Offensive as a sign showing that the US was actually losing the war. The US military have always reported that they were winning the war and in December 1967, Walt Rostow stated, "Their casualties are going up at a rate they cannot sustain ... I see light at the end of the tunnel.", but after the Tet Offensive, the public became skeptic about the reports from the US military because suddenly, it seemed like they were losing the war. So, more and more people were involved in the protest against the Vietnam War in the US.
Economically, the US gave more economic support to the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive. After the Tet Offensive, the president Johnson raised the income tax to give more support to the Vietnam War. It was used to recover its military and to make its military power stronger. The US's involvement in Vietnam was now costing more than 66 million dollars a day which is a lot of money compared to before. (1960 - 180.3 million 1963 - 186.0 million 1966 - 792.2 million) Since the Tet Offensive increased the income tax, the poverty in the US was exacerbated.
Why did the US fail to save South Vietnam from Communism?
In front of Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum in Hanoi.
The US failed to save the South from Communism due to many interconnected reasons. America did not have the ordinary Vietnamese on their side, and like the French and Japanese before, they were seen as 'foreign occupiers'. Furthermore, America faced much controversy over the war within its own borders, and therefore was fighting a war unpopular to its own people and the people which they tried to 'save'. Militarily the US failed to stop guerilla warfare and committed many atrocities against the Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh (the leader of the North Vietnamese) on the other hand was a person supported by a lot of the Vietnamese (including many in the South), because he gave the people what they wanted, which were to rid the country of foreign occupiers once an for all, and to give the normal person land.
The biggest plausible reason the US's failure to save communism, was because the people were not on their side. Day after day more and more Vietnamese joined the North, and America was gradually left on its own. This was because America supported the Diem regime in South Vietnam, a catholic repressive government system, and a puppet state to America. For example the Diem regime refused to allow other religious practice other than Catholism. It seemed very obvious why America failed to gain the support of the people when they were allies with the government of Diem. Nowadays in Iraq (though not as big of a war as in Vietnam), a similar situation has occurred where the majority of the Iraqi people are against American occupation, mainly because of cultural reasons such as, religion, race, lifestyle etc. America could and probably would have had a much better chance of winning the Vietnam War if they had the support of the populous.
Since 1887 Vietnam was occupied by the French, the Japanese and finally the Americans. The Vietnamese people were tired of being ruled by people that did not share the same qualities as they did. For example their religion was significantly different from the US, America being predominately Christian and Vietnam being predominately Buddha. America was seen as an imperialist country, fighting only because they were much 'stronger'. A Vietnamese reporter named Lai Chou ling said that no matter how big America is, they will never be able to control the majority, for it is the majority that will eventually rid this country of its foreign occupiers. America couldn't have possibly saved the Vietnamese from communism simply because they didn't want to be saved, and much preferred living under the communist regime of the North. Furthermore another reason why they were seen as imperialists was because a lot of Vietnamese were forced to move away from their original home (home to where there parents, and grand parents were buried and so on). This further angered the Vietnamese because they did not have many options, only to abide by the rules of the country's new "leaders". The Vietnamese people simply couldn't care less if a communist regime from their own cultural ideas was in power, as long as it was not another rich foreign country fighting for what was clearly not theirs.
As the war progressed America faced similar hostility from the public at home. People were tired of seeing the war progress, a war that was unpopular with the Vietnamese people, a war that had no clear sign of ending, a war which imposed a drafting system (In which most were minority groups, and people who were not in college) where a lot of the more economically active families were able to escape the system, and finally a war where thousands of Americans died for what ended out to be no reason at all. Protesters outside the White House held signs up such as LBJ! LBJ! How many kids have you killed today? Moreover America's biggest anti-war protest took place in Washington DC where hundreds of thousands of people protested about many issues to do with the war (e.g. The drafting system, the pentagon papers, which in turn created a lot of the public cynicism towards the government, etc ) for days on end. With this sort of hostility faced at home and abroad it was only a matter of time before the US had no other option than to withdraw.
Militarily America simply was never trained for such an extensive guerilla war. Though the North was terribly out numbered and suffered many more casualties than America (Vietnamese casualties were (both North and South) over 2 million, and American casualties numbered 56,000). However even though the casualties were different by a big amount, most of the war was fought on ground by infantry units. America could only call in air strikes occasionally, and the jungle's rugged terrain made it impossible to use tanks to fight their battles. Furthermore America guerrilla tactics seemed unmatched to that of the Vietcong. Even America's elite soldiers, the Green Berets (today's equivalent of the Delta Force or the British SAS) were sent to help the South against the North, however their training in America proved non valuable against the guerrillas and eventually, were forced to pull out. Though the military of the US seemed impregnable against guerrilla attack forces, the sheer geography of rural Vietnam proved much different.
The US military, along with the help of the media, were very badly portrayed. After stories of how American troops reportedly raped all the women of a village and then killed the rest of its inhabitance leaked out, huge outrage all around the world was voiced. The British (who were against the Vietnam War) were appalled by this and questioned the American military infrastructure; wondering how such crimes could be committed especially when it was against the people they were there for in the First place. From a US military POV one could say that this was justifiable under the circumstances. This was because the villagers were "supposedly" supporting the North Vietnamese. However such claims true or false could not support this point of view simply because America is the so called bearer of freedom, and personal rights. Once these bad atrocities were made public, the Vietnam War was not supported within the US or in Vietnam.
Ho Chi Minh was the light at the end of the tunnel for the Vietnamese. He was seen by many as a popular, caring leader that gave the ordinary person what they had wanted from the beginning, a Vietnamese leader. Under his communist ideas he insured the ordinary person land (not just the select few). People were willing to fight and die for him, because it was an actual cause. Furthermore it was his popularity and guerilla tactics that saw him to victory.
In conclusion America clearly failed to save the South from Communist occupation. This was due to many reasons, many of which were triggered by the US. America was clearly the unpopular side in the war and could not over come the North because of the lack of support from the South. Even the American public, towards the later years of the war, were very against the American Government's objectives, and were seen as enemies of the State. Ho Chi Minh on the other hand was highly supported within Vietnam and thus these reasons state why Vietnam could not and would not be saved from Communism.
Why the US lost in Vietnam
The Vietnam War, America's longest war, had ended up in failure for the US. At that time, and until today, the US was the strongest nation on the planet and Vietnam was one of the poorest and a primary industrial country, where peasantry was in majority. The war, more officially, began from 1964 and ended in 1972 and the main reasons for losing the war was underestimation of VC, Ho Chin Minh Trail, Vietnamese people, protests back in the US, efficiency of US troops, cultural differences, and US casualties.
The US has underestimated Vietcong and the NLF. They had supply from the USSR and China, such as MiG fighters that shoot down more than 700 airplanes and the leader of VC, Ho Chi Minh, saw how Mao used the guerrilla tactics. In early 1968, the Tet offensive has proven that 'No Where', 'Nothing', 'No one' was safe in South Vietnam at 'Anytime'. It came to that Saigon, capital city of South Vietnam where had most of the US bases and the US embassy, had been attacked by Vietcong. Obviously the US had underestimated them. Nonetheless, they were not trained to fight in jungles against guerrillas, even Green Berets were not practical in this environment, thus they, militarily, had not much advantages. Not only the Ho Chi Minh Trail but Vietcong also had Cu Chi tunnel system which US troops never figured out.
North Vietnamese, and the local people supplied needs and ordnance to Vietcong, mainly from North Vietnam, through Ho Chi Minh trail. US airplanes have never stopped try bombing this trail but they've never succeeded and figure out where they are. They were not through high ways or big roads but through farmlands which could hardly been seen on airplanes. Also, it covered Cambodia, which made decisions even hard to make. When Nixon decided to bomb Cambodia, soon he realized it was a mistake by strong Cambodian defense and protests back in the US. Vietnamese, through this, had successfully supplied the Vietcong who are fighting in South Vietnam.
Back in the US, there were protests everywhere. Beginning from Johnson presidency, people doubted if the war was winning. They for the first time saw the TV broadcast from the battlefield and saw how people were killed. "LBJ LBJ how many people did you kill today" was one of their slogan. They've protested over economic issues, casualties, US tactics in Vietnam including Search and Destroy, Operation Ranch Hand, Air attacks etc. By 1970, the Peace Movement had support from all sections of society and no government could ignore it. It got attention from everybody when Security guards killed 4 protesting students in May 1970 at Kent State.
After informing US troops are withdrawing since 1968, those who left in Vietnam had low morale. There were deep questions about the efficiency of them. They started taking drugs, raping, not fighting much, counting the days until the tour was over.
One of the biggest difficulties was to find out the Vietcong amongst Vietnamese. It was hard and they introduced Strategic Helmets where they were kept in a specific area surrounded by the US troops. They had to leave their ancestors' tombs, farmlands, beliefs and houses. Coca Cola, chewing gum, ice creams could not buy off their losses.
By 1968, before the Offensive, US casualties was over 15,000 and keep increasing rapidly. Especially during the Tet Offensive, nearly 1500 US troops were killed every week. This made low morale and huge protests back in the US, which made the war even harder to fight.
With these causes, the US lost the war in Vietnam. There was fully mass back in the US, demonstrations, unstable politics beginning from resign of Johnson, assassination of two Kennedys, Martin Luther King Junior. In the end, US began withdrawing its troops from 1968~1972, began Vietnamisation, however, South Vietnam was taken over by Vietcong, they lost the war and failed to save another "Domino".
After the death of the president, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was appointed president of the United States. Johnson felt that the U.S. should stay involved in Vietnam to prove the U.S. kept its commitments and could stop communism aggression. August 2, 1964 the USS Maddox was off the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, when in was fired upon by North Vietnam coastal gunboats. On August 4 the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy both reported attacks from North Vietnam forces. Johnson decided to escalate the war. He ordered bombing of different North Vietnam targets. Congress soon authorized the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president authority “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Johnson came up with a strategy to take control of Vietnam called Operation Rolling Thunder. The operation would consist of bombing of North Vietnam, more air power, and increase the number of ground troops. In June 1965, U.S. advisors were sent into combat. This would shift the U.S. “from helping the Vietnam people help themselves, to fighting a full-scale war on and over the land mass of Asia.”
There are many things people blame America’s defeat on. For one thing the North Vietnam and Vietcong armies were much stronger than anyone anticipated. Their guerilla warfare tactics was something the U.S. soldiers were not used to. The fact that there were no clear combat zones also made fighting confusing. The Vietcong also would dress as peasants to trick the soldiers before they would attack. This made it hard for soldiers to distinguish between the enemy and friendly civilians. The Vietcong was also fighting for a cause they were willing to fight to the death for. They had heroic determination and fighting spirit. The American soldiers on the other hand didn’t always have confidence in their goals, and some felt the war was unwinnable. There was no direct threat to their own country and there was no support from the general population. The soldiers were also angered by the government lies they had to witness. Those who returned from war joined the forefront of the antiwar movements. They began wearing peace symbols and other signs of their digression. The African Americans were especially opposed to fighting “a racist war, in a racist army, for a racist government.” Military discipline broke down, and “fragging” began. Fragging was when soldiers would attack their officers, usually by tossing fragments of grenades into the officers sleeping quarters. Some soldiers also openly refused their orders. The military also experienced financial corruption, theft, murder, and suicide. All these factors seriously hurt the U.S. army.
Beside the tank that liberated Saigon from American control |
The war also had effects on the economy. In the beginning the war spending increased the economy, but soon the cost of war caught up to the United States. The budget had to be expanded. The cost of living rose greatly between the years of 1965 to 1975. The spending of the war was about 150 billion dollars in all. Prices of goods had increased 16% by 1970. Inflation occurred wiping out almost all economic gains, and wages were lowered, leading to many strikes. President Johnson finally asked Congress for extra taxes to help pay for the war. Congress agreed as long as he cut domestic spending. By 1961, 25 billion dollars per year were being spent on the war effort. Business leaders thought it best to end the war than to cause more civil rights movements, strikes, and youth movements against the government.