A. Plan of Investigation – 151 words
When did Adolf Hitler first exhibit anti-Semitic views? This investigation will examine the origins of Hitler’s anti Semitism, considered herein as “actions and attitudes against Jews based on the belief that Jews are uniquely inferior, [...] by their very nature,”[1] focussing primarily upon three primary sources from Hitler himself. These become increasingly public over time, starting with what is considered his “first anti-Semitic writing”[2] – a letter written in 1919. Another crucial source from the following year will be a speech delivered at the Hofbräuhaus in which he publicly expresses his anti-Semitism from personal initiative. Finally, ‘Mein Kampf’, both political testament and auto-biography nationally published in Munich in 1925, will be analysed. English, French, and German secondary sources, such as August Kubizek (described as “a personal – and exclusive – friend” to Hitler) will be interpreted, to such respected authorities as Kershaw and Rosenbaum, to test Hitler’s personal writings against his own conscious bias.[3]
B. Summary of Evidence - 439 words
Hitler first attended Linz Realschule at the age of 11 in May 1900 – three months after his brother’s death[4], followed by his father’s in 1903. The identification of his mother’s incurable cancer was announced by the family’s private doctor - Dr. Eduard Bloch, a Jew[5]. Her death in 1907 was followed by Hitler’s move to Vienna to begin his 6 year old dream, at the Academy of Fine Arts: to become an artist[6]. In 1909 he faced failure in the artistic examination[7] however in 1910 Reinhold Hanisch acted as a salesman for Hitler’s first artworks – postcards, paintings, and advertising posters - first selling on February 9th 1910, until 1913[8].
In 1914, Hitler was rejected by the Austrian army for being “too weak”[9]. As WWI broke out, he was accepted in the German army, after volunteering.[10] Hitler was a successful corporal during the war[11], proven by the iron cross he was awarded.[12] After WWI, in March 1919, Hitler returned to Munich where he was confronted with the communist ‘Münchener Räterepublik’, which initiated his political engagements[13]. Within the Bavarian revolution of the Räterepublik, “the notion of an international Jewish conspiracy could be made to sound plausible”[14]. In June 1919 in the Reichswehr-Gruppenkommando 4, sponsored by the military, he was trained as a soldier, taking a “political re-education course for demobilizing soldiers after the Munich uprising.”[15] He joined the ‘Deutsche Arbeiter Partei’ in the summer of 1919, in which he soon took a leading role[16] meeting influential figures such as Alfred Rosenberg[17] and Dietrich Eckart[18]. In September 1919 he was chosen to answer a letter of Adolph Gemlich, in regard to the role of Jews in Germany, in the name of the Bavarian Reichswehr[19] - as Karl Mayr[20] considered him an “expert” on the question.[21]
While Hitler began to develop the culture of his speeches in 1920[22], which he explained later in Mein Kampf: „people are influenced less by the written word than by the spoken word“. Between April and August the Jew gradually became the focus of his discourses, until the 13th of August where he presented “Warum sind wir Antisemiten?”[23] Hitler, developing into a significant figure of the DAP, was a main transmitter of ideas of the party’s program[24] and was chosen chairman on July 29 1921, giving him ultimate authority.[25]In February 1924, the DAP was renamed the ‘National Sozialistische DAP’, publishing the “25-Punkte Programm” – in which Jews are firstly referred to as foreign.[26] Points 4, 5, and 6, define a “Staatsbürger”, however clearly present the “Jude” as non-fitting to the German people: “Kein Jude kann daher Volksgenosse sein.”[27]
C. Evaluation of Sources – 450 words
The ‘Gemlich Brief’, by Adolf Hitler, written on the 16 of September 1919.
Karl Mayr chose Hitler to reply to a letter aiming to clarify the so-called Jewish question to German soldier Adolph Gemlich[28] given Hitler was “so passionate” on the subject and “had done so well” in the military’s re-education course[29], and also because he was seen as an “expert regarding Karl Marx’s work ‘On the Jewish Question’”[30]. Written in Munich, it called for 'rational' anti-Semitism, respecting a planned idea of resolving the “Jewish Question” [31]. Rabbi Marvin Hier[32] declared it "[t]he most significant historic document ever acquired by the Simon Wiesenthal Center” as the first documented and published source in which Hitler displays anti-Semitism[33]. Written shortly after the initiation of Hitler’s political activities for the military, it already portrays extreme views later reflected in Nazism and his ’25-Punkte-Programm’. However, Hitler was ordered to write it[34], forcing him to respect certain boundaries and ideas followed by the military; this source thus is not a voluntary personal statement. Furthermore, it is argued that Hitler follows the diction resembling Gottfried Feder’s, to prove his rationalised presumptions scientifically, to be more persuasive, but also less reliable[35], as this possibly hints towards the weakness of his personal ideas.
‘Mein Kampf’ by Adolf Hitler, published in Munich by the Eher Verlag in 1925.
Written whilst imprisoned in Landsberg Prison after the failure of the so-called “Hitlerputsch”, this source presents Hitler’s ideology in an almost autobiographical structure. The purpose was, as stated in the prologue, to “clarify the aims of the movement”, “sketch a picture of its development”, “depict his own development”[36], and portray his personal convictions about Germany and its National Socialist future, free of Jews[37]. He himself also addresses “not the foreign, but the followers of his movement” with his work[38]. Furthermore, he clearly positions himself as a right-wing, authoritarian leader with clear anti-Semitic aims. The date this piece was published is vital, showing that Hitler is attempting to build on the reputation gained from his Putsch. This is an “indispensable source”[39] as it is one of Hitler’s few published works[40]. He highlights the origins of his anti-Semitism, thereby directly giving his answer to this investigation. However, it presents Hitler’s past and himself in a heroic manner[41]. Kershaw argues that it “is inaccurate in detail and coloured in interpretation.”[42]; being the leader of a radical political party will surely have led him to idealise the published ideas, aims, and visions. As Hitler dictated the book to his “loyal follower” Rudolf Hess[43], it is also argued that Hess “helped Hitler to write” Mein Kampf, and “made up for his lack of intelligence, oratorical ability or capacity for political intrigue by a dogged subservience and devotion to Hitler which was as naive as it was sincere.”[44]
D. Analysis – 756 words
Hugh Trevor-Roper, the Author of Hitler’s first biography, regarded Hitler as a “mountebank” – “a figure of public life who practices his charlatanry from a public platform.”, without “real conviction”, which would make any of his actions and decisions inexplicable, as these would only be taken as a matter or popularity and power.[45]. Volker Ullrich supports this idea, by describing how he became a “radical anti-Semite” during the revolution in the Bavarian Räterepublik in Munich between 1918 and 1919, “which he experienced firsthand and first swung very far to the left, then back very far to the right.”[46]
However, Hitler himself claims his anti-Semitism began in Vienna when he “ceased to be a weak-kneed cosmopolitan and become an anti-Semite.”[47] Although there is “no direct evidence” for him being “virulently” anti-Semitic during these years[48], clearly it was then present in Vienna[49]. Anti-Semitism was a subject Hitler studied, led by four political figures[50] described as his “political models” who were all “radical anti-Semites.”[51] This was exacerbated by his rejection by the Academy of Applied Arts in 1909 which led to an intensification of his anti-Semitism[52] for which he blamed “the four of seven Jewish examiners who graded his drawings.”[53] Indeed, Hitler sent a protesting letter to the director of the academy threatening “that the Jews will pay for this.”[54] Yet, this seems illogical if one considers how subsequently Hitler managed to have “amicable” relationships with Jews[55], also seen by the “warm correspondence with his family’s old Jewish doctor”[56], and Jews being the main buyers of his artwork[57]. Fischel argues that at Hitler’s arrival in Vienna “he was already receptive to the racist literature that permeated the right-wing circles” of the “Volkisch nationalist movement.”, therefore arguing that his time there only “strengthened” his anti-Semitism[58], proving “useful as an excuse to justify his personal failures”, but not initiating his “dämonisierung”[59].
Several factors support Fischel’s argument, beginning with the deaths within his family which were said to be the root of his anti-Semitic perspective through finding a responsible for these occurrences[60]. In 1907 due to mistreatment by Dr. Bloch, his beloved mother – who he would protect at every price[61] - died suffering unnecessarily. Bloch was seen as responsible[62], moreover the hate against Bloch is supposedly the origin of a global hatred against Jews[63]. The thankfulness of Hitler towards the doctor e.g.: “Your ever grateful patient Adolf Hitler”[64] is seen as “psychological substitution” for his anti-Semitism[65]; a personal automatism substituting his political convictions. Cornish argues that his hatred originates from Linz Realschule, through interaction with Jewish classmate Ludwig Wittgenstein[66]. Clearly, Hitler does not deny the influence of this relationship as he refers to him in the chapter “Die Judenfrage” of Mein Kampf: “In der Realschule lernte ich wohl einen jüdischen Knaben kennen, der von uns allen mit Vorsicht behandelt wurde,”[67]. In 1945, the “Anthropologische Commission“ discovered that Hitler was a “Bastard of a not very regarded Jew.” Apparently in primary school he was called a “Judenbengel,”[68] an idea Mein Kampf directly contradicts in which he argues that not until he was fourteen to fifteen he came across the word Jew, without seeing them differently from Germans until coming to Vienna[69].
It is the date of the fundamental Gemlich letter[70] which is remarkable, showing by that time a clear awareness of anti-Semitic ideas, yet it does not prove Hitler developed anti-Semitic ideas earlier, leading one to question why they were published in 1919. Weber claims his anti-Semitism developed during WWI[71], however his service in the war is known to have increased but not initiated it[72]. This idea is denied in Mein Kampf in which Hitler argues that during the war he did not wear his Iron Cross (First Class), as it had been recommended by Hugo Guttmann, a “Jewish regimental adjutant”[73], described as "the most terrible coward. He has the Iron Cross, First Class. It was revolting.”[74] - it was an idea he was already convinced of. Yet, the vast majority of his regiment in WWI were Jews with which he met no conflict[75]. Marks argues that his anti-Semitism initiated in 1919 and developed by 1921 through contact with Eckart and Rosenberg, “who discovered Hitler,” which lead him from an “angry but directionless young man” to a “virulent and politically successful racist rabble-rouser.”[76] This is widely reflected in his speeches held in the Munich Hofbräuhaus from 1920, which articulated an Aryan culture, hatred against the Jews as a race, and solutions to their removal[77].
E. Conclusion – 198 words
Ullrich argues that anti-Semitism “was the core” of Hitler’s personality whose actions show him to have been “an obsessive anti-Semite” [78]. While Kershaw warns that we cannot be certain “precisely when and why Hitler became a pathological anti-Semite” [79], one can reasonably estimate how and when this initiated. Clearly he was in contact with Jews in his childhood, with classmates or his family doctor, however there seems to have been more of a general separation of Jews by the society at that stage, rather than a clear focussed developed hatred. Similarly was the influence that Hitler encountered in the trenches during the War, which was a general distinctive view on Jews he met but did not heavily pursue. As Mein Kampf and the Gemlich letter demonstrate, it was Hitler’s life in Vienna which contributed to his anti-Semitism; “before 1919 there is no reliable evidence of the hatred and hostility towards Jews of his later years.”[80] The Gemlich letter certainly shows that by September 1919, Hitler was already known as an expert in this domain, and that by 1920 he held open speeches, convincing audiences of his ideas, which developed further and more explicitly until the publication Mein Kampf.
F. List of Sources:
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Augstein, Rudolf. "Die Abstammung Hitlers." SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG [Hamburg] 1967, 31st ed. Print.
Berding, Helmut, and Olivier Mannoni. Histoire De L'antisémitisme En Allemagne. Paris: Ed. De La Maison Des Sciences De L'Homme, 1991. Print.
Bertin, Francis. Secret, Initiations Et Sociétés Modernes. Paris: L'Âge D'homme, 1991. Print.
Birzer, Tobias. Adolf Hitlers Aufstieg in Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei. 2001: Universität Karlsruhe, n.d. Print.
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Bruppacher, Paul. Adolf Hitler Und Die Geschichte Der NSDAP: Eine Chronik. Norderstedt: on Demand, 2008. Print.
Cornish, Kimberley. The Jew of Linz: Wittgenstein, Hitler, and Their Secret Battle for the Mind. London: Century, 1998. Print.
Davidson, Eugene. The Making of Adolf Hitler: The Birth and Rise of Nazism. Columbia: University of Missouri, 1997. Print.
Degeorge, Gérard. Damas: Des Origines Aux Mamluks. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997. Print.
Dorst, Tankred. Die Münchner Räterepublik. Zeugnisse Und Kommentar. (Frankfurt A.M.): Suhrkamp, 1968. Print.
Dupeux, Louis. Aspects Du Fondamentalisme National En Allemagne De 1890 À 1945: Et Essais Complémentaires. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires De Strasbourg, 2001. Print.
Eberle, Henrik, and Hans-Joachim Neumann. War Hitler Krank?: Ein Abschließender Befund. Köln: Bastei Lübbe, 2011. Print.
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Fischel, Jack. Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1999. Print.
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Fischer, Klaus P. Hitler & America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2011. Print
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MacDonogh, Giles. 1938: Hitler's Gamble. New York: Basic, 2009. Print.
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Marks, Steven G. How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003.Print.
Marrus, Michael Robert. "Part 2: ´The Origins of the Holocaust." Nazi Holocaust. Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989. Print.
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"| Simon Wiesenthal Center." | Simon Wiesenthal Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2013
Was Hitler responsible for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss?
SECTION A: PLAN OF THE
INVESTIGATION
This
investigation will be exploring whether or not Hitler ordered the assassination
of Engelbert Dollfuss. To do so, a variety of sources from newspapers of the
time to recent works by recognised experts will be consulted. Chief among these
will be Kershaw, whose expertise of Hitler has been highly acknowledged here in
Germany, through his informative work on Hitler.
As well as Kershaw, Shirer will be of crucial use due to his experience as an
American reporter in Berlin and Vienna from 1934 until 1940. As a result of
Shirer’s first-hand experience of the lead up as well as the beginning of the
Second World War, he has the advantage of being able to portray the Third Reich
in great detail and the hindsight that came along with the access to German
documents after the end of the war.
Word Count: 139
SECTION B: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
Beginning his career as a secretary of the Lower Austrian Farmers League, Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor of Austria and Foreign Minister by 20 May 1932 [1]. Dollfuss was very opposed to the beliefs of the Nazi Party and Hitler’s Anschluss, which is probably what led to his friendship with the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini [2]. Shortly after Dollfuss accepted the role of Chancellor [3], he followed Mussolini’s lead and became a dictatorial power himself. As they were both against the Nazi beliefs [4], Mussolini and Dollfuss schemed in secret ways to prevent the Nazis from rising anymore to power. Their “K plan” was simple: Austria would act as the go-between for Mussolini [5]. Following his assumption of Chancellorship of Austria, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party from Austria in June 1933 [6] “driving the movement underground” [7]. In response to the Socialist movement that occurred shortly after his admission to office in February 1943 [8] , and as a result of his abuse of the emergency decree much like Hitler, Dollfuss turned Austria into an austrofascist state. During his rule as a dictator, he was viewed by many, in particular the NSDAP and the Social Democrats, with much aversion.
In February 1934, the Social Democrats staged an uprising to try and overthrow the Austrian government [9]. This attempt was terminated through the use of military force and led to many of the Social Democrat leaders being imprisoned [10]. Although it was the Social Democrats who staged the uprising against the Austrian Government, it was the Austrian Nazis in June 1934 who began a civil war against the government [11]. On 25 July 1934, 154 members of SS Standarte 89 invaded the Federal Chancellery disguised as officers of the Heimwehr (Fascist Home Guard) and fatally shot the Austrian Chancellor in the neck and armpit [12]. They left him to lie in pain without any sort of medical help for seven hours, after which Dollfuss died. In spite of the fact that Dollfuss had died, the Austrian army remained loyal to their government and so, led by Dr Kurt von Schuschnigg, they put an end to the attempted coup d’état [13]. Soon after Dollfuss’ assassination, Mussolini found out and angrily claimed to Starhemberg, Austrian Vice Chancellor, that Hitler was to blame for it [14].
In order to avenge his ally’s death, Mussolini threatened to declare war on Hitler if he attempted to try to invade and take control of Austria [15]. Mussolini publicised his intentions towards keeping Austria an independent country shortly thereafter [16]. Upon seeing Mussolini’s reaction to Dollfuss’ death, Hitler made sure to deny any ties he may have had in regards to the murder of the Austrian Chancellor and declared his innocuousness in the whole matter. To further prove his innocence, Hitler banned Dollfuss’ assassins from Germany, and they were later tried and hanged for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss [17]. Hitler’s contribution to Dollfuss’ murder was never fully determined and the actual individual responsible for his assassination has never been ascertained, with multiple accounts providing different sources of evidence that is not necessarily accurate. Mussolini was adamant that Hitler was to blame for Dollfuss’ murder; however, whether or not his theory is true has yet to be determined. Based on the German Chancellor’s actions following Dollfuss’ murder, it seems quite likely that he is to blame, however this could be argued due to the lack of evidence.
Word Count: 604
SECTION C: EVALUATION OF
SOURCES
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York:
W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.
Kershaw is a
world-renowned historian whose expertise is the Third Reich. The purpose of the
biography is to provide a background and source-based account of Hitler’s life
and career, described by him as “a study of Hitler’s power”. The value of this
source is that he has access to a substantial range of sources, primary as well
as secondary, on which he bases many of his conclusions. As well as this,
Kershaw has the benefit of hindsight with which to be able to impartially judge
many of the events that transpired. Kershaw examines Dollfuss’ assassination
from Hitler’s perspective, which is useful in its provision of information of
the extent at which the German dictator was aware of the staged coup d’état. The
limitations of this source, however, are that it is a condensed edition and
therefore may be lacking information that would have possibly been considered
as lacking importance. Another limitation of Kershaw is that, as he was born in
1943, he doesn’t have the benefit of having experienced the reaction provoked
by the assassination of Dollfuss, whereas Shirer does.
Word Count: 180
Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall
of the Third Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1960. Print.
Shirer, having been present
in Berlin during the assassination of Dollfuss as an American journalist
writing about the rise of the Reich, is famous for being known as “a witness to
history rather than a professional historian”. The purpose of his work is to
chronicle the events affiliated with the rise of the third Reich under the rule
of Hitler. As Shirer was in Germany at the time of Dollfuss’ murder, his work
has particular value due to the access the journalist had upon German defeat,
of the countless sources of German documents. Another value of Shirer’s work is
that, as a result of its publishing being in 1960, the author has the benefit
of hindsight to support the authenticity of his opinions on the causes as well
as effects of the events. The limitations of Shirer’s work is that, as he
originally was a journalist, he takes a journalistic point of view on the
events, and therefore conclusions he has reached may be based more on a purpose
of entertainment rather than informing.
Word Count: 174
SECTION D: ANALYSIS
Considering the situation at the time, Kershaw’s theory seems quite plausible as “Hitler did seem intent on seeing Austria’s Chancellor, the pro-Mussolini Engelbert Dollfuss, removed from office, and on having Nazis installed in the Austrian government” [23], however murdering Dollfuss would not have been in his best intentions, taking into account the alliance he was trying to procure with Mussolini. Mussolini and Dollfuss were known for having a close relationship and so, if Hitler wanted to forge an alliance with Italy, the assassination of Dollfuss would have been detrimental to his purpose. Kershaw speaks of Hitler’s reaction to finding out of the assassination of Dollfuss, “Papen found Hitler in a near-hysterical state, denouncing the idiocy of the Austrian Nazis for landing him in such a mess” [24], strengthening the argument that Hitler’s intention had only been to remove Dollfuss from power rather than murdering him, and therefore causing “damage to relations with Italy” [25].
Shirer’s argument, however, seems also reasonable. Dollfuss was the only figure standing in between Hitler and his aims of Anschluss; it seemed in tone with his goals for Hitler to have wanted to somehow eradicate the problem the Austrian Chancellor created for him. An Italian historian, Franco Selleri, agrees with Kershaw saying, “Hitler fa assassinare il cancelliere austriaco Dollfuss con il chiaro intento di annettersi l’Austria”, the literal translation being “Hitler had the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss assassinated with the clear intention to annex Austria” [26]. Most historians support Shirer’s perspective on the responsibility of Hitler for assassinating Engelbert Dollfuss, due to the fact that Dollfuss was preventing Hitler’s aims being accomplished. Public opinion at the time of the assassination was also in favour of blaming Hitler, which is shown through the New York Times explicitly mentioning, “Revolt is laid to Hitler” [27].
Word Count: 459
SECTION E: CONCLUSION
Both Kershaw and
Shirer agree that Hitler was aware of and supported the Austrian Nazis coup
d’état that later turned into the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss’
assassination. Kershaw states that Hitler’s understanding of the coup d’état
was based on a misunderstanding, and had originally believed that the coup d’état
had resulted in Dollfuss’ removal from office, later realising that it had
progressed into a murder. However, as Shirer explains, it seems unlikely that
Hitler was aware of the coup d’état, had furnished the Austrian Nazis with the
weapons required to stage their rebellion and had been misled on the aspect of
Dollfuss’ assassination. By playing such an influential role in the progression
of the rebellion it seems implausible that Hitler wouldn’t have been prepared
for or had expected the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor during the
process of maintaining power in the Federal Chancellery, meaning Hitler was
responsible for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss.
Word Count: 154
SECTION F: LIST OF SOURCES
- Bell, P. M. H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. London: Longman, 1986. Print. - Blamires, Cyprian, and Paul Jackson. World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006. Print. - Burgwyn, H. James. Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Print. - Burleigh, Michael. The Third Reich: A New History. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001. Print. - Corvaja, Santi, and Robert Miller. Hitler & Mussolini the Secret Meetings. New York: Enigma, 2012. Print. - "Dollfuss Assassination...." Timothy Hughes - Rare & Early Newspapers. N.p., n.d. Web. - He, Fengshan, and Monto Ho. My Forty Years as a Diplomat. Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Pub., 2010. Print. - Kemp, Arthur. March of the Titans: A History of the White Race. Burlington, IA: Ostara, 2006. Print. - Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print. - Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis. London: Routledge, 2004. Print. - Lowe, C. J., and F. Marzari. Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940. London: Routledge & Paul, 1975. Print. - Mallett, Robert. Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War: 1933 - 1940. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print. - Noakes, Jeremy, and Geoffrey Pridham. Nazism, 1919-1945. Vol. 3. Exeter, England: U of Exeter, 1983. Print. - Sachar, Howard Morley. The Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print. - Selleri, Franco. Fisica Senza Dogma: La Conoscenza Scientifica Tra Sviluppo E Regressione. Bari: Dedalo, 1989. Print. - Shell, Kurt Leo. The Transformation of Austrian Socialism. Albany: State U of New York, 1962. Print. - Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print. - Waldheim, Kurt. The Austrian Example. Trans. Ewald Osers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973. Print.
What motivated foreign SS divisions to fight the Battle of Berlin when the war was already lost?
Part A – Plan of the Investigation
What motivated foreign SS divisions to fight the Battle of Berlin when the war was already lost? To understand the mindset of these soldiers, I will analyze the recruitment process and development of the formations. The scope will be limited to foreign SS divisions that took part in the Battle of Berlin. Two of the sources used in this investigation, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower and Reichsführer-SS Himmlers speech held in Kharkov, 1944. As I focused this investigation primarily on the divisions involved in the battle for Berlin, Mazower provided a valuable source. Another resource I investigated is NS music and the role the lyrics played in the motivation of foreign SS divisions. Laying particular focus on the notorious Horst Wessel Lied and analyzing how the lyrics were modified for the use in France, as well as considering the insignia and uniforms of the foreign divisions. In addition I shall visit the Reichstag in Berlin which was primarily defended by the Charlemagne division.
Part B – Summary of Evidence
In 1929 Himmler massively expanded the SS and boosted the number of troops to 150.000 when the war began.[1] Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler combined the SS-VT, LSSAH and all armed units of the SS-TV into the Waffen-SS.[2] During the late 1930s, Himmler was facing increasing recruitment difficulties, as the Wehrmacht possessed exclusive conscription rights within Germany. In August 1940, soon after the invasion of the Nordic states, Hitler therefore authorised the recruitment of ethnic Germans and Germanic populations within all newly occupied regions. Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, with the collaboration and support of the governments of the respective countries began heavy recruitment. At this time, volunteers would only be accepted if they complied with the Nazi doctrine.[3] After the horrendous losses at Stalingrad in 1943, Himmler was no longer able to rely on German volunteers alone and expanded the recruitment throughout Europe. The SS Hauptamt prepared a specially tailored program for each national or ethnic group[4]. Many of these divisions not only shared ideologies but during the 1930s many European fascist groups adapted the Horst Wessel Lied to appeal to their soldiers. The song itself, written by SA commander Horst Wessel is known to have been very effective in encouraging the masses[5].
By the end of the war, some 500.000 foreigners served in the SS and outnumbered native Germans[6]. Western nationalities made up roughly 125.000 most of which were volunteers joining to acquire status, glory or material benefits[7]. French SS consisted primarily of right wing intellectuals, workers and reactionary aristocrats, united by their ferocious anti-Communism[8]. Most non-German SS men were eastern Europeans who were either conscripted or coerced into the SS[9] and “fought primarily for the independence of their countries”[10]. However, the official ideological goal of the SS was never to stir pan European nationalistic feelings but “to subordinate [the] national ideal to… the German Reich”[11] and operate the SS merely for the benefit of Germany. The largest non-German SS formations that are historically verified to have taken part in the battle of Berlin (not scattered troops) are: 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland (attached to LVI Panzer Corps)[12], 23rd SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Nederland (attached to XI SS Panzer Corps),[13] 33rd Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Charlemagne[14],15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS[15], Waffen Grenadier Regiment of the SS (attached to III Germanic SS Panzer Corps).
Whilst German soldiers and civilians fled Berlin en masse, foreign soldiers were ready to die in the Ruins of the Third Reich [16]. The SS Charlemagne were the only reinforcements arriving during late April. By April 28, the Charlemagne Sturmbataillon destroyed 62 of 108 Soviet tanks in the southeast sector of Berlin alone. Latvian, French, and a “large portion of foreign SS” were among the last to defend the government district.[17]
Part C – Evaluation of Sources
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower is a straightforward historical text, dedicating a large section to the Nazi recruitment of foreign SS soldiers, laying particular focus on the Charlemagne division that was the last to fight in the battle of Berlin. It is part of extensive research done by the British historian Mazower about the Second World War. It is said to be “a tireless, immensely valuable reassessment of the entire Nazi edifice and its breakdown”[18]. The text is written to describe and inform about the racial contradictions under NS rule and evaluate Germany’s downfall.[19] The author uses primary documents, such as illustrations and unpublished accounts on which he founds his understanding of the foreign SS. It gives a generalized insight into the mentality and structural organization of the troops, especially the SS Charlemagne[20]. In addition he has been able through the use of retrospect and evidence that has become accessible in the last decades to gain a much more sophisticated understanding of the downfall of the NS regime. Although Mazower devotes a sizeable part of his book to the SS, in particular the foreign divisions Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany was primarily written to offer an understanding of the downfall of Germany under Hitler and the NS regime.
The second source is a speech held by SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler on January 28, 1944. The purpose of the speech was to administer the creation of specialized training modules in order to allow soldiers of different ethnicities and nationalities to serve in the SS. It marks a change in the SS recruitment, which used to forbid the enlistment of men that failed to meet Nazi regulations to qualify as Aryan[21]. At the same time, it shows Himmler’s longing for more military control and shows Germany’s increasing desperation to replace its dwindling manpower. [22] Therefore the speech is important as it shows that SS recruitment was willing to acquire people’s loyalty by dropping racist or prejudicial Nazi doctrine. However, the speech cannot be taken entirely as matter of fact, as by 1944 the outcome of the war had become apparent and Germany was merely trying to prolong her war efforts through the call for man power, even cannon fodder.[23]
Part D – Analysis
If Mazower is right in asserting that foreign volunteers in the SS fought until the end simply "out of the desperation of men who had nothing to return to,"[24] what motivated them to join is of utmost importance if one is to understand their presence in the first place. Although many joined due to ideological conviction, this was not always centered on Nazi belief. Before the invasion of Russia began in June 1941, Himmler further extended his recruitment program to the Baltics and Eastern countries.[25] He changed the ideological focal point for these new recruits from Aryan supremacy (Slavs being seen as 'inferior') to their common struggle against Bolshevism which Mazower was effective as many had “suffered at the Bolsheviks’ hands” prior to the German occupation.[26] This is supported by Beevor who states “these volunteers ready to die in the ruins of the Third Reich were all fanatical anti-Bolsheviks, whether they believed in New Europe or `viedle France'”. Himmler’s recruitment strategy was to exploit the fears and anxieties of those directly in the path of the red army[27]. This can be seen in the recruitment posters used in the eastern countries[28]. However Nazi recruitment posters played on anti-Bolshevism even in the western countries from Scandinavia, Netherlands and Latvia respectively, all of which had strong anti-Russian sentiments before and during the war.[29] In addition the anti-Bolshevik tone is supported in the marching music of the different divisions. When analyzing the various translations of the Horst Wessel Lied, one finds the shared themes of pride, glory and comradeship. Whilst the original German version primarily focuses in the victory over the Rotfront,[30] the French version's violent and aggressive lyrics begin “we shall smite the Jews and the Marxists”[31]. This anti-communist theme continues as they sing “We shall avenge our brothers killed by them”[32], hostile lyrics echoing La Marseillaise and therefore speak to the French divisions rather than directly translating the German lyrics. Such changes suggest that each division fought for the glory of their own country and to fend off a common threat rather than welcome a German leadership.
Another large percentage of eastern recruits fought for purely nationalistic reasons, hoping their countries would be granted some form of autonomy in Hitler’s post-war Europe. Mazower states that Hitler had ruled out political autonomy for the Baltic countries in November 1943.[33] However as Himmler feared this would jeopardize his recruitment efforts, Hitler’s decision was not made public[34]. The Baltic divisions were not volunteers in direct sense of Western or Nordic volunteers. In the Baltics, primarily Latvia and Estonia, Germany had denied them their own military so volunteers and existing armed formations joined the Wehrmacht, later being forced into the SS. These transferred conscripts saw themselves as nationalists fighting for their countries as seen by the names given to their divisions- Nordland, Nederland, Latvian, etc.[35] It is telling that the Ukrainians, denied any notion of self-determination and to whom arming was described as "idiocy" by Hitler as late as March 1945, were simply designated Galician. The divisions that fought in Berlin shared their struggle against Bolshevism. Their prospects should they surrender was torture and annihilation[36]. Most of these troops were not fundamental Nazis, but extremely patriotic and had anti-Bolshevistic sentiments[37]. “Later, the few foreign SS volunteers who survived tried to rationalize their doomed battle as the need to provide an anti-Bolshevik example for the future”[38]. Beevor tells of “an extraordinary comradeship of the damned had grown up among the foreign volunteers defending the last bastion of German nationalism”[39].
Part A – Plan of the Investigation
What motivated foreign SS divisions to fight the Battle of Berlin when the war was already lost? To understand the mindset of these soldiers, I will analyze the recruitment process and development of the formations. The scope will be limited to foreign SS divisions that took part in the Battle of Berlin. Two of the sources used in this investigation, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower and Reichsführer-SS Himmlers speech held in Kharkov, 1944. As I focused this investigation primarily on the divisions involved in the battle for Berlin, Mazower provided a valuable source. Another resource I investigated is NS music and the role the lyrics played in the motivation of foreign SS divisions. Laying particular focus on the notorious Horst Wessel Lied and analyzing how the lyrics were modified for the use in France, as well as considering the insignia and uniforms of the foreign divisions. In addition I shall visit the Reichstag in Berlin which was primarily defended by the Charlemagne division.
Part B – Summary of Evidence
In 1929 Himmler massively expanded the SS and boosted the number of troops to 150.000 when the war began.[1] Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler combined the SS-VT, LSSAH and all armed units of the SS-TV into the Waffen-SS.[2] During the late 1930s, Himmler was facing increasing recruitment difficulties, as the Wehrmacht possessed exclusive conscription rights within Germany. In August 1940, soon after the invasion of the Nordic states, Hitler therefore authorised the recruitment of ethnic Germans and Germanic populations within all newly occupied regions. Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, with the collaboration and support of the governments of the respective countries began heavy recruitment. At this time, volunteers would only be accepted if they complied with the Nazi doctrine.[3] After the horrendous losses at Stalingrad in 1943, Himmler was no longer able to rely on German volunteers alone and expanded the recruitment throughout Europe. The SS Hauptamt prepared a specially tailored program for each national or ethnic group[4]. Many of these divisions not only shared ideologies but during the 1930s many European fascist groups adapted the Horst Wessel Lied to appeal to their soldiers. The song itself, written by SA commander Horst Wessel is known to have been very effective in encouraging the masses[5].
By the end of the war, some 500.000 foreigners served in the SS and outnumbered native Germans[6]. Western nationalities made up roughly 125.000 most of which were volunteers joining to acquire status, glory or material benefits[7]. French SS consisted primarily of right wing intellectuals, workers and reactionary aristocrats, united by their ferocious anti-Communism[8]. Most non-German SS men were eastern Europeans who were either conscripted or coerced into the SS[9] and “fought primarily for the independence of their countries”[10]. However, the official ideological goal of the SS was never to stir pan European nationalistic feelings but “to subordinate [the] national ideal to… the German Reich”[11] and operate the SS merely for the benefit of Germany. The largest non-German SS formations that are historically verified to have taken part in the battle of Berlin (not scattered troops) are: 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland (attached to LVI Panzer Corps)[12], 23rd SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Nederland (attached to XI SS Panzer Corps),[13] 33rd Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Charlemagne[14],15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS[15], Waffen Grenadier Regiment of the SS (attached to III Germanic SS Panzer Corps).
Whilst German soldiers and civilians fled Berlin en masse, foreign soldiers were ready to die in the Ruins of the Third Reich [16]. The SS Charlemagne were the only reinforcements arriving during late April. By April 28, the Charlemagne Sturmbataillon destroyed 62 of 108 Soviet tanks in the southeast sector of Berlin alone. Latvian, French, and a “large portion of foreign SS” were among the last to defend the government district.[17]
Part C – Evaluation of Sources
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower is a straightforward historical text, dedicating a large section to the Nazi recruitment of foreign SS soldiers, laying particular focus on the Charlemagne division that was the last to fight in the battle of Berlin. It is part of extensive research done by the British historian Mazower about the Second World War. It is said to be “a tireless, immensely valuable reassessment of the entire Nazi edifice and its breakdown”[18]. The text is written to describe and inform about the racial contradictions under NS rule and evaluate Germany’s downfall.[19] The author uses primary documents, such as illustrations and unpublished accounts on which he founds his understanding of the foreign SS. It gives a generalized insight into the mentality and structural organization of the troops, especially the SS Charlemagne[20]. In addition he has been able through the use of retrospect and evidence that has become accessible in the last decades to gain a much more sophisticated understanding of the downfall of the NS regime. Although Mazower devotes a sizeable part of his book to the SS, in particular the foreign divisions Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany was primarily written to offer an understanding of the downfall of Germany under Hitler and the NS regime.
The second source is a speech held by SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler on January 28, 1944. The purpose of the speech was to administer the creation of specialized training modules in order to allow soldiers of different ethnicities and nationalities to serve in the SS. It marks a change in the SS recruitment, which used to forbid the enlistment of men that failed to meet Nazi regulations to qualify as Aryan[21]. At the same time, it shows Himmler’s longing for more military control and shows Germany’s increasing desperation to replace its dwindling manpower. [22] Therefore the speech is important as it shows that SS recruitment was willing to acquire people’s loyalty by dropping racist or prejudicial Nazi doctrine. However, the speech cannot be taken entirely as matter of fact, as by 1944 the outcome of the war had become apparent and Germany was merely trying to prolong her war efforts through the call for man power, even cannon fodder.[23]
Part D – Analysis
If Mazower is right in asserting that foreign volunteers in the SS fought until the end simply "out of the desperation of men who had nothing to return to,"[24] what motivated them to join is of utmost importance if one is to understand their presence in the first place. Although many joined due to ideological conviction, this was not always centered on Nazi belief. Before the invasion of Russia began in June 1941, Himmler further extended his recruitment program to the Baltics and Eastern countries.[25] He changed the ideological focal point for these new recruits from Aryan supremacy (Slavs being seen as 'inferior') to their common struggle against Bolshevism which Mazower was effective as many had “suffered at the Bolsheviks’ hands” prior to the German occupation.[26] This is supported by Beevor who states “these volunteers ready to die in the ruins of the Third Reich were all fanatical anti-Bolsheviks, whether they believed in New Europe or `viedle France'”. Himmler’s recruitment strategy was to exploit the fears and anxieties of those directly in the path of the red army[27]. This can be seen in the recruitment posters used in the eastern countries[28]. However Nazi recruitment posters played on anti-Bolshevism even in the western countries from Scandinavia, Netherlands and Latvia respectively, all of which had strong anti-Russian sentiments before and during the war.[29] In addition the anti-Bolshevik tone is supported in the marching music of the different divisions. When analyzing the various translations of the Horst Wessel Lied, one finds the shared themes of pride, glory and comradeship. Whilst the original German version primarily focuses in the victory over the Rotfront,[30] the French version's violent and aggressive lyrics begin “we shall smite the Jews and the Marxists”[31]. This anti-communist theme continues as they sing “We shall avenge our brothers killed by them”[32], hostile lyrics echoing La Marseillaise and therefore speak to the French divisions rather than directly translating the German lyrics. Such changes suggest that each division fought for the glory of their own country and to fend off a common threat rather than welcome a German leadership.
Another large percentage of eastern recruits fought for purely nationalistic reasons, hoping their countries would be granted some form of autonomy in Hitler’s post-war Europe. Mazower states that Hitler had ruled out political autonomy for the Baltic countries in November 1943.[33] However as Himmler feared this would jeopardize his recruitment efforts, Hitler’s decision was not made public[34]. The Baltic divisions were not volunteers in direct sense of Western or Nordic volunteers. In the Baltics, primarily Latvia and Estonia, Germany had denied them their own military so volunteers and existing armed formations joined the Wehrmacht, later being forced into the SS. These transferred conscripts saw themselves as nationalists fighting for their countries as seen by the names given to their divisions- Nordland, Nederland, Latvian, etc.[35] It is telling that the Ukrainians, denied any notion of self-determination and to whom arming was described as "idiocy" by Hitler as late as March 1945, were simply designated Galician. The divisions that fought in Berlin shared their struggle against Bolshevism. Their prospects should they surrender was torture and annihilation[36]. Most of these troops were not fundamental Nazis, but extremely patriotic and had anti-Bolshevistic sentiments[37]. “Later, the few foreign SS volunteers who survived tried to rationalize their doomed battle as the need to provide an anti-Bolshevik example for the future”[38]. Beevor tells of “an extraordinary comradeship of the damned had grown up among the foreign volunteers defending the last bastion of German nationalism”[39].
Part E – Conclusion
The primary reason why these foreign SS divisions fought in the Battle of Berlin can be found in their ideological history. The Scandinavian and Dutch divisions consisted of volunteers that believed they were fighting alongside their ally in a struggle against Imperial Russia.[40] The Latvian division, fought to gain post-war autonomy from Russia and could therefore not surrender to the Red Army. The French and Bulgarian divisions were made up of right-wing intellectuals, aristocrats and supporters of the Nazi regime. Regardless of their personal goal, its soldiers could not surrender to either side without the risk of being tortured or executed.[41] All of these divisions had been exclusively fighting the Red Army throughout the war, and saw their struggle as a bulwark against the archenemy of Bolshevism.[42] The Latvian, French and Bulgarian formations especially, could not hope to survive after surrendering to either side and were therefore determined to fight Russia until the end.
The primary reason why these foreign SS divisions fought in the Battle of Berlin can be found in their ideological history. The Scandinavian and Dutch divisions consisted of volunteers that believed they were fighting alongside their ally in a struggle against Imperial Russia.[40] The Latvian division, fought to gain post-war autonomy from Russia and could therefore not surrender to the Red Army. The French and Bulgarian divisions were made up of right-wing intellectuals, aristocrats and supporters of the Nazi regime. Regardless of their personal goal, its soldiers could not surrender to either side without the risk of being tortured or executed.[41] All of these divisions had been exclusively fighting the Red Army throughout the war, and saw their struggle as a bulwark against the archenemy of Bolshevism.[42] The Latvian, French and Bulgarian formations especially, could not hope to survive after surrendering to either side and were therefore determined to fight Russia until the end.
Part F – Bibliography
Books Baxter, Ian. Into the Abyss: The Last Years of the Waffen SS 1943-45 : A Photographic History. Solihull, England: Helion &, 2006. Print. Beevor, Antony. Berlin: The Downfall, 1945. Australia: Penguin, 2003. Print. Dželetović, Ivanov Pavle. 21. SS-divizija Skenderbeg. Beograd: Nova Knjiga, 1987. Print. Kallis, Aristotle A. Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol 1: Norway, Denmark, France. San José: R. James Bender Publ., :. Print Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol 3: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary and Yugoslavia. San Jose, Californien: R. James Bender, 1985. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol.2: Belgium, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Spain. San José, Californien: R.James Bender, 1981. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol.4: Poland, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Free India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Russia. San Josè, Californien: R. James Bender Publ., 1987. Print. Mazower, Mark. Hitler's Empire Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe. London: Penguin, 2009. Print. McNab, Chris. World War II Data Book: the SS, 1923-45. London: Amber, 2009. Print. Murdoch, Brian. Fighting Songs and Warring Words: Popular Lyrics of Two World Wars. London: Routledge, 1990. Print. Parrish, Michael. The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security : 1939 - 1953. Westport, Conn. [u.a.: Praeger, 1996. Print. Rigg, Bryan Mark. Hitler's Jewish Soldiers: the Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military. Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas, 2002. Print. Stackelberg, Roderick, and Sally Anne. Winkle. The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts. London: Routledge, 2002. Print. Stein, George. Waffen-SS: Hitler's Élite Guard at War, 1939-1945. Bristol: Cerberus, 2002. Print. Steiner, Felix. Die Freiwilligen Der Waffen-SS: Idee Und Opfergang. Rosenheim: Dt. Verlagsges., 1992. Print. Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Flemish Lions: the History of the 27th SS-Freiwilligen Grenadier Division Langemarck (Flämische Nr. 1). Stroud [England: Spellmount, 2007. Print. Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Gauls: the History of the 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division, Der SS (Französische Nr 1) Charlemagne. Stroud: Spellmount, 2006. Print. Welch, David. The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. London: Routledge, 1993. Print. Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print. Werther, Steffen. Dänische Freiwillige in Der Waffen-SS. Berlin: WVB, Wiss. Verl., 2004. Print. Winchester, Charles, and Charles Winchester. Hitler's War on Russia. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2007. Print.
Online "Antony Beevor | Berlin The Downfall 1945." Antony Beevor | Home. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. . "Antony Beevor, Berlin 1945. Das Ende." Arlindo Correia's Home Page. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. . "Die Fahne Hoch." / Horst Wessel Lied / Horst Wesselliedfree Midi Mp3 Download Strand Hotel Sechelt Bed Breakfast. Deutsche Volkslieder. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. . "Europaische Freiwillige - Marches And Songs Of The Waffen SS Europe." Nazi.org. Web. 23 Feb. 2012. . "Hitler's Empire: How The Nazis Ruled Europe." Indigo. 2010. Web. 18 Jan. 2012. . Thomas Darnstädt, Klaus Wiegrefe. "DER SPIEGEL 13/2002 - Vater, Erschieß Mich!" SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. . Pipes, Jason. "Research on the German Armed Forces 1918-1945." Feldgrau.com - The German Armed Forces 1919-1945. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. . Willemar, Wilhelm. "The German Defense of Berlin." Naval History and Heritage Command. Web. 02 Nov. 2011. .
Speech "Reichsführer-SS Himmler at Kharkov, April 1934." 27 Oct. 2011. Speech. "Reichsführer-SS Himmler Auf Der Tagung Der RPA-Leiter Am 28. Januar 1944." 25 O
Books Baxter, Ian. Into the Abyss: The Last Years of the Waffen SS 1943-45 : A Photographic History. Solihull, England: Helion &, 2006. Print. Beevor, Antony. Berlin: The Downfall, 1945. Australia: Penguin, 2003. Print. Dželetović, Ivanov Pavle. 21. SS-divizija Skenderbeg. Beograd: Nova Knjiga, 1987. Print. Kallis, Aristotle A. Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol 1: Norway, Denmark, France. San José: R. James Bender Publ., :. Print Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol 3: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary and Yugoslavia. San Jose, Californien: R. James Bender, 1985. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol.2: Belgium, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Spain. San José, Californien: R.James Bender, 1981. Print. Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol.4: Poland, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Free India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Russia. San Josè, Californien: R. James Bender Publ., 1987. Print. Mazower, Mark. Hitler's Empire Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe. London: Penguin, 2009. Print. McNab, Chris. World War II Data Book: the SS, 1923-45. London: Amber, 2009. Print. Murdoch, Brian. Fighting Songs and Warring Words: Popular Lyrics of Two World Wars. London: Routledge, 1990. Print. Parrish, Michael. The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security : 1939 - 1953. Westport, Conn. [u.a.: Praeger, 1996. Print. Rigg, Bryan Mark. Hitler's Jewish Soldiers: the Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military. Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas, 2002. Print. Stackelberg, Roderick, and Sally Anne. Winkle. The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts. London: Routledge, 2002. Print. Stein, George. Waffen-SS: Hitler's Élite Guard at War, 1939-1945. Bristol: Cerberus, 2002. Print. Steiner, Felix. Die Freiwilligen Der Waffen-SS: Idee Und Opfergang. Rosenheim: Dt. Verlagsges., 1992. Print. Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Flemish Lions: the History of the 27th SS-Freiwilligen Grenadier Division Langemarck (Flämische Nr. 1). Stroud [England: Spellmount, 2007. Print. Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Gauls: the History of the 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division, Der SS (Französische Nr 1) Charlemagne. Stroud: Spellmount, 2006. Print. Welch, David. The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. London: Routledge, 1993. Print. Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print. Werther, Steffen. Dänische Freiwillige in Der Waffen-SS. Berlin: WVB, Wiss. Verl., 2004. Print. Winchester, Charles, and Charles Winchester. Hitler's War on Russia. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2007. Print.
Online "Antony Beevor | Berlin The Downfall 1945." Antony Beevor | Home. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. . "Antony Beevor, Berlin 1945. Das Ende." Arlindo Correia's Home Page. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. . "Die Fahne Hoch." / Horst Wessel Lied / Horst Wesselliedfree Midi Mp3 Download Strand Hotel Sechelt Bed Breakfast. Deutsche Volkslieder. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. . "Europaische Freiwillige - Marches And Songs Of The Waffen SS Europe." Nazi.org. Web. 23 Feb. 2012. . "Hitler's Empire: How The Nazis Ruled Europe." Indigo. 2010. Web. 18 Jan. 2012. . Thomas Darnstädt, Klaus Wiegrefe. "DER SPIEGEL 13/2002 - Vater, Erschieß Mich!" SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. . Pipes, Jason. "Research on the German Armed Forces 1918-1945." Feldgrau.com - The German Armed Forces 1919-1945. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. . Willemar, Wilhelm. "The German Defense of Berlin." Naval History and Heritage Command. Web. 02 Nov. 2011. .
Speech "Reichsführer-SS Himmler at Kharkov, April 1934." 27 Oct. 2011. Speech. "Reichsführer-SS Himmler Auf Der Tagung Der RPA-Leiter Am 28. Januar 1944." 25 O
Did Hitler Kill His Niece Angelika “Geli” Raubal?
This study will investigate the question of whether Adolf Hitler’s murdered his half-niece Geli Raubal.
The first source to be evaluated is the article, “Hitler’s Doomed Angel” by Ron Rosenbaum. Rosenbaum is an American journalist, he is the author of eight books, all of which are historical non-fiction and he has written for Harper’s, Vanity Fair, The New York Times and the New York Observer among others. Though he studied English Literature at Yale and is not a historian, he has investigated Adolf Hitler extensively through original research and interviews with historians, philosophers, psychologists and theologians. In his book, “Explaining Hitler” he goes into some detail about the relationship between Geli Raubal and Hitler but this is addressed in more detail in his article “Hitler’s Doomed Angel”. Rosenbaum being a journalist can be seen as a limitation as usually journalists are prone to exaggeration in their work, he has also never been trained as a historian and may not see the content in the same way as a historian would, leading to errors in the information. It might also be a limitation as he might not be able to have gotten the same access to information as a historian would have; for example, access to information. This could also be seen as beneficial as he could then take the topic from a new perspective and could be less limited in trying to investigate the topic due to using journalist methods to gaining access to information. A limitation is that he is American and might misinterpret the German culture or language in his research or might be biased against the issue due to lack of a personal connection to German history.
The second source to be evaluated is the book, “Hitler & Geli” by Ronald Hayman. Hayman is a British critic, playwright and respected biographer of Nietzsche, Kafka and Sylvia Plath among others. His book, “Hitler & Geli” focuses on the relationship between Hitler and Geli and tries to investigate how this affected Hitler. As he is not a historian, this is a limitation as he might not be given the same access to sources but as a critic and a biographer it can still be seen as a credible critical analysis. A limitation is that Hayman is English and therefor may not see the topic with the same objectivity and sensitivity as someone German would. Another limitation is that he is writing decades after the events happened and has no primary evidence. A strength of the source is that as enough time has gone by he has access to primary sources from that time that wouldn’t have been able to be publicized or even said in the time of the Third Reich, another benefit of this is that the archives in Germany are now open and and police reports, interviews, evidence from the time can now be accessed.
Investigation
In 1931, Geli Raubal was found dead in her bedroom in her uncle Hitler’s apartment. She had suffered a bullet to her heart and was discovered on the morning of September 19th, 1931. [1]Her body was removed and sent to Vienna for her burial by the pro-Nazi police before either an inquest or autopsy could be carried out. [2] Her death was ruled a suicide, however, there is a large amount of evidence suggesting she was murdered by Hitler.
The daughter of Hitler’s sister Angela, Hitler met Geli when his sister came to work at his residence, Berghof, bringing Geli with her. Hitler immediately became fond of Geli and invited her to live with him in his Munich residence. Among Hitler’s circle, it was widely assumed that Hitler was having an affair with Geli.[3] This was not the full extent to Hitler’s attention on Geli. She was said to have no freedom and could only do things her “Uncle Alf”[4] approved of and that he was very possessive of her and that he even had said he wished to marry her. She did have some relations with members of Hitler’s SA and social circle, who she confided in. According to Otto Strasser, a Nazi at the time who later turned co-leader of a left-wing opposition group[5], Geli detailed Hitler’s sexual advances towards her; saying that he “was frequently incapable of sexually satisfying her. He would make her undress and then he'd lie down on the floor so he could examine her closely, before demanding that she urinated on him.” [6] Historian Ian Kershaw, in his book “Hitler: A Biography” states that “whether actively sexual or not, Hitler's behaviour towards Geli has all the traits of a strong, latent at least, sexual dependence.” Geli claimed she couldn’t bare what he did to her but apparently put up with it in order to stay his favourite.
Details of her death are unclear and contradictory, which makes the case for her murder more likely. Hitler visited her on the evening of her death and according to reports from neighbours, they got into a fight with Hitler shouting "No. For the last time, no.” up to Geli, who had shouted at him from her balcony.[7] He was reported to leave after seeing her, for a rally in Hamburg.[8]The servants of Hitler’s apartment found Geli in the morning, they reported having to break down the door as it was locked from the inside.[9] Three servants claimed responsibility for breaking the door down by themselves. In the police report; which was conducted by Heinrich Müller, future head of the Gestapo, it stated that Geli was shot in the chest, the bullet puncturing her lung and that she bled out.[10] According to the report, the bullet went through her heart, exiting from her lower back, entailing that Geli had held the gun higher than her heart and pointed downwards, which would be an unusual and impractical way to shot oneself. She found lying on her front with an outstretched arm in the direction of the pistol that had been used, which was on the sofa.[11] The pistol used was Hitler’s own.[12] The Münchener Post reported in an article, two days after Geli’s death, that the death was suspicious and claimed Geli had a broken nose. [13]The newspaper, which was hated by Hitler and the Nazi party, was closed down when Hitler became chancellor.[14]On Geli’s desk was a letter she had begun writing to a friend of hers, talking of her excitement over possibly meeting in the near future. Geli had not finished the letter, it ended in the word “und”, German for “and”.[15] The letter, presumably written on the night of her death, does not resemble one a suicidal person might write.
There are also doubts surrounding Hitler’s whereabouts at the time of Geli’s death. Hitler claimed to already have been in Nuremburg at the time[16], however members of his party disputed this. Georg Strasser, later murdered during the night of the long knives, was close to Hitler at the time of Geli’s death and he leaked information that Hitler had shot Geli and come to him on the brink of committing suicide himself, with Strasser having to talk him down from it. [17][18] A local journalist, Fritz Gerlich, wrote that Hitler hadn’t left Munich that night and that he and Geli had been to a restaurant and then gone back to the apartment later and had a fight, resulting in Geli’s death. The owner of the restaurant they were supposed to have dined at was also killed during the night of the long knives. [19]One of the policeman at the investigation had disputed Geli’s death as suicide and believed that Hitler had been in the apartment at the time of Geli’s death. [20]
Geli’s funeral was private, Hitler travelled to Vienna secretly in order to attend.[21] The priest who had performed the funeral, Father Johann Pant, later wrote to a French newspaper, "They pretended she committed suicide. From the fact I gave her a Christian burial you can draw your own conclusions."[22] Altogether, it seems that Hitler murdered Geli out of possessiveness and then got his Gestapo soldiers to cover it up through murdering witnesses and burning/ changing documents.
Reflection
Through this investigation I learned the challenges historians face and limitations in the methods historians used. As a historian one is very dependent on the credibility of the source used and this can be challenging to prove; I found that it is challenging to find primary sources and that secondary sources can be biased or exclude parts of the primary source. In order to investigate my topic; read articles, books, watched documentaries and looked at photographs and as I live in Munich, where Geli spent her last years and where she died I visited the places incl. Hitler’s apartment myself. I learnt that a limitation for a historian in a case like this is that they are not informed on forensic science or psychology and this can then cause difficulties in assessing what happened, what the crime scene points to and what human behaviour can say about what happened before or after. I found that as a historian it is also a difficulty in investigating murders etc. as crime scenes are sensitive to time and so is memory. This means that eyewitness reports are not completely reliable and data found in a crime scene can easily be corrupted. Another limitation is the accessibility to information; for example, Nazi police hid, changed or burned incriminating files at times and any information remaining could first be accessed way after the incident; because of the fear of incarceration etc. at the time, eyewitnesses would most likely have kept quiet or been forcibly silenced. I found during this investigation that not only historians can provide valuable analysis and information and events and that any source of information might be helpful and credible as long as it is properly evaluated. This investigation has shown me that history, compared to other fields for example science or mathematics, faces many limitations as it deals with things happening, memory is very personal and so are opinions and so bias, misunderstanding and taking things out of context can easily be done and in this way errors are easily committed accidently in historical research.
Works Cited
Rusch, Kristine Kathryn. “Hitler's Angel.” AbeBooks, Max Crime, 1 Jan. 1970
Rosenbaum, Ron.
Trueman, C. N. “Otto Strasser.” History Learning Site, The History Learning Site, 22 May 2015, www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/weimar-germany/otto-strasser/
Schultz, R. M. “Hitler and Geli Raubal.” Axis History Forum, Chicago Public Library, 25 May 2005, forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=77003.
Colley, Rupert. “Geli Raubal - Hitler's Niece.” History in an Hour, History in an Hour, 1 Nov. 2016, www.historyinanhour.com/2013/09/18/geli-raubal-hitlers-niece/.
Rosenbaum, Ron. Explaining Hitler: the Search for the Origins of His Evil. New York, Random House, 1998.
Hoser, Paul. “Münchener Post.” Münchener Post , Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, 3 July 2006, www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/M%C3%BCnchener_Post
Trueman, C. N. “Gregor Strasser.” History Learning Site, The History Learning Site, 22 May 2015, www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/weimar-germany/gregor-strasser/
Colley, Rupert. “Geli Raubal - Hitler's Niece.” History in an Hour, History in an Hour, 1 Nov. 2016, www.historyinanhour.com/2013/09/18/geli-raubal-hitlers-niece/.
Hayman, Ronald. Hitler & Geli. 1st ed., New York, Bloomsbury, 1999.
Barclay, Shelly. “Did Adolf Hitler Kill His Niece?” Historic Mysteries, Historic Mysteries, 9 Sept. 2016, www.historicmysteries.com/did-adolf-hitler-kill-his-niece/
Glaise von Horstenau, Edmund. “Minister im Ständestaat und General im OKW” Böhlaus. Der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs. 1983
Heinrick Fraenkel and Roger Manvell, “Goering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader”. Frontline Books. 2011.
Roland, Paul. “Suicide Doubts.” Nazi Women: the Attraction of Evil, Arcturus Pubishing, London, 2015.
FOOTNOTES: [1] Rusch, Kristine Kathryn. 52 [2] Rosenbaum, Ron. 43 [3]Glaise von Horstenau. 516. [4] Hayman, Ronald. 144. [5] Trueman, C. N. [6] Schultz, R. M. 78 [7] Colley, Rupert. [8] Rosenbaum, Ron. 44 [9] Rosenbaum, Ron. 44-45 [10] Hayman, Ronald. 195. [11] Hayman, Ronald. 198. [12] Hayman, Ronald. 198. [13] Rosenbaum, Ron. 76 [14] Hoser, Paul. [15] Rosenbaum, Ron. 77-78 [16] Heinrick Fraenkel and Roger Manvell, 301. [17] Trueman, C. N. [18] Rosenbaum, Ron. 78 [19] Hayman, Ronald. 203. [20] Colley, Rupert. [21] Hayman, Ronald. 203. [22] Roland, Paul. -
