Lectures Relating to Churchill

I bought this series of lectures from the Great Courses library where Professor Rufus  Fears begins at the supreme moment in Churchill's life, as he spoke to the House of Commons on June 4, 1940, declaring to the world that Britain "shall never surrender."  As Churchill later wrote, his whole past "had been but a preparation for this hour and this trial." Drawing on the most recent historical scholarship and richly documenting his lectures with material from Churchill's writings and speeches, Professor Fears argues that there are four qualities that merit for Churchill the title of statesman. In fact, Professor Fears goes even further., arguing that Churchill belongs with Pericles of Athens and Abraham Lincoln as one of the greatest statesmen in the history of democracy because of his:  

• Bedrock of principles 
• Moral compass 
• Vision 
• Ability to build consensus to achieve that vision. 

These qualities, Professor Fears claims, are intimately related to Churchill's lifelong faith in the ideal of liberty under law and to his belief in absolute right and wrong. That belief enabled him to discern, name, and denounce the wickedness of Hitler at a time when such a stance was far from common.  For Churchill, ideals of liberty and justice were best embodied in history by the twin bastions of Britain and the United States. Those ideals guided him through all the issues and challenges over the decades, and led him to become a friend of social justice but a foe of socialism.  He remained a fearsome enemy to both Fascist and Communist tyranny, even though he was willing to bring his country into an alliance with the latter when the former presented the more immediate threat. Throughout his life, Churchill never shrank from controversy—and never lacked critics. Many of his personal qualities tended to provoke controversy, including his refusal to "stay in his box," compromise his vision, or avoid difficult decisions. Professor Fears evaluates some of the most influential criticisms of Churchill, many of which were first heard during his lifetime.   He explains why historians representing a range of political opinions have assailed Churchill, and sketches briefly how these critics may be answered.   In the end, perhaps the spirit of this indomitable man is best captured by some advice he gave in the fall of 1941 to the boys of Harrow, his old school:   "Never give in," said the old lion, "Never, never, never, never!"  He never did. What follows are my summaries of his lectures.

Lecture One: Heritage and Destiny

Professor J. Rufus Fears argues that Winston Churchill was a pivotal figure in twentieth-century history, exemplifying the qualities of a statesman through his leadership during Britain’s darkest hour in World War II. Central to his thesis is the significance of Churchill’s June 4, 1940, speech to Parliament, where he declared, “We shall never surrender,” as a turning point that galvanised British resolve against Nazi Germany. Fears contextualises this moment by detailing the dire military situation: the fall of France, the evacuation at Dunkirk, and internal British debates about negotiating peace. He notes that figures like Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax and even King George VI initially favoured compromise, viewing resistance as futile. Churchill’s defiance, Fears contends, not only shifted public opinion but also redefined Britain’s role in the war, ultimately shaping Allied victory.  
Fears emphasises Churchill’s aristocratic lineage as foundational to his character, particularly the influence of his ancestor John Churchill, the 1st Duke of Marlborough. Marlborough’s military triumphs, such as the 1704 Battle of Blenheim—a decisive victory in the War of the Spanish Succession—established Britain as a European power and provided Churchill with a legacy of strategic brilliance and resilience. Winston Churchill later rehabilitated Marlborough’s reputation through his exhaustive biography, countering historical critiques by writers like Thomas Babington Macaulay. Fears highlights this familial narrative to underscore Churchill’s belief in duty, honour, and moral courage, traits he inherited from both Marlborough and his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, a controversial but ambitious Conservative politician.  
Churchill’s statesmanship, Fears argues, rested on four pillars: unwavering principles, a moral compass, a visionary outlook, and the ability to forge consensus. His principles were rooted in liberal democracy and individual liberty, while his moral compass rejected expediency that compromised ethics, as seen in his opposition to appeasement in the 1930s. His vision extended beyond national interests to a post-war world order based on freedom and justice, reflected in his later advocacy for European unity. Churchill’s rhetorical mastery, honed through decades as a writer and orator, enabled him to articulate this vision compellingly. Fears cites the June 1940 speech as a prime example, noting its immediate psychological impact: it transformed public sentiment from resignation to determination, despite initial scepticism.  
Fears situates Churchill within a pantheon of democratic statesmen, comparing him to Pericles of Athens and Abraham Lincoln. Like Pericles, Churchill inspired civic pride during existential crises; like Lincoln, he preserved national unity through moral clarity. His multifaceted career—soldier, historian, politician—culminated in a leadership style that balanced pragmatism with idealism. Fears acknowledges critiques of Churchill’s imperialism and wartime decisions but focuses on his role in 1940 as emblematic of statesmanship under duress. By synthesising historical context, familial legacy, and rhetorical power, Fears presents Churchill as a figure whose actions and ideals transcended his era, leaving an enduring model of democratic leadership.

Lecture Two Young Churchill

Here Fears examines Winston Churchill’s formative years, arguing that his early life—marked by parental neglect and academic struggles—paradoxically laid the groundwork for his later resilience and ambition. Central to Fears’ analysis is the contrast between Churchill’s aristocratic lineage and his unremarkable childhood. Born in 1874 at Blenheim Palace, Churchill was the son of Lord Randolph Churchill, a charismatic but volatile Conservative politician, and Jennie Jerome, an American heiress. Fears notes that Lord Randolph’s political career, though meteoric, was cut short by his confrontational style and declining health, exacerbated by possible syphilis. This instability left young Winston emotionally adrift, with minimal parental attention; his upbringing was largely entrusted to his nanny, Elizabeth Everest, whom he affectionately called “Woom.”  
Fears emphasises Churchill’s academic underperformance, particularly at Harrow School, where he excelled only in history and English. His father’s disappointment barred him from attending Oxford or Cambridge, redirecting him toward a military career. Churchill’s admission to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1893, after failing entrance exams twice, marked a turning point. Fears highlights his improvement at Sandhurst, where he graduated 20th in a class of 130, as evidence of his emerging discipline and focus. This period, Fears argues, cultivated Churchill’s self-reliance and determination, traits he later channelled into his military and political endeavours.  
The lecture underscores the psychological impact of Lord Randolph’s premature death in 1894, which Churchill interpreted as a challenge to prove himself worthy of his father’s unattainable approval. Fears connects this dynamic to Churchill’s lifelong drive, citing his autobiographical reflections on growing “strong and sturdy” like a “solitary tree” in the absence of paternal validation. Additionally, Fears contextualises Churchill’s familial heritage, tracing the Marlborough lineage through the Spencer family—noting Princess Diana’s distant relation—to illustrate the weight of aristocratic expectation Churchill navigated.  
Fears’s narrative avoids romanticising Churchill’s upbringing, instead framing it as a crucible that honed his ambition and rhetorical skill. By juxtaposing his early isolation with his later achievements, Fears posits that Churchill’s adversities fostered a tenacity crucial to his wartime leadership. The lecture concludes by linking these formative experiences to Churchill’s self-mythologising tendencies, evident in his writings and speeches, which often emphasised overcoming personal and national trials.

Lecture Three: On the Empire’s Frontier

Fears’s third lecture examines Winston Churchill’s early military and journalistic career, arguing that his experiences on the British Empire’s frontiers between 1895 and 1900 forged his reputation as a daring leader and prolific writer. Fears emphasises Churchill’s service in India, Sudan, and South Africa, where he combined military action with war correspondence, leveraging his writings to critique imperial policy while advancing his public profile. 
After graduating from Sandhurst, Churchill was commissioned into the 4th Hussars and posted to India in 1895. Fears notes Churchill’s dual role as soldier and journalist, beginning with his coverage of the Cuban War of Independence for the *Daily Graphic*. Despite accusations of bias toward Spanish colonial rule, Churchill defended his reporting, framing it as a defence of British imperialism’s civilising mission. This duality—military duty intertwined with media engagement—defined his early career. 
In 1897, Churchill participated in the Malakand Field Force’s campaign against Pashtun tribesmen on India’s northwest frontier. Fears highlights his bravery under fire and his controversial book The Story of the Malakand Field Force (1898), which criticised British military strategy. Though it drew ire from the War Office and General Herbert Kitchener, the book won praise from Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, who facilitated Churchill’s transfer to Kitchener’s Sudan campaign. At the Battle of Omdurman (1898), Churchill witnessed the British Army’s decisive victory but condemned Kitchener’s desecration of the Mahdi’s tomb and mistreatment of prisoners. His account, The River War (1899), became a bestseller, cementing his literary reputation. 
Fears underscores Churchill’s South African exploits during the Second Boer War (1899–1902) as pivotal. Captured by Boer forces in 1899, Churchill escaped captivity in Pretoria and trekked 300 miles to safety in Portuguese East Africa, garnering international acclaim. His books London to Ladysmith via Pretoria (1900) and Ian Hamilton’s March (1900) capitalised on public fascination, solidifying his status as a national hero. 
Returning to Britain in 1900, Churchill leveraged his celebrity to win a parliamentary seat for Oldham as a Conservative. Fears notes that by age twenty-six, Churchill had achieved financial independence through his writings, earning approximately £1.5 million in today’s currency. This period, Fears argues, established patterns central to Churchill’s career: risk-taking, self-promotion through media, and a willingness to challenge authority. His early critiques of imperial excesses, juxtaposed with staunch defence of British global influence, foreshadowed the complexities of his later political stances.

Lecture Four: Political Beginnings

Professor J. Rufus Fears’s fourth lecture on Winston Churchill’s political beginnings argues that Churchill's career was built upon a foundation of core principles that set him apart from many contemporary politicians. This principled stance, while contributing to his distinctiveness and ultimately his successes, also meant he consistently faced criticism throughout his career. Despite this, Fears contends that Churchill’s considerable political skill, administrative competence, and exceptional oratory abilities allowed him to progress rapidly and significantly in British politics. At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Churchill held the crucial position of First Lord of the Admiralty, responsible for the Royal Navy. In this role, he was instrumental in ensuring the navy was at its most effective. However, Fears suggests that it was precisely these bedrock principles that led Churchill to question the strategies of the British High Command, particularly the ultimately disastrous Dardanelles campaign of 1915.
Professor Fears begins by outlining Churchill's early motivations, arguing that ambition and a deep-seated need for recognition were driving forces in his early life.  Fears proposes these needs stemmed from a childhood characterised by parental neglect. He suggests that Churchill's desire to prove himself to his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, and later to vindicate his father's political legacy, fuelled his pursuit of success as both a soldier and an author.  Churchill viewed these achievements as stepping stones to a political career.  Fears notes that while serving in India with the army, Churchill embarked on a programme of self-education, reading books sent to him by his mother. This self-directed study, focusing on a relatively small number of works read in depth, profoundly shaped his literary and oratorical style.  Fears specifically highlights the influence of Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (published in six volumes between 1776 and 1788) and the works of Thomas Babington Macaulay, including his *History of England* and his essays and poems.  Gibbon’s grand narrative style and Macaulay’s vivid prose and Whiggish interpretation of history demonstrably influenced Churchill’s own approach to historical writing and his rhetorical style.  Fears adds that Churchill also studied parliamentary debates and his father's speeches, immersing himself in the traditions of British political oratory. By the time Churchill wrote about his experiences in the Boer War, Fears argues he had become a highly skilled writer of English prose.  Churchill himself believed, according to Fears, that genuine conviction was essential for truly effective public speaking.  He dedicated considerable time to crafting his speeches, often spending eight to ten hours on preparation for each one.  Despite this meticulous preparation, Fears points out that his speeches were often perceived by audiences as being delivered spontaneously.
Professor Fears then places Churchill's entry into Parliament in 1900 within the context of late Victorian Britain.  Queen Victoria was nearing the end of her reign, which concluded in 1901, and the British Empire was at its zenith, controlling vast territories and populations across the globe.  Great Britain was the leading economic power in the world, its industrial might unmatched by any other nation.  However, Fears is careful to note that this period of apparent imperial and economic strength also masked significant domestic and international challenges.  Within Britain itself, there was a stark disparity between the wealthy elite and the working classes, resulting in widespread poverty and social inequality.  This social divide, Fears explains, contributed to considerable labour unrest, with the rise of trade unions and numerous strikes and protests as workers demanded better conditions and pay.  Furthermore, the contentious issue of Irish Home Rule was causing deep political division and even violence, with Irish nationalists campaigning for greater autonomy or even complete independence from British rule.  Internationally, Fears highlights the growing military strength of Imperial Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II as a major concern. Germany's rapid industrialisation and naval expansion, particularly the Anglo-German naval race which began in the late 1890s, were seen as a direct challenge to British power and security.  Professor Fears outlines the British system of government as it stood in 1911, describing it as a parliamentary democracy with sovereignty residing in Parliament.  Parliament comprised three elements: the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. Whilst legally sovereign, Fears stresses that in practice, the House of Commons was the dominant body.  The House of Lords, composed of hereditary peers and bishops, still retained the power to veto legislation passed by the Commons, though this power was increasingly contested and would be curtailed by the Parliament Act of 1911.  Fears clarifies that in the British system, the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public, but rather is the leader of the political party that wins a general election and commands a majority in the House of Commons.  Members of Parliament represent geographical constituencies but, as Professor Fears points out, are not required to live within the constituency they represent.  In 1900, British politics was dominated by two main parties: the Conservatives and the Liberals.  Fears characterises the Conservatives as generally adhering to more traditional values and advocating for a more limited role for government intervention.  Conversely, the Liberals, according to Fears, broadly believed in a more active role for the state in addressing social problems and implementing social reforms.
Professor Fears argues that Churchill, like his father Lord Randolph, espoused a political philosophy known as Tory Democracy, albeit with a notably liberal leaning.  This ideology, Fears explains, advocated for a Conservative framework but one that incorporated social reforms to improve the lives of the working class and address poverty.  Key elements of Tory Democracy, according to Fears, included social programmes such as improved education, national health insurance, unemployment benefits, and legal recognition for trade unions.  Despite being initially elected as a Conservative Member of Parliament, Professor Fears states that Churchill harboured a profound distrust of the Conservative leadership.  This distrust, Fears argues, stemmed from the belief that Conservative figures had been instrumental in undermining and destroying his father's political career.  In 1906, Churchill published a biography of his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, a project that Fears interprets as a deliberate attempt by Churchill to rehabilitate his father’s reputation and vindicate his memory.  For Churchill, Fears suggests, Lord Randolph represented a form of principled, non-partisan politics that he admired and sought to emulate.  However, Fears points out that Lord Randolph’s legacy was not necessarily an advantage for Churchill in his early political career, and in some respects, may have been a hindrance.  Churchill’s maiden speech in the House of Commons, according to Fears, proved to be controversial.  He praised the Boer fighters for their bravery during the Second Boer War, a conflict still ongoing at the time.  This stance, Professor Fears indicates, drew criticism, with some accusing him of being soft on the Boers and insufficiently patriotic.  He further courted controversy, according to Fears, by voting against large increases in army spending, leading to accusations that he was attempting to conduct imperialism on the cheap and neglecting Britain’s military needs.  Fears notes that Churchill also warned against the prospect of war with Germany, arguing that Britain could not realistically raise a sufficiently large army to defeat the German military on land.  He cautioned, in line with later historical reality, that any future war would be protracted and would incur immense costs in terms of both human lives and financial resources.
In 1904, a significant turning point in Churchill’s early career occurred when he decided to leave the Conservative Party and join the Liberal Party.  Professor Fears states that this defection was primarily driven by Churchill’s strong belief in free trade, a principle that clashed with the Conservative Party’s growing support for protectionist tariffs, advocated by figures like Joseph Chamberlain, who sought to establish imperial preference and protect British industries.  Churchill’s move to the Liberals was met with predictable condemnation from his former Conservative colleagues, who, as Professor Fears notes, accused him of political opportunism, suggesting his decision was motivated by personal ambition rather than genuine principle.  This perception of opportunism, Fears argues, also hindered his acceptance within certain segments of the Liberal Party, who remained wary of his Conservative background and perceived ambition.  Despite these reservations, in 1905, Churchill was appointed Undersecretary of State for the Colonies in the Liberal government.  Fears points out that he was immediately assigned a highly sensitive and important task: to develop a new constitution for South Africa in the aftermath of the Second Boer War (1899-1902).  This war had been fought between Britain and the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.  The constitution Churchill devised, according to Fears, is a key example of his magnanimous approach to politics.  It advocated a policy that, while not precisely ‘one man one vote’ in the fully enfranchised sense, was notably generous to the defeated Boers, allowing them significant political representation and self-government within the framework of the British Empire.  Fears notes that the constitution permitted the Boers to retain their Afrikaans language alongside English as an official language.  Professor Fears concludes that this constitution played a significant role in shaping South Africa's trajectory through the Second World War and in maintaining its close ties to the British Empire, although the longer term outcome was considerably more complex with the later development of apartheid.
In 1908, Churchill’s career progressed further when he was appointed President of the Board of Trade.  Fears explains that this promotion brought him into the Cabinet, the inner circle of government, and gave him a platform to advance his programme of social reform.  The Board of Trade at this time had a broad remit encompassing various aspects of commerce, industry and labour relations, making it a significant position for implementing domestic policy.
By 1910, Churchill had become Home Secretary, the second youngest person to hold this office in British history.  Professor Fears emphasises the enormous responsibility associated with the post of Home Secretary, or His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department.  This role, according to Fears, effectively placed him in charge of almost all domestic affairs within Great Britain.  His responsibilities included law enforcement, policing, criminal justice, labour relations, immigration, censorship, and a wide array of other issues directly affecting the lives of people in Britain.  Fears asserts that Churchill handled these diverse and demanding responsibilities with considerable skill.  He was noted for his energy, his innovative approach to administration, and his forceful advocacy for policies he believed were beneficial.  Furthermore, Fears highlights Churchill’s willingness to take responsibility for his actions, both positive and negative.  However, Professor Fears also points out that certain events during his tenure as Home Secretary generated significant controversy and criticism that would continue to dog him for years.  One such event was the ‘Siege of Sidney Street’ in London in 1911, involving a confrontation between police and a gang of Latvian anarchists.  Fears clarifies that the criticism directed at Churchill was not primarily about the police action itself, or even the fact that the building where the anarchists were hiding caught fire and burned down.  Instead, the criticism focused on Churchill’s decision to personally attend the scene of the siege, with some considering it inappropriate and unbecoming for a senior cabinet minister to be directly involved in such an operational policing matter.  Another episode that generated lasting controversy was Churchill’s response to riots by striking Welsh miners in Tonypandy in 1910.  Fears explains that the persistent accusation was that Churchill had deployed troops who then fired upon and killed striking miners.  Fears corrects this misconception, stating that while troops were considered and dispatched to the area, Churchill in fact ultimately decided against their deployment in a direct interventionist role.  The riots were actually put down by the police, but the damaging allegations of military violence, and Churchill’s perceived overreaction, persisted for decades, according to Fears, impacting his public image and political reputation.
In 1911, Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, a position Professor Fears describes as second only in importance to that of Prime Minister within the British government at a time when Britain’s naval power was paramount.  Fears characterises Churchill as outstanding in this role.  From 1911 onwards, Professor Fears states that Churchill became convinced that war with Germany was inevitable and that it would be a conflict of unprecedented destructiveness.  The First World War, which commenced in 1914, indeed proved to be incredibly costly in terms of human life.  Professor Fears argues that Churchill believed there were alternative ways to wage war, rejecting the attritional trench warfare strategies adopted by the military High Command, which resulted in horrific casualties for minimal territorial gains.  It was this conviction, according to Fears, that led Churchill to propose the Dardanelles campaign in 1915.  The objective of this campaign was to force a passage through the Dardanelles Straits, capture Constantinople (now Istanbul), and knock Ottoman Turkey out of the war, potentially opening up a supply route to Russia and relieving pressure on the Western Front.  However, Fears concludes, the Dardanelles campaign, as it was ultimately executed, became a military disaster, marked by poor planning, inadequate resources, and ultimately failure.  Churchill, as the political architect of the campaign, received a large share of the blame for this failure and was subsequently forced to resign from his position in government.

Lecture Five: Churchill and Controversy

Churchill was- and for some historians still is- a controversial figure. Many of his personal qualities tended to provoke controversy, including his refusal to “stay in his box,” to compromise his vision, and to avoid difficult decisions. The Dardanelles campaign was a major controversy and seminal event in Churchill’s life. It turned into a disaster because of Churchill’s impetuosity and his inability to interpret human character and recognize those who bore him ill. The tragic failure of that campaign, and the public and political response to it, threatened to destroy Churchill’s political career. His own response embodied those personal qualities that enabled him not only to survive but, ultimately, to triumph. Fears’s lecture regarding the controversies that plagued Winston Churchill throughout his political life centres on the idea that Churchill’s inherent qualities, while contributing to his greatness, also made him a consistently divisive figure.  Fears suggests that Churchill’s refusal to conform to political norms, his unwavering conviction in his own vision, and his willingness to make difficult and often unpopular decisions repeatedly placed him at the heart of disputes.  The Dardanelles campaign, according to Professor Fears, serves as a prime example of these controversies and represents a pivotal moment in Churchill’s career.  Fears argues that the campaign’s disastrous outcome, attributed in part to Churchill's impetuosity and his misjudgements of character, threatened to destroy his political future.  However, Fears emphasises that Churchill's response to this crisis exemplified the very personal characteristics that enabled him not only to survive politically but eventually to achieve triumph.

Professor Fears opens his argument by posing the question of why Churchill was perpetually surrounded by controversy.  He proposes that a key factor was Churchill's genius, a quality that, particularly in the political arena, often breeds distrust and envy.  Fears elaborates on this by explaining that Churchill consistently defied expectations and exceeded the conventional boundaries of his roles.  Even in his position as First Lord of the Admiralty, ostensibly responsible for the navy, Churchill extended his influence beyond budgetary management.  He actively intervened in naval modernisation, pushing for larger calibre guns on warships, advocating for faster ship designs, and crucially, championing the transition from coal to oil as the navy's primary fuel source.  This shift to oil, while prescient and eventually vital, was a contentious decision at the time as Britain had abundant domestic coal reserves but was reliant on foreign sources for oil, adding a layer of strategic vulnerability.
Fears highlights that Churchill often disregarded advice from senior admirals, preferring to consult figures considered unorthodox or maverick within the Admiralty, such as Admiral Sir John Fisher.  Fisher, a highly innovative but also controversial figure, had previously served as First Sea Lord and was known for his radical reforms of the navy, including the introduction of the Dreadnought battleship in 1906, which revolutionised naval warfare and made all previous battleships obsolete.  Churchill’s close relationship with Fisher and his willingness to listen to his unconventional ideas further alienated some within the traditional naval establishment.  Fears also points to Churchill's early recognition of the military potential of aircraft, a vision that was not widely shared within the military establishment, which largely viewed aeroplanes as novelties or sporting playthings rather than serious weapons of war. Fears provides a specific example of Churchill’s tendency to overstep his remit with the 1914 defence of Antwerp.  As German forces advanced through Belgium, Churchill, without direct cabinet authorisation, dispatched Royal Marines and naval reservists to reinforce Antwerp, a strategically important port.  Furthermore, in a highly unusual move for a First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill personally travelled to Antwerp and became directly involved in the military operations.  While King Albert I of Belgium later praised Churchill’s actions, arguing they were crucial in allowing time for British forces to deploy to Calais and other Channel ports, thus preventing their capture and contributing significantly to the Allied war effort by securing the vital supply lines across the English Channel, this intervention was widely criticised at the time.  The fall of Antwerp to the Germans despite Churchill’s efforts was portrayed in the press as a fiasco, and Churchill was publicly ridiculed and officially reprimanded for what was seen as excessive enthusiasm and a lack of judgement.  However, Fears underscores that the initial negative perception overshadowed the longer-term strategic benefits acknowledged later, and the label of the Antwerp operation as a failure stuck to Churchill, damaging his reputation despite any subsequent vindication.
Fears then turns to other factors that contributed to Churchill's perceived untrustworthiness in the eyes of his contemporaries.  He points to the legacy of Churchill's father, Lord Randolph Churchill, a prominent but ultimately politically unsuccessful Conservative politician whose career had ended in abrupt resignation and controversy.  Professor Fears notes that Churchill did not attempt to distance himself from his father’s problematic reputation. Instead, he wrote a biography, *Lord Randolph Churchill*, published in 1906, which was a clear attempt to defend and rehabilitate his father's political image.  This act of filial loyalty, while understandable, was criticised by some who felt that Churchill was aligning himself with a tarnished political brand and potentially inheriting his father's political liabilities.
Another aspect of Churchill’s personality that fuelled controversy, according to Fears, was his ‘incisive tongue’.  Churchill was renowned for his brilliant oratory but also for his sharp wit and sometimes scathing remarks, which could make him enemies and alienate potential allies.  Furthermore, Fears asserts that Churchill lacked ‘antennae’ when it came to judging character.  He was not adept at discerning people's true motives and intentions and often failed to recognise those who posed a threat to his career.  This, combined with a tendency to misjudge individuals, sometimes mistaking enemies for friends, made him vulnerable to manipulation and political betrayal.  Professor Fears cites the example of Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, who, despite outward cordiality, harboured a deep-seated dislike for Churchill.  Fears argues that Kitchener, along with others in the Cabinet, deliberately set Churchill up to fail in the Dardanelles campaign.
Professor Fears emphasises the Dardanelles campaign as the ‘seminal event’ in Churchill's life, a catastrophic episode that profoundly affected him.  His wife, Clementine Churchill, reportedly spoke of his deep ‘grief’ over the Dardanelles, believing it to be a disaster from which he might never recover.  The Dardanelles campaign was indeed Churchill's most audacious and ultimately disastrous initiative during the First World War.  Driven by a desire to break the deadlock on the Western Front, where trench warfare had resulted in horrific stalemate and casualties, Churchill advocated for a naval and amphibious campaign against the Dardanelles Straits, a narrow waterway controlled by Ottoman Turkey, Germany’s ally.  His strategic vision, as described by Professor Fears, was ambitious and far-reaching.  Churchill believed that by forcing the Dardanelles, Allied forces could knock Turkey out of the war, capture Constantinople, and then advance through the Balkans to threaten Austria-Hungary from the south, potentially diverting German resources and ultimately shortening the war.  This eastern front strategy contrasted sharply with the prevailing Western Front focus of the British military establishment.
However, Fears explains that Kitchener and the majority of the British High Command remained convinced that the war could only be won through attrition on the Western Front in France and Belgium.  Despite their scepticism, they ultimately gave reluctant approval for Churchill’s Dardanelles plan to proceed, perhaps partly to appease the ambitious First Lord of the Admiralty and partly to explore any potential alternative to the bloody stalemate in the west.  Fears details a catalogue of missteps and misfortunes that contributed to the Dardanelles’ failure.  The campaign was launched prematurely and without adequate preparation.  Coordination with allies proved problematic.  Greece, initially considered a potential ally, became politically unstable, and a pro-German government came to power, undermining any prospect of Greek cooperation. The initial naval bombardment of Turkish forts was entrusted to ageing admirals whose strategy proved ineffective.  Changes in naval command mid-operation further disrupted the already faltering campaign.  Several British warships were lost to mines and Turkish coastal batteries during the naval assault phase.  For the subsequent land invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula, Sir Ian Hamilton, an old friend of Churchill's, was appointed to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.  However, Professor Fears points out that Hamilton was ill-prepared, arriving with outdated maps of Gallipoli and obsolete intelligence on the Turkish army.  His initial assessment recommended a substantial troop commitment, but Kitchener, focused on the Western Front, was unwilling to divert significant forces.  By the time sufficient troops were eventually landed, the Turks, under effective German military leadership, had had ample time to heavily fortify their positions on the peninsula. Fears reiterates that Churchill’s ‘impetuosity’ and poor judgement of character were contributing factors to the disaster.  He rushed into the campaign without fully appreciating the complexities and potential pitfalls and without accurately gauging the opposition he would face from within the British establishment.  Furthermore, Professor Fears highlights Churchill’s miscalculation of his own political vulnerability.  His ministerial colleagues, some of whom were actively undermining him, leaked damaging information to the press, fueling a hostile media campaign against Churchill and the Dardanelles operation.  By the time the Allied forces were finally withdrawn from Gallipoli in January 1916, the campaign had resulted in approximately 213,980 British casualties, along with substantial French, Australian, New Zealander, and Turkish losses, all for no strategic gain.  Churchill, as the primary political architect of the Dardanelles campaign, bore the brunt of the blame.  In the political fallout, he accepted responsibility for the debacle and resigned from his position as First Lord of the Admiralty, a significant blow to his career.
Professor Fears concludes by noting Churchill's relative isolation in the aftermath of the Dardanelles.  He observes that Churchill had few truly loyal friends who stood by him during this crisis.  Even David Lloyd George, the Liberal leader whom Churchill had considered a close political ally, offered him no support in the wake of the disaster.  Furthermore, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith, while remaining outwardly cordial, refused to allow Churchill the customary opportunity to defend his actions in Parliament, further isolating him politically.  Despite this setback and potential public humiliation, Professor Fears emphasises Churchill's remarkable resilience.  Instead of publicly detailing the horrors and failures of the war effort, Churchill displayed a sense of patriotic duty and sought a different form of service.  He requested a field command and, to his credit, was sent for training with the Grenadier Guards, a prestigious infantry regiment.  Initially met with some scepticism and social awkwardness within the officer corps, Churchill reportedly applied himself to training without complaint.  His efforts were eventually recognised, and he was appointed lieutenant colonel in the Royal Scots Fusiliers, a front-line infantry battalion.  Professor Fears notes that Churchill served alongside his men in the trenches on the Western Front during the spring of 1916.  According to anecdotal accounts cited by Fears, Churchill became a highly respected and popular commander amongst his troops, who reportedly considered him one of the most well-liked leaders on the entire Western Front, a testament to his personal courage and ability to connect with soldiers despite his aristocratic background and previous high office.

Lecture Six: Post-War Challenges

Fears's sixth lecture delves into Churchill's post-World War I career, highlighting the challenges and controversies he faced. Despite being cleared of blame for the Dardanelles disaster by an investigative committee in 1917, Fears notes that the shadow of the campaign continued to plague Churchill's reputation. He was brought back into government by Prime Minister David Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions. In this role, according to Fears, Churchill continued his support for the development of the tank, a concept he had championed as First Lord of the Admiralty. Moreover, Fears emphasises Churchill's advocacy for the expansion of air power during the latter stages of the war.
Fears explains that after the war, Churchill's career was marked by his tenure in several significant government positions. In 1919, he became Minister for War and Air. Fears points out that, given the prevailing aversion to further military conflict within the British establishment, Churchill was tasked with demobilisation and cutting the military budget, a policy he implemented based on the length of service of soldiers.
A key aspect of Fears's lecture focuses on Churchill's staunch anti-communism. Fears argues that Churchill strongly opposed the Bolsheviks after World War I, advocating for military intervention in Russia. Churchill's opposition, Fears contends, stemmed from his belief that socialism and communism infringed upon the fundamental right to property. However, Fears acknowledges that this stance led to accusations of warmongering, and the British government ultimately did not intervene militarily. Fears includes the fact that the Labour Party and many workers criticised Churchill, interpreting his anti-Bolshevism as an attack on labour rights in general.
In 1921, Churchill became Colonial Secretary, a position that, according to Fears, presented numerous challenges. Fears states that with the British Empire reaching its zenith, Churchill had to grapple with complex issues in Ireland and the Middle East. Fears mentions Churchill's involvement with T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East. Fears argues that Lawrence believed Britain had prioritised promises to Arabs over the establishment of a Jewish state. Despite this, Fears says Churchill, a friend of Zionist leaders, supported the idea of a Jewish state, even at the expense of Arab land, a position that garnered him enemies in the Middle East and opposition from within the British government and army.
Furthermore, Fears indicates that Churchill had to address the longstanding issue of home rule for Ireland. Having sent troops, including the Black and Tans, to combat the IRA during his time as Minister of War, Fears notes that as Colonial Secretary, Churchill engaged in negotiations with the IRA. Fears claims that the compromise reached, which persists today, involved the partition of Ireland, with Northern Ireland (Ulster) remaining part of Britain and the rest of Ireland becoming a free state, later the Republic of Ireland.
Fears concludes by highlighting Churchill's return to the Conservative Party in 1925 following the decline of the Liberal Party. According to Fears, this decision led to further accusations of political opportunism. Under Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Fears states that Churchill was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, a powerful role traditionally seen as a stepping stone to the premiership.

Lecture Seven In the Wilderness

Britain was given little chance to recover from World War I. The 1920s saw a devastating general strike and a stock market crash. In 1925, Churchill rejoined the Conservative Party and, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, reinstated the gold standard. When the Labour Party took over the government in 1929, Churchill was out of office and out of favour in his own Conservative Party. He entered what was termed “the wilderness.” He took refuge at his country home of Chartwell. Here, we encounter Churchill as a faithful husband and devoted father. We experience his love of life and hobbies. We see him as a multifaceted genius, painter, and author, who earned much of his livelihood through his writings. This time was a period of renewal, enabling Churchill to rally a nation “never to surrender.” Fears argues that following the First World War, Britain under the Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin sought a return to pre-war conditions. Baldwin, who served multiple terms including 1923-1924 and 1924-1929, presided over a nation where working-class men increasingly demanded social benefits, contributing to labour restlessness. Fears notes that during the period from 1922 to 1924, Winston Churchill experienced significant political setbacks, failing to win a seat in three successive elections and consequently being outside of Parliament. Other politicians, according to Fears's analysis, adjusted their political discourse to appeal to an electorate that was shifting towards the left. In contrast, Fears highlights that Churchill maintained a staunch opposition to socialism, openly criticising its principles. However, in the 1924 general election, Churchill successfully stood for Parliament in the Epping constituency, a seat he would retain until his retirement from the House of Commons in 1964. His election at this time was with the backing of the Conservative Party. Fears points out that with the decline of the Liberal Party and the rise of the Labour Party as the primary opposition to the Conservatives, Churchill formally rejoined the Conservative Party in 1925. Subsequent to this, he was appointed to the significant position of Chancellor of the Exchequer in Baldwin's government. Fears then discusses the events of May 1926, when a general strike was called across Britain. This action was initiated in solidarity with coal miners who were facing wage reductions proposed by mine owners. During this period of industrial action, Fears describes how many ordinary citizens attempted to maintain essential services usually performed by striking workers. Baldwin entrusted Churchill with the responsibility of producing a government newspaper, the British Gazette, during the strike. According to Fears, this publication, which ran for eight days from 5 to 13 May 1926, contained strong criticisms directed against the striking labour unions and the strike itself. Following the conclusion of the general strike, which ended without achieving its main objectives for the miners, Fears states that Churchill, in his capacity as Chancellor of the Exchequer and with the agreement of the Bank of England, made the decision to return Britain to the gold standard in 1925. This move aimed to stabilise the currency and restore pre-war economic confidence but has been argued by economists to have contributed to deflationary pressures.
Fears then moves to the year 1929, when the Conservative government was defeated, leading to the formation of a Labour government with Ramsay MacDonald becoming Prime Minister for the second time (his first being in 1924). Fears notes that the Wall Street Crash of October 1929 had a significant personal impact on Churchill, causing him substantial financial losses which posed a threat to his and his family's economic well-being. By 1931, Fears explains that Churchill found himself at odds with the leadership of the Conservative Party, primarily over the issue of granting greater self-governance and eventual independence to India. While he retained his seat in Parliament, his divergence from the party line on such a major policy issue led to what is described in British political terminology as entering "the wilderness". Fears indicates that this phrase signifies a period when a politician is out of favour with their party leadership and holds no governmental office. At this juncture, Fears suggests that many informed commentators of the time believed Churchill's political career had effectively reached its end.
Fears dedicates attention to the personal life of Churchill, identifying Clementine Churchill as the most significant individual in his life. Clementine, born Clementine Hozier, was, as Fears notes, the granddaughter of the 7th Earl of Airlie, connecting her to the Scottish aristocracy. While her lineage was respectable, her immediate family was not affluent. Fears mentions her education at the Sorbonne in Paris, suggesting an exposure to broader European perspectives, and describes her as holding liberal political views. He characterises her as strong-willed and possessing considerable political astuteness, often providing Churchill with valuable counsel. Fears asserts that Churchill maintained a deep devotion and faithfulness to Clementine throughout their marriage, which lasted for fifty-seven years until Churchill's death. Together, Winston and Clementine Churchill had five children: Diana, Randolph, Sarah, Marigold, and Mary. Fears sadly notes that Marigold died at a young age in 1921 from septicaemia. Despite the demands of his public life, Fears portrays Churchill as a loving and generous father, and in turn, his children were deeply attached to him.
During the 1930s, a period Churchill himself termed his "wilderness years", Fears describes how Churchill found solace and occupation at his country home, Chartwell, located in Kent. Chartwell is described by Fears as a mansion with a history tracing back to the time of the Domesday Book in 1086, though the current house largely dates from later periods. Churchill purchased Chartwell in 1922, the same year his mother, Jennie Jerome, passed away. Fears underscores that Chartwell remained Churchill's primary residence until his death in 1965. The considerable attention and resources Churchill invested in modifying and maintaining Chartwell, according to Fears, rendered it a tangible expression of his personality and preferences. He is depicted as living in a comfortable and expansive manner, with household servants being a standard feature of his domestic life. Fears details aspects of Churchill's personal habits, noting his preference for simple food, which he consumed with enthusiasm, alongside an appreciation for good quality wine, spirits, particularly whisky, and cigars. Chartwell frequently hosted gatherings, and Fears points out Churchill's enjoyment of offering hospitality. Notable figures and celebrities of the era were regular visitors, including T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, and the film actor and director Charlie Chaplin. Fears suggests that Churchill was stimulated rather than intimidated by individuals of great talent and achievement, thus choosing to surround himself with them. In a similar vein, Fears notes that Churchill's study contained numerous items of memorabilia related to Napoleon Bonaparte, indicating an admiration for the historical figure. Fears also highlights Churchill's capacity for wide-ranging enthusiasms, as evidenced by the variety of hobbies he pursued at different times. These included learning to fly aeroplanes, the manual labour of bricklaying (at which he became quite proficient and even joined a trade union), constructing ponds and water features at Chartwell, keeping tropical fish, engaging in horse racing as an owner, and for a period, raising pigs.
Fears argues that Churchill's principal source of income throughout much of his adult life was derived from his writing. A significant portion of his time during his years at Chartwell was dedicated to literary endeavours, encompassing books, articles for newspapers and magazines, and extensive correspondence. Fears quantifies this output by stating that by the year 1940, Churchill had authored more than twenty-five books and over two hundred and twenty-five articles. Over the course of his entire lifetime, his total number of published books reached fifty-six. The literary merit of Churchill's writing is evidenced, as Fears points out, by his being awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953. The citation for this award specifically mentioned "for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values". Fears notes that Churchill's prodigious literary output was made possible partly through the employment of research assistants who helped gather and organise material, and also by his practice of composing texts through dictation to secretaries. In terms of financial reward, Fears estimates that Churchill's income from his writings, when adjusted to contemporary monetary values, often amounted to sums exceeding what would be equivalent to a million US dollars today. The breadth of subjects addressed in his books and articles, according to Fears, showcases his diverse intellect and interests, covering areas such as political analysis, historical narratives, the practice of painting as an art form, discussions on social issues of the day, and descriptions of his personal hobbies, among other topics. Fears specifically draws attention to five substantial works of history and biography produced by Churchill, each of which, he suggests, would represent a major career achievement for most academic historians. These works are: "Lord Randolph Churchill", a two-volume biography of his father published in 1906; "The World Crisis", a six-volume account of the First World War published between 1923 and 1931; "Marlborough: His Life and Times", a comprehensive four-volume biography of his ancestor John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, published between 1933 and 1938; "A History of the English-Speaking Peoples", a four-volume survey spanning from Roman Britain to the beginning of the First World War, published between 1956 and 1958; and "The Second World War", another extensive six-volume history based on his wartime experiences and knowledge, published between 1948 and 1953.
Finally, Fears discusses Churchill's engagement with painting, arguing that for Churchill, it transcended being merely a hobby and became more akin to a serious vocation. He began painting in earnest around 1915, during a period of political downturn after the Dardanelles campaign in the First World War, initially as a means of alleviating stress and depression. Even earlier, during the Second Boer War (1899-1902), Fears mentions that Churchill's sketches made on battlefields were published to accompany his journalistic dispatches. Fears notes that Churchill's artistic endeavours received positive recognition from established art critics. Furthermore, many of his paintings were eventually exhibited in professional art galleries and museums. In recognition of his artistic achievements, Churchill was made an Honorary Member Academician Extraordinary of the Royal Academy of Arts in 1948. Fears also reveals an interesting commercial aspect to Churchill's art, stating that at one stage in his life, he earned a considerable income from the reproduction of his paintings on greeting cards produced by Hallmark. In terms of subject matter, Churchill predominantly favoured painting landscapes. Stylistically, Fears describes Churchill's choice of colours as typically bold and bright, and notes that his approach to painting was largely influenced by the impressionist movement. According to Fears, the substantial body of Churchill's paintings, numbering in the hundreds, collectively projects a sense of profound optimism towards life.

Lecture Eight The Nazi Menace

Whilst Churchill was in the wilderness, Adolf Hitler was achieving the pinnacle of power in Germany. While such politicians as Baldwin and Chamberlain focused on winning elections and balancing budgets, Churchill recognized the evil of Hitler and proclaimed it to an apathetic public. During much of the 1930s, Churchill stood almost alone as he urged Britain to resist Nazi aggrandizement and to prepare for war. This lecture examines the political principles that contrasted Churchill and Hitler and made Churchill regard the Nazi menace with such alarm. Both Hitler and Churchill were men of ambition and patriotism. The difference lay in the moral compass that guided Churchill and that was utterly despised by Adolf Hitler.

Fears's first main point is that by 1930, many observers within British political circles and the press believed Winston Churchill's political career to be effectively over. Fears suggests that Churchill himself entertained similar thoughts during this period. As evidence, Fears notes that in 1930, at the age of fifty-six, Churchill published his memoir, "A Roving Commission: My Early Life". Fears interprets this work, which covers Churchill's life before entering Parliament, as a reflection by a man who views his active career as concluded. To support this interpretation, Fears quotes Churchill's writing about his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, stating, "It is never possible for a man to recover his lost position. He may recover another position in the fifties and sixties, but not one he lost in the thirties and forties." Fears implies that Churchill may have been projecting his own situation onto his father's experience. Indeed, Lord Randolph Churchill's own political career suffered a significant decline after his resignation as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1886, from which he never fully recovered before his early death. Adding to this sense of being out of step with the times, Fears observes that Churchill looked his age and often chose old-fashioned attire. Furthermore, his manner of speaking employed dated phraseology, and he expressed a noted dislike for foreign words, preferring anglicised versions, particularly of French terms. Fears highlights a quote from "My Early Life" where Churchill articulates his belief about political leadership: "to hold the leadership of a party or a nation with dignity and authority requires that the leader’s qualities and message shall meet not only the need but the mood of both."
Secondly, Fears argues that the prevailing mood in Britain around 1930 was incongruent with Churchill's perspectives, particularly his profound concerns about the resurgence of German power. Fears points out that Churchill had been issuing warnings regarding Germany's ambitions from as early as the 1920s. However, in the wake of the First World War, British society was largely unreceptive to discussions about the possibility of another conflict. Fears elaborates on the reasons for this reluctance. The victory in the First World War, lasting from 1914 to 1918, had come at an enormous human cost for Britain and its empire, with nearly one million dead and over three million casualties in total from areas including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa. There was also significant dissatisfaction across various segments of society concerning the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty signed in 1919, which officially ended the war. A widespread sentiment permeated British society that the First World War had ultimately been a futile endeavour. Compounding this was a conviction that advancements in military technology had rendered warfare so potentially destructive that another major war could lead to the collapse of civilisation. Consequently, patriotism began to be viewed by some as a misguided value. As a striking illustration of this shift in attitude, Fears references an event in 1933 where students at the Oxford Union debating society passed a motion stating, "That this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country." This declaration, made by individuals who represented potential future leaders, was perceived as outrageous by Churchill. Fears also notes that popular culture during this period consistently reinforced the message of war's futility through literature, film, and theatre.
Fears further contends that Britain's economic power was another significant casualty of the First World War. The financial resources necessary to maintain its status as a great power had been substantially depleted by the war's expenses. These economic vulnerabilities were greatly exacerbated by the global economic depression that began in 1929 and extended through the 1930s, often referred to as the Great Depression. Fears notes that Churchill himself received blame for Britain's economic difficulties, particularly because of his decision as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1925 to return Britain to the gold standard at the pre-war parity. Economists continue to debate the impact of this decision, with some arguing it overvalued the pound, hampered exports, and contributed to deflation and unemployment even before the onset of the Great Depression. The status of the British Empire also suffered a decline in public perception during this period. Fears argues that instead of being a symbol of national pride and glory, the Empire came to be seen by many as an increasing burden that Britain lacked the resources to sustain adequately. A diminishing confidence in Britain's role as a proponent of civilisation made concepts like Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden" appear anachronistic and even objectionable to growing sections of the populace. Even within the Conservative Party, historically strong supporters of empire, there was a growing acceptance of eventual independence for India, often described as "the jewel in the crown" of the British Empire. Fears characterises Churchill as an imperialist, deeply committed to the preservation of the Empire, whose warnings about a renewed threat from Germany were largely ignored by a public deeply averse to the prospect of another war. His characteristic sharp wit, often deployed in political debate, was also not widely appreciated in the prevailing political climate. Instead, Fears suggests that politicians he describes as mediocre, such as Stanley Baldwin, who served as Prime Minister three times between 1923 and 1937, and Neville Chamberlain, who succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister in 1937, more accurately reflected the cautious and war-averse mood of Britain in the inter-war years.
Thirdly, Fears contrasts Churchill's political decline with the ascendancy of Adolf Hitler in Germany. Fears asserts that while there might be superficial similarities between the backgrounds of Churchill and Hitler – both experienced periods of being political outsiders, for instance – the fundamental differences between them were profound. Above all, Fears posits that Churchill was guided by a moral compass, appealing to positive aspects of human nature, whereas Hitler appealed to darker, more destructive impulses. From the outset of Hitler's rise to prominence, Fears states that Churchill recognised him as an embodiment of evil. Fears notes that Churchill read Hitler's book, "Mein Kampf", as soon as an English translation became available (the first unabridged English translation by James Murphy was published in 1939, although earlier, heavily abridged versions existed). From this reading, Churchill discerned that Hitler's ideology and explicitly stated political objectives posed a grave danger to global stability. One of Hitler's initial significant actions upon gaining power in 1933 was the systematic stripping away of rights from German Jews, starting with the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" in April 1933, which barred Jews and political opponents from civil service positions. Fears argues that Churchill attempted to alert Britain to the dangers at each significant stage of Hitler's aggressive expansionist plans. However, leaders within the British government at the time often maintained that Britain should not intervene in what they considered to be the internal affairs of another sovereign nation. Fears mentions that Stanley Baldwin later conceded that he had consciously chosen not to adopt a firm stance against Hitler's growing threat due to concerns about potentially losing electoral support.
Fears identifies the remilitarisation of the Rhineland by Germany in March 1936 as the first major test case of international resolve. This action was a direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. Despite this breach of international agreements, the Allied powers, including Britain and France, offered no substantive response. Baldwin and subsequently Chamberlain advocated for a policy that became known as appeasement, seeking to avoid conflict with Hitler through negotiation and concession. Meanwhile, Fears reveals that Churchill was receiving confidential information, provided at considerable personal risk to the sources, regarding the actual state of Britain's military preparedness. These figures reportedly indicated unequivocally that the German air force, the Luftwaffe, was considerably larger and more modern than Britain's Royal Air Force. Despite this intelligence, Baldwin's government took limited action to accelerate British rearmament at that stage.
Also in 1936, Fears points to an event that he argues significantly damaged Churchill's political standing, stemming from Churchill's sense of personal loyalty. This was his public support for King Edward VIII during the abdication crisis, which revolved around the King's desire to marry Wallis Simpson, an American socialite who was twice divorced. For reasons that Fears suggests might seem difficult to comprehend from a contemporary perspective, Churchill's backing of Edward VIII in this deeply controversial matter dealt a severe blow to his political reputation at the time. Public opinion and the political establishment were largely against the marriage.
Moving forward in time, Fears highlights Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938, known as the Anschluss. Churchill sought to voice his strong opposition to this act but was reportedly prevented from doing so in a newspaper column by Lord Beaverbrook, a prominent newspaper proprietor who initially held a more isolationist stance. Furthermore, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) also purportedly denied Churchill opportunities to broadcast his critical views on the matter. Then, in September 1938, at the Munich Conference, Britain and France, under the leadership of Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier respectively, agreed to Hitler's demands for the annexation of the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia with a significant ethnic German population. Upon his return from Munich, Chamberlain famously declared that he believed it was "peace for our time". In stark contrast, Fears notes that Churchill publicly denounced this agreement in Parliament, accusing the leadership of betraying Czechoslovakia and delivering a stark warning that Britain would not ultimately escape the consequences of Hitler's ambitions unless it rediscovered its moral resolve and undertook urgent and substantial rearmament.

Lecture Nine: Rallying the Nation

Churchill’s prophecies proved true, and in 1939, Britain and France were found utterly unprepared for the total war waged by the seemingly invincible Nazi war machine. Leaders of the British government, including King George, thought the only hope for Britain lay in a negotiated peace with Germany. Such a desertion of the cause of freedom was unthinkable to Churchill. Assuming the prime ministership, Churchill felt that his whole past life “had been but a preparation for this hour and this trial.” The fall of France marked the beginning of the Battle of Britain, ten months of incessant bombing in which Hitler and his Luftwaffe sought to break the will of the British people. Fears's lecture follows Churchill as he leads the British in “their finest hour.” Fears's argument initially focuses on the state of British preparedness for war under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain, who lived from 1869 to 1940. Fears posits that Chamberlain's policies had left Britain inadequately prepared for conflict with Germany. A pivotal moment highlighted by Fears occurred in March 1939, when Adolf Hitler contravened the assurances he had given at the Munich Conference in September 1938 and proceeded to occupy the remaining territories of Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement, signed by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, had permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia. Hitler's subsequent disregard for this agreement, by invading and dismembering the rest of the Czechoslovak state, creating the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and a nominally independent Slovak Republic, is presented by Fears as a clear act of treachery that started to alter sentiments within the British Parliament regarding the possibility of appeasing Hitler. Fears notes that Winston Churchill had advocated for the formation of an alliance with the Soviet Union as a bulwark against German expansionism. However, Chamberlain rejected this course of action. Instead, Britain under Chamberlain's leadership extended security guarantees to Poland, notably the Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual assistance signed in August 1939, formalising pledges made earlier that year. In this geopolitical landscape, Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, shifted his diplomatic strategy and entered into what Fears describes as a fateful alliance with Hitler. This refers to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, officially the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939. This pact contained secret protocols that divided territories of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Romania into German and Soviet "spheres of influence". Fears argues that this agreement directly facilitated Hitler's invasion of Poland, which commenced on 1 September 1939. Following this invasion, Britain and France, honouring their treaty obligations to Poland, declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939.
Fears then discusses the initial phase of the Second World War and Churchill's return to government. Following the outbreak of war, there were increasing calls for Winston Churchill to be included in the government. In response, Chamberlain appointed Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty on 3 September 1939, the same day Britain declared war. This was a position Churchill had previously held during the First World War. Fears points out that during this period, which became known as the "Phoney War" or "Sitzkrieg", Britain and France undertook no significant military action to directly aid Poland against the German invasion from the west and the subsequent Soviet invasion from the east, which began on 17 September 1939. Poland was rapidly overrun, suffering immense losses and entering a period of brutal occupation under Nazi Germany and, initially, the Soviet Union. Fears asserts that as a consequence of this inaction by the Western Allies, Hitler became increasingly convinced that Britain and France would not mount effective opposition to his military campaigns. The German offensive in Western Europe commenced on 9 April 1940 with the invasions of Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserübung). Denmark surrendered within hours, while fighting in Norway continued until June. Fears then notes the rapid progression of German military success, stating that barely two months after the start of these operations, on 14 June 1940, German troops entered and occupied Paris.
Fears proceeds to describe the governmental crisis in Britain precipitated by German military successes. The major German offensive against Belgium, the Netherlands, and France began on 10 May 1940 (Operation Fall Gelb). The speed and effectiveness of the German advance using Blitzkrieg tactics led to a crisis of confidence in Neville Chamberlain's leadership in Britain. This culminated in Chamberlain's resignation as Prime Minister. Fears highlights a pervasive sense of pessimism within the highest levels of the British government at this juncture. Lord Halifax, who was serving as Foreign Secretary at the time, along with King George VI, are presented by Fears as being convinced that Britain faced insurmountable odds and could not achieve victory against Germany. David Lloyd George, who had been Britain's Prime Minister during the latter part of the First World War, also held this belief. Fears further mentions that other influential figures, such as the press proprietor Lord Beaverbrook, shared this pessimistic outlook. The prevailing view amongst these individuals was that Britain should seek a negotiated peace settlement with Germany. The envisioned terms, according to Fears, would likely have involved German dominance over continental Europe while allowing Britain to retain its Empire. Fears also states that Hitler himself was favourably disposed towards such a treaty arrangement at that time.
Fears then turns to the circumstances surrounding Churchill's appointment as Prime Minister. Given Churchill's consistent and public warnings about the dangers of German aggression throughout the 1930s, Fears argues he was the obvious candidate to succeed Chamberlain. However, Fears also notes that Churchill was viewed with distrust by many within the political establishment. In a move that Fears describes as canny, Lord Halifax, despite his own pessimistic assessment of Britain's war prospects, urged that Churchill be appointed Prime Minister. Fears suggests a potential underlying motive for Halifax's support: the expectation that Churchill, upon assuming leadership, would be compelled by the dire military situation to negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Germany. Such an action, it was surmised, would damage Churchill's political standing, potentially forcing his resignation and thereby opening a path for Halifax himself to become Prime Minister. Churchill accepted the King's invitation to form a government and became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940. He established a coalition government that included prominent members from all the main political parties: Labour, Liberal, and Conservative. Key appointments included Clement Attlee (Labour) as Lord Privy Seal and later Deputy Prime Minister, and Archibald Sinclair (Liberal) as Secretary of State for Air. In addition to being Prime Minister, Churchill also took on the newly created role of Minister for Defence. Fears underscores the significance of holding both these offices simultaneously, as it allowed Churchill to directly oversee and coordinate both the political direction and military conduct of the war effort. Upon taking office, Churchill set a resolute tone, calling for "victory at all costs", and warning that anything less would result in the disintegration of the British Empire. Shortly after Churchill became Prime Minister, the military situation on the continent deteriorated further. The surrender of King Leopold III of the Belgians to German forces on 28 May 1940 left a substantial number of British and French troops cut off and encircled by German forces around the port of Dunkirk in northern France. The subsequent evacuation operation, codenamed Operation Dynamo, took place between 26 May and 4 June 1940. During this operation, a total of approximately 338,000 Allied soldiers, the majority British and French, were rescued by a hastily assembled fleet of naval vessels and civilian boats. Fears presents this evacuation, often referred to as the "Miracle of Dunkirk", as an event that significantly boosted British morale in a period of otherwise bleak news. Fears also identifies Hitler's decision not to deploy his armoured divisions to decisively eliminate the trapped Allied forces at Dunkirk as a crucial early mistake that would contribute to Germany's eventual defeat. This "halt order", issued on 24 May 1940, provided a critical window for the Allies to organise and execute the evacuation. The reasons behind this order remain a subject of historical debate, with suggested factors including concerns about terrain, the need to conserve armoured units, and a belief by some in the German high command that the Luftwaffe could prevent a large-scale evacuation.
Finally, Fears addresses the immediate aftermath of the fall of France and the commencement of the Battle of Britain. The strategic implications of France's collapse in June 1940 were profound, leaving Britain to face Germany largely alone. Fears argues that the news of France's impending surrender had a severely detrimental effect on British morale. Amidst this atmosphere, Lord Halifax continued to advocate within the War Cabinet for exploring possibilities of a negotiated peace with Hitler. Fears mentions Halifax's proposal to potentially offer strategic concessions to Benito Mussolini, the Fascist leader of Italy, in the Mediterranean region in exchange for Mussolini using his influence with Hitler to broker favourable peace terms for Britain. Italy had entered the war on Germany's side on 10 June 1940. However, Fears notes that the Labour members of the War Cabinet strongly opposed any such negotiations and gave their firm support to Churchill's more belligerent stance. Churchill himself made it unequivocally clear that he had no intention of seeking or negotiating peace with Nazi Germany. On 4 June 1940, shortly after the completion of the Dunkirk evacuation, Churchill delivered one of his most renowned speeches to the House of Commons, in which he famously declared, "We shall go on to the end...we shall never surrender." This speech is widely regarded as a pivotal moment in galvanising British resolve. With the fall of France, what became known as the Battle of Britain commenced. Fears quotes Churchill's later, characteristically modest description of his role during this period, stating it was simply his job to "give the roar to the British lion." The Battle of Britain involved a sustained campaign of aerial attacks by the German Luftwaffe against the United Kingdom, lasting approximately from mid-June 1940 to mid-May 1941, although the most intense phase is often considered to be between July and October 1940. The primary objectives of the German bombing campaign, according to Fears, were to gain air superiority over southern England by destroying Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters and infrastructure, to undermine the morale of the British population, and ultimately to compel Britain to agree to a negotiated peace settlement, or to prepare the ground for a potential invasion (Operation Sea Lion, which was ultimately never launched). The German bombing raids, particularly during the Blitz from September 1940 onwards, caused extensive destruction in London and other cities. Fears describes Churchill's personal conduct during this time, noting his refusal to remain confined to bomb shelters and his frequent public appearances in bombed-out areas of London and other affected cities. During these visits, Churchill was often seen giving the "V for Victory" sign and offering words of encouragement to the civilian population enduring the attacks. On 16 August 1940, during what was up to that point one of the most intense periods of German air attacks, Churchill was present at the headquarters of RAF Fighter Command at Uxbridge. Deeply moved by the bravery and relentless efforts of the RAF pilots in repelling the German attacks, Churchill uttered the now-legendary phrase, captured by those present and later refined for public delivery: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." This tribute was specifically directed at the Allied fighter pilots who fought in the Battle of Britain.

Lecture Ten: The Tide of War Turns

In a war of powerful leaders, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Hitler, Churchill proved to be the supreme strategist. The Cabinet War Rooms in London still evoke the memory of Churchill as a wartime leader. Fears argues that Winston Churchill rallied his countrymen during the Second World War through powerful rhetoric. Although some observers at the time and subsequently have characterised Churchill's oratorical style as somewhat archaic, drawing on historical precedents and a more formal mode of address than was becoming common, Fears posits that the fundamental concepts Churchill invoked, such as valour, honour, and freedom, possess an enduring relevance that transcends temporal fashions in communication. For example, Churchill's speeches during the Battle of Britain, such as the "finest hour" address delivered on 18 June 1940, aimed to instil courage and resilience in the face of imminent threat. Beyond his rhetorical skill, Fears asserts that Churchill possessed a keen understanding of the effective exercise of power. In this regard, Fears draws a contrast between Churchill's approach to wartime administration and that of Adolf Hitler. Churchill established an organisational structure for conducting the war that Fears deems considerably more effective than the system employed by Nazi Germany. According to Fears, Hitler presided over a chaotic governmental apparatus where internal rivalries between different party factions and state entities were common, and where significant strategic decisions were often made unilaterally by Hitler without comprehensive consultation with his ministers or military advisors. This picture of German wartime decision-making is supported by historical accounts detailing the fragmented nature of the Nazi regime and Hitler's increasing isolation from, and distrust of, established governmental and military hierarchies as the war progressed. In contrast, Fears highlights Churchill's consolidation of key roles; he served not only as Prime Minister but also as Minister of Defence, a position created for him in 1940, thereby concentrating control over both political and military strategy. Furthermore, after October 1940, following Neville Chamberlain's resignation from the party leadership due to ill health, Churchill also became the leader of the Conservative Party and consequently the Leader of the House of Commons. Fears contends that during the most critical junctures of the war, Churchill benefited from substantial support within Parliament. This parliamentary backing, Fears suggests, was founded upon the considerable popular support Churchill enjoyed amongst the British public, particularly after his resolute stance against appeasement and his wartime leadership became evident. An important factor contributing to political stability during this period was the electoral truce agreed upon by the three major political parties in Britain: the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party. This agreement suspended normal party political competition for the duration of the conflict. As a result, the general election that had been constitutionally scheduled for 1940 was postponed, and did not ultimately take place until after the conclusion of the war in Europe, in July 1945. Fears emphasises that Churchill implemented a well-structured and efficient system for managing the war effort. His War Cabinet, the central executive body for wartime decision-making, was deliberately constituted as a coalition government, including representatives from all three main parties. This was intended to foster national unity and draw upon a wide range of political experience. Notably, the position of Deputy Prime Minister was held by Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party, underscoring the cross-party nature of the wartime administration. The War Cabinet itself was a relatively small body, typically comprising between six and eight members. Fears explains that this smaller group was able to concentrate on overarching strategic matters and essential questions related to the direction of the war effort. Its membership included not only Churchill and Attlee but also those ministers holding key portfolios directly relevant to waging war, such as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer responsible for the national budget, and the Minister of Labour, crucial for mobilising manpower and industrial resources.

In the summer of 1940, Fears argues that the prospect of a German invasion of Britain appeared highly realistic. Adolf Hitler was indeed actively developing plans for such an undertaking, codenamed Operation Sea Lion. A significant vulnerability for Britain at this juncture was the substantial loss of military equipment, particularly artillery, abandoned during the evacuation from Dunkirk between late May and early June 1940. Fears notes that from the very beginning of this crisis, Churchill recognised the critical strategic importance of Britain's naval strength, specifically the fact that Germany lacked a surface fleet comparable to the Royal Navy, which posed a fundamental obstacle to any amphibious invasion. Concurrently, Churchill understood the imperative of countering the German air force, the Luftwaffe, whose success in gaining air superiority over southern England was considered a prerequisite for invasion by the German high command. Fears highlights that throughout the war, British intelligence efforts were significantly enhanced by the programme codenamed Ultra. This involved the successful decryption of encoded German military communications. The intellectual foundations for Ultra, as Fears points out, were laid by Polish mathematicians. In the period before the war, Polish cryptanalysts, notably Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Różycki, and Henryk Zygalski, had made groundbreaking advances in understanding the workings of the German Enigma encryption machine. With the invasion of Poland seeming imminent, this knowledge was shared with French and British intelligence services. By the summer of 1940, British codebreakers based at Bletchley Park had developed systematic methods for routinely decrypting German signals traffic across various branches of the German armed forces. Consequently, Fears explains, British intelligence was able to ascertain, for instance, that German bomber aircraft were utilising radio navigation beams to locate British targets. This knowledge allowed the development of countermeasures to jam or disrupt these beams, thereby reducing the accuracy of German bombing raids. More broadly, Ultra provided insights into German invasion planning for Operation Sea Lion, including assessments of available German naval assets and troop dispositions. Subsequently, Ultra intelligence also played a role in alerting the British to shifts in German strategic priorities, including the indications that Hitler was redirecting his focus towards an invasion of the Soviet Union.
During the summer and autumn of 1940, and continuing through 1941 and 1942, Fears states that Britain's strategic concerns extended beyond the immediate threat of invasion to encompass the situation in Egypt and the potential danger posed by Italy, Germany's ally, to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was a vital artery of communication and supply for the British Empire, particularly with India and other eastern territories. Italian forces based in Libya presented a threat to British positions in Egypt. Fears argues that information gleaned through Ultra concerning Hitler's decision to postpone, and effectively abandon, Operation Sea Lion was of crucial importance. This intelligence, Fears suggests, was a significant factor in Churchill's decision to take the calculated risk of dispatching military reinforcements to Egypt, even while Britain itself still faced potential threats. In North Africa, Fears notes that Churchill eventually found in General Bernard Montgomery a highly capable military commander. Montgomery assumed command of the British Eighth Army in August 1942. Fears credits Montgomery with achieving a decisive victory over the German General Erwin Rommel and the German-Italian Panzer Army Africa (often referred to as the Afrika Korps, though this technically only formed part of the larger Axis force) at the Second Battle of El Alamein, fought between October and November 1942. This battle is widely considered a turning point in the North African campaign.
In 1940, Fears also identifies a primary element of Churchill's role as war leader as being his focused effort to secure the entry of the United States into the war. Fears posits that Churchill viewed American intervention as potentially the only path to Britain's ultimate survival and victory against Nazi Germany. To this end, Churchill meticulously cultivated a personal and political relationship with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the period 1940–1941, these efforts contributed to the United States progressively becoming a de facto military partner of Britain, even while officially remaining neutral. This partnership also enabled Roosevelt, once the US did enter the war, to prioritise the strategic effort of the United States against Germany (the "Germany First" policy), rather than focusing primarily on Japan in the Pacific theatre. Fears suggests that certain shared aspects of Churchill's and Roosevelt's backgrounds and experiences may have facilitated their personal rapport. Churchill famously referred to Roosevelt as "the best friend Britain ever had". Their extensive personal correspondence, numbering hundreds of letters and telegrams exchanged throughout the war years, attests to the closeness of their working relationship. However, Fears acknowledges the prevailing sentiment within the United States during this period, which was largely against entanglement in another European war. Memories of the First World War, including subsequent disputes over war debts owed by European nations, including Britain, contributed to this isolationist tendency. Britain, in fact, owed substantial sums to the United States stemming from the earlier conflict. Despite these challenges, Fears underscores Churchill's determination to secure American material assistance. He notes that Churchill went to considerable lengths to achieve this, reportedly even agreeing to unprecedented levels of American oversight regarding British financial assets as a means of building trust and demonstrating need. Ultimately, these efforts proved successful. In the spring of 1941, the United States Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. This programme, as Fears explains, provided a mechanism for the US to supply Allied nations, primarily Britain initially, with war materials, effectively financing the development and production of much-needed British military equipment without immediate payment.
On 7 December 1941, Japanese forces executed a surprise attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. Fears notes that three days following this event, Adolf Hitler made the decision to declare war on the United States. Research indicates that Hitler's declaration of war actually occurred on 11 December 1941. Fears characterises Hitler's decision to gratuitously declare war on the United States as a strategic error of profound magnitude, comparable in its negative consequences for Germany to his decision to invade the Soviet Union. With the entry of the United States into the war as a full belligerent, Fears asserts that Churchill could, for the first time, entertain a firm belief in the certainty of eventual Allied victory.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union, which had previously been bound to Germany by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of non-aggression signed in August 1939, commenced on 22 June 1941. This operation was codenamed Operation Barbarossa. Fears judges this invasion to be a mistake from which Hitler and the German war effort never fully recovered, opening up a vast eastern front that consumed enormous resources. Utilising intelligence derived from Ultra, Fears states that Churchill had provided warnings to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin regarding Hitler's aggressive intentions prior to the actual invasion. Despite Churchill's long-standing and well-documented political opposition to communism and the Soviet regime, Fears observes that he responded with what he terms "intelligent alacrity" to the new strategic reality. Britain moved swiftly to offer support to the Soviet Union in its struggle against their common enemy, Nazi Germany, providing material aid and establishing a military alliance.
Fears describes a divergence in strategic thinking between British and American military planners regarding the conduct of the war in Europe. The American military leadership, particularly represented by General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, advocated for a direct assault on German-occupied Europe as soon as practicable, aiming for a decisive confrontation with the main German forces. Churchill, however, expressed doubts about the feasibility and potential success of an early cross-Channel invasion against what he termed "fortress Europe". Drawing parallels with strategic debates during the First World War, Fears positions Churchill as a proponent of what are sometimes referred to as peripheral or indirect strategies. In this context, North Africa presented itself as one theatre where the Western Allies could realistically undertake a successful offensive campaign against Axis powers in 1942. Fears notes that the American military leadership initially argued strongly against prioritising operations in North Africa. General Marshall reportedly viewed Churchill's emphasis on the Mediterranean with scepticism, perhaps seeing echoes of the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign of 1915, another peripheral strategy championed by Churchill in the previous war that had ended in failure. Despite these reservations, on 8 November 1942, Allied forces launched Operation Torch, involving amphibious landings in Morocco and Algeria, then under the control of Vichy France. Fears concludes that the North African campaign ultimately proved to be a significant tactical and strategic success for the Allies. The German and Italian forces in North Africa found themselves caught between the advancing Allied armies from the west (following Operation Torch) and the British Eighth Army under Montgomery advancing from the east, following their victory at El Alamein, which Fears notes coincided temporally with the Allied landings. The result was the encirclement and eventual destruction of Axis armies in Tunisia. By 13 May 1943, the campaign concluded with the surrender of over 250,000 German and Italian troops. Allied casualties during the North African campaign amounted to approximately 76,000.
At the Casablanca Conference, held between 14 and 24 January 1943, Fears argues that Churchill successfully persuaded President Roosevelt and the American leadership to endorse his proposal for an invasion of Sicily to follow the successful conclusion of the North African campaign. On 17 August 1943, American forces under General George S. Patton entered Messina, effectively completing the Allied conquest of Sicily. Fears contends that the Allied invasion of Sicily had significant strategic consequences. Notably, it directly contributed to the downfall of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who was dismissed by King Victor Emmanuel III and arrested on 25 July 1943. Furthermore, the campaign in Sicily and the subsequent Allied landings in mainland Italy compelled Germany to divert substantial military resources to the Italian theatre, tying down German troops who might otherwise have been deployed on other fronts, particularly against the Soviet Union or in preparation to repel an eventual cross-Channel invasion. Fears assesses this period, around mid-1943, as representing the zenith of Britain's strategic influence within the Grand Alliance.

However, Fears also charts a relative decline in Britain's standing within the Allied coalition as the war progressed. Several factors contributed to this shift. The continuously expanding industrial and military might of the United States played a significant role. Additionally, the substantial financial assistance provided by the US through Lend-Lease had transformed Britain's economic relationship with America, with Britain becoming, in effect, a debtor nation. Concurrently, the growing military strength and territorial gains of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front also elevated its position within the alliance. These developments, Fears suggests, collectively contributed to reducing Britain's role towards that of a third, somewhat junior partner in the alliance alongside the two emerging superpowers. Fears notes that Churchill, much like his historical predecessor John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough, whom Fears has written about extensively, placed considerable faith in personal diplomacy as a means of influencing Allied strategy and policy. Throughout the war, Churchill undertook numerous journeys to confer directly with Allied leaders, most notably Roosevelt and Stalin, at various international conferences. As the war drew towards its conclusion, particularly by the end of 1944, Fears indicates that Churchill began to harbour concerns that the defeat of Nazi Germany might give rise to another significant tyrannical threat in Europe, this time emanating from the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, where Churchill met with Roosevelt and Stalin to discuss the post-war organization of Europe, Fears concludes by observing that Churchill had little inkling that within a matter of months, following the general election in Britain in July 1945, he would be removed from power and stripped of his offices as Prime Minister and leader of the country.

Lecture Eleven: Champion of Freedom

Fears argues that among the principal figures of the Second World War, Winston Churchill possessed a unique depth of military experience and a more profound understanding of history compared to his contemporaries such as Roosevelt or Stalin. Churchill's prior military service included participation in conflicts such as the Malakand campaign on the North-West Frontier of India in 1897, the Battle of Omdurman in Sudan in 1898, and service during the Second Boer War where he gained public recognition for his escape from captivity. His First World War experience included a controversial role in the Gallipoli campaign and a later period commanding the 6th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers on the Western Front. This background, Fears suggests, informed his strategic thinking. Furthermore, Fears attributes to Churchill a degree of foresight not evident to the same extent in other Allied leaders during the conflict. Specifically, during 1943 and 1944, Churchill reportedly became increasingly concerned about the potential for a repetition of what he perceived as the strategic and political errors made at the conclusion of the First World War, which had arguably contributed to the instability leading to the second global conflict within a generation. His apprehension extended to the planning for Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy. Fears posits that Churchill harboured scepticism regarding this direct assault due to his deep-seated aversion to large-scale casualties, a sentiment heavily influenced by his understanding of the First World War. The extensive fortifications constructed by the Germans along the French coast as part of the Atlantic Wall evoked for Churchill the devastating losses incurred by British and French forces during frontal assaults against entrenched positions in battles such as the Somme in 1916 and Passchendaele in 1917. As Churchill himself reflected in his writings, historical awareness can function as both a valuable guide and a potential hindrance when making contemporary decisions. Fears highlights Churchill's somewhat pessimistic view regarding humanity's capacity to learn from past errors, even as Churchill himself actively sought to educate and warn others, notably in his attempts to alert President Roosevelt to the perceived post-war threat posed by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union's geopolitical ambitions. Despite his initial reservations concerning the Normandy landings, once the strategic decision was definitively taken by the Allied command, Churchill afforded the operation his complete support.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Fears contends that Churchill was acutely aware of his position as the representative of the weakest partner within the 'Big Three' coalition. The power dynamics at the conference often saw key decisions being deliberated primarily between Stalin and Roosevelt, sometimes with limited inclusion of Churchill's perspective. An example of this relative marginalisation, according to Fears, can be seen in the context of the atomic bomb. Although British scientists had made significant early contributions to the research that ultimately led to the development of nuclear weapons, under the auspices of the 'Tube Alloys' project before it was effectively merged into the American-led Manhattan Project following the Quebec Agreement of 1943 which stipulated mutual consent for the weapon's use, the British government was not consulted by the United States administration prior to the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. At Yalta, a significant concern for Churchill was what he perceived as the burgeoning danger presented by the post-war expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Fears indicates that Churchill endeavoured to impress upon Roosevelt the gravity of this threat. However, Roosevelt and the American delegation exhibited a reluctance to directly challenge the Soviet Union's assertions of control over territories such as Poland. Churchill engaged in strenuous but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to secure a significant role for the London-based Polish government-in-exile in the formation of Poland's post-war administration, which was largely being shaped by the Soviet-backed Lublin Committee. Fears concludes that Britain, at this stage of the war and in the immediate post-war period, lacked the requisite power to enforce Churchill's preferences in regions falling under Soviet influence.

During the Potsdam Conference, which commenced in July 1945 to address post-war order, Churchill's tenure as Prime Minister came to an abrupt end. In May 1945, the Labour Party, which had been a partner in the wartime coalition government, held its annual conference in Blackpool and determined that, with victory achieved in Europe, a general election should be held. Churchill concurred with this decision. It is notable that when the election was called, the war against Japan was still ongoing. Due to the exigencies of the war, no general election had been conducted in Britain since 1935, thus the Parliament had sat for an unusually extended term. The Labour Party was particularly insistent on holding an election at the earliest opportunity. Polling took place on 5 July 1945. Under the British constitutional system, voters elect members of Parliament to represent individual constituencies, rather than directly electing the Prime Minister. The leader of the party that secures the majority of seats in the House of Commons is typically invited by the monarch to form a government and become Prime Minister. Fears suggests that the British electorate in 1945 desired substantial change. A contemporary slogan reportedly encapsulated this sentiment: “Cheer for Churchill, vote for Labour”. The Conservative Party, according to Fears, still carried the burden of association with the pre-war appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain, which were widely perceived as having failed to prevent the outbreak of war. Conversely, the Labour Party platform offered a broad programme of social and economic reform rooted in socialist principles, which held considerable appeal for a population weary of wartime austerity and aspiring to a more equitable post-war society. Key elements of Labour's platform included the creation of a National Health Service and the nationalisation of major industries. Fears assesses Churchill's own election campaign as poorly executed, largely comprising negative attacks on socialism which failed to resonate broadly with the electorate. He also faced significant opposition from the trade union movement. Fears notes that many ordinary British voters harboured a degree of dislike for Churchill, stemming from perceptions of his past actions, including an anti-labour stance evident during events such as the General Strike of 1926 when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. For many, their wartime support for Churchill had been predicated on the belief that he possessed the unique strength and determination necessary to lead Britain through the existential crisis of the war. With the war in Europe concluded, this imperative was perceived by many voters as diminished. The election result, announced on 26 July 1945 after delays to allow for the collection of votes from service personnel stationed overseas, delivered a landslide victory for the Labour Party under Clement Attlee. On the same day, Churchill tendered his resignation as Prime Minister to King George VI. Interestingly, Fears observes that Churchill personally approved of certain aspects of the Labour Party's proposed social reforms.

In the period between 1945 and 1951, following his departure from the premiership, Churchill remained an active member of Parliament, serving as Leader of the Opposition. During these years, Fears notes several key areas of Churchill's activity. He dedicated considerable time to writing his extensive multi-volume history of the Second World War, which also served as his personal memoirs of the conflict. The six volumes of 'The Second World War' were published between 1948 and 1953. Churchill also continued to pursue his well-known hobby of painting. On a more serious note, he reportedly brooded over the profound dangers presented by the advent of atomic weapons and the implications for global security in the post-war era. A primary focus of his public pronouncements during this period was his effort to alert the 'free world', particularly the United States and Western Europe, to what he viewed as the growing menace posed by Soviet communism.

 Fears identifies Churchill's speech delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, as the most dramatic expression of this warning about the Soviet threat. It was in this speech that Churchill famously declared that an "iron curtain" had descended across the continent of Europe, dividing the Soviet-dominated East from the West. Much like the reaction to his warnings about Nazi Germany in the 1930s, many political leaders and sections of the press at the time criticised Churchill for what they perceived as alarmist rhetoric and potentially warmongering sentiments. President Harry S. Truman, who was present on stage during the speech, initially sought to publicly distance his administration from Churchill's more forceful pronouncements, reflecting a desire at that time to avoid immediate confrontation with the Soviet Union, a wartime ally. In a different but related vein of post-war vision, Churchill delivered another significant speech at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946 (Fears's outline incorrectly states 1947, requiring correction based on factual research). In this address, Churchill advocated for the creation of a 'United States of Europe', envisaging a continent where nations would cooperate closely to ensure harmony and peace, laying some of the conceptual groundwork for future European integration. Fears notes that it would take considerable time, indeed more than fifty years, for such a vision of European unity to substantially materialise in formations like the European Union. Even in his earlier Fulton speech, Churchill had already appealed for a "fraternal association" between the English-speaking peoples, particularly Great Britain and the United States. Fears suggests that escalating concerns regarding Soviet expansionism in the late 1940s, exemplified by events such as the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, coupled with anxieties about the possibility of a third world war in the nascent nuclear age, contributed to a shift in British public opinion. In the general election of 1951, the Conservative Party secured a narrow majority, enabling Churchill to return as Prime Minister, an office he held from 1951 until 1955. During his second term as Prime Minister, Churchill prioritised efforts towards fostering greater European unity and strengthening the alliance with the United States. However, Fears also points out Churchill's nuanced understanding that while Britain and the United States might share fundamental democratic ideals, their national interests did not always perfectly align. He notes, for example, that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration was generally opposed to the continuation of European colonial empires, including the British Empire. Indeed, the process of imperial decline was already well underway. Churchill harboured fears that the granting of independence to India, which occurred in August 1947 during Attlee's premiership, could lead to large-scale bloodshed and instability, reflecting his belief in the British Empire as a force for order and stability in the world, a perspective embodying what some historians have termed a 'paternalistic' view of empire. Nonetheless, once Indian independence became a fait accompli, Churchill offered his support to the newly independent nation. In the realm of international relations, Churchill aspired for Britain to leverage its perceived moral authority to encourage détente, or a reduction of tensions, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, Churchill worked persistently to persuade President Eisenhower of the merits of initiating such a process of engagement with the new Soviet leadership. These efforts, however, did not come to fruition during his premiership. Churchill resigned as Prime Minister for the second time on 5 April 1955. Fears recounts that among his final words to his ministers were an admonition to "never be separated from the Americans", underscoring his enduring belief in the centrality of the Anglo-American relationship for British foreign policy and global security.

Lecture Twelve: The Legacy of Churchill

Unlike some recent American politicians, Churchill was not obsessed with his historical legacy. He was content to know that he had done his best. At Churchill’s death, Clement Attlee, the socialist who succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister in 1945, called him “the greatest Englishman of our time. I think the greatest citizen of the world of our time.” Professor J. Rufus Fears argues that Winston Churchill's ultimate significance derives from his political principles. Fears posits that Churchill’s understanding of liberty and democracy was deeply rooted and informed his approach to governance.
Fears suggests that during his time as Prime Minister between 1951 and 1955, Churchill pursued policies aimed at reducing international tensions, a concept known as détente, particularly relevant in the early Cold War period following the Second World War. For instance, Churchill advocated for summit meetings between the leaders of the major powers. Simultaneously, Fears notes Churchill held a forward-looking perspective regarding European integration. This vision can be contextualised by the post-war movements towards greater cooperation in Europe, culminating initially in organisations such as the European Coal and Steel Community established in 1951. Fears also observes that Churchill recognised the British public's desire for a comprehensive welfare state, providing social support from birth to death. It is important to understand that the foundations of this system were largely established by Clement Attlee's Labour government after 1945, building upon the 1942 Beveridge Report. Fears asserts that Churchill was not inherently against many aspects of these welfare provisions.
In his later years, as Fears recounts, Churchill received increasing recognition alongside declining physical health. In 1953, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, primarily for his extensive historical writings, particularly his multi-volume work, "The Second World War". Also in that year, Fears notes that Churchill accepted a knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II, becoming Sir Winston Churchill. His commitment to public service continued, as he remained a Member of Parliament until 1964, reaching the age of eighty-nine. Beyond politics, Fears mentions Churchill’s engagement with personal interests such as painting, an activity he pursued seriously, exhibiting work under a pseudonym. His other leisures included horse racing – he owned racehorses – keeping tropical fish, and an interest in pigs. Fears highlights that Churchill travelled extensively in this period. His historical works, notably "A History of the Second World War", published in six volumes between 1948 and 1953, brought him considerable financial success in addition to the Nobel Prize. Similarly, Fears points out the success of his four-volume "A History of the English-Speaking Peoples", completed in the late 1950s after many years of work.
Fears also touches upon personal difficulties faced by Churchill, noting the death of his daughter Diana in 1963. Fears indicates Churchill's supportive nature towards his children, with particular mention of his son, Randolph. According to Fears, Churchill did not exhibit anxiety regarding his historical legacy, expressing contentment in having performed his duties to the best of his abilities.
Central to Fears's analysis is the assertion that Churchill's political thought was fundamentally based on the concept of freedom. Fears identifies the historical lineage of Churchill’s ideals within the tradition of English liberty, tracing it back to Magna Carta in 1215, a foundational document that established principles limiting the power of the monarch and upholding certain rights. Fears elaborates that Churchill articulated freedom through tangible criteria: the right of a populace to criticise its government and the capacity to change that government through elections. Furthermore, Churchill considered the fairness and accessibility of the justice system paramount, specifically questioning whether impoverished individuals received the same legal standards as the wealthy. The right of ordinary citizens to live without fear of arbitrary state detention was another key element of his definition.
Fears draws a parallel between Churchill's concept of liberty and that of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, noting Churchill's agreement with Roosevelt's articulation of "four freedoms": freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom from fear, and freedom from want, as outlined in Roosevelt's 1941 State of the Union address. Fears interprets Churchill’s view of the First World War as a significant conflict fought to preserve individual liberty against the autocratic powers of Central Europe. In terms of economic philosophy, Fears suggests that Churchill advocated for economic opportunity and free trade principles. However, this was balanced by a belief in providing individuals with security against unemployment, poverty in old age, and illness without access to medical treatment, aligning with the principles emerging in the development of welfare states.
Fears argues that Churchill viewed parliamentary democracy as the essential protector of individual liberty. At his core, according to Fears, Churchill held profoundly democratic convictions.
A key aspect of Fears' lecture addresses the apparent tension between Churchill’s commitment to democracy and his support for the British Empire. Fears proposes that Churchill perceived the British Empire as an institution that actually upheld individual liberty for its subjects. He differentiated between national independence and genuine freedom, suggesting they were not synonymous. Fears articulates Churchill's scepticism about transferring power to local ruling groups who might then exercise tyrannical control over their populations. This perspective reflects debates about the nature and readiness for self-governance in colonial territories. For Churchill, as Fears explains, every freedom entailed a corresponding responsibility. He believed that British legal frameworks and administrative practices provided necessary protections for various minority groups within territories like India. Furthermore, Fears asserts that Churchill viewed the British tradition of liberty under the rule of law as the most suitable guide for India’s future political development. This view was, of course, highly contested by Indian nationalists who sought immediate self-rule. Fears also notes Churchill's early and consistent support for Zionism, the movement for a Jewish homeland, from his initial years in Parliament.
Fears emphasises Churchill’s belief in the necessity for politicians and statesmen to establish clear priorities. While acknowledging Churchill's understanding of the destructive nature of warfare, Fears states that Churchill also recognised that certain circumstances and ideologies necessitated conflict. He believed some aggressive regimes only respected and responded to displays of strength. Consequently, Fears concludes that Churchill advocated for negotiation, but always from a position of strength, encompassing both military capability and moral standing.
Fears acknowledges that Churchill faced criticism during his lifetime, and his historical reputation remains a subject of debate. Some biographers and historians, Fears notes, have lauded Churchill as the pre-eminent figure of the twentieth century, crediting him with saving freedom during the Second World War. Conversely, others have assessed him as a failure and an opponent of liberty. Fears cites the 1966 publication "Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment", edited by the prominent British historian A. J. P. Taylor, which included critical perspectives. Among these was an essay by military theorist Basil Liddell Hart, who, according to Fears, viewed Churchill as unsuccessful in statesmanship and military strategy, possibly referencing controversies such as the Gallipoli campaign during the First World War. Robert Rhodes James, in his 1970 biography "Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900–1939", and John Charmley, in his 1993 work "Churchill: The End of Glory", are also mentioned by Fears as historians who presented Churchill as largely unsuccessful in his endeavours.
According to Fears, critics such as Charmley and Taylor locate Churchill’s primary failure in the outcome of the Second World War, specifically the diminution of British global power. Their perspective, as outlined by Fears, is that while Churchill may have intended to maintain Britain's great power status, the war resulted in Britain becoming economically weakened and increasingly dependent on the United States. These critics also suggest Roosevelt outmanoeuvred Churchill in wartime negotiations, shaping a post-war order less favourable to British interests. They argue that Churchill's demands on British resources during the war were excessive and damaging to the nation's long-term prosperity. Additionally, these critical historians point to periods when Churchill was out of political office, such as after the Dardanelles campaign during the First World War and during significant parts of the 1930s, as well as what they perceive as limited accomplishments during his second term as Prime Minister in the 1950s. Fears indicates these criticisms often attribute these perceived failings to aspects of Churchill's personality, such as impetuosity and a misjudgement of public sentiment.
However, Fears counters these critical interpretations by asserting that Churchill himself did not frame the Second World War as a conflict primarily aimed at preserving or enhancing British imperial power. Instead, Fears emphasises Churchill’s repeated declarations that the war was fought for the cause of freedom. Fears also brings up Churchill’s post-war aspiration, expressed in 1947, to see Europe restored to a position of global influence. Fears suggests that the modern European Union, with its collective intellectual and economic resources operating under conditions of peace, individual liberty, and parliamentary democracy, represents a fulfilment of this vision, and notes Britain's role within this European framework (contextually pre-Brexit). The type of freedom Churchill championed, according to Fears, was one where the condition of the individual improved. Fears underscores Churchill's crucial role in rallying the British nation to resist totalitarianism when it held sway across much of Europe, from Spain under Franco to the Soviet Union under Stalin.
Fears concludes with poignant details surrounding Churchill’s final days. He references a letter from Churchill’s daughter, Mary, written shortly before his death, expressing not only familial affection but also acknowledging a debt owed by all British citizens to Churchill for liberty itself. On 10 January 1965, Fears recounts, Churchill suffered a severe stroke. He died two weeks later. He was accorded a state funeral held at St. Paul’s Cathedral, a significant honour. Fears notes that an estimated 300,000 people filed past his coffin as he lay in state. As his body was transported along the River Thames towards his final resting place, dockworkers along the riverbanks raised their crane jibs in a gesture of silent respect. Churchill was interred in the family burial ground at St Martin's Church, Bladon, a village close to Blenheim Palace, his birthplace.

In War: Resolution.

In Defeat: Defiance.

In Victory: Magnanimity.

In Peace: Goodwill.

May 13 1940 in his first address as Prime Minister:'I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined the government: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat."
'We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy?
'I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime.
'That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.'
June 4 1940 following the evacuation of forces from Dunkirk:
'We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air.
'We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills.We shall never surrender!'
June 18 1940 following the collapse of France to Nazi forces:
'Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire.
'The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands.
'But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.
'Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their Finest Hour."'

August 20 1940 in tribute to the RAF:
'The gratitude of every home in our island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion.
'Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.'

September 9 1941 on Britain's increasing strength in battle:
'The mood of Britain is wisely and rightly averse from every form of shallow or premature exultation.
'This is no time for boasts or glowing prophecies, but there is this—a year ago our position looked forlorn, and well nigh desperate, to all eyes but our own. Today we may say aloud before an awe-struck world, "We are still masters of our fate. We still are captain of our souls."'

November 10 1942 following the victory at El Alamein, North Africa:
'The Germans have received back again that measure of fire and steel which they have so often meted out to others. Now this is not the end.
'It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.'

 I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender. If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.
- George Bernard Shaw sent him two complimentary tickets to his play with a note, “You are invited to my première. Come and bring a friend—if you have one.” Winston Churchill replied: “Impossible to be present for first performance. Will attend second—if there is one.”
- We make a living by what we get, but we make a life by what we give.
- A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on.
- A love for tradition has never weakened a nation, indeed it has strengthened nations in their hour of peril.
- All great things are simple, and many can be expressed in single words: freedom, justice, honour, duty, mercy, hope.
- To build may have to be the slow and laborious task of years. To destroy can be the thoughtless act of a single day.
- Although prepared for martyrdom, I preferred that it be postponed.
- Broadly speaking, the short words are the best, and the old words best of all.
- A prisoner of war is a man who tries to kill you and fails, and then asks you not to kill him.
- Some see private enterprise as a predatory target to be shot, others as a cow to be milked, but few are those who see it as a sturdy horse pulling the wagon.
- The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.
- We contend that for a nation to tax itself into prosperity is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle.
- An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.
- The problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult.
- From now on, ending a sentence with a preposition is something up with which I shall not put.
- A fanatic is one who can’t change his mind and won’t change the subject.
- Bessie Braddock: “Sir, you are drunk.”
Churchill: “Madam, you are ugly. In the morning, I shall be sober.”
- Nancy Astor: “Sir, if you were my husband, I would give you poison.”
Churchill: “If I were your husband I would take it.”
- Once in a while you will stumble upon the truth but most of us manage to pick ourselves up and hurry along as if nothing had happened.
- If you are going to go through hell, keep going.
- Much of his imaginative energy was spent in trying to get the sick Roosevelt to do the sensible thing. “No lover,” he said, ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.”
- After being dismissed by the British electorate after WWII Mrs. Churchill commented, “Perhaps it is a blessing in disguise.” Churchill replied: “It appears to be very effectively disguised.”
- It is a good thing for an uneducated man to read books of quotations.
- Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful. Yet there will stretch out before you an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending, ever-improving path. You know you will never get to the end of the journey. But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to the joy and glory of the climb.
- You have enemies? Good. That means you’ve stood up for something, sometime in your life.
- He has all the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire.
- If you have ten thousand regulations, you destroy all respect for the law.
- You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.
- History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.
- Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it becomes a master, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to the public.
- The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.
- Mussolini’s foreign minister, Count Ciano, who had married Mussolini’s daughter, had been accused of treason and shot. Churchill’s reaction: “Well, at least he had the pleasure of murdering his son-in-law.”
- I like pigs. Dogs look up to us. Cats look down on us. Pigs treat us as equals.
- A sheep in sheep’s clothing. (On Clement Atlee)
- A modest man, who has much to be modest about. (On Clement Atlee)
- Once an empty taxi drove up to the House of Commons and Clement Attlee got out.
- I am ready to meet my Maker. Whether my Maker is prepared for the ordeal of meeting me is another matter.
- The truth is incontrovertible, malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end; there it is.
- Never hold discussions with the monkey when the organ grinder is in the room.
- Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things.
- A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
- To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
- When I am abroad, I always make it a rule never to criticise or attack the government of my own country. I make up for lost time when I come home.
- Politics is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen.
- Socialism is a philosophy of failure, the creed of ignorance, and the gospel of envy.
- One ought never to turn one's back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger. But if you meet it promptly and without flinching, you will reduce the danger by half.
- When the eagles are silent, the parrots begin to jabber.
- Solitary trees, if they grow at all, grow strong.
- Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.
- The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.
- It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.
- Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.
- Everyone has his day and some days last longer than others.
- There are a terrible lot of lies going around the world, and the worst of it is half of them are true.
- The whole history of the world is summed up in the fact that, when nations are strong, they are not always just, and when they wish to be just, they are no longer strong.
- From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.-“The Sinews of Peace” speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946

- If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.
- "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations."
- Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.
- The price of greatness is responsibility.
- Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality that guarantees all the others.
- The problems of victory are more agreeable than those of defeat, but they are no less difficult.
- If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without blood shed; if you will not fight when your victory is sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.

Churchill about Munich 1938: “It is a total defeat. Czechoslovakia will be swallowed up by the Nazis. And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning.”

“Second world war was the easiest war to be prevented.”

“An Iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind”

Churchill after Yalta to Roosevelt: “The Soviet Union has become a danger to the free world.”

Churchill about Korea: “Korea does not really matter. I’d never heard of the bloody place until I was seventy-four. Its importance lies in the fact that it has led to the re-arming of America.”

IBDP Extended Essays and Internal Assessments from past students relating to Churchill:

The Gallipoli campaign remains a controversial topic, with Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, facing significant scrutiny. Historians debate his culpability, considering his ambitious, yet ultimately flawed, strategic vision. Critics highlight his forceful advocacy for the naval-led operation and his reluctance to accept early setbacks. Proponents, however, acknowledge the complex circumstances of the First World War and the immense pressure on decision-makers. They also emphasise the involvement of other key figures and argue Churchill shouldn't be solely blamed for the catastrophic outcome, although his role remains a central point of contention.

No doubt influenced by my vocal admiration for the man and his role in liberating Europe and the Free World, this is yet another extended essay focusing on Churchill, in this case his role in the creation of Israel for which the student received an 'A'. Whilst he supported the Zionist cause during the early 20th century, his stance was influenced by strategic considerations rather than unwavering ideological commitment. Churchill's 1921 White Paper, which limited Jewish immigration to Palestine, reflected British imperial interests and concerns about Arab reactions. However, he later advocated for a Jewish state during the Second World War, partly to address the plight of Jewish refugees. Historians debate the extent of his influence, with some emphasising his pragmatic approach and others highlighting his evolving support for Zionism amidst shifting geopolitical dynamics.

The appalling question of whether Churchill deliberately sacrificed Coventry to protect intelligence secrets during the Second World War still remains contentious. On November 14, 1940, the Luftwaffe devastated Coventry, killing hundreds. Some historians, citing Ultra decrypts, argue that Churchill knew of the impending raid but withheld warnings to avoid revealing that Britain had cracked Enigma codes. Others, including Martin Gilbert, contend that the intelligence was imprecise, lacking specific targets, and that Churchill prioritised national strategy over local defence. While evidence suggests strategic considerations influenced decisions, the notion of deliberate sacrifice remains speculative, lacking definitive proof. 

The Royal Navy's action against the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940 was clearly justified by compelling strategic necessity following France's surrender to Nazi Germany. With the French government capitulating and signing an armistice against its sworn promises, Britain faced the grave risk that significant naval assets would fall into German hands, fundamentally altering the balance of naval power. Despite diplomatic efforts to secure alternative arrangements, including neutralisation of the vessels or their relocation to distant ports, French Admiral Gensoul haughtily rejected these proposals. Churchill's government, faced with existential threats to Britain's survival, had no viable alternative but to neutralise these vessels, thereby preventing Hitler from acquiring formidable naval resources that would have imperilled the Allied war effort.