Who is most to blame for the Great War?
The question of who bears the most responsibility for the outbreak of World War I has been debated extensively, with Germany often singled out due to its aggressive policies and actions in the lead-up to 1914. Fritz Fischer, a prominent German historian, argues that Germany's leadership pursued a deliberate policy of war to achieve hegemonic ambitions, likening Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to a "Hitler of 1914" due to the imperialist and militarist ideologies driving the German elite[1]. This perspective contrasts with earlier historiographies that glorified Germany's "Sonderweg" or special path[2]. However, some contend that Germany’s actions were defensive, aimed at preventing encirclement by the Entente powers. I argue that Germany’s aggressive strategies—evidenced by the Schlieffen Plan, the Blank Cheque to Austria-Hungary, and the Weltpolitik—place primary responsibility on Germany for escalating a regional crisis into a global conflict.
The Schlieffen Plan, devised in 1905, was a clear indicator of Germany’s aggressive intent. Designed to counter the Franco-Russian alliance by enabling a rapid invasion of France through neutral Belgium, the plan prioritised offensive action over diplomacy[3]. Its execution in August 1914, with Germany declaring war on Russia on 1 August and France on 3 August, and invading Belgium, violated international norms and provoked Britain’s entry into the war. The plan’s preemptive nature, prepared a decade before the conflict, suggests Germany anticipated and prepared for war, undermining claims of a purely defensive posture. The invasion of Belgium, a neutral state, further demonstrates Germany’s disregard for international agreements, escalating the conflict unnecessarily.
The Blank Cheque issued to Austria-Hungary on 5 July 1914, following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, further implicates Germany. This unconditional support emboldened Austria-Hungary to issue a harsh ultimatum to Serbia, knowing Germany would back them militarily[4]. Fischer suggests the German General Staff saw this as an opportunity to wage a preventive war against Russia before its military strength peaked by 1916[5]. By encouraging Austria-Hungary’s aggressive stance, Germany knowingly risked Russian mobilisation, which it used as a pretext for war. This calculated move to exploit the crisis points to Germany’s role as an instigator rather than a peacemaker[6].
Germany’s Weltpolitik, initiated in the late 19th century, aimed at colonial expansion and military dominance, further fueling tensions. The policy led to conflicts like the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911, which strained relations with France and Britain, and the naval arms race with Britain, driven by the creation of the High Seas Fleet[7]. These actions positioned Germany as a threat to the European balance of power, provoking defensive alliances among other nations. The pursuit of a colonial empire, often at the expense of existing powers, reflects Germany’s belligerent ambitions, which destabilised Europe long before 1914.
While other nations contributed to the war’s outbreak—Russia’s mobilisation, Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, and Britain’s commitment to Belgium—Germany’s actions were pivotal in transforming a Balkan dispute into a global war. Its strategic planning, encouragement of Austrian aggression, and imperial ambitions created the conditions for escalation. Therefore, Germany bears the most blame for the Great War due to its proactive role in precipitating the conflict.
Bibliography:
1. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Fischer
2. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg
3. http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm
4. http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_Germany_grant_Austria-Hungary_a_blank_check
5. http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_Germany_grant_Austria-Hungary_a_blank_check
6. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/mirror01_01.shtml
7. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
How did international events lead to World War One?
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 was the culmination of a series of international events that heightened tensions and created a volatile environment in Europe. These events, spanning decades, can be grouped into three key areas: the Moroccan and Agadir Crises, the Bosnian Crisis and Balkan Wars, and the Anglo-German naval rivalry, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand acting as the final trigger.
The Moroccan Crises of 1905-06 and 1911 intensified Franco-German antagonism. In 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s visit to Tangier challenged French influence in Morocco, testing the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain. The resulting Algeciras Conference ruled in France’s favour, strengthening Anglo-French ties[1]. In 1911, Germany sent the gunboat Panther to Agadir, prompting Britain to support France against German intimidation. This second crisis further solidified the Entente and heightened tensions, as Germany’s aggressive posturing was perceived as a threat to European stability[2].
The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-14 escalated tensions in Eastern Europe. Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia in 1908 angered Serbia and its ally Russia, who supported Slavic nationalism. Germany’s backing of Austria-Hungary deepened the divide between the Triple Alliance and the Entente[3]. The Balkan Wars saw Serbia expand its territory, alarming Austria-Hungary, which feared growing Slavic influence. These conflicts created a powder keg in the Balkans, with alliances drawing major powers into regional disputes[4].
The Anglo-German naval rivalry, fueled by Germany’s Weltpolitik and Britain’s Naval Defence Act of 1889, was another critical factor. Germany’s naval expansion, particularly the construction of dreadnoughts under Admiral Tirpitz, challenged Britain’s naval supremacy[5]. This arms race fostered mutual suspicion, with Britain perceiving Germany’s fleet as a direct threat. The resulting tension reinforced the Entente’s cohesion, as Britain sought to counter Germany’s growing military power[6].
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 by a Serbian nationalist triggered the July Crisis. Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany’s Blank Cheque, issued an ultimatum to Serbia, which was partially rejected. This led to Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July, prompting Russian mobilisation. Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August, invaded Belgium on 3 August, and declared war on France the same day. Britain entered the war on 4 August to defend Belgian neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London[7]. These events, built on years of tension from crises and rivalries, transformed a regional conflict into a global war.
Bibliography:
1. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
2. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agadir_Crisis
3. http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/1871-1914/section9.rhtml
4. http://cnparm.home.texas.net/Wars/BalkanCrises/BalkanCrises02.htm
5. http://www.historyatfreeston.co.uk/fbechistorysite/Paper%201/KQ1-Arms%20Race.htm
6. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1984/mar/29/slithering-over-the-brink/?pagination=false
7. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/london1839.htm
The Failure of the German Spring Offensive of 1918
The German Spring Offensive of 1918, launched to break the Western Front stalemate and defeat the Allies before American forces could fully deploy, failed due to a combination of strategic, logistical, and external factors. This essay examines five primary reasons for its failure: General Ludendorff’s planning errors, his tactical and strategic mistakes during the offensive, Germany’s agricultural shortages, inadequate weaponry production, and America’s reinforcements for the Allies.
Ludendorff’s planning mistakes weakened the offensive from the outset. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, Germany transferred over one million troops from the Eastern to the Western Front, but Ludendorff left 1.5 million soldiers and 270,000 horses in the East, including the elite Eighth Army, which could have bolstered the offensive[1]. His decision to prioritise stabilising occupied territories over concentrating forces in the West overestimated German capabilities and deprived the offensive of critical manpower[2].
During the offensive, Ludendorff’s strategic and tactical errors compounded these issues. The Hutier infiltration tactics, successful in earlier battles, were misapplied. In Operation Michael, launched on 21 March 1918, General Hutier’s breakthrough created a gap in British lines, but Ludendorff failed to exploit it, launching three separate attacks instead of focusing reserves on the breach[3]. This squandered a potential victory, as British accounts noted the vulnerability of their Fifth Army[4]. Ludendorff’s overwork and loss of strategic clarity further hampered effective decision-making[5].
Germany’s agricultural shortages in 1918 undermined troop morale and performance. The British naval blockade, in place since 1914, caused severe food shortages, with flour rations reduced from 200 to 160 grams daily by May 1918[6]. The anticipated food supplies from Ukraine, gained through Brest-Litovsk, failed to materialise due to administrative chaos, forcing German troops to retreat from advanced positions due to starvation[7].
Industrial unproductiveness further crippled the offensive. By 1918, German artillery production had halved from 1917 levels, and industrial output was down 53% from 1913 due to the blockade and labour shortages[8]. The lack of tanks and motorised artillery prevented Germany from securing gains, leaving infantry vulnerable against Allied forces equipped with modern weaponry[9].
America’s entry into the war provided decisive reinforcements. By June 1918, 584,000 American troops had arrived, bolstering Allied morale and halting German advances at key battles like Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood[10]. Their industrial support, including 11,200 machines and 14,500 aero engines monthly, overwhelmed Germany’s dwindling resources[11].
The combination of Ludendorff’s errors, logistical failures, and American intervention ensured the offensive’s collapse by July 1918, paving the way for the Allied Hundred Days Offensive and Germany’s armistice on 11 November 1918.
Bibliography:
1. Gilbert, Martin. A History Of The Twentieth Century: Volume One: 1900-1933. U.S.A.: First Avon Books Trade Paperback Printing, November 1998.
2. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. United States of America: Penguin Groups, 2004.
3. Encarta Reference Library Premium 2005. 2005.
4. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. United States of America: Penguin Groups, 2004.
5. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. United States of America: Penguin Groups, 2004.
6. The Effect Of The British Naval And Economic Blockade: On The Western Front In The Great War. Dr. David Payne. The Western Front Association.
7. Gilbert, Martin. A History Of The Twentieth Century: Volume One: 1900-1933. U.S.A.: First Avon Books Trade Paperback Printing, November 1998.
8. German Historical Banknotes: Notegeld WW1: Emergency Money.
9. The Effect Of The British Naval And Economic Blockade: On The Western Front In The Great War. Dr. David Payne. The Western Front Association.
10. United States in the War and Last Battles.
11. Gilbert, Martin. A History Of The Twentieth Century: Volume One: 1900-1933. U.S.A.: First Avon Books Trade Paperback Printing, November 1998.
Identify and explain three attempts to break the military deadlock on the Western Front in World War I
The Western Front’s deadlock, resulting from the failure of Germany’s Schlieffen Plan and the establishment of trench warfare, prompted both the Allies and Central Powers to attempt breakthroughs through major battles and technological innovations. Three significant attempts were the Battle of Gallipoli, the Battle of the Somme, and the rapid development of new weaponry, each aimed at overcoming the stalemate but met with limited success.
The Battle of Gallipoli (April-December 1915) was an Allied attempt to open a new front and break the deadlock by securing the Dardanelles and weakening the Ottoman Empire. Winston Churchill’s plan involved a naval assault followed by land invasions to capture Constantinople, potentially forcing Turkey out of the war and relieving pressure on the Western Front[1]. However, the campaign failed due to poor planning, with naval forces crippled by sea mines and land assaults, including those by Australian and New Zealand troops, suffering heavy casualties (141,113 Allied losses) due to entrenched Turkish defenses[2]. The failure to advance beyond a few hundred yards highlighted strategic miscalculations and reinforced the deadlock.
The Battle of the Somme (July-November 1916) was a joint Anglo-French offensive to break through German lines in Picardy. General Douglas Haig planned an eight-day artillery bombardment to destroy German defenses, expecting minimal resistance for advancing troops[3]. However, German deep trenches withstood the barrage, and on 1 July, the British suffered 58,000 casualties, a third fatal, due to ineffective preparation and strong German positions[4]. Despite minor gains, such as the capture of Pozieres, the Allies advanced only two miles at a cost of 420,000 British and 200,000 French casualties, with Germany losing 500,000[5]. The battle weakened German forces but failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough.
Technological advancements, particularly tanks and poison gas, were developed to overcome trench warfare’s stalemate. Poison gas, first used by Germany at Ypres in 1915, aimed to disrupt enemy lines, causing 1,200,000 casualties across the war[6]. Tanks, introduced by the British at Flers in 1916, were intended to cross trenches and crush barbed wire, protecting infantry. At Cambrai in 1917, tanks enabled a 12-mile advance, capturing 10,000 Germans[7]. However, mechanical unreliability and limited deployment prevented these technologies from decisively breaking the deadlock until 1918.
These attempts, while innovative, resulted in heavy losses and limited territorial gains, underscoring the difficulty of overcoming entrenched defenses until the Allies’ coordinated efforts in 1918.
Bibliography:
1. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gallipoli#Footnotes
2. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gallipoli#Footnotes
3. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme
4. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWsomme.htm
5. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme
6. DK Eyewitness World War I page 44-45
7. http://www.firstworldwar.com/weaponry/tanks.htm
Why did World War One start in 1914 and not earlier?
World War I erupted in 1914 due to a combination of long-term tensions and the specific catalyst of the July Crisis, which Germany exploited to escalate a Balkan conflict into a European war. While militarism, imperialism, nationalism, and alliances created a volatile environment, Germany’s deliberate actions, driven by autocratic leaders seeking to maintain power and expand influence, ensured war broke out in 1914 rather than earlier.
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 triggered the July Crisis. Germany’s Blank Cheque to Austria-Hungary on 5 July emboldened a harsh ultimatum to Serbia, which, when partially rejected, led to Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on 28 July[1]. Germany’s support was not merely defensive; the German War Council in December 1912 had advocated for a war “the sooner, the better,” seeing the crisis as an opportunity to counter Russia’s growing strength[2]. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s decision to back Austria-Hungary, despite knowing it risked Russian mobilisation, reflects a calculated move to provoke conflict[3].
Germany’s aggressive policies in the preceding decades set the stage. The Schlieffen Plan, developed in 1905, prepared for a two-front war, indicating long-term war planning[4]. Weltpolitik, announced in 1897, drove naval expansion and colonial ambitions, leading to crises like the Moroccan incidents of 1905 and 1911, which alienated France and Britain[5]. The naval race, with Germany building 17 dreadnoughts by 1914, heightened British fears of German dominance[6]. These actions destabilised Europe, but earlier crises, like the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, did not escalate because leaders were not yet ready to commit to war.
Domestic pressures in Germany also precipitated the 1914 outbreak. The 1912 elections saw the Socialist Democrats gain 35% of votes, threatening the monarchy’s authority[7]. A war was seen as a way to unify the nation through nationalism, as evidenced by the euphoria noted in contemporary accounts[8]. The Kaiser’s inner circle, including von Moltke, pushed for war to maintain their power, bypassing diplomatic restraint[9]. Other nations faced similar internal strife—Britain’s Curragh Incident and France’s political divides—but Germany’s proactive role in escalating the July Crisis was decisive[10].
While alliances, like the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, created a domino effect, they were not the primary cause, as earlier crises showed alliances could be ignored. Russia’s mobilisation on 31 July 1914 forced Germany’s hand, but Germany’s declaration of war on Russia and France, and the invasion of Belgium, ensured global escalation[11]. Thus, Germany’s calculated aggression, fueled by imperial ambitions and domestic needs, made 1914 the year war erupted.
Bibliography:
1. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
2. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799
3. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilhelm_II%27s_Account_of_Events
4. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
5. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
6. http://www.historyatfreeston.co.uk/fbechistorysite/Paper%201/KQ1-Arms%20Race.htm
7. http://www.dhm.de/lemo/objekte/statistik/wa19122/index.html
8. Personal diary extract, as cited in the original prompt
9. http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/germanresponsibility.htm
10. http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1914?p=2
11. http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/1871-1914/section9.rhtml
Why did war break out in 1914?
The First World War (1914-1918) was the culmination of complex political tension across the globe. In Europe, the primary belligerents included the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) and the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany). These groups formed under an alliance system designed to preserve peace by balancing power so no camp would initiate war. As an article in The Times declared in April 1914, the division of the Great Powers into two well-balanced groups with intimate relations between members is a twofold check upon inordinate ambitions or sudden outbreaks of race hatred[1]. However, the alliances failed to prevent conflict. Instead, the alliance system’s passive diplomacy, characterised by poor communication, fostered hostility and was a major cause of the war. While historians like AJP Taylor argue the alliance system was too fragile to cause war[2], its instability impacted politics, generating maximum conflict. War broke out in 1914, not earlier, due to a history of strain combined with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a provocative act. The war’s eruption, defined as two major powers entering warfare, can be attributed to the alliance system, exemplified by the Franco-Russian agreement, the Triple Entente’s effect on the Triple Alliance, and Russia’s relationship with Serbia.
The Franco-Russian Alliance, signed in 1894, was a pivotal agreement. It promised mutual support if Germany attacked either France or Russia[3]. Though the powers rarely acted together in crises, the alliance created political expectations, leaving Germany encircled by opposing nations. Russia opposed Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary, while France sought to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine[4]. Germany responded with the Schlieffen Plan to win a two-front war[5]. Though the alliance had mixed effectiveness—France offered little support to Russia during the 1908 Bosnian Crisis—its impact on German policy created hostility[6]. Between 1912 and 1914, neither France nor Russia had reason to attack Germany, as the Moroccan and Agadir Crises isolated Germany diplomatically, and the Triple Entente promised aid only if Germany declared war[7]. In 1914, Austria-Hungary’s war on Serbia and Russia’s mobilisation on German borders prompted Germany to enact the Schlieffen Plan for self-defence[8]. Earlier, Russia’s economic ties with Germany—13% of Russian exports and 35% of imports in 1901—prevented conflict, as Russia needed German investment for industrialisation[9]. In 1914, Russia’s mobilisation led Germany to declare war on both France and Russia, driven by fears of encirclement[10].
The Triple Entente’s formation impacted Central European alliances. Germany feared the 1904 Entente Cordiale between France and Britain, prompting attempts to disrupt it. In 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm II challenged French influence in Morocco, but the Algeciras Conference strengthened Anglo-French ties[11]. The 1911 Agadir Crisis, where Germany sent the gunboat Panther to Morocco, further isolated Germany as Britain supported France[12]. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg noted Germany’s primary interest was preserving Austria-Hungary, its only reliable ally[13]. The Moroccan Crises highlighted passive diplomacy, with conferences held only during crises, limiting communication and polarising Europe[14]. AJP Taylor argues the Algeciras Conference made war inevitable[15], but Sir Eyre Crowe noted in 1911 that the Entente was not a binding alliance, merely a shared policy[16]. Germany mobilised due to Russia’s actions, not the Entente Cordiale, and Austria-Hungary’s internal issues weakened its reliability as an ally[17].
The Russia-Serbia alliance was critical. After Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by a Serbian nationalist, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, prompting Russia’s mobilisation[18]. Russia’s support was driven by pan-Slavic sentiment and geopolitical goals, including Black Sea dominance[19]. The Slavic anthem “Hey, Slavs,” composed in 1834, reflected long-standing pan-Slavic nationalism[20]. Serbia’s Black Hand, linked to its military, sought a Slavic state, while Russia aimed to counter Austria-Hungary’s Balkan influence[21]. The 1908 Bosnian Crisis, where Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, humiliated Russia, which vowed not to back down again[22]. Germany’s promise to mobilise if Russia did emboldened Austria-Hungary[23]. In 1914, the assassination provided Austria-Hungary a chance to suppress Serbian nationalism, Russia to assert Balkan influence, and Serbia to pursue self-determination[24].
No alliance was cited as an official war declaration. France sought Alsace-Lorraine, and Germany pursued Weltpolitik and defence against encirclement[25]. Alliances bridged conflicts but were not the primary cause, as tensions predated them. Most treaties were defensive, requiring imperialist or nationalist triggers[26]. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia due to nationalism threatening its empire, not alliances[27]. The system’s fragility, as Taylor suggests, caused volatility, with fluctuating support fostering aggression or hostility[28]. The passive diplomacy, accepting war as likely, meant nations prepared for conflict, as seen in the Schlieffen Plan[29]. In 1914, the assassination and Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, backed by Germany’s Blank Cheque, escalated a local conflict into a global one[30].
The alliance system caused the war by connecting local and international conflicts. Despite aiming to deter aggression, it polarised Europe, reduced diplomatic flexibility, and allowed a regional conflict to escalate when Russia and Germany entered warfare due to their alliances[31]. Thus, Taylor’s claim that the alliance system was too fragile to provoke war is invalid.
Bibliography:
1. The Times, April 1914.
2. http://lswhs.leesummit.k12.mo.us/Steve.Smith/World%20War%20I/Historians%20and%20the%20Origins%20of%20the%20First%20World%20War.pdf
3. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
4. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
5. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
6. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
7. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/agadir_crisis_1911.htm
8. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/schlieffen.htm
9. Jelevich, Barbara. Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914.
10. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/germanmobilisation.htm
11. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
12. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
13. http://www.geschichtsforum.de/f62/betrachtungen-zum-weltkriege-quelle-27843/
14. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/agadir_crisis_1911.htm
15. http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/c/course-of-german-history.html
16. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
17. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
18. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/serbianmobilisation.htm
19. http://www.enotes.com/topic/Hey,_Slavs#English_Translation
20. http://www.enotes.com/topic/Hey,_Slavs#English_Translation
21. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/black_hand.htm
22. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
23. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
24. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
25. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
26. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
27. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/serbia_and_world_war_one.htm
28. http://lswhs.leesummit.k12.mo.us/Steve.Smith/World%20War%20I/Historians%20and%20the%20Origins%20of%20the%20First%20World%20War.pdf
29. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
30. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
31. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/causes_world_war_one.htm
World War One broke out on 1 August 1914 when Germany declared war on Russia due to its mobilisation. Key reasons for the outbreak include the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, rising militarism, and growing nationalism.
The assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 was a clear provocation by Serbia against Austria-Hungary[1]. Organised by the Black Hand, a group with ties to Serbian politicians, it targeted the heir apparent, who sought to integrate Slavs into Austria-Hungary, a policy opposed by Serbian nationalists aiming for independence[2]. The assassination on Serbia’s national day heightened its provocative nature[3]. Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany’s Blank Cheque, issued a harsh ultimatum to Serbia, leading to war on 28 July[4]. Russia, humiliated in the 1908 Bosnian Crisis, mobilised to support Serbia, unwilling to face further shame[5]. Austria-Hungary’s response was necessary to maintain authority, though some argue their decision to send Franz Ferdinand to Serbia was provocative[6].
Militarism was central to the outbreak. In 1897, Kaiser Wilhelm II introduced Weltpolitik to make Germany a dominant power, escalating tensions with France and Britain[7]. The naval race with Britain, marked by Germany’s dreadnought construction, intensified competition, though Britain maintained naval superiority[8]. France and Britain militarised defensively in response to Germany, while Russia and Austria-Hungary mobilised later[9]. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, devised in 1905, prepared for a two-front war, reflecting early militarisation[10].
Nationalism fueled tensions. France sought revenge for the 1871 loss of Alsace-Lorraine, fostering anti-German sentiment[11]. Britain and France, traditional rivals, united against German aggression, as seen in the 1904 Entente Cordiale, solidified by Germany’s provocations in the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911[12]. In the first, Germany’s push for Moroccan independence failed at the Algeciras Conference, isolating it[13]. The 1911 Agadir Crisis, with Germany’s gunboat Panther, further united Britain and France[14]. Austria-Hungary struggled with Slavic nationalism, weakening its stability[15]. Russia’s humiliation in the Bosnian Crisis fueled its national pride, prompting support for Serbia[16].
Some argue the complex alliance system caused the war, with nations like Britain entering to honour allies like Belgium[17]. However, alliances were defensive, and national interests took precedence. Britain’s declaration of war on Germany, after the invasion of Belgium, was strategic, aiming to prevent German dominance[18]. Tensions from miscommunication and failed diplomacy, not alliances, made war inevitable in 1914[19].
In conclusion, the assassination, militarism, and nationalism, exacerbated by miscommunication and failed diplomacy, caused World War One in 1914.
Bibliography:
1. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/serbianmobilisation.htm
2. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/black_hand.htm
3. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
4. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
5. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
6. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
7. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
8. http://www.historyatfreeston.co.uk/fbechistorysite/Paper%201/KQ1-Arms%20Race.htm
9. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/germanmobilisation.htm
10. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
11. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
12. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
13. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
14. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
15. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/serbia_and_world_war_one.htm
16. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
17. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/london1839.htm
18. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/britishdeclaration.htm
19. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
Julius Caesar once said “Veni Vidi Vici” (I came, I saw, I conquered), a phrase apt for describing the Great War. World War I, from 4 August 1914 to 11 November 1918, involved European powers, the United States, and others. Triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofia by a Bosnian Serb from the Black Hand, the war escalated with Germany’s Blank Cheque to Austria-Hungary, enabling an attack on Serbia[1]. However, this was a short-term cause, as earlier assassinations did not lead to war. Long-term causes—nationalism, imperialism, alliances, and militarism—drove the conflict[2].
Nationalism prophesied war. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s desire for world power, mirroring Germany’s 1871 ambitions, fueled rivalry with France over Alsace-Lorraine[3]. The Black Hand’s assassination reflected Serbian patriotism, aiming to break free from Austria-Hungary[4]. This nationalist act aligned with Serbia’s goal of a Slavic state[5].
Imperialism framed the war. From 1880 to 1914, competition for African and Asian colonies, controlling 90% of Africa, drove economic and political rivalry[6]. Nations sought raw materials for growth, escalating tensions[7].
Alliances, formed between 1879 and 1914, divided Europe. The 1879 Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, expanded to the Triple Alliance with Italy in 1882, prompted the 1892 Franco-Russian Alliance[8]. The 1904 Entente Cordiale and 1907 Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia countered Germany’s ambitions[9]. AJP Taylor argues alliances created a rigid framework where small events caused huge explosions[10]. The Blank Cheque dragged Germany into Austria-Hungary’s war with Serbia[11].
Militarism, intensified by Weltpolitik in 1897, saw Kaiser Wilhelm II pursue a navy to rival Britain’s[12]. Germany’s army grew to 4,200,000 by 1914, with defence spending rising to 73 million pounds from 1910 to 1914[13]. Fritz Fischer argues Germany’s aggressive Weltpolitik caused the war[14]. The naval race and German provocations in the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan Crises united Britain and France[15].
Pre-1914 events, like the 1905 Moroccan Crisis, where Germany failed to break the Entente Cordiale, and the 1908-09 Bosnian annexation, angered Serbia and Russia[16]. The 1912-13 Balkan Wars heightened Balkan rivalries[17]. The 1911 Agadir Crisis saw Germany’s Panther gunboat fail to secure concessions, reinforcing French control[18]. The Schlieffen Plan, planned in 1905, aimed to defeat France quickly via Belgium, underestimating Russia’s mobilisation speed[19]. Germany’s invasion of Belgium on 4 August prompted Britain’s entry[20].
Some historians, like AJP Taylor, argue Austria-Hungary sought to punish Serbia’s existence, not just the assassination[21]. Ritter claims Germany aimed to support Austria-Hungary, not seek world dominance[22]. However, Sidney Bradshaw Fay asserts imperialism, nationalism, militarism, and alliances meshed to create war’s impetus[23]. George F. Kennan attributes the war to alliances[24], while Fischer blames Germany’s provocations[25]. Pre-1914 disputes, unresolved, escalated tensions until war was inevitable[26].
Bibliography:
1. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
2. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
3. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
4. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/black_hand.htm
5. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/serbia_and_world_war_one.htm
6. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
7. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
8. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
9. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale
10. http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/c/course-of-german-history.html
11. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
12. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
13. The Great Powers of Old Europe. N.p.: n.p., n.d. DOC.
14. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
15. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
16. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
17. http://cnparm.home.texas.net/Wars/BalkanCrises/BalkanCrises02.htm
18. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
19. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
20. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/britishdeclaration.htm
21. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
22. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
23. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
24. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
25. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
26. http://www.johndclare.net/causesWWI_Answer1.htm
Why war broke out on 28 July 1914 and not in 1913, 1915, or a month earlier after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, is because Germany was at its peak readiness for war in 1914, and agricultural cycles in Germany and Austria-Hungary delayed action until the harvest was secured.
In 1914, many in Germany believed war was imminent. General Helmut von Moltke, chief of the German army staff from 1906 to 1914, advised Kaiser Wilhelm II to declare war on Russia sooner rather than later, as Russia, France, and Britain were outpacing Germany in armaments due to Germany’s financial constraints[1]. Admiral Tirpitz, at a 1912 conference, claimed the navy would be best prepared for war by late 1913 or early 1914[2]. German leaders saw the Austria-Hungary-Serbia crisis as the optimal moment for war[3].
After Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July, designed to be unacceptable, with a 48-hour deadline[4]. Serbia accepted most terms on 25 July, but Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July, despite Germany’s Blank Cheque on 5 July[5]. The delay, nearly a month, relates to the agricultural economies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, particularly Hungary, where June and July were critical for harvesting, requiring manpower and resources[6].
Some historians argue the alliance system preserved peace from the 1815 Vienna Congress until 1914 but dragged nations into war in 1914[7]. This is partially true: Britain’s claim to protect Belgium’s neutrality was strategic, not altruistic, as Britain had invaded neutral nations previously[8]. Britain aimed to prevent German dominance, pressured by France and Russia[9]. Russia supported Serbia to avoid further humiliation after the Bosnian Crisis, not solely due to alliances[10]. The alliance system, like NATO later, was designed to prevent war, delaying conflict until 1914[11].
The M.A.I.N. framework (Militarism, Alliances, Imperialism, Nationalism) oversimplifies causes. Winston Churchill argued war resulted from general restlessness, with governments seeing it as a distraction from domestic issues[12]. Marxist historians like Emil Ludwig attribute it to capitalist competition[13]. Fritz Fischer blames Germany’s planned aggression[14]. Poor communication prevented de-escalation[15]. Lloyd George’s 1934 memoirs claim Europe “muddled into war” due to failed diplomacy[16]. The combination of Germany’s war-readiness and the harvest delay explains the 1914 outbreak.
Bibliography:
1. Kitson, Alison. Germany, 1858-1990: Hope, Terror and Revival. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
2. http://www.johndclare.net/causesWWI_Answer1.htm
3. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/germanmobilisation.htm
4. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
5. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
6. Personal experience, as cited in the original prompt.
7. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
8. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/british_empire.htm
9. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/britishdeclaration.htm
10. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
11. http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html
12. http://www.johndclare.net/causesWWI_Answer1.htm
13. Ludwig, Emil. July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War.
14. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
15. http://www.johndclare.net/causesWWI_Answer1.htm
16. George, Lloyd. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 1934.
The reasons why war broke out in 1914 differ from those that escalated it into a world war. This essay discusses why the Austria-Hungary-Serbia conflict started and why it became a global conflict, focusing on the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the alliance system.
On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Black Hand member supported by Serbian military officials, assassinated Franz Ferdinand and his wife[1]. The Black Hand, a nationalist Serb group, opposed Franz Ferdinand’s plan to integrate Slavs into Austria-Hungary, which threatened their goal of a Slavic state[2]. The assassination, dubbed “the spark that lit the powder keg,” was critical due to Franz Ferdinand’s role as heir[3]. Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum and declaration of war on 28 July were not merely an excuse but a response to a significant attack, backed by Germany’s Blank Cheque[4].
The conflict escalated globally due to alliances. The Triple Entente (Britain, France, Russia) and Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) pulled nations into the war[5]. France joined due to its alliance with Russia, not direct involvement with Serbia[6]. Britain’s entry on 4 August, after Germany’s invasion of Belgium, made it a world war, involving its colonies[7]. Alliances turned a Balkan conflict into a global one.
Bibliography:
1. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/black_hand.htm
2. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/serbia_and_world_war_one.htm
3. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/serbianmobilisation.htm
4. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/I,_6._Graf_Sz%C3%B6gy%C3%A9ny_an_Grafen_Berchtold,_5._Juli_1914
5. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
6. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/frenchmobilisation.htm
7. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/britishdeclaration.htm
“Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired.” To what extent does this statement explain the outbreak of the First World War?
Wars don’t usually happen overnight, so World War I’s roots extend before 1914. Alliances, the naval race, military buildup, and Balkan conflicts contributed, with tensions building before Gavrilo Princip’s assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand[1].
The Dual Alliance (1879) and Triple Alliance (1882) between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, followed by the Franco-Russian Alliance (1892) and the 1904 Entente Cordiale, culminating in the 1907 Triple Entente, divided Europe[2]. These were defensive, not offensive, but set the stage for escalation[3]. The Entente Cordiale was not military, as seen in the 1905 Moroccan Crisis, where Britain supported France diplomatically, not militarily[4]. Germany’s provocations in the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan Crises aimed to test the Entente but strengthened it, isolating Germany[5].
The naval race, intensified by Germany’s dreadnoughts against Britain’s HMS Dreadnought, heightened tensions[6]. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan (1905) planned a quick attack on France via Belgium to avoid a two-front war[7]. France’s Plan Seventeen (1915) and Britain’s Expeditionary Force (1906) reflected similar preparations[8]. Austria-Hungary’s 1912 annexation of Bosnia fueled Balkan tensions[9].
The assassination sparked the war, but the alliances and military plans made it global[10]. The quote holds true in that tensions built over a decade, but the Balkan conflict, not events from 1904, directly triggered the war[11].
Bibliography:
1. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/serbianmobilisation.htm
2. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
3. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
4. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
5. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
6. http://www.historyatfreeston.co.uk/fbechistorysite/Paper%201/KQ1-Arms%20Race.htm
7. http://www.deutsches-reich-1914-1918.de/schlieffenplan.html
8. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/plan17.htm
9. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
10. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
11. http://cnparm.home.texas.net/Wars/BalkanCrises/BalkanCrises02.htm
Thucydides’s claim that war was inevitable due to Athens’ growing power and Sparta’s fear applies to World War I, where Germany’s rise caused British apprehension[1]. This essay examines events from 1904-1914 and earlier to assess the quote “Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired.”
From 1904-1914, the 1904 Entente Cordiale resolved colonial disputes between Britain and France, leading to the 1907 Triple Entente with Russia[2]. The 1905 Moroccan Crisis saw Germany test the Entente, but the Algeciras Conference strengthened Anglo-French ties[3]. The 1908 Bosnian annexation, supported by Germany, angered Russia and Serbia[4]. The 1911 Agadir Crisis further isolated Germany, as Britain backed France[5]. Germany’s 73% military spending increase from 1910-1914 alarmed other powers[6]. The 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand, followed by Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum and Russia’s mobilisation, led to Germany’s war declarations[7]. Sir Richard J Evans argues Serbia’s nationalism and Austria-Hungary’s overreaction were key[8].
Events before 1904 include Germany’s unification in 1871, upsetting Europe’s balance[9]. The 1866 Prussian-Austrian War and 1871 Franco-Prussian War strengthened Germany, fuelling tensions[10]. Bismarck’s Triple Alliance (1882) and Russia’s 1894 alliance with France heightened fears of encirclement[11]. Nationalism, evident in the 1898 Fashoda Crisis, and Germany’s Weltpolitik (1897) intensified rivalries[12].
The quote explains the war’s outbreak, as tensions from 1904-1914, built on earlier conflicts, made war likely. Germany’s actions, though significant, were not the sole cause[13].
Bibliography:
1. “Guide to Thucydides.” Guide to Thucydides. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Sept. 2014.
2. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale
3. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
4. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
5. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
6. The Great Powers of Old Europe. N.p.: n.p., n.d. DOC.
7. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
8. “10 Interpretations of Who Started WW1.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Sept. 2014.
9. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
10. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
11. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
12. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
13. Cooper, David, David Williamson, and John Laver. Years of Ambition: European History 1815-1914. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2001.
The First World War was caused by interlinking events and societal shifts like alliances, nationalism, and the Moroccan Crises. Captain K.K.V. Casey’s claim that “Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired” prompts examination of its relevance to the Great War, considering 1904-1914 and earlier events.
From 1904-1914, the 1904 Entente Cordiale strengthened Anglo-French ties, weakening Germany’s position[1]. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention united Germany’s rivals[2]. The 1905-06 Moroccan Crisis saw Kaiser Wilhelm II challenge French influence, but the Algeciras Conference boosted French power[3]. The 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand by a nationalist Slav sparked the war[4]. George F. Kennan argues alliances caused the war, with the 1882 Triple Alliance laying foundations for discord[5].
Pre-1904, Germany’s 1871 unification disrupted Europe’s balance[6]. Bismarck’s 1890 dismissal and Wilhelm II’s Weltpolitik fueled tensions[7]. Fritz Fischer blames Germany’s aggressive Weltpolitik[8]. Nationalism, seen in the 1898 Fashoda Crisis, and militarism, with Britain fearing Germany’s naval growth, were key[9]. Thucydides’ view that Germany’s rise caused British fear applies[10].
The quote holds, as tensions from the 1870s, intensified in 1904-1914, led to war, though earlier events were foundational.
Bibliography:
1. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale
2. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/anglo_russian_convention.htm
3. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
4. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/serbianmobilisation.htm
5. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
6. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
7. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltpolitik
8. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
9. http://www.historyatfreeston.co.uk/fbechistorysite/Paper%201/KQ1-Arms%20Race.htm
10. “Guide to Thucydides.” Guide to Thucydides. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Sept. 2014.
“Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired.” To what extent does this statement explain the outbreak of the First World War?
Sidney Bradshaw Fay argues the First World War resulted from imperialism, nationalism, militarism, and alliances[1]. The Serbian Kingdom, particularly its nationalist actions, was a primary instigator, more than Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, or Italy.
Serbian nationalism, embodied by Gavrilo Princip and the Black Hand, supported by Serbia’s government, drove the assassination of Franz Ferdinand[2]. Princip’s act reflected Serbia’s desire to annex Bosnia, knowing Russia’s support would counter Austria-Hungary and Germany[3]. Prime Minister Pasic’s statement after the Balkan Wars, “the first round is won,” showed Serbia’s confidence in Russian backing[4]. Austria-Hungary’s month-long delay in issuing an ultimatum was diplomatic, not belligerent, unlike Serbia’s reliance on Russia[5]. Otto von Bismarck’s 1888 prediction that a Balkan issue would spark a European war proved prescient[6].
The quote applies, as tensions from the 1905 Moroccan Crisis, 1908 Bosnian annexation, and earlier events like the 1873 Treaty of Frankfurt built up to 1914[7]. Fritz Fischer argues Germany planned war, but Serbia’s actions were the spark[8]. Alliances and militarism amplified the conflict.
Bibliography:
1. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
2. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/black_hand.htm
3. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/serbia_and_world_war_one.htm
4. http://cnparm.home.texas.net/Wars/BalkanCrises/BalkanCrises02.htm
5. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm
6. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
7. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
8. Heath, David. “Hakenkreuz Und Zirbelnuss: Augsburg Im 3. Reich.” Traces of Evil: Historians and Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2012.
“Wars Frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired.” To what extent does this statement explain the outbreak of the First World War?
Sidney Bradshaw Fay attributes the First World War to imperialism, nationalism, militarism, and alliances, with tensions predating 1914[1]. This essay examines social and economic factors from 1904-1914, focusing on Germany’s interactions.
The 1903 Berlin-Baghdad Railway announcement heightened Anglo-German tensions, granting Germany Iraqi oil control and bypassing Britain’s Suez Canal monopoly[2]. Arthur P. Maloney notes this threatened Britain’s economy[3]. Germany’s industrial growth, with a 1,300% steel production increase from 1886-1910 compared to Britain’s 150%, and trade growth from half to nearly equal Britain’s by 1912, alarmed Britain[4]. Germany’s shipping increases by 1911 rivaled the US, despite fewer ports[5].
The 1907 Kiel Canal widening enabled dreadnought passage, signaling Germany’s naval ambitions[6]. Germany’s 60% revenue allocation to the army and 940 million marks for naval expansion challenged Britain’s dominance[7]. AJP Taylor argues economic motives underlie wars[8]. Britain, strained by colonial costs, viewed Germany’s rise as a threat[9].
The quote partially explains the war, as economic rivalries from 1904-1914, built on earlier tensions like the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, escalated conflicts[10]. However, a broader scope, including pre-1904 events, is needed for a full explanation.
Bibliography:
1. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
2. Maloney, Arthur P. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I. Alexandria, Va.: Naval Studies Group, Center for Naval Analyses, 1984.
3. Maloney, Arthur P. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I. Alexandria, Va.: Naval Studies Group, Center for Naval Analyses, 1984.
4. Helfferich, Karl. Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913. New York: Germanistic Society of America, 1914.
5. Helfferich, Karl. Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913. New York: Germanistic Society of America, 1914.
6. “Kiel Canal.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 19 Sept. 2014.
7. Bönker, Dirk. Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2012.
8. http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/c/course-of-german-history.html
9. McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2010.
10. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
Germany’s expansionist and nationalist foreign policy was a main factor in its decision to go to war, according to Fritz Fischer[1]. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s pursuit of a “place in the sun” through aggressive colonialism, notably in the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan Crises, fostered distrust[2]. Britain perceived Germany’s 1905 challenge as an attempt to undermine the Entente Cordiale, and the 1911 Agadir Crisis raised fears of a German naval presence[3]. Germany, unified in 1871, disrupted Europe’s balance with its industrial and military growth[4]. Fischer argues Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg aimed to annex parts of Russia, Belgium, and France, driven by domestic expansionist groups[5]. Gerhard Ritter counters that Bethmann-Hollweg opposed military annexations and that Germany’s elite were not swayed by public pressure[6].
Ritter emphasizes Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary, which worsened relations with other powers[7]. Germany’s vulnerability between France and Russia, intensified by their 1892-95 alliance, necessitated loyalty to Austria-Hungary[8]. The 1908-09 Bosnian Crisis, where Germany supported Austria-Hungary, humiliated Russia[9]. Fischer claims Germany used the 1914 assassination as a pretext for planned war, while Ritter argues Germany was drawn in to preserve Austria-Hungary’s status, underestimating British involvement[10]. Austria-Hungary’s role was significant, yet unblamed in the Treaty of Versailles[11].
Fischer highlights Germany’s military growth, particularly its naval expansion under Admiral Tirpitz from 1898, threatening Britain[12]. Germany’s support for the Boers in 1899-1902 worsened relations[13]. Ritter argues Germany lacked a long-term military plan, reacting to Russia’s mobilisation with the Schlieffen Plan, devised in 1898[14]. Britain’s entry, prompted by Germany’s invasion of Belgium, globalized the war[15]. Germany spent less per capita on its military than other powers, and its generals, not statesmen, drove escalation[16].
Germany cannot bear sole blame, as Hans Joachim Morgenthau’s Realism theory suggests states act selfishly, making conflict inevitable[17]. All powers contributed to the war’s outbreak.
Bibliography:
1. Fischer, Fritz. Germany’s War Aims in the First World War. London: Chatto & Windus, 1967.
2. http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Crisis
3. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/world-war-100-1-july-the-agadir-crisis-1911
4. McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
5. Fischer, Fritz. Germany’s War Aims in the First World War. London: Chatto & Windus, 1967.
6. Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954-68.
7. Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954-68.
8. Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed.
9. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bosnian_crisis.htm
10. Fischer, Fritz. Germany’s War Aims in the First World War. London: Chatto & Windus, 1967.
11. Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954-68.
12. Bönker, Dirk. Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2012.
13. Herwig, Holger H. “Luxury Fleet”: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918. London: Allen & Unwin, 1980.
14. Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954-68.
15. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/britishdeclaration.htm
16. Showalter, Dennis E. “World War I (1914-18).” Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 19 Sept. 2014.
17. Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, 1948.
