Example ONE
To What Extent Did Hitler Create a Totalitarian System of Government?
IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
The focus of this investigation will be “To what extent did Hitler create a totalitarian government?” and will analyse the degree to which the main aspects of a totalitarian government were expressed in the Nazi governmental system. The issue of totalitarianism is of course much wider and encompasses all areas of the state, but for the purposes of this investigation it will focus solely on the governmental system of the Nazi party as it is from this which all other areas of the state extend. Thus, Twelve years with Hitler, the memoires of Otto Dietrich and The Limits of Hitler’s Power by Edward Peterson are sources of particular value to this investigation, due to the insight they give into the inner workings of Nazi government either through first-hand experience or through academic focus the area, aiding our understanding of the nature of Nazi government and, further to this, whether it can be classed as totalitarian.
Source: Extract from Twelve years with Hitler, the memoirs of Otto Dietrich, Hitler’s press chief, published in 1955.
This source could be of particular value to historians looking at the question of whether Hitler created a totalitarian government as it originates from Otto Dietrich who, as Hitler’s press chief, was part of the high ranks of the Nazi government. This means he would have had direct experience of the confusion and thus would be able to make an informed judgement on where it stemmed from and also what it was intended to create.
However this source also has limitations that affect its usefulness. One limitation is the fact that it may give a one-sided interpretation of the confusion due to historiographical tradition and lack of hindsight. Published in the 1955, this was right in the middle of the period where the trend was to focus on Hitler with an Intentionalist perspective; thus when Dietrich proclaims this confusion as a ‘technique’ of Hitler, his conception may be biased toward the Intentionalist perspective and thus is unable to give historians a holistic perspective on the nature of Nazi government. Similarly, it also may not be able to do this as, although it comes from someone high in the ranks of Nazi government, that person is only from one section of Nazi government- the press- and therefore is unlikely to be able to reflect fully on the confusion and whether the confusion in this department was representative of the confusion in the system as a whole.
It may also carry limitations due to its origin and purpose in conjunction. Written relatively soon after World War II and the holocaust and also from a Nazi official its purpose may be to seek to shift the blame, therefore causing Dietrich to desire to paint Hitler as an omnipotent force within Nazi government to explain the actions of many subordinates.
Source: The Limits of Hitler’s Power by Edward Peterson, 1969
This source also has significant values in terms of its ability to enable historians to evaluate Nazi governmental system. This predominantly comes from the fact that it was published in 1969 by Edward Peterson, a historian external to the Nazi regime. This means that when assessing the Nazi government he would have had further hindsight and more information available to him, thus able to see a wider and more complete picture of Hitler’s government and therefore able to come to a more well informed judgement in some respects .
However it too has limitations concerning historiographical tradition, as during this time the Structuralist approach was predominant and there was a tendency to paint Hitler as a “weak” dictator. This is alongside the fact that Peterson would have not had close experience of the Nazi system like Dietrich, and therefore would have had to rely on secondary sources in order to come to a judgement about the nature of the chaos, something which could have skewed the conclusion he came to.
INVESTIGATION
Hitler officially became the undisputed leader of the party in 1933 after the law concerning the head of the state of the German Reich merged the positions of the president and the chancellor 1. This, however, did not eradicate his reliance on subordinates to enact his “will”, and it is within this is where the notorious confusion in Nazi government lies, giving rise to the debate over the extent to which Hitler succeeded in creating a totalitarian government in that he exercised absolute control over all state institutions, subordinating all others to his authority2 .The historiography of this area is characterised by the debate between Intentionalists, who hold that the confusion within government was a tool of control used by Hitler, and Structuralists, who conversely hold that the governmental system evolved out of various functional pressures which are in fact reflective of the limits on Hitler’s power. Both of these views must each be explored further in order to discern whether Hitler had absolute control of government and therefore the extent to which he had created a totalitarian system of government. Through analysis of these it becomes apparent that a synthesis of the two sides, championed by Ian Kershaw, provides the best explanation of Nazi government, in that it acknowledges that the confusion within government was not always under Hitler’s direct control, but also recognises the totalitarian nature of Hitler’s personal power, in that it created an environment in which even independent decisions of Nazi officials would naturally reflect in some way the will of Hitler.
As mentioned, Intentionalist historians acknowledge this confusion and hold that Hitler created and manipulated it consciously to his advantage in a divide and rule strategy that created an environment in which no one could amass enough power to opposed him, very much supporting the idea that Hitler had created a totalitarian system of government 3. A source of particular value to this study is the source from Otto Dietrich’s memoirs which suggests that the confusion was indeed part of this strategy as a “technique” he employed to create disorganisation in the upper levels of the government “in order to develop and further the authority of his own until it became a “despotic tyranny”4, allowing Hitler to be placed above party politics, confirming his absolute control of Nazi Germany. Hitler, as argued by this school of thought, was also careful where and to whom he delegated power. This is exemplified by the fact that he gave huge power bases to the men he trusted, namely Himmler, Ley, Goring and Bormann while conversely refusing to support Frick’s attempt to establish central control over the governors and the Gauleiter, suggesting that Hitler was conscious of where and to whom he was distributing power, doing so intentionally5. The chaos therefore was not allowed to get out of control and remained at a level which could be manipulated by Hitler to confirm and enhance his totalitarian control of government. Stemming from this control, Intentionalists go on to suggest that Hitler’s “will” was the controlling factor of Nazi government and subsequent effects on German society. This could be inferred by the fact that the major policies that were adopted by the German state, from Lebensraum to the extermination of the Jews, seem to stem from clear objectives of Hitler’s that go as far back as those detailed in “Mein Kampf”, underlining the control he exerted on Nazi government, adding to the overall impression that it was indeed a totalitarian system6. However, this impression of totalitarian control through chaos is viewed by Structuralist historians as merely superficial. Structualist’s hold that the Nazi regime and its policies evolved from functional pressures, interpreting the confusion of the Nazi Governmental system, not as a tool for control, but as a reflection of the limits on Hitler’s power due to influence from other sources7. The SS provides a strong example of the fact that Hitler was not in control of the apparatus of the Nazi state. By 1939 it numbered 250,000 effectively developing into a state within a state under Himmler, giving him massive amounts of power within the Nazi system8. Structuralist historians also assert that Hitler’s style of rule was incongruent with totalitarian government, Hitler being said to have had a “pronounced distaste for bureaucratic procedures and conventional administrative work routines”9. In the source from Edward Peterson’s “the limits of Hitler’s power” (1969, pp.432, 446) he dubs Hitler as “the man who does not decide” and attributes the “literal anthill” of Nazi government to being a product of this characteristic rather than a calculated policy of “divide and rule”, clearly calling into question the level of control Hitler was able to exert and thus the supposed totalitarian nature of Nazi government10.
With ample evidence to support both perspectives, a synthesis of the two is in fact able to give a better explanation of the nature of Nazi government as totalitarian, as it is sensitive to its finer details. Historians such as Ian Kershaw have neither sided with Intentionalist’s or Structualist’s but rather proposed a synthesis of these two approaches. Kershaw agrees that in no way did Hitler create a monolithic state and rather refers to the governmental structure as “a shambles of constantly shifting power bases and warring factions”11. Although Kershaw recognises that measures such as those taken towards the holocaust were enacted by lower ranking officials without the authorisation of Hitler, he also recognises that much of Hitler’s power came from the way other people in government and the German people perceived him, not solely on his abilities as a dictator, in the form of “charismatic rule”12. Hitler, in Kershaw’s view, was indeed above party politics and ruthlessly pursued objectives which were clarified by those below him, but nevertheless he was structurally conditioned to sustain the successes on which his ‘charismatic’ power rested13. This helps us to explain the level of control Hitler was able to exercise despite not being able to directly control all elements of government.
It is clear to see that both the Intentionalist and Structuralist approaches provide justifiable explanations for parts of the governmental system. There is evidence to suggest that there was a vision that Hitler sought to pursue from early on and equally that he had a motive when letting the governmental system disintegrate as it allowed him to be placed above party politics, creating a totalitarian system. However there is also ample evidence from the Structuralist approach to suggest he was only one part of a poly-cratic system that happened to work in his favour at times; he was not exempt from the functional pressures within the system and was therefore limited by them. However neither approach has given a definitive answer that justifies how Hitler maintained power, pursuing many areas of his policy, amongst the undeniable chaos of the governmental system. A synthesis of approaches explains how Hitler was able to pursue objectives without rational government, as a unifying purpose was clarified by subordinates. Nevertheless this charismatic rule rested on limiting structural pressures due to Hitler’s need to sanction these in order to continue this style of leadership. Thus, in itself, Nazi government was not totalitarian in the sense that Hitler had tangible control of all of its aspects; however the cumulative loyalty generated due to the charismatic style of rule effectively created one, eliminating almost all pressures on Hitler, giving him uncompromised power from the perspective of almost every facet of government.
REFLECTION
The process of this investigation has certainly allowed me to use a variety of research methods and thus experience some of the challenges that face historians. Firstly, through my use of primary sources, notably that of the memories of Otto Dietrich, I came to appreciate the difficulty of gaining accurate historical knowledge. Although primary sources are useful for bringing us closer to the past, we must nevertheless rely on inferences from them in order to suggest how and why things were at this time, calling into question how accurate historical knowledge can be. This challenge was made explicit to me through the examination of Dietrich’s extract, as it contained within in it biases, such as the desire to shift blame away from Nazi officials, which may have distorted the true picture of events, thus distorting the accuracy of our knowledge of them.
The sheer amount of research into Nazi Germany has made a wealth of information available, both helping and challenging historians. This challenge comes in the form of fact selection. Whilst trying to accurately represent the nature of Nazi government and thus expose whether it was totalitarian or not, I questioned the extent to which a historian can construct an objective history. Indeed, certain facts appeal to us more than others, whilst others are ignored, and historians are constantly challenged to select the one’s which best explain the period. I was aware of this in my own investigation and selected facts based on how they confirmed each other to create a coherent picture of Nazi government.
Finally, in building an argument from the chosen sources and facts, I was prompted to consider the problem of interpretation that faces the historian. As highlighted by my analysis, examinations of Nazi government have been dominated by Structuralist and Intentionalist theories, posing a distinct challenge in avoiding being over-influenced by their research; instead new angles should be considered, as Ian Kershaw did when proposing a synthesis of the two schools, something which I tried to explore further in my own work.
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Extract from Twelve Years with Hitler by Otto Dietrich, quoted in Hite and Hinton
Weimar and Nazi Germany (London, 2000) p.187
In the twelve years of his rule in Germany Hitler produced the biggest confusion in government that has ever existed in a civilized state. During his period of government he removed from the organization of the state all clarity of leadership and produced an opaque network of competencies. It was not laxness or an excessive degree of tolerance which led the otherwise so energetic and forceful Hitler to tolerate this real witch's cauldron of struggles for position and conflicts over competence. It was intentional. With this technique he systematically disorganized the upper echelons of the Reich leadership in order to develop and further the authority of his own will until it became a despotic tyranny
Appendix B: Extract from The Limits of Hitler’s Power by Edward Peterson (1969), quoted in Hite and Hinton, Weimar and Nazi Germany (London 2000) p.186
This view of Hitler – the man who does not decide – would help explain the eternal confusion of the men working for him, a literal anthill of aspiring and fearing people trying to please the ‘great one’... The result was the division of domination into thousands of little empires of ambitious men... Hitler’s will [was] largely a mirage.
MODERATOR'S COMMENTS:
Criterion A: 4 marks
The question for investigation has been clearly stated and it is appropriate. Two sources are identified. (The sources consist only of extracts which themselves appear to have been taken from Hite and Hinton, Weimar Germany and Hitler, which is a shame.) One source is primary. The value relates to its origin but not to its purpose or content and the explanation is not developed. There is repetition of “confusion” without identifying what is meant or how this is relevant to the research question. Limitations are more developed. It has been chosen as an example of the Structuralist viewpoint. Second source is secondary. The origin is not clearly addressed, for example there is no information about the author. The limitations are not fully explained and are little more than generalisations. It is chosen an example of the Intentionalist viewpoint.Criterion B: 12 marks
This starts with an error, in that Hitler used the Enabling Act to merge the offices of Chancellor and President in 1934 and he became recognized leader of the Nazi party as early as 1921. There is no definition of “Totalitarian System of Government”. There is an attempt to describe the two viewpoints of Hitler’s rule, namely Structuralist and Intentionalist, then critical analysis of the two supported by examples, coming to the conclusion that Hitler’s rule should be seen as a mixture of the two as according to Ian Kershaw. The investigation is focused on the research question and clearly shows different perspectives with a reasoned conclusion. Some examples are given to support both viewpoints but more could have been given and at times the investigation is not developed.Criterion C: 4 marks
The reflection is clearly focused on what the investigation highlighted to the student about the methods used by historians and challenges facing historians but not the limitations of methods. It is clearly focused on the rest of the investigation.
Total: 20 marks
EXAMPLE TWO
To what extent did World War II lead to women in the United States becoming permanent participants of the labour force?
Section 1: Identification and Evaluation of sources
This investigation will explore the question: To what extent did World War II lead to women in the United States becoming permanent participants of the labour force? The years 1940 to 1950 will be the focus of this investigation, to allow for an analysis of women’s employment during the war, as well as its evolution in the post-war period.
The first source which will be evaluated in depth is Julia Kirk Blackwelder’s book “The Feminization of Work in the United States, 1900-1995”, written in 1997. The origin of this source is valuable because Blackwelder is a professor of history at Texas University, specializing in Modern US and American women’s history, and has written extensively on women’s employment in scholarly journals and books, indicating that she is knowledgeable on this topic. Furthermore, the date of the publication of this source, 1997, strengthens its value, as it indicates that Blackwelder, benefiting from hindsight, has been able to analyse a comprehensive range of sources, including government documents, interviews and statistics. However, the origin of the source is limited in that Blackwelder is not a professional expert in economics, with which this topic is closely related and, consequently, might have misinterpreted some of the economic data presented.
The purpose of Blackwelder’s book is to analyse the trends of American women’s employment in the 1900-1955 period, and “to let evidence speak for itself” (Blackwelder xiii). This is valuable, for it indicates that an extended period of time has been examined, permitting for connections to be made between the trends discovered. However, the fact that the author has covered nearly a century of economic developments limits its value to a historian studying economic developments within a short time period.
The second source evaluated in depth is Mary Anderson’s 1944 address American Economic Association “The Postwar role of American women”, which was delivered in March, 1944. The origin of this source is valuable because the address was delivered by the head of the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labour, and therefore provides an insight into the views of a well-known figure regarding women’s employment and post-war plans. Additionally, the date of delivery of the address, 1944, indicates that the source allows for a valuable understanding of contemporary views on women’s employment. However, this date is also a limitation, for it suggests that the source, having been written before the completion of the war, is likely to fail to analyze extensive research on women’s employment. In terms of origin, the source is also limited in that Anderson was herself a former factory worker and was “ particularly well attuned to the thinking of female employees” (Weatherford 256), indicating that she might have tended to shape the address according to her views, and, consequently, may have provided a slightly subjective insight into government plans.
The purpose of this source is to underscore the importance of the adoption of measures to secure the position of women in the American post-war workforce. The address therefore provides a valuable insight into government plans at the time. The source is, however, limited in its purpose in that the address, having been written to convince others of Anderson’s point of view, perhaps omits some ‘inconvenient truths’ about the government’s views, merely describing encouraging plans for female workers.
Section 2: Investigation
Few historians would disagree that World War II brought about a dramatic increase in female participation in the American labour force during the early 1940s. Between 1940 and 1944, women’s participation in the workforce rose by 23.5% (Clark, Summers 8), a change affecting women of all ages (See Table 1 of the Appendix). As a whole, women workers grew by 5 million in the 1941-1944 period (Anderson 239), with one-sixth of the working women being employed by a war- related industry (Goldin 753). The war was therefore responsible for the unquestionable incorporation of women into the American labour force. However, historians disagree on the extent to which these changes had long-term effects. While some refer to this war as a “watershed” event leading to the permanent incorporation of women into the labour force, others refute this statement by arguing that the war’s influence on women’s employment “appears to have been more modest” (Goldin 741).
Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945, the situation regarding women’s employment was uncertain. On the one hand, 75% of women who had been employed during the war years intended to continue working after the conflict (Weissbrodt 11) and, according to estimates, 3 million women would abandon the jobs acquired during the war, whereas 15 million women would remain in the labour force in the post-war period (Anderson 239). Important public figures encouraged the implementation of measures to face the “challenge” of maintaining the opportunities gained in war. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the measures defended were a realistic part of the government’s plans. This is due to the fact that important public figures, such as Mary Anderson, who made some of the first public statements defining the attitude of the government towards this change, which was to have far-reaching consequences for the American female population, are likely to have shaped their addresses so as to encourage the female working sector. Indeed, the hopes of working women failed to materialize, for the immediate postwar period saw a significant diminution of the opportunities gained during the war. In 1947, for example, the participation of women in the labour force had declined by 12% (Hartmann) and about half of the women who had entered the labour force during the war left it shortly after 1944, with 4.6 million of the wartime entrants leaving labour force by February 1946 (Blackwelder 124). The participation of women aged 20 to 24 in the workforce fell from 54.4% to 46% in the April 1945-1946 period, and that of women aged 25 to 34 fell from 33.3% to 23% in the same one-year period (Durand 154). Women in the war industries were particularly affected, with the number of female autoworkers falling by 16.5% between 1944 and 1946 (Chafe 160) and another 800,000 workers being laid off by the air-craft industry shortly after V-J day (Chafe 159). It therefore appears that the employment of women workers during the war, was, as pointed out by Goldin, shortly reversed after the conflict, leading revisionist historians to argue that the effects of this event were limited as to the persistence of “Rosies” as part of the labor force (Goldin 750).
However, the late postwar period gave way to a reversal of this initially unfavorable effect, for women’s employment soared in the 1947-1950 years. In this period the percentage of working women between 25-64 years of age increased from by 2% (Clark, Summers 1982), and that of working married women rose from 20% to 23.8% (Goldin 742). Additionally, the number of from 175,246 to 331,140 between 1940 and 1950. (Blackwelder 145). Also, twice as many women were employed in California in 1949 as had been employed in 1940 (Chafe 161).These examples of growth have led some to point out that the war did, indeed, have, a “ long-term rather than temporary impact on women's place in the labor force" (Blackwelder 147). The 5.25 million female increase in the labor force between 1940 and 1949 (Chafe 161) further strengthens the point that the war was, despite the initial postwar setback, a “milestone for women in America." (Chafe 172). Conversely, it seems relevant that only 22% of the eventual 1950 women workers joined during the war years (Goldin 744) and that more than half of the women employed in 1950 had been employed before the United States’s entry in the war (Goldin 744). “Rosies” of 1944 were only 20 % of the eventual 1951 employment among married women (Goldin 750). These figures indicate that a majority of the jobs offered during the war period disappeared at its conclusion, and, consequently, that the women that participated in the labor force during the war years only constituted a small percentage of the late postwar employment. This suggests that the changes brought about by the war were more moderate than suggested by enthusiastic modern historians such as Blackwelder, who, perhaps in an effort to analyze an extensive time period, might have failed to examine short-term trends, consequently venturing to claim that "World War II had clearly accelerated the feminization of the U.S. labour force and increased employment among married women." (Blackwelder 146).
It therefore seems that World War II was indeed, responsible for an incorporation of females in the American labour force during the war years, an increase that is likely to have lead to a change in the perspective of male employers. However, evidence regarding the percentage of “Rosies” that were to form part of the postwar labor force suggests that the conflict did not secure a permanent incorporation of war female workers into the American labor force. World War II can therefore be seen as responsible for a number of significant ideological changes regarding women’s employment but its direct influence in terms of persistence of women’s participation in the labor force appears to have been modest.
Section 3: Reflection
This investigation has allowed be to gain an insight into some of the methods used by historians, as well as to the challenges that historians face when carrying out historical investigations. I feel I have developed a skill that is fundamental in the study of history, that of carefully analysing sources, often presenting different points of view on a same subject, to reach a justified conclusion. In order to carry out the investigation, I read books by renowned historians on the subject, analysed statistical evidence, read government documents and public addressees concerning the subject of this study, all of which are methods often used by historians.
When comparing evidence provided by different types of sources regarding my research question I also became more aware of the challenges facing historians. As I began reading about this subject, I was initially surprised that the main theses of the sources that I was using differed significantly from each other. One the one hand, some, such as Blackwelder in her book Now Hiring: The Feminization of Work in the United States, 1900-1995 and Anderson in the address “The Postwar Role of American Women”, argued that the incorporation of women in the workforce brought about a dramatic change that would have far-reaching consequences in the post-war era. Others, for example Claudia D. Goldin in her article The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's Employment stated that the effects of the war had been modest, and the incorporation of women in the workforce was reversed shortly after its conclusion.
Although I initially found it difficult to reach a conclusion, as I continued the investigation I began to understand the work of the historian better. In history, unlike mathematics or science, there is no “absolute truth”. However, this does not mean that all versions of an event are equally acceptable. It is the task of the historian to find the most ‘acceptable version’, which often involves assessing the values and limitations of the sources at hand to find a version that is more closely aligned with the truth. I personally found this a challenge during my investigation. However, by considering the limitations of the sources I was employing I was able to reach a conclusion. For example, I regarded the evidence presented by the extensive article by Claudia D. Golding more valuable than that of Julia K. Blackwelder’s book because the former focused specifically on women’s employment in the World-War II and post-war period, while the latter evaluated nearly a century of developments in the workforce. This meant I that I tended to side with Goldin’s view as I found that her ‘version’ of events was probably more accurate and well-researched than Blackwelder’s, who only devoted a few chapters to the World War II period in her book. I also employed a similar method to assess the reliability of primary sources, in particular, Mary Anderson’s address. Anderson defended that the war had far reaching consequences for women in the workforce. Although providing an interesting insight, I deemed this primary source as only partially valuable for my investigation, due to the fact that it was a piece of persuasive writing, and it was delivered in 1944, before the effects of the war could be fully assessed.
All in all, this investigation has provided me with a valuable insight into the tasks and challenges facing the historian, and has allowed me to understand the importance of assessing the reliability of historical sources when forming an opinion.
Works Cited
Anderson, Mary. "The Postwar Role of American Women." The American Economic Review , Vol. 34, No. 1, Part 2, Supplement Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth- sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Mar., 1944). Pp.237-244. Published by: American Economic Association. JSTOR. Web. 18 Mar. 2013.
Blackwelder, Julia Kirk. Now Hiring: The Feminization of Work in the United States, 1900-1995. College station, TX: Texas A&M UP, 1997. Questia Online Library. Web. 6 Feb. 2013.
Chafe, William H. The Paradox of Change: American Women in the 20th Century. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. Questia Online Library. Web. 6 Feb. 2013.
Clark, Kim B., and Lawrence H. Summers. "Labour Force Participation: Timing and Persistence." Rev.Econ.Studies 49 (1982): 825-44. JSTOR. Web. 3 June 2013.
Durand, John D. The Labor Force in the United States, 1890-1960. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1848. Questia Online Library. Web. 25 Jan. 2013.
10
Goldin, Claudia D. "The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's Employment." The American Economic Review 81.4 (1991): 741-56. JSTOR. Web. 20 Jan. 2013.
Hartmann, Susan M. "Women, War and the Limits of Change." National Forum Sept.- Oct. 1995: 15+. Questia Online Library. Web. 6 Feb. 2013.
Pidgeon, Mary Elizabeth. "Changes In Women's Employment During the War." Washington: U.S. Govt (1944): n. pag. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER). Web. 15 June 2013.
Weatherford, Doris. American Women during World War II: An Encyclopedia. Illustrated ed. N.p.: Taylor & Francis, 2009. Print.
Weissbrodt, Sylvia R. "Women Workers In Ten War Production Areas And Their Postwar Employment Plans." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt (1946): n. pag. Hathi Trust Digital Library. Web. 15 June 2013.
Women working in construction. Historias de cinema. A.C. Gomes de Mattos, n.d. Web. 18 May 2013.
MODERATOR'S COMMENTS
Criterion A: 5 marks
The research question is clearly stated and appropriate with a clear explanation. The two sources a clearly identified and also are also appropriate and relevant. Source One is a secondary source. The value is related to the origin as well as the content, although the value in relation to its purpose is not entirely well explained. The limitations are related to the content and in a rather weak way to its origin. Source Two is a primary source. The value and imitations are linked to the content and origin. There is a clear explanation of the relevance of the sources to the investigation and an analysis and evaluation.Criterion B: 13 marks
The investigation addresses two different viewpoints with a good use of statistics to show women’s incorporation into the workforce during the war. It would have been interesting to have more information on the women’s ages, marital status and sector of the economy. There is also a good use of statistics to show the number of women who left the workforce after the end of the war and the number of women workers in the period 1947-50s, showing long term trends. Reference is made to government plans to encourage women workers but this is not developed. The investigation comes to a reasoned conclusion consistent with the evidence and arguments.Criterion C: 4 marks
This is very much a personal reflection but it does highlight the methods of historians and the challenges and limitations which they face. It is clearly and explicitly linked to the investigation.
Total: 22 marks
Example THREE
How successful was Mao’s attempt to reassert his authority over the party through the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution? (1959-1968)
Section 1: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
This investigation focuses on the Chinese Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and will discuss “How successful was Mao’s attempt to reassert his authority over the party through the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution?” I will examine Mao’s removal of opposition and his cult of personality prior to and during the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, starting from 1959. History texts and online archive of Mao’s works will be used to investigate the effectiveness of Mao’s purges, specifically that of the Beijing Municipal Government, the mobilization of the Red Guards, the role of the Army and control over public communication will be explored in order to gauge how successful he was in regaining authority, both practically and psychologically. Source A is a primary source, a direct speech given by Mao, chosen for detailed analysis due to its pertinence in outlining Mao’s stated official reasons for starting the Cultural Revolution; while Source B is a secondary source chosen due to the detailed account of the causes of the Cultural Revolution provided in the book that is important for this investigation.
1. Source A1
This speech was taken from Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guards’ publication, on April 28, 1966. The purpose of Mao’s speech was to publicly assert his disapproval of the Beijing Municipal Government, especially mayor Peng Zhen. It is a primary source that records Mao’s public denunciation of Peng, who was branded as part of the counter-revolutionary group. This document is useful because it shows Mao’s strategies of using speeches and the power struggle to re-establish his leadership through discrediting his political opposition by making a clear distinction between himself, a Great Helmsman, and revisionists such as Peng, who desired to transform China according to their outlook and deviate from the idea of permanent revolution, which put Mao at a better light. His criticisms of Peng were crucial to the subsequent removal of the rest of the Beijing group, which was very critical of Mao. However, Mao’s arguments may be limited and may not be wholly reliable because he was throwing one-sided accusations at Peng in order to rid him of power and authority, and to restore Mao’s own authority.
2. Source B2
This book is written by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, who was a sinologist on modern China’s history and a history professor at University of California at Santa Barbara. The purpose of the book is to convey general information on the rise of Modern China from 1600- 1949 onwards for history students and general readers. It is a useful secondary source because Hsü received education both in China and America, hence he could draw upon evidences from both Chinese and Western sources to provide extensive analyses to convey a more thorough view of the evolution of Modern China3. However, Hsü is an American- Chinese and there is limited access to Chinese archives. Hence, the Chinese perspective may not be as fully explored as Western interpretations. Also, it is a comprehensive analysis of a very extensive period of Chinese history, of which only a small part is dedicated to the Cultural Revolution. Hence, information on this is relatively brief.
Section 2: Investigation
The party reorganization in 1956, the Sino-Soviet split and the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1964 increased ‘tension and divisiveness within the Chinese leadership,’4 and Mao was retreated to second line. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was largely initiated by Mao to reassert his own authority. He wanted to preserve himself in power for the rest of his life, and to ensure that his concept of revolution would continue after his death.5 This was carried out mainly through strategic removal of political opposition and a cult of personality with the support of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA), the Red Guards, and control over public communication.6
Mao’s strategic attack and removal of opposition enabled him to regain authority of the party practically. Firstly, Mao replaced Peng Dehuai, an ardent critic of Mao’s ideas such as equating the Great Leap Forward to a ‘petty bourgeois fanaticism’,7 with his ‘loyal acolyte’8, Lin Biao, as Minister of Defense in 1959.9 This puts the Army firmly under his command, whose support became crucial for effective mobilization of the Red Guards later on to secure his authority.
In 1966, Mao dissolved the Beijing power base, which was often labeled as counter- revolutionary at that time. In 1965, Beijing was so well under mayor Peng Zhen’s control that Mao described ‘even a silver needle cannot penetrate into Peking’.10 Members of the government were highly critical of Mao’s leadership using historical allegories.11 Mao chose it as the first target of his counterattack by directing Yao Wenyuan’s criticism of Wu Han’s anti-Maoist historical allegorical play ‘Hai Jui Dismissed from Office’ on November 10, 1965,12 which is often believed to be the first strike of the Cultural Revolution.
This was a tactical denunciation because the Beijing group was notable supporters of Liu Shaoqi, President of PRC, Mao’s likely successor and adversary. Wu was deputy mayor of Beijing and a leading intellectual associated with Teng To, Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, editor of Frontline, and editor-in-chief of the Peoples’ Daily; and Liao Mosha, director of the United Front Department in the committee.13 From October 1961 to July 1964, Teng, Liao and Wu had jointly published 67 articles in the Frontline, criticizing Mao using historical allegories. A criticism on Wu meant that it would inevitably link to the Beijing group, and most importantly, Peng, mayor of Beijing, and consequently Peng’s patron, Liu. The group was then discredited. Wu recanted on December 30, 1965, while Peng disappeared on March 26, 1966.14 Liu was ousted from all positions and posts within the party on November 1968.15 Other prominent figures outside Beijing were also attacked, such as Deng Xiaoping, Party General Secretary, Zhu De, founder of the Red Army, and Bo Yibo, vice premier and chairman of State Economic Commission.16 As seen above, oppositions were purged one by one, allowing Mao to regain power and authority practically by removing those who were against him.
Mao’s cult of personality also helped re-establish his ‘charismatic leadership.’17 This was successful in regaining trust and support psychologically. The cult led to mass mobilization of young, zealous Red Guards through propaganda and speeches, whose support became Mao’s instrument for ‘reimposing his will upon the nation and reshaping it according to his vision,’18 such that ‘a few words from Mao seemed capable of eliciting immediate national compliance.’19 The Red Guards were a ‘spontaneous mass movement from below’ that largely fueled Mao’s manifestation as their ‘great teacher’, ‘great leader’ and ‘great helmsman’.20 They branded themselves as successors of the revolution and rebels who swore to uphold Mao’s thoughts and were ‘dedicated to the elimination of old thought, old culture, and old habits’.21 In their eyes, Mao was seen as divine, and the rallies were like religious rituals.22 Millions of Red Guards marched through cities and countryside during August to December 1966, carrying portraits of Mao while chanting Mao was ‘the reddest sun in our hearts’, waving copies of Mao’s Little Red Book, which was referred to with ‘semimagical properties’.23 He was honored as a revolutionary genius ‘remoulding the souls of the people’24 during 1966 rallies, and ‘the revolutionary tides of the world rose and fell at his command.’25
Loyally and dutifully the Red Guards followed Mao’s instructions to ‘bombard the headquarters, ’26 and attack party officials ‘pursuing a capitalist road.’27 They challenged all authority and attacked Liu ‘as a revisionist and a Chinese Khrushchev’;28 held demonstrations specifically targeted at Mao’s greatest adversaries, Deng and Liu,29 which ultimately made them publicly confess their errors in October 1966, 30 and led to them being violently attacked by Red Guards and purged. Mao’s manifestation as the ‘Great Helmsman’31 was greatly enhanced as he regained mass support and party authority.
The Army’s support was also vital both during the purge and in fueling the Red Guards’ mass mobilization. Mao relied heavily on the Army to crush the party, which had been ideologically trained to back Mao to restore order.32 The success of the Red Guards movement was largely attributed to the PLA, which was ordered to assist the Red Guards and allegedly trained the Red Guards,33 because only the Army was able to ‘transport thousands of young Chinese into the city as well as lodge, feed, and outfit them in khaki uniforms for their first demonstration.’34
Mao later set up the Cultural Revolution Group,35 which extended his control over public communications. Lu Tingyi, chief of CCP’s propaganda department, who also controlled the People’s Daily publications, was purged.36 People’s Daily and Liberation Army Daily continuously published editorials that promoted ideas such as ‘Mao Zedong Thought is the source of our life,’37 which ‘enlarged the cult of individual worship’.38 This reinforced Mao’s image as the ‘supreme commander’39 who had reinvigorated the youth to ‘uproot “bourgeois” ideas’40 and continue the revolution.
In conclusion, Mao’s reassertion of supreme authority over the party was largely successful, which was achieved through strategic purges of opposition and effective cult of personality with the support of the Peoples’ Liberation Army, the devoted Red Guards, and control over public media. The replacement of Peng Dehuai by Lin Biao as Minister of Defence, the tactical attacks on well-chosen political targets like the Beijing group, and subsequently the dismissals of many other high rank officials enabled Mao to secure power practically. Mao’s cult of personality heightened greatly and his personal prestige was effectively re-established as he demonstrated himself as the ‘great leader’ with command over the PLA and fervent support of the masses, specifically the Red Guards who challenged all authority. Mao seized control on multiple levels and succeeded in pushing forward his vision and at the same time reasserted political power.
Section 3: Reflection
Completing this investigation has rendered me more aware of the challenges faced by historians in formulating analysis and conclusions during the process of historical investigation, and the limitations of these methods.
First of all, I gathered facts from different sources, read different interpretations, and together formulated my own analysis and conclusion on how successful Mao was in reasserting his power and authority through the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. This is a similar process to that faced by historians, as they also gather many data and facts, and attempt to conclude their findings and provide meaningful interpretations through careful selection of relevant information.
A limitation of this method is the difficulty in being unbiased when providing interpretations, in selecting different historical events and in determining their importance. Past events are interpreted and converted into History by historians whose values and thinking were greatly influenced by the context in which they were set in. Hence, there can never be absolute objectivity and certainty as to how and why events happened because historians’ judgements cannot be value-free. The reliance on analysis of past events to acquire knowledge in History makes it very much subjective and subjected to paradigm shifts. Through this investigation, I became more aware of the importance for historians to be aware of the assumptions and values they are affected by through understanding the present.
The selection of events and the determination of the importance of certain events are as much influenced by historians’ values as are analysis and concluding. However, there is a difference between being biased and selecting. Being biased is more inherent – historians’ values embedded most of the time unintentionally influence historians when they make interpretations. However, selecting is a more logical judgement – it is about weighing the importance of an event as compared to other events gathered before analysing. Though it is important to note that selection could be directed in such a way that leads to the desired interpretations and conclusions. This problem is less pertinent to a scientist or a mathematician, because these disciplines are much more strictly defined. In these disciplines, there are axioms that must be followed in order to arrive at a correct answer, whereas in History, axioms rarely exist – judgements are very much influenced by historians’ upbringing and values. Mathematical and scientific analyses are also empirical studies – results and observations may be reproduced to confirm and reject certain theories. However, in History, this is much more difficult, as historians rely on their judgment to select facts that would help support their interpretations of historical events to become logical conclusions and analyses.
Bibliography
Brown, Colin. China 1949-76. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980.張, 戒 [Chang, Jung], and 哈利戴, 喬 [Halliday, Jon]. 毛澤東:鮮為人知的故事 [Mao: The Unknown Story]. Hong Kong:Kai Fang Chu Ban She, 2006.
Dittmer, Lowell. China’s Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch 1949- 1981. London: University of California Press, 1987.
Fenby, Jonathan. The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of A Great Power 1850 – 2009. London: Penguin Group, 2009.
Gao, Kwok, and Yan, Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1996.
Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China (Fifth Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
1990.Karnow, Stanley. Mao and China: A Legacy of Turmoil. London, Penguin Group, Lawrance, Alan. China under Communism. London: Routledge, 1998.
Lynch, Michael. The People’s Republic of China since 1949. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998.
Meisner, Maurice. Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic. New York: The Free Press, 1986.
Moise, Edward E. Modern China. Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2008. 特 里爾, 羅斯 [Terrill, Ross]. 毛澤東傳 [Mao: A Biography]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press Co., LTD, 2008.
The Marxists Internet Archive: Mao Zedong. “Criticism of P’eng Chen.” The Marxist Internet Archive. April 28, 1966. Accessed January 19, 2014. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume- 9/mswv9_56.htm.
Moderator comments
Criterion A: 3 marks
An appropriate research question has been stated. There is an attempt at “scope” which was part of the previous syllabus’ requirements but not necessary here. There is also an attempt to show the relevance of the sources chosen. Source One is a primary source and the limitations and value are explained with reference to the origin, purpose and content but this is not developed and there is also some description of the source. The result of this speech is implicit. Source Two is a secondary source and the value of the book is seen because of the importance of the author. However, there is some contradiction here as the value is seen because the author can “draw on evidence from Chinese and Western sources” but then it is stated there is “limited access to Chinese archives”. This should have been made clearer. Therefore there is some analysis and evaluation of the two sources but reference to the value and limitations is limited.Criterion B: 11 marks
The investigation is generally clear and well organised and shows the main ways Mao regained power, through control of the PLA, overturning the Beijing power base, developing a cult of personality and control of public communications. The response moves beyond description to include some critical analysis but this is not sustained. There is limited attempt to integrate the sources from criterion A with the analysis. However, evidence from a wide range of sources is used. There is no awareness of different perspectives. The investigation contains critical analysis in that it shows how each factor contributed to Mao’s reassertion of his power. There is a reasoned conclusion.Criterion C: 2 marks
Here the connection between the reflection and the rest of the investigation is more or less implied. Except for the fact that the author had gathered information from many sources, studied many interpretations and formulated their own conclusion there are only general comments about bias which are not related to the investigation. This is a pity as, for example, one of the sources used is Halliday and Chang’s book, Mao, the Untold Story which is a good example of bias.Example FOUR
Why did part of the extra-parliamentary movement see the need to form the Greens in 1980 in West Germany?
Identification and Evaluation of Sources
DIE GRÜNEN, the Green Party of Germany, was the first of it’s [sic] kind. Founded already really early in 1980, it is not hard to draw a parallel to the student movement of the 70’s [sic] and the later established citizen’s initiative movements, short the strong extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany. This investigation is going to explore the reasons for this shift of an opposition from outside to the inside of the parliament, asking the question:
Why did part of the extra-parliamentary movement see the need to form the Greens in 1980 in West Germany?
Of particular importance in answering this question will be a study by the American Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis published in 1983: The Greens of West Germany: Origins, Strategies, and Transatlantic Implications. and Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei a German book about the Green Party published in 1984. They are important as they are the two sources that represent best two different perspectives on the topic as one of them is looking very much from the outside, even a foreign country on the topic and the other is very much looking from within.
written by Pfaltzgraff, Holmes, Clemens and Kaltefleiter is a study by the American Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and got published in 1983 in Washington D.C. As the IFPA is an independent, nonpartisan research organization1 its purpose concerning this study was to inform American policy makers, leaders and other officials about the Green Party in West Germany and its implications for America. The value of this is that this organization is not favoring any party and did not publish this study to entertain the general reader but did serious research and is therefore going in depth with the topic. It’s limitation is though that it is American written for American officials and so has a biased view on German politics, especially because the greens and the extra- parliamentary movement from which they evolved had a strong anti American attitude.
The Greens of West Germany: Origins, Strategies, and Transatlantic Implications.
Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei (trans.: From Protest to Ruling Party) is a book by Hubert Kleinert published in 1992. As Hubert Kleinert was and still is a member of the Green Party this book tells the history of the greens from his point of view, to inform the general or interested reader. The value is, that this book gives many inside views into the Green Party that one would not be able to find in a book written by an from the outside observing historian. On the other hand the limitations are that this book is an opinion and never had the intention of objectively reporting what happened. It is lacking in political distance, as the author was one of the main characters in a party that he is analysing. He was part of the wing of the party favouring realpolitik over ideology. The reader needs to be aware of all this and information needs to be carefully selected and treated as an opinion. Also with only being written 12 years after the foundation of the Green Party the distance the book and it’s author had to the political action taking place is questionable, especially because the author wrote the book just after losing his important political post within the party.
Investigation
Where the need of a Green Party in Germany comes from is very controversial. The American Diplomat Kim R. Holmes thinks that they are heirs of the German tradition of political romanticism, which is to be dated back to the 18th century.2,3 A more common German view is that the dissolving of the student movement of the 60’s was responsible for this, as after the failure of these peaceful protests, other means of achieving change were discussed. Participation within the existing political system seemed a new option after the extra-parliamentary opposition stayed widely unheard.
When the SDS4 dissolved in spring 1970, the end of the heart of the student movement of the 60’s was reached.5 Reasons for the downfall of the student movement were mainly growing radicalization and the use of violence, which increased exponentially as the protesters did not achieve change. From the early 70’s new ways of political participation formed, they were called citizen’s initiative movements (Bürgerinitiativbewegungen). The difference was that these new movements were interested in practical problems rather than big ideological theories as the SDS and APO6 had been.7 Explanations for the perception of politics. As because of the student movement and the new era of reforms from the social-liberal coalition, politics were seen more as being a chance of taking part in decision-making.8
With an increasing importance of the environmental issue, the citizen’s initiative movements got closer together. The founding of the BBU9 in June 197210 was a change because now the citizen’s initiatives were not focused so much anymore on their own small-scale, local problems but worked together over regionally e.g. for the demonstration of Brockdorf in November 1976 and Grohnde and Gorleben in March 197711, for the good of the people and against the nuclear lobby that in their opinion wanted to destroy the same.12 Generally a change in perspective within the population needs to be considered, shown by a survey in 1977, where 60% of the asked were against economical growth, if it is damaging the environment.13 At the end of the 70’s it got more and more visible that the existing parties did not work with the impulses given by the new environmental movement and the several citizen’s initiative movements, an example of this is that in 1977 just after the demonstrations of Grohnde and Gorleben the party congresses of both SPD14 and FDP15 form resolutions, which allow the energy program of the government to proceed.16 This followed in drastic increase in size of the environmental movement, e.g. the BBU included 960 member initiatives and more than 300 000 people by 1978.17 This mass movement against the building of new nuclear power plants was soon disillusioned after the huge demonstration in Grohnde had escalated between the police and the limits of the citizen’s initiative movements were seemingly reached. If now the struggle against nuclear power was to be continued, then this had to happen inside the parliament, as Jutta Ditfurth, a founding member of the Green Party stated in an interview with DER SPIEGEL in 2011: “After {...} conditions similar to a police state at the demonstrations of Brokdorf, Grohnde and Kalkar, we considered forming a party virtually out of self-defence.”18 But as the existing parties were still in favour of enlarging the nuclear sector for energy production19, discussions about an own political party started. 20
To be successful it was necessary to be big and unified, which is due to the stability of the German party system and that in Germany, it is only possible to be part of the Bundestag with at least 5% of the votes (5% Hürde).21 From 1977 on parties of similar kind were formed for federal state elections, as e.g. the GLU/N22, which was a classical party for environmental protection and had energy economic plans concerning the nuclear power plant and nuclear waste disposal in Lower Saxony (Grohnde, Gorleben), as stated in their party program they wanted to begin “the transformation into an ecologically based society”23,24. Only one year after their foundation they won 3.9 % of the votes in the Federal state elections of lower Saxony, which marked a clear success of the movement.25 The first party to enter a federal state government followed soon with the BGL26 in 1979.27 For the European elections in June 1979 the SPV28 was established as a joint party of many small Green Parties and movements. 3.2% of the votes and 900 000 votes in total in the European elections were a huge success for the movement and most importantly let their self-confidence grow.29 Also to get their money for the election campaign back, they had to become a regular party Böll31 now, made 500 delegates of the SPV meet to discuss and prepare the foundation of the German Party. Finally in the beginning of 1980 DIE GRÜNEN were founded in Karlsruhe and had 10 000 members only shortly after.32 Already 3 years later they made it into the Bundestag with 5.6% of the votes 28 representatives.33
After the downfall of the student movement because of growing radicalization, the new citizen’s initiatives were established. Seeming more successful in the beginning because they were less radical and focusing on local seemingly fast to solve small-scale problems, also they soon reached their limits. The new environmental movement under which many of the citizen’s initiatives united fought the struggle against nuclear power. The demonstration of Grohnde escalated massively, similar to protests of the earlier student movement. The disillusionment was high and since not heaving been heard by the existing parties, the step towards forming an own party and moving from being the opposition from outside the parliament to being the opposition inside of it was not big. The different small parties focusing on their federal states united for the European elections, which strengthened their self-confidence and most importantly the German Party law pushed them the final bit of now officially establishing the German Green Party.
Reflection
Working on my investigation showed me that even when researching recent history, a historian could find many limitations. For example interviewing witnesses seems like a great source of information and opinion and is a real advantage when researching recent history as opposed to less recent history where no witnesses are alive anymore. A problem that I came across though is that it is very hard to prove the reliability of such witnesses or in my case there was actually no person that I would have said to be possibly reliable. This is because the Green Party of Germany is still existing and there are basically just people to interview that are either still taking part in political decision making within the party (those do not want to or rather can not really say anything about their party that would make the party stand in a light the party does not want to stand in) or those who left the party because they were and still are not happy with what path the decision making of the party is taking (those like to criticise the party). Doing this investigation has underlined to me how difficult research in history is in general, as differing from other areas of knowledge there is no exact truth. The historian has to strive and try and find what comes closest to what actually happened, but even a single event, even at the time it happened is perceived by different people in very different ways. Maybe in this way the real task of a historian is rather to collect as many perspectives on an issue as possible to so offer every individual to judge himself or herself. Doing my investigation I noticed that this task is much easier to fulfil when researching recent history in a democracy where archives are accessible and one can at least be relatively sure that history in books is not ideologically modified by the ideals of an authoritarian state.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
American Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis . January 18, 2014. http://www.ifpa.org.
Berschin, Helmut; Bierett, Ralph; Eisel, Stephan; Schulte, Christoph; Stuth, Reinhard; Thiemer, Gösta; Veen, Hans-Joachim;. DIE GRÜNEN - Partei wider Willen. Mainz: v. Hase und Koehler, 1984.
"BREMEN - Unten gegen oben." DER SPIEGEL, no. 42/1979 (October 1979): 23. Ditfurth, Jutta, interview by DER SPIEGEL. Alt-Linke Jutta Ditfurth: "Grünen-
Wähler wollen getäuscht werden" (February 22, 2011).
Grupp, Joachim. Abschied von den Grundsätzen? Berlin: Zehrling , 1986.
Kleinert, Hubert. Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei. Frankfurt am Main : Eichborn, 1992.
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L.; Holmes, Kim R.; Clemens, Clay; Kaltefleiter, Werner. The Greens of West Germany: Origins, Strategies, and Transatlantic Implications. Washington D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983.
Raschke, Joachim. DIE GRÜNEN Wie sie wurden, was sie sind. Köln: Bund-Verlag , 1993.
www.bundestag.de. http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/parteienfinanzierung/ (accessed February 1, 2014).
"Zelle in der Heide." DER SPIEGEL, no. 5 (1978): 46-51.
Moderator comments
Criterion A: 5 marks
This section starts with a justification for the choice of the research question which is not actually necessary. The research question itself is clearly stated and is appropriate, although the actual wording could have been clearer, eg why did local opposition to the policies of the mainstream political parties lead to the formation of the Greens as a political party within parliament? Two sources are identified and there is clear reference to their relevance to the research question. Source one is a website. The value and limitations are linked to the origin, purpose and content but this could have been more developed. Source Two, a book, is a more developed explanation of the value of this source with regards to its origin and content and there is a clear and detailed evaluation of the limitations of this source.Criterion B: 13 marks
There is an awareness of different reasons for the formation of the Green Party. These are explained but not fully developed and there is no further reference. The growth of the citizen’s movement is clearly and carefully explained and analysed, together with the growth in importance of environmental issues which was not reflected in the policies of the existing political parties. Detailed explanation of the growth of environmental parties in state elections and finally in the Federal elections is shown with careful reference to a wide variety of sources, including the two which were identified in Section A. The investigation is clear, coherent and effectively organised but there needs to be more evaluation of different perspectives. The conclusion is consistent with the argument and evidence provided and is carefully reasoned.Criterion C: 4 marks
This was clearly focused on the challenges and limitations facing a historian researching the origins of the Green Party in West Germany. The connection between the reflection and the research question is clear and explicit. The comments on researching in a democracy rather than an authoritarian state were interesting but perhaps not related to research in West Germany, rather than East Germany.
Total: 22 marks
To what extent was Pieter Willem Botha an influence to the peaceful end of Apartheid?
Section 1: Identification and evaluation of sources
This investigation will explore the question “To what extent was Pieter Willem Botha an influence to the peaceful end of Apartheid?” The two key sources I will look at come from a history professor and from a speech from Botha himself, which will give me two important different perspectives for my investigation.
This investigation will explore the question “To what extent was Pieter Willem Botha an influence to the peaceful end of Apartheid?” The two key sources I will look at come from a history professor and from a speech from Botha himself, which will give me two important different perspectives for my investigation.
Evaluation of source one
Eades, Lindsay Michie. The End of Apartheid in South Africa. Westport: Greenwood, 1999. Questia Online Library. Web. 1 Feb. 2013.
The origin of the source helps give it value because Eades is an expert in the field of history, lecturing at the University of Transkei in South Africa from 1989 to 1991 and being a history professor at Chowan College, East Carolina University and Greensboro College in North Carolina. As well as this, by being published in 1999, the author has been able to look at the subject more in depth and analyze the effects of such incident. Furthermore, the fact that Eades is not South African makes the analysis of the book more objective. However, the origin of this source also limits its value because, since it was not written during the apartheid era, some of the information might not be completely accurate. Likewise, the date of publication also limits its value because more information concerning the end of apartheid might have come to sight since it was published.
The purpose of Eades’ book is to go over the changes made to transform the government and the challenges that this new government faced concerning the end of apartheid as well as going through the divisions of the South African society. This is of value because a variety of primary documents, including F.W. deKlerk’s policies as well as Freedom Charters from politicians with knowledge on the topic, are of great use when exploring the causes to the end of apartheid. However, by focusing mainly on the changes made to transform the government, the author does not make much reference to Botha himself; instead he focuses more on F.W. deKlerk’s policies. As well as this, her basis of her analysis is based on official documents, not taking into account the possibility that these political documents are biased since politicians looked for positive publicity.
Evaluation of source two
Botha, Pieter Willem. Address by State President P. W. Botha at the opening of the National Party Natal Congress, Durban, 15 August 1985. Reproduced online in O’Malley, P. ed. The Heart of Hope - South Africa's Transition from Apartheid to Democracy.
The origin of this source is valuable since it is a direct speech delivered by Botha in August 1985. Through this speech, the reader is able to understand Botha’s view on apartheid and on the end of it. By being from the apartheid era itself, the source helps us analyze the situation of South Africa at the time. For example, the speech talks about why Botha did not want to release Nelson Mandela from prison despite lots of people wanting him to be released.
Anyhow, there are limitations to this source. The speech was delivered to the Cabinet but was also broadcast all over the world. Therefore it is possible then when putting it out to the public, the information might have been altered making his ideas sound different, probably making them more exaggerated. The purpose of this speech is to express Botha’s views as prime minister and his ideas and opinion on apartheid. But the purpose might also be to present an image of himself as a strong leader to all of the people all over the world hearing his speech, which is important to remember when reading the speech.
Botha, Pieter Willem. Address by State President P. W. Botha at the opening of the National Party Natal Congress, Durban, 15 August 1985. Reproduced online in O’Malley, P. ed. The Heart of Hope - South Africa's Transition from Apartheid to Democracy.
The origin of this source is valuable since it is a direct speech delivered by Botha in August 1985. Through this speech, the reader is able to understand Botha’s view on apartheid and on the end of it. By being from the apartheid era itself, the source helps us analyze the situation of South Africa at the time. For example, the speech talks about why Botha did not want to release Nelson Mandela from prison despite lots of people wanting him to be released.
Anyhow, there are limitations to this source. The speech was delivered to the Cabinet but was also broadcast all over the world. Therefore it is possible then when putting it out to the public, the information might have been altered making his ideas sound different, probably making them more exaggerated. The purpose of this speech is to express Botha’s views as prime minister and his ideas and opinion on apartheid. But the purpose might also be to present an image of himself as a strong leader to all of the people all over the world hearing his speech, which is important to remember when reading the speech.
Section 2: Investigation
Introduction
In his early years as leader of South Africa, Botha was seen as an activist and promoter of apartheid. Already by 1948, the National Party introduced acts making apartheid a legal fact (Eades, 1999: 157), and 30 years later Botha set a new constitution that limited the reform of apartheid policies (Gregory, 2006). Many newspapers in the late 1980’s, including the New York Times, describe Botha as the “South African leader who struggled vainly to preserve apartheid rule” (Gregory, 2006). Yet in the end Botha started to become more flexible about the opposition of apartheid. He started passing some acts like legalizing interracial marriage (Radebe, 2006). This investigation will therefore look at the extent to which Botha was an influence to the peaceful end of Apartheid.
Botha’s views on apartheid
Botha did not want to end apartheid (Bautista). He held racist views and speeches he gave, for example his famous speech in 1985, also suggest that he had no intention to end apartheid in South Africa and did not believe in the prosperity of the Black race in South Africa at the time. As a whole, Botha believed that his government was not doing anything wrong. Talking about voting he said, “I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the other and it would lead to chaos.” (Botha, 1985) In this way, Botha thought that it was acceptable for there to be white dominance of the political system, but thought that changing the system to give everyone an equal vote would lead to “chaos”. So, in years as State President, Botha was in favour of apartheid.
Botha’s views towards apartheid seemed to be less strong later in his leadership. He started passing some acts like legalizing interracial marriage (Radebe, 2006). But these changes were more for practical reasons than because Botha’s views on the wrongness of apartheid actually changed. By this time “the situation had reached a crisis for apartheid and could not continue any longer” (Mati, 2007). Botha believed that he would have more supporters if he opposed the elimination of apartheid but abolished some small apartheid laws that satisfied the majority (Viljoen, 2013). When the country’s situation started to get worse and “Botha could not continue as Head of State, the National Party had intensive talks with the ANC to end apartheid in a peaceful manner” (Viljoen, 2013) committing to the Groote Schuur Minute (Eades 1999, 172). Botha realized that he would no longer have support against the opposition of apartheid and had to accept the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the need for a Cabinet representative of all South Africans (Giliomee, 2012).
The extent of Botha’s influence on the end of apartheid
Although he did eventually pass some laws against apartheid, the public did not see Botha as an engineer to the stop of apartheid. To an extent, Botha was almost obliged to try to end apartheid even though he did not really want to end it. By 1985, countries like France and the United States did not want to take risks of making business with South Africa, especially involving loans, investments and borrowing facilities (Giliomee, 2012). After Botha’s speech in 1985 this got worse, and many countries made even more severe restrictions on trading with South Africa. In this way, pressure from other countries made Botha have to be more flexible on apartheid and in the end was one of the reasons that made him have to resign.
The lack of influence of Botha on the end of apartheid is clear if Botha is compared to other people who had much more influence. Botha was succeeded by de Klerk, the last state president of the apartheid-era. De Klerk set more fundamental reforms than Botha and is therefore seen as more influential in the end of apartheid than Botha. When he became president, he wanted to introduce reform and address the problems of apartheid further than what P.W. Botha had done (Eades 1999, 165). As state president, de Klerk passed anti-apartheid laws whose “aim was totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant would enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor – constitutional, social and economic”(de Klerk 1990). Sources explain that de Klerk also took more radical changes such as “the prohibition of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party and a number of subsidiary organizations being rescinded” (de Klerk 1990). This evidence shows that de Klerk was more influential in the end of apartheid because, unlike Botha, he believed in it. He helped pass laws and by 1994 apartheid was over.
Conclusion
With this information is it clear that Botha was not a primary influence in the peaceful end of apartheid mainly because throughout his entire career as state president, he did not believe in the end of apartheid. He thought that Black people were, and always would be inferior to the White race and therefore saw no reason to end this segregation. Even if he did pass some laws, there were none set by him that actually set the Black race and the White race equal to each other. At the end Botha almost fell obliged to help end apartheid. Furthermore, after Botha there were other politicians that were more influential than him in the end of apartheid, as was de Klerk. Under his rule, de Klerk passed a legislation that actually managed to put ends to apartheid.
Introduction
In his early years as leader of South Africa, Botha was seen as an activist and promoter of apartheid. Already by 1948, the National Party introduced acts making apartheid a legal fact (Eades, 1999: 157), and 30 years later Botha set a new constitution that limited the reform of apartheid policies (Gregory, 2006). Many newspapers in the late 1980’s, including the New York Times, describe Botha as the “South African leader who struggled vainly to preserve apartheid rule” (Gregory, 2006). Yet in the end Botha started to become more flexible about the opposition of apartheid. He started passing some acts like legalizing interracial marriage (Radebe, 2006). This investigation will therefore look at the extent to which Botha was an influence to the peaceful end of Apartheid.
Botha’s views on apartheid
Botha did not want to end apartheid (Bautista). He held racist views and speeches he gave, for example his famous speech in 1985, also suggest that he had no intention to end apartheid in South Africa and did not believe in the prosperity of the Black race in South Africa at the time. As a whole, Botha believed that his government was not doing anything wrong. Talking about voting he said, “I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the other and it would lead to chaos.” (Botha, 1985) In this way, Botha thought that it was acceptable for there to be white dominance of the political system, but thought that changing the system to give everyone an equal vote would lead to “chaos”. So, in years as State President, Botha was in favour of apartheid.
Botha’s views towards apartheid seemed to be less strong later in his leadership. He started passing some acts like legalizing interracial marriage (Radebe, 2006). But these changes were more for practical reasons than because Botha’s views on the wrongness of apartheid actually changed. By this time “the situation had reached a crisis for apartheid and could not continue any longer” (Mati, 2007). Botha believed that he would have more supporters if he opposed the elimination of apartheid but abolished some small apartheid laws that satisfied the majority (Viljoen, 2013). When the country’s situation started to get worse and “Botha could not continue as Head of State, the National Party had intensive talks with the ANC to end apartheid in a peaceful manner” (Viljoen, 2013) committing to the Groote Schuur Minute (Eades 1999, 172). Botha realized that he would no longer have support against the opposition of apartheid and had to accept the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the need for a Cabinet representative of all South Africans (Giliomee, 2012).
The extent of Botha’s influence on the end of apartheid
Although he did eventually pass some laws against apartheid, the public did not see Botha as an engineer to the stop of apartheid. To an extent, Botha was almost obliged to try to end apartheid even though he did not really want to end it. By 1985, countries like France and the United States did not want to take risks of making business with South Africa, especially involving loans, investments and borrowing facilities (Giliomee, 2012). After Botha’s speech in 1985 this got worse, and many countries made even more severe restrictions on trading with South Africa. In this way, pressure from other countries made Botha have to be more flexible on apartheid and in the end was one of the reasons that made him have to resign.
The lack of influence of Botha on the end of apartheid is clear if Botha is compared to other people who had much more influence. Botha was succeeded by de Klerk, the last state president of the apartheid-era. De Klerk set more fundamental reforms than Botha and is therefore seen as more influential in the end of apartheid than Botha. When he became president, he wanted to introduce reform and address the problems of apartheid further than what P.W. Botha had done (Eades 1999, 165). As state president, de Klerk passed anti-apartheid laws whose “aim was totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant would enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor – constitutional, social and economic”(de Klerk 1990). Sources explain that de Klerk also took more radical changes such as “the prohibition of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party and a number of subsidiary organizations being rescinded” (de Klerk 1990). This evidence shows that de Klerk was more influential in the end of apartheid because, unlike Botha, he believed in it. He helped pass laws and by 1994 apartheid was over.
Conclusion
With this information is it clear that Botha was not a primary influence in the peaceful end of apartheid mainly because throughout his entire career as state president, he did not believe in the end of apartheid. He thought that Black people were, and always would be inferior to the White race and therefore saw no reason to end this segregation. Even if he did pass some laws, there were none set by him that actually set the Black race and the White race equal to each other. At the end Botha almost fell obliged to help end apartheid. Furthermore, after Botha there were other politicians that were more influential than him in the end of apartheid, as was de Klerk. Under his rule, de Klerk passed a legislation that actually managed to put ends to apartheid.
Section 3: Reflection
During this research on Botha, the way of acquiring information has been one of the aspects that has limited the study. Amongst the ways used to investigate the topic are books written by historians and professors, interviews with Botha’s advisors, and newspaper articles. Surely some become more reliable than others and it has been by reading many different perspectives that it has become clearer how accurate each source is on Botha’s role in the end of Apartheid.
This study has highlighted the limitations some of the ways of acquiring information pose. First of all, considering books written by historians it is very important to keep in mind who writes the book and when it was written. Not only can the information be bias because of the personal views of the person who wrote it, but the date can also have an influence as more accurate information on the topic might appear after the book was published. For example, a book written during apartheid does not give the reader the immediate effects of the end of Apartheid. Moreover, most books looked at do not only focus on Botha so the amount of information provided might not be enough to provide a solid argument about his role in the end of Apartheid. Similarly other sources, such as newspaper articles, have also proved to be somewhat unreliable. When reading newspapers articles it must be taken into account that journalists write their first impressions, mainly trying to please the readers. By deforming the information in a way that fits their objectives, the information on the research topic can be manipulated and changed providing the audience with a completely different view of the original facts.
Nevertheless, information obtained from first point of views tend to be particularly valuable. Many provide very trustworthy points that broader sources cannot provide. Primary sources may look into the topic to a greater extent and into the smallest details. This way of acquiring information becomes extremely helpful when, after having read different perspectives on the topic, the historian still does not know which argument to rely more on. In conclusion, this study has allowed me to realize how a historian has to categorize information and facts in order to reach solid arguments. After research, a historian has to choose to what extent the information he or she has obtained is reliable and how can it be helpful towards his or her study.
During this research on Botha, the way of acquiring information has been one of the aspects that has limited the study. Amongst the ways used to investigate the topic are books written by historians and professors, interviews with Botha’s advisors, and newspaper articles. Surely some become more reliable than others and it has been by reading many different perspectives that it has become clearer how accurate each source is on Botha’s role in the end of Apartheid.
This study has highlighted the limitations some of the ways of acquiring information pose. First of all, considering books written by historians it is very important to keep in mind who writes the book and when it was written. Not only can the information be bias because of the personal views of the person who wrote it, but the date can also have an influence as more accurate information on the topic might appear after the book was published. For example, a book written during apartheid does not give the reader the immediate effects of the end of Apartheid. Moreover, most books looked at do not only focus on Botha so the amount of information provided might not be enough to provide a solid argument about his role in the end of Apartheid. Similarly other sources, such as newspaper articles, have also proved to be somewhat unreliable. When reading newspapers articles it must be taken into account that journalists write their first impressions, mainly trying to please the readers. By deforming the information in a way that fits their objectives, the information on the research topic can be manipulated and changed providing the audience with a completely different view of the original facts.
Nevertheless, information obtained from first point of views tend to be particularly valuable. Many provide very trustworthy points that broader sources cannot provide. Primary sources may look into the topic to a greater extent and into the smallest details. This way of acquiring information becomes extremely helpful when, after having read different perspectives on the topic, the historian still does not know which argument to rely more on. In conclusion, this study has allowed me to realize how a historian has to categorize information and facts in order to reach solid arguments. After research, a historian has to choose to what extent the information he or she has obtained is reliable and how can it be helpful towards his or her study.
List of Sources
Bautista, Terrproynn. E-mail interview. 25 Jan. 2013.
Botha, “Address by State President P. W. Botha at the opening of the National Party Natal Congress, Durban, 15 August 1985”, reproduced online in O’Malley, P. ed , "The Heart of Hope - South Africa's Transition from Apartheid to Democracy", accessed online at
DeKlerk, F. W. Speech at the opening of Parliament 2 February 1990.
Eades, Lindsay Michie. The End of Apartheid in South Africa. Westport: Greenwood, 1999. Questia Online Library. Web. 1 Feb. 2013..
Giliomee, Hermann. "The Day Apartheid Started Dying." Mail & Guardian 26 Oct. 2012: n. pag. Mail & Guardian. Web. 13 Mar. 2013..
Gregory, Joseph R. "P.W. Botha, Defender of Apartheid, Is Dead at 90." New York Times (2006): 1-4. NY Times. Web. 1 Feb. 2013.. Mailu, David G., ed. "Botha's Speech 1985." Nairaland. Oluwaseun Osewa, Mar. 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2013. .
Mati, Shepi. Interview Segment. Interview by David Bailey. South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy. N.p., 18 June 2007. Web. 1 Feb. 2013..
Radebe, Hopewell. "Looking Back on Botha's South Africa." BBC [Johannesburg] 3 Nov. 2006: n. pag. BBC News. Web. 23 May 2013..
Viljoen, Diedre. E-mail interview. 4 Feb. 2013.
Bautista, Terrproynn. E-mail interview. 25 Jan. 2013.
Botha, “Address by State President P. W. Botha at the opening of the National Party Natal Congress, Durban, 15 August 1985”, reproduced online in O’Malley, P. ed , "The Heart of Hope - South Africa's Transition from Apartheid to Democracy", accessed online at
DeKlerk, F. W. Speech at the opening of Parliament 2 February 1990.
Eades, Lindsay Michie. The End of Apartheid in South Africa. Westport: Greenwood, 1999. Questia Online Library. Web. 1 Feb. 2013.
Giliomee, Hermann. "The Day Apartheid Started Dying." Mail & Guardian 26 Oct. 2012: n. pag. Mail & Guardian. Web. 13 Mar. 2013.
Gregory, Joseph R. "P.W. Botha, Defender of Apartheid, Is Dead at 90." New York Times (2006): 1-4. NY Times. Web. 1 Feb. 2013.
Mati, Shepi. Interview Segment. Interview by David Bailey. South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy. N.p., 18 June 2007. Web. 1 Feb. 2013.
Radebe, Hopewell. "Looking Back on Botha's South Africa." BBC [Johannesburg] 3 Nov. 2006: n. pag. BBC News. Web. 23 May 2013.
Viljoen, Diedre. E-mail interview. 4 Feb. 2013.
Moderator comments
Criterion A: 4 marks
The research question is clearly stated. In the discussion of source one the discussion of origin is connected to value and limitations, although the response is unclear and difficult to follow in places. The connections between limitations and origin are weak, and although there is some discussion of value and limitations related to purpose and content these points are not developed.Criterion B: 7 marks
This part of this IA moves beyond mere description, but the critical analysis lacks development and clarity. The investigation is under the word limit, and this is reflected in the lack of development of the analysis. There is a limited awareness of different perspectives. As this section progresses it appears to become more of a discussion as to whether Botha or deKlerk was more effective rather than keeping the focus on the question.
Please note: This is an example of an IA where the investigation section is broken down into a
series of sub-sections. It is perfectly acceptable for candidates to structure their
investigation in this way if they wish to do so. It is not required to provide sub-headings
but it can be a useful strategy, particularly for students who might otherwise struggle
with how to structure this section of the task. It is also a strategy that some teachers
may decide to encourage students to use in the planning stages of their investigation
to provide additional support and scaffolding of the task, even if sub-headings are
not then used in the final presentation of the investigation.
Criterion C: 2 marks
There is some reflection on the methods used by the historian. The student analyses the problems in assessing bias and value in a variety of sources, albeit simplistically. There is some very basic discussion of the challenges facing historians, although this is very weak and could have been developed far more effectively. The student does make a connection between the reflection and the rest of the investigation in places.
Total: 13 marks
