IBDP Internal Assessment
Identification and evaluation of sources
Source 1[2]
The origin of Source 1 is a memo,
written by Arthur H. McCollum the year before the Pearl Harbour bombing. The
origin is valuable when looking at the content, as Franklin D. Roosevelt was
looking for an opportunity for the USA to enter the war so they needed to
conjure a plan which would give them their needed opportunity. This is an
important and valuable source due to it being a primary source that is taking
place at the time of the second world war, which would give us an understanding
of the events as it occurred and to what lengths the US government would go to.
Also now with hindsight it becomes evident how great of a role this memo would
have had in the United States’ entrance into World War 2. The purpose of this
memo was to inform FDR how he could “le[a]d [Japan] to commit an overt act of
war”. However, the limitation with this is that McCollum could not have known
how large of an affect Pearl Harbour would have and how strongly the US would
be hit. He only wanted a way for the US to get into the war and not the death
of nearly 2,500 of his own people and a two front war with the Germans and the
Japanese.
Source 2[3]
The origin of Source 2 is a book called Day of Deceit, by Robert Stinnett, published in 1999, 58 years after Pearl Harbour took place. This is valuable as this source is able to see the event with hindsight, as classified government documents were made public in 1994 on this topic, giving Stinnett a new understanding that could not have been understood before. He points out how Roosevelt was prevented from joining the war and needed to provoke Japan in order for their isolated standpoint to be released, which is valuable when trying to understand this prior knowledge theory. On the other hand, the purpose of this source is to inform people of the claimed false history and that things weren’t as simple as they appeared to be. However, the limitation of this source is that Stinnett throws around a lot of allegations without much evidence and seems to ignore 10 years of Japanese aggression in the east and well as the fact that Roosevelt wanted to fight against Germany, and not a two front war.
Investigation
“We will have to take a
good many defeats before we can have a victory.”[4] The words uttered by
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his wife upon hearing the news of the Pearl Harbour attack
that would launch the United States into World War 2. It is claimed that the
United States, in an attempt to enter the war, needed to provoke the Japanese
into attacking them and use them as a scapegoat for their entrance. This
investigation will examine whether through the McCollum memo, the US and FDR
had prior knowledge of the Pearl Harbour attack by goading Japan into an attack,
but that there is also limited evidence to support that this document, although
created for the President, was ever seen by him. This is ultimately the
predominant focus that would decide whether or not Franklin D. Roosevelt, the
32nd President of the United States knew of the Pearl Harbour attack
before it occurred on the 7th December 1941 in order to join the Great
War in Europe.
Since the
declassification of the McCollum memo in 1994, new light has been shed upon the
previously claimed surprise attack on the Pearl Harbour naval base. Within the
memo, written by Arthur McCollum, it states his 9-point plan which “If by these
means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”[5] This identifies the focal
argument that in order for the US to join the war, they were required to find
an entrance where they weren’t seen as the aggressor. This is exemplified by Harry
E. Barnes who argues that;
“Roosevelt and Churchill had decided that it
may be impossible for the United States to enter the war through by the
European front door, and in August, 1941, they met off the coast of
Newfoundland to devise a way whereby Roosevelt could force America into war
through the backdoor of the Far East by a manipulation of Japanese-American
relations.”[6]
This “backdoor of the Far
East”[7] was America’s chance to
join the war effort, but if carried our incorrectly, could lead them into
fighting a much larger war than they could anticipate. Over the next few
months, since the creation of the McCollum memo, the United States began to
carry out the 9-point plan to lure the Japanese into an attack. For this memo
and its points to have been carried out, it would have needed to have been seen
and approved for it to go ahead by the President. Although there are no
specific records which indicate that FDR had ever seen the McCollum memo,
Robert Stinnett claims that “a series of secret presidential routing logs plus
collateral intelligence information in the Navy files offer conclusive evidence
that [FDR] did see it.”[8] Furthermore it is evident
that that FDR saw the memo as he stated that he wanted pop-up cruises “to keep
popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don't mind losing one
or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.”[9] Which would support
actions D, “Send a division of long range heavy
cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.” and E, “Send two divisions of
submarines to the Orient.”, of the memo[10]. All in all, the United
States needed to enter the war but did not have an opportunity to do so, making
the McCollum memo a necessary document that would aid FDR in entering a war to
fight fascism in Europe.
However, the issue with
the McCollum memo is that although there are assumptions that can be made to
show that Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the memo, there is no real proof to support
this assumption. According to James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, in their book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor published in
1991, it is claimed that the British
had cracked the Japanese codes, where they were led to know of the Japanese intentions
to attack Pearl Harbour.[11] There is credibility in
the account by Rusbridger and Nave, as Eric Nave was the person who had cracked
the Japanese naval cipher JN-25 in 1939, and Rusbridger, a member of MI6, was
an expert on intelligence matters.[12] Their book claims that
Winston Churchill had advance knowledge of the attack and refused to inform the
President of the United States in order to drag the US into the Great War as
their help was much needed and their entrance would be almost impossible if there
was not to be an unprovoked attack on them by the enemy[13]. Although the account by
Nave is speculated to be untrue, Eugene L. Rasor[14], Ian Pfenningwerth[15], Michael Smith[16], and Peter Donovan[17] all agree on his
involvement in solving the Japanese naval cipher in 1939. Not only do they
agree on this matter, but the fact, as expressed in Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, that
Nave was able to intercept the cipher and solve it would be a sign of the
allies having advanced knowledge of the attack upon Pearl Harbour, and in an
attempt to win the war, withheld it for the Americans. The McCollum Memo’s
purpose in this conspiracy is to indicate that Franklin D. Roosevelt had prior
knowledge of the attack, but with Rusbridger’s argument, one can see that it
would make sense for the British Intelligence to withhold information from
Roosevelt as the act that was going to be committed by Japan would force the
USA into the Second World War, giving Britain a greater chance of defeating the
Nazis[18].
With the consideration of
the McCollum Memo and Eric Nave’s code breaking, it can be determined that this
topic is widely disputed amongst experts especially as it is a conspiracy
theory with the ability to change the way that America’s entrance into the war could
be seen. The actions that have been claimed against Roosevelt have implications
for people on the wider scale, especially when referring to the Navy seals
after the attack. It becomes apparent that the events after Pearl Harbour were
very similar to occurrences in the world today, especially in respect to the
intelligence agencies who look for scapegoats in order to improve a situation,
where possible inside knowledge would lead to drastic consequences[19]. While the evidence from Betrayal at Pearl Harbor would lead to
one assuming that Churchill had prior knowledge of the attack, James Rusbridge
received his information from an elderly man writing over 50 years after the
events occurred. Although the book is a fascinating read, it appears to be
following William Stevenson’s style in A
Man Called Interpid, where the reader appears to be delving into an
imaginative story rather than a factual historical account[20]. The basis that this
conspiracy theory has been written on simply appears to be, as most conspiracy
theories do, filling in an area of history where there is a blank, and then
finds loose bits of ‘evidence’ that are able to make the story make sense. This
would lead one to be more inclined to believe that FDR or even Winston
Churchill did not know about the Pearl Harbour attacks in advance. Even the
McCollum Memo lacks significant evidence to support that it was ever shown to
the President and was anything more than a report by Arthur McCollum, with
little significance other than tying together the strings of a conspiracy
theory.
In conclusion, it can be
seen that there have been several attempts made to support the theory that
Franklin D. Roosevelt knew of the Pearl Harbour attacks before it happened in
order to join the war in Europe, but with little to no citations stated in the
bibliographies other that the McCollum Memo, one would have to opt in favour of
the real story due to the scarcity of sources on the topic being available.
Although there are a few books that have been written on the conspiracy theory,
they all seem to have three things in common; the McCollum Memo, a heroic story
of one man’s incredible discovery of the Japanese intentions, and a lack of
sources to back up the claims of the writers. This would all point towards the
decision that FDR did not have prior knowledge of the Pearl Harbour attack in
December 1941.
Reflection
I knew that the only way to attempt to find reasons to
support this conspiracy theory would be if I started from the beginning, where
it all came from. The McCollum Memo was the document that Robert Stinnett and
other writers on this topic based their theory more or less completely on and I
knew that I had to research it in order to yield valuable results. The so
called ‘historians’ on this topic based their investigation around the McCollum
Memo and used loose bits of evidence of heroic stories in order to make their
point heard.
The issue that I faced with the memo was that although it
was an official US government document that assessed different ways of goading
Japan into an attack, it lacked evidence to prove that FDR had even seen it.
Other limitations were that a few of the books claimed that they had too many
citations to put them in, making me question the broad range of claims and
accusations that had been made without evidence to support it. Not only were there
limited sources on this topic, but the heroic accounts of Eric Nave appeared to
be rather fictional and over exaggerated in order to make the story fit with
real hard facts. All of these issues limited the effectiveness of this
investigation in finding a result to back the conspiracy theory because there
simply is not enough information on the topic, and the evidence that is
available lacks credibility or citations.
Writing in Germany, one has to feel that a historian writing
on this conspiracy theory would have certain limitations. Especially with
holocaust denial being such a taboo subject, how can other conspiracy theories,
especially one with the importance of this one, be written about without facing
certain ethical dilemmas depending on the country that it is being written in.
This investigation required me to rely on history and
emotion, as to understand the historical accounts, one has to feel the emotion
that the source is presenting and even though there is significant hyperbole in
the writing, one has to overlook it to grasp what was really intended and use
it as accurately as possible.
Overall, this investigation gave me a great opportunity to
find out more on the subject that I have been so interested in discovering. I
was able to use investigative skills to find evidence to support and counter
the research question and ultimately I have discovered enough evidence to show
that Roosevelt did not know about the Pearl Harbour attack before it happened.
Bibliography
Barnes, Harry
Elmer. Perpetual war for perpetual peace: a critical examination of the foreign
policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and its aftermath. Torrance, CA: Institute
for Historical Review, 1982. Print.
Donovan, Peter. Code breaking in
the pacific. S.l., Springer International PU, 2016. Print.
Goodwin, Doris
Kearns. No ordinary time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: the home front in
World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013. Print.
Layton, Edwin T. "And I was
there". New York, William Morrow and Company, 1986. Print.
McCollum, A. McCollum
Memo. Franklin D. Roosevelt, DC. 7 October 1940.
Stinnett,
Robert B. Day of deceit: the truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York, NY:
Touchstone, 2004. Print.
PFENNIGWERTH, IAN. MAN OF
INTELLIGENCE: the life of captain eric nave, code breaker extraordinary. S.l.,
READHOWYOUWANT COM LTD, 2012. Print.
Rusbridger,
James, and Eric Nave. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: how Churchill lured Roosevelt
into World War II. London: Michael O'Mara, 1991. Print.
Schneider, Carl J., and Dorothy
Schneider. World War II. New York, Facts On File, 2003. Print.
Smith, Michael. The emperors
codes: the thrilling story of the allied code breakers who turned the tide of
World War II. New York, Arcade Pub., 2011. Print.
Stevenson, William. “A man called
Intrepid: the incredible WWII narrative of the hero whose spy network and
secret diplomacy changed the course of history”. Guilford, CT, Lyons Press,
2000. Print
Stinnett, Robert B. Day of deceit: the
truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York, NY: Touchstone, 2004. Print.
The burning
and damaged ships at Pearl Harbor. 1941. Historylink101.
[1] The burning and damaged ships at Pearl
Harbor. 1941. Historylink101.
[2] McCollum,
A.
[3]
Stinnett,
Robert B.
[4]
Goodwin,
Doris Kearns. P290
[5]
McCollum,
A.
[6]
Barnes,
Harry Elmer.
[7]
Barnes,
Harry Elmer.
[8]
Stinnett,
Robert B. P9
[9]
Stinnett,
Robert B. P9
[10] McCollum,
A.
[11] Rusbridger,
James, and Eric Nave. P227
[12] Rusbridger,
James, and Eric Nave. P166
[13] Rusbridger,
James, and Eric Nave. P151
[14] Rasor,
Eugene L. P146
[15]Pfennigwerth,
Ian. P277
[16] Smith,
Michael.
[17] Donovan,
Peter. P37
[18] Schneider,
Carl J., and Dorothy Schneider. P183
[OLD EXAMPLE USING PREVIOUS C19]
Layton,
Edwin T. P268
[20]
William,
Stevenon.
Old example using previous criteria
Did Roosevelt Have Advance Warning of Pearl Harbour?
Did Roosevelt Have Advance Warning of Pearl Harbour?
Plan of Investigation
This investigation seeks to address the extent to which President Roosevelt and his commanding authorities had foreknowledge of the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbour, specifically in terms of advance warning and code breaking. If the cover-up was to be true, FDR would be directly responsible for 2403 deaths, 1178 wounded, 18ships and 350 planes[1] damaged by the war. Two of the main sources used in the essay which both represents the main school of thought, Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour by Robert Stinnett and At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour by Gordon W. Prange are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, value and limitations.
B. Summary of Evidence
Chronology of events before the attack
1904- The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in
undeclared war.[i]
October 7 1940 –McCollum proposes the 8 point memo to President Roosevelt[ii]
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war.[2][iii]
June 14 1941 – FDR learns about Germany’s plans for attacking the Soviet Union by means of a Purple intercept[iv]
November 5 1914 – Emperor Hirohito in an Imperial conference decided on war and Japan’s military was given the go-ahead for the conquest of Southeast Asia.[v]
December 6 1941 –- FDR makes a final appeal to the Emperor of Japan for peace. [vi]
Chronology of events during the attack on December, 7th 1941
Sunday, December 7 - Washington D.C. - The last part of the Japanese message, stating that diplomatic relations with the U.S. are to be broken off, reaches Washington in the morning and is decoded at approximately 9 a.m. About an hour later, another Japanese message is intercepted. It instructs the Japanese embassy to deliver the main message to the Americans at 1 p.m. The Americans realize this time corresponds with early morning time in Pearl Harbour, which is several hours behind. The U.S. War Department then sends out an alert but uses a commercial telegraph because radio contact with Hawaii is temporarily broken. Delays prevent the alert from arriving at headquarters in Oahu until noontime (Hawaii Time) four hours after the attack has already begun.
Sunday, December 7 - Islands of Hawaii, near Oahu - The Japanese attack force under the command of Admiral Nagumo, consisting of six carriers with 423 planes, is about to attack. At 6 a.m., the first attack wave of 183 Japanese planes takes off from the carriers located 230 miles north of Oahu and heads for the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour.
Pearl Harbour - At 7:02 a.m., two Army operators at Oahu's northern shore radar station detect the Japanese air attack approaching and contact a junior officer who disregards their reports, thinking they are American B-17 planes which are expected in from the U.S. west coast.
Near Oahu - At 7:15 a.m., a second attack wave of 167 planes takes off from the Japanese carriers and heads for Pearl Harbour.
At 7:53 a.m., the first Japanese assault wave, with 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo bombers, 50 high level bombers and 43 'Zero' fighters, commences the attack with flight commander, Mitsuo Fuchida.
Chronology of events after the attach
Monday, December 8 - The United States and Britain declare war on Japan with President Roosevelt calling December 7 “a date which will live in infamy.”
Thursday, December 11 - Germany and Italy declare war on the United States. The European and Southeast Asian wars have now become a global conflict with the Axis powers; Japan, Germany and Italy, united against America, Britain, France, and their Allies.
Wednesday, December 17 - Admiral Chester W. Nimitz becomes the new commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Both senior commanders at Pearl Harbour, Navy Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, were relieved of their duties following the attack. Subsequent investigations will fault the men for failing to adopt adequate defence measures.
C. Evaluation of Sources
Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett, a WWII naval veteran who served under Lt. George Bush, was the first revisionist to claim that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor through decrypted Japanese naval messages. While Robert Stinnett himself claims his primary purpose as “to learn about the intercept procedures”[3] of the requested sources and to “disclose a story hidden from the public” which “should be told to the American people”[4], Library Journals claims it a book which “contemporary and classic Roosevelt haters would cherish”. The book’s value lies in the fact of Stinnett’s 20 years of archival research through the Freedom of Information Act and interviews with surviving U.S. Navy cryptographers. Earning a 70 percent public approval rating, Day of Deceit continues among the top 10 best-sellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbour book category, according to Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com[5]. Immediately after its appearance in bookstores in 1999, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices triggered the removal of Pearl Harbour documents from public inspection. Nevertheless, as the New York Times states the book will probably “elicit sceptical responses from other historians”[6]. According to Robert Bernstein, Stinnett as a journalist who plays amateur historian with the fact that most participants of the war are dead and cannot defend themselves[7], may take a “dogged and sometimes compelling” attitude when substantiating his conclusion. Moreover, the book failed to take account of less drastic possible analysis for the data it has covered and to some extent may reflect contemporary anti-government sentiment.
Whereas Day of Deceit was claimed to be “skeptical”, At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour is the first and most important volume, covering nearly the entire 12-month period leading up to the "day of infamy" that marked America's entry into World War II. It provides insights into both Japanese and American mindsets while attacking revisionists' views that Japan's attack succeeded because President Franklin D. Roosevelt withheld critical information from Army and navy commanders in Hawaii. Value of this book can be seen, as Prange was a military historian on MacArthur's staff who researched for military and government documents of both sides that participated in the war and interviewed key people involving Pearl Harbour for 37 years prior to his death. He never finished this book, leaving his collaborators Goldstein and Dillon to finish the book, so this is a composite production. The author is fair and presents the facts in a manner that allows the reader to draw his or her own conclusions. However, while the greatest strength of this book is the extensive Japanese information and interviews, those who had the greatest knowledge were almost all killed during the war or in the war crimes trials shortly thereafter. As well, the book lacks essential information, some of which only become available recently, with other material still locked up. Much was destroyed or disappeared at the orders of the accusers of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, the scapegoats. Therefore, some claimed that it should no longer be considered "definitive" or "authoritative."
D. Analysis
For nearly 60 years it had been bruited about, and for nearly 60 years unproved[8]. Revisionist historians have long argued that Roosevelt, by withholding critical information from commanders in the field, wanted, as Stinnett puts it, to ''ensure an uncontested overt Japanese act of war.''[9] Given that 2,273 American soldiers and sailors died at Pearl Harbour[10], this conclusion, if proven to be correct, would require some drastic rethinking about Roosevelt and the American entry into the war.
Historians of World War II generally agree that Roosevelt believed war with Japan was inevitable and that he wanted Japan to fire the first shot[11]. Yet, revisionist historians tend to demonstrate that to ensure that the first shot would have a traumatic effect, Roosevelt intentionally left Americans defenceless.
Stinnett’s view in the book focusses on three main points:
1. McCollum Memo
One of the the centrepieces of Stinnett’s argument is an October 7, 1940 memorandum by Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, which details eight actions which might have the effect of provoking Japan into attacking the United States. The memo was only classified until 1994. Sections 9 and 10 of the memo are cited as the "Smoking Gun", a line was written that “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.” A primary thesis of Stinnett’s book suggests that the memorandum was central to the high level conspiracy to lure the Japanese into an attack and that it actually reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the highest levels of US Navy command.
However, orthodox historians claim that such misinterpretation exaggerated the impact of McCollum's memo and assuming Germany was bound to declare war on the United States once Japan did. The memo suggests that only a direct attack on U.S. interests would sway the American public or Congress to favour direct involvement in the European war, specifically in support of the British. An attack by Japan would not, could not, do that as history has proved. Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US, a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" as a meaning of OP-20-G in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WW2. Furthermore, according to Stinnett, among the eight actions offered in the, only one was ever implemented in any fashion, and there is considerable doubt the memo was the inspiration. Nonetheless, as shown in Day of Deceit, Stinnett claims all action items were implemented. Lastly, although the memo was passed to Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, two of Roosevelt's military advisors, on October 7, 1940, there is no evidence available to suggest Roosevelt ever saw it, nor any he did not.
2. Diplomatic Codes
“The most explosive controversy involving America’s foreknowledge of Japan’s attack on pearl harbor,” Robert Stinnett has written, “involved the Kaigun Ango [Navy code], a complex matrix of twenty-nine separate codes.”[12] To assemble and dispatch the first Air Fleet to Hawaii by radio, the Japanese Navy used four of these separate codes. By the fall of 1914, U.S. cartographers had solved them all.[13] A sixty-year cover-up has hidden American and Allied success in obtaining the solutions of the Kaigun Ango prior to Pearl Harbor.[14] “Naval intelligence records, deceptively altered, were places in the US Navy’s cryptology files to hide the cryptographic success.”[15] Moreover, the last intercept of a message from Yamaoto to the First Air Fleet was on December 2. It read:” Climb niitakyama[16] 1280, repeat 1280.” According to historian James Rusbridger, “(i)t hardly needed a code breaking genius to deduce that this was the date of the opening attack.”[17] This was the only radio message giving the date of the attack; previously, it had been mentioned only as Y-Day in the operational orders given to the First Air Fleet in Hitokappu Bay before it got underway.
Though significant, for Budiansky this was also one of the “most disturbing and irrational” argument by confusing intercepts, codes, and decryptions. As well assured by Wedemeyer, Stinnett used the subterfuge of referring the two completely different versions of the Japanese main administrative naval code as only one "5-Num" code. Thus, he imputed the U. S. Navy's initial success with the earlier and simpler one-part code and cipher, JN-25A (AN), which was implemented on 1 June 1939, to the much more complicated two-part code and cipher combination with a much larger dictionary of about 50,000 code values (by use of auxiliary tables) and a larger cipher additive book of JN-25B (AN-1) in effect at the time of Pearl Harbour[18], whereas the fact that JN-25B (AN-1) replaced JN-25A (AN) on 1 December 1940 was skimmed over.
E. Conclusion
It is difficult, after reading a whole bevy of suspicions and allegations thrown out by the revisionists, not to wonder at the "possibility" that U. S. had decrypted a substantial number of key JN-25B messages which gave a questionable forewarning of the planned attack on Pearl Harbour and that such "foreknowledge" was intentionally withheld to incite US into war.
However, the failure to take into account other, less drastic possible analyses and interpretations outweighed the assumption. Though interesting, the conspiracy theory shows a strong dose of scepticism.
Within the few decades, the holocaust denial, the 9/11 truth and the John F. Kennedy assassination have been dredged up. Pearl Harbour provides a less urgent lesson. The disaster there needs to be remembered, not for anything about Japanese treachery or U.S blunders. Its main lessons are about sacrifice, deception and political considerations as common features of military planning.
The sense of duty and regard for human life of President Roosevelt and his chief advisers should be understood. After all, so wrote the immutable warrior Winston Churchill: “No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States in war on our side was to be the greatest joy…”[19]
F. List of Sources
Books
Carew, Michael G. The Power to Persuade: FDR, the Newsmagazines, and Going to War, 1931-1941. Unites States of America: University Press of America, 2005
Garrarty, John A. A Short History of the American Nation. Addison Wesley Educational Publisher Inc, 1987 Heardon, Patrick J. Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II. Northern Illinois University Press 1987 Jenkins, Roy. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New York: Pan books, 2003 Odo，Franklin. No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II. Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2004 Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbour. USA: Penguin, 1982 Ross, Stewart Halsely. How Roosevelt failed America in World War II. Mcfarland & Company: United States, 2006 Stinnett Robert. Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour. Free Press 2000 Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. New York: Berkley, 1986 The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970 Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. United States of America: Potomac Books, 2007 Wood, Edward W. Worshipping the Myths of World War II: Reflections on America’s declaration to war. Potomac books: Washington D.C, 2006 Yardley, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber. USA: Aegean Park Press, 1989
[1] Daniel J. McINERNEY. A Traveler’s History of the USA.2001.New York Interlink Books [2] (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424 [3] Douglas Cirignano (March 11, 2002). Interview with Robert B. Stinnett - Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? [4] Stinnett, 412 [5] Stinnett (December 7, 2003). The Pearl Harbor Deception Independent Institute [6] Richard Bernstein (December 15, 1999). Books of the Times: On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew? New York Times. [7] Philip H. Jacobsen: A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of Day of Deceit [8] [9] Stinnett, 23 [10] Ross 75 [11] Wood, 134 [12] Stinnett, 30 [13] Ross, 68 [14] Stinnett, 69 [15] Stinnett, 71 [16] Niitakyama is a 130,000 –foot peak in formosa, the highest mountain in what was then part of Japan. Scaling it was considered a siginificant mountaineering feat. Inthis instance it was final confirmation that the First Air flett should attack pearl Harbour. [17] Rusbridger, 125 [18] Stinnett, 22-3, 47-52, 71-82, 204, 231 [19] Toland, The Rising Sun, 146
[i] The Battle of Port Arthur starting the Russo-Japanese War began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers on the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, Manchuria, and continued with an engagement of major surface combatants the following morning. This case was similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
[ii] As the Head of the Far East desk of Office of Naval Intelligence, Lt. Commander Arthur H. proposed a secret U.S foreign policy initiative that called for goading Japan into an overt act of war against an isolationist United States.
[iii] Navy Chief Stark objected by claiming that "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested [more forces to Manila] and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6."
[iv] Japan’s preparation for war took an ominous turn in July 1941. That was the month Roosevelt put into place the last of McCollum’s action items, Action H- a strangling embargo that was intended to provoke strong counterstrokes by Japan. Intercepts of Purple code transmissions throughout the summer revealed Japan’s reaction to FDR’s tightening of the economic screws: 500,000 Japanese citizens were inducted into the armed services; Japanese merchant ships from all over the world were recalled to home water; and Japanese warships and air squadrons were withdrawn from china. War clouds were gathering
[v] Specifically, Admiral Yamamoto was charged with smashing the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
[vi] There is no reply. Late this same day, the U.S. code-breaking service begins intercepting a 14-part Japanese message and deciphers the first 13 parts, passing them on to the President and Secretary of State.
Old example using previous criteria
Did Roosevelt Have Advance Warning of Pearl Harbour?
This investigation seeks to address the extent to which President Roosevelt and his commanding authorities had foreknowledge of the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbour, specifically in terms of advance warning and code breaking. If the cover-up was to be true, FDR would be directly responsible for 2403 deaths, 1178 wounded, 18ships and 350 planes[1] damaged by the war. Two of the main sources used in the essay which both represents the main school of thought, Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour by Robert Stinnett and At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour by Gordon W. Prange are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, value and limitations.
B. Summary of Evidence
Chronology of events before the attack
1904- The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in
undeclared war.[i]
October 7 1940 –McCollum proposes the 8 point memo to President Roosevelt[ii]
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war.[2][iii]
June 14 1941 – FDR learns about Germany’s plans for attacking the Soviet Union by means of a Purple intercept[iv]
November 5 1914 – Emperor Hirohito in an Imperial conference decided on war and Japan’s military was given the go-ahead for the conquest of Southeast Asia.[v]
December 6 1941 –- FDR makes a final appeal to the Emperor of Japan for peace. [vi]
Chronology of events during the attack on December, 7th 1941
Sunday, December 7 - Washington D.C. - The last part of the Japanese message, stating that diplomatic relations with the U.S. are to be broken off, reaches Washington in the morning and is decoded at approximately 9 a.m. About an hour later, another Japanese message is intercepted. It instructs the Japanese embassy to deliver the main message to the Americans at 1 p.m. The Americans realize this time corresponds with early morning time in Pearl Harbour, which is several hours behind. The U.S. War Department then sends out an alert but uses a commercial telegraph because radio contact with Hawaii is temporarily broken. Delays prevent the alert from arriving at headquarters in Oahu until noontime (Hawaii Time) four hours after the attack has already begun.
Sunday, December 7 - Islands of Hawaii, near Oahu - The Japanese attack force under the command of Admiral Nagumo, consisting of six carriers with 423 planes, is about to attack. At 6 a.m., the first attack wave of 183 Japanese planes takes off from the carriers located 230 miles north of Oahu and heads for the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour.
Pearl Harbour - At 7:02 a.m., two Army operators at Oahu's northern shore radar station detect the Japanese air attack approaching and contact a junior officer who disregards their reports, thinking they are American B-17 planes which are expected in from the U.S. west coast.
Near Oahu - At 7:15 a.m., a second attack wave of 167 planes takes off from the Japanese carriers and heads for Pearl Harbour.
At 7:53 a.m., the first Japanese assault wave, with 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo bombers, 50 high level bombers and 43 'Zero' fighters, commences the attack with flight commander, Mitsuo Fuchida.
Chronology of events after the attach
Monday, December 8 - The United States and Britain declare war on Japan with President Roosevelt calling December 7 “a date which will live in infamy.”
Thursday, December 11 - Germany and Italy declare war on the United States. The European and Southeast Asian wars have now become a global conflict with the Axis powers; Japan, Germany and Italy, united against America, Britain, France, and their Allies.
Wednesday, December 17 - Admiral Chester W. Nimitz becomes the new commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Both senior commanders at Pearl Harbour, Navy Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, were relieved of their duties following the attack. Subsequent investigations will fault the men for failing to adopt adequate defence measures.
C. Evaluation of Sources
Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett, a WWII naval veteran who served under Lt. George Bush, was the first revisionist to claim that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor through decrypted Japanese naval messages. While Robert Stinnett himself claims his primary purpose as “to learn about the intercept procedures”[3] of the requested sources and to “disclose a story hidden from the public” which “should be told to the American people”[4], Library Journals claims it a book which “contemporary and classic Roosevelt haters would cherish”. The book’s value lies in the fact of Stinnett’s 20 years of archival research through the Freedom of Information Act and interviews with surviving U.S. Navy cryptographers. Earning a 70 percent public approval rating, Day of Deceit continues among the top 10 best-sellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbour book category, according to Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com[5]. Immediately after its appearance in bookstores in 1999, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices triggered the removal of Pearl Harbour documents from public inspection. Nevertheless, as the New York Times states the book will probably “elicit sceptical responses from other historians”[6]. According to Robert Bernstein, Stinnett as a journalist who plays amateur historian with the fact that most participants of the war are dead and cannot defend themselves[7], may take a “dogged and sometimes compelling” attitude when substantiating his conclusion. Moreover, the book failed to take account of less drastic possible analysis for the data it has covered and to some extent may reflect contemporary anti-government sentiment.
Whereas Day of Deceit was claimed to be “skeptical”, At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour is the first and most important volume, covering nearly the entire 12-month period leading up to the "day of infamy" that marked America's entry into World War II. It provides insights into both Japanese and American mindsets while attacking revisionists' views that Japan's attack succeeded because President Franklin D. Roosevelt withheld critical information from Army and navy commanders in Hawaii. Value of this book can be seen, as Prange was a military historian on MacArthur's staff who researched for military and government documents of both sides that participated in the war and interviewed key people involving Pearl Harbour for 37 years prior to his death. He never finished this book, leaving his collaborators Goldstein and Dillon to finish the book, so this is a composite production. The author is fair and presents the facts in a manner that allows the reader to draw his or her own conclusions. However, while the greatest strength of this book is the extensive Japanese information and interviews, those who had the greatest knowledge were almost all killed during the war or in the war crimes trials shortly thereafter. As well, the book lacks essential information, some of which only become available recently, with other material still locked up. Much was destroyed or disappeared at the orders of the accusers of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, the scapegoats. Therefore, some claimed that it should no longer be considered "definitive" or "authoritative."
D. Analysis
For nearly 60 years it had been bruited about, and for nearly 60 years unproved[8]. Revisionist historians have long argued that Roosevelt, by withholding critical information from commanders in the field, wanted, as Stinnett puts it, to ''ensure an uncontested overt Japanese act of war.''[9] Given that 2,273 American soldiers and sailors died at Pearl Harbour[10], this conclusion, if proven to be correct, would require some drastic rethinking about Roosevelt and the American entry into the war.
Historians of World War II generally agree that Roosevelt believed war with Japan was inevitable and that he wanted Japan to fire the first shot[11]. Yet, revisionist historians tend to demonstrate that to ensure that the first shot would have a traumatic effect, Roosevelt intentionally left Americans defenceless.
Stinnett’s view in the book focusses on three main points:
1. McCollum Memo
One of the the centrepieces of Stinnett’s argument is an October 7, 1940 memorandum by Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, which details eight actions which might have the effect of provoking Japan into attacking the United States. The memo was only classified until 1994. Sections 9 and 10 of the memo are cited as the "Smoking Gun", a line was written that “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.” A primary thesis of Stinnett’s book suggests that the memorandum was central to the high level conspiracy to lure the Japanese into an attack and that it actually reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the highest levels of US Navy command.
However, orthodox historians claim that such misinterpretation exaggerated the impact of McCollum's memo and assuming Germany was bound to declare war on the United States once Japan did. The memo suggests that only a direct attack on U.S. interests would sway the American public or Congress to favour direct involvement in the European war, specifically in support of the British. An attack by Japan would not, could not, do that as history has proved. Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US, a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" as a meaning of OP-20-G in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WW2. Furthermore, according to Stinnett, among the eight actions offered in the, only one was ever implemented in any fashion, and there is considerable doubt the memo was the inspiration. Nonetheless, as shown in Day of Deceit, Stinnett claims all action items were implemented. Lastly, although the memo was passed to Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, two of Roosevelt's military advisors, on October 7, 1940, there is no evidence available to suggest Roosevelt ever saw it, nor any he did not.
2. Diplomatic Codes
“The most explosive controversy involving America’s foreknowledge of Japan’s attack on pearl harbor,” Robert Stinnett has written, “involved the Kaigun Ango [Navy code], a complex matrix of twenty-nine separate codes.”[12] To assemble and dispatch the first Air Fleet to Hawaii by radio, the Japanese Navy used four of these separate codes. By the fall of 1914, U.S. cartographers had solved them all.[13] A sixty-year cover-up has hidden American and Allied success in obtaining the solutions of the Kaigun Ango prior to Pearl Harbor.[14] “Naval intelligence records, deceptively altered, were places in the US Navy’s cryptology files to hide the cryptographic success.”[15] Moreover, the last intercept of a message from Yamaoto to the First Air Fleet was on December 2. It read:” Climb niitakyama[16] 1280, repeat 1280.” According to historian James Rusbridger, “(i)t hardly needed a code breaking genius to deduce that this was the date of the opening attack.”[17] This was the only radio message giving the date of the attack; previously, it had been mentioned only as Y-Day in the operational orders given to the First Air Fleet in Hitokappu Bay before it got underway.
Though significant, for Budiansky this was also one of the “most disturbing and irrational” argument by confusing intercepts, codes, and decryptions. As well assured by Wedemeyer, Stinnett used the subterfuge of referring the two completely different versions of the Japanese main administrative naval code as only one "5-Num" code. Thus, he imputed the U. S. Navy's initial success with the earlier and simpler one-part code and cipher, JN-25A (AN), which was implemented on 1 June 1939, to the much more complicated two-part code and cipher combination with a much larger dictionary of about 50,000 code values (by use of auxiliary tables) and a larger cipher additive book of JN-25B (AN-1) in effect at the time of Pearl Harbour[18], whereas the fact that JN-25B (AN-1) replaced JN-25A (AN) on 1 December 1940 was skimmed over.
E. Conclusion
It is difficult, after reading a whole bevy of suspicions and allegations thrown out by the revisionists, not to wonder at the "possibility" that U. S. had decrypted a substantial number of key JN-25B messages which gave a questionable forewarning of the planned attack on Pearl Harbour and that such "foreknowledge" was intentionally withheld to incite US into war.
However, the failure to take into account other, less drastic possible analyses and interpretations outweighed the assumption. Though interesting, the conspiracy theory shows a strong dose of scepticism.
Within the few decades, the holocaust denial, the 9/11 truth and the John F. Kennedy assassination have been dredged up. Pearl Harbour provides a less urgent lesson. The disaster there needs to be remembered, not for anything about Japanese treachery or U.S blunders. Its main lessons are about sacrifice, deception and political considerations as common features of military planning.
The sense of duty and regard for human life of President Roosevelt and his chief advisers should be understood. After all, so wrote the immutable warrior Winston Churchill: “No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States in war on our side was to be the greatest joy…”[19]
F. List of Sources
Books
Carew, Michael G. The Power to Persuade: FDR, the Newsmagazines, and Going to War, 1931-1941. Unites States of America: University Press of America, 2005
Garrarty, John A. A Short History of the American Nation. Addison Wesley Educational Publisher Inc, 1987 Heardon, Patrick J. Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II. Northern Illinois University Press 1987 Jenkins, Roy. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New York: Pan books, 2003 Odo，Franklin. No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II. Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2004 Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbour. USA: Penguin, 1982 Ross, Stewart Halsely. How Roosevelt failed America in World War II. Mcfarland & Company: United States, 2006 Stinnett Robert. Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour. Free Press 2000 Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. New York: Berkley, 1986 The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970 Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. United States of America: Potomac Books, 2007 Wood, Edward W. Worshipping the Myths of World War II: Reflections on America’s declaration to war. Potomac books: Washington D.C, 2006 Yardley, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber. USA: Aegean Park Press, 1989
[1] Daniel J. McINERNEY. A Traveler’s History of the USA.2001.New York Interlink Books [2] (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424 [3] Douglas Cirignano (March 11, 2002). Interview with Robert B. Stinnett - Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? [4] Stinnett, 412 [5] Stinnett (December 7, 2003). The Pearl Harbor Deception Independent Institute [6] Richard Bernstein (December 15, 1999). Books of the Times: On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew? New York Times. [7] Philip H. Jacobsen: A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of Day of Deceit [8] [9] Stinnett, 23 [10] Ross 75 [11] Wood, 134 [12] Stinnett, 30 [13] Ross, 68 [14] Stinnett, 69 [15] Stinnett, 71 [16] Niitakyama is a 130,000 –foot peak in formosa, the highest mountain in what was then part of Japan. Scaling it was considered a siginificant mountaineering feat. Inthis instance it was final confirmation that the First Air flett should attack pearl Harbour. [17] Rusbridger, 125 [18] Stinnett, 22-3, 47-52, 71-82, 204, 231 [19] Toland, The Rising Sun, 146
[i] The Battle of Port Arthur starting the Russo-Japanese War began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers on the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, Manchuria, and continued with an engagement of major surface combatants the following morning. This case was similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
[ii] As the Head of the Far East desk of Office of Naval Intelligence, Lt. Commander Arthur H. proposed a secret U.S foreign policy initiative that called for goading Japan into an overt act of war against an isolationist United States.
[iii] Navy Chief Stark objected by claiming that "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested [more forces to Manila] and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6."
[iv] Japan’s preparation for war took an ominous turn in July 1941. That was the month Roosevelt put into place the last of McCollum’s action items, Action H- a strangling embargo that was intended to provoke strong counterstrokes by Japan. Intercepts of Purple code transmissions throughout the summer revealed Japan’s reaction to FDR’s tightening of the economic screws: 500,000 Japanese citizens were inducted into the armed services; Japanese merchant ships from all over the world were recalled to home water; and Japanese warships and air squadrons were withdrawn from china. War clouds were gathering
[v] Specifically, Admiral Yamamoto was charged with smashing the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
[vi] There is no reply. Late this same day, the U.S. code-breaking service begins intercepting a 14-part Japanese message and deciphers the first 13 parts, passing them on to the President and Secretary of State.
EXTENDED ESSAY
Candidate Number: gpz103
Did Roosevelt have prior knowledge into the attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941?
An exploration into the Pearl Harbor Conspiracy
September 11th, 2001 was a dark day in American history. The country came together in mourning after almost 3000 lives were lost on American soil due to foreign terrorists. And yet, already today we see publications of plausible conspiracy theories and even a British politician (Michael Meacher) calling for independent investigations into the Bush-Cheney administration of the time.1 We revise and revisit the catastrophe, and in some cases, blame our leaders. Pearl Harbor was the American Greatest Generation’s September 11th--a great catastrophe with thousands of lives lost, and an enemy made.2 The country unified with the intent of defeating fascism in Asia, more specifically, the aggressive expansionist Hirohito and his militaristic Japanese empire. In the 1990s, the motives behind this seemingly inevitable catastrophe were revised and were more critical of Roosevelt and his administration, with some theories even going as far as to say that Roosevelt had planned the attack.3 The pioneer of these theories, Robert Stinnett, wrote the controversial revisionist book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor in which he implicates then president Roosevelt for both directly and indirectly contributing to such a massive loss of life. Stinnett argues three main factors implicate the Roosevelt administration: The American hacking of Japanese diplomatic codes, Roosevelt’s “back door to war” and Stinnett’s smoking gun: the infamous McCollum Memo. This essay will examine these factors with the intent of determining whether Roosevelt had prior knowledge into the December 7th attacks.
Diplomatic Codes
Stinnett argues that by obtaining documents through the Freedom of Information Act, he was able to draw the conclusion that Roosevelt knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor and chose to do nothing about it due to the Americans intercepting audio from the Japanese where the idea of attacking Pearl Harbor was discussed.4 The contents of these messages were inflammatory as if they were indeed heard by anyone in the US military or administration, the attack could have been prevented two weeks before it occurred (November 25th, 1940). The message, if intercepted, would prove quite damming to the case that Roosevelt knew “...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow...”5. Stinnett argues that the existence of this intelligence alone implicates Roosevelt. Furthermore, Roosevelt met with founder of Offices of Strategic Services William Donovan on the evening of December 7th1941 to discuss possible next steps. Donovan recalls the President seeming less interested in the attack itself but rather how the public would view Roosevelt’s declaration of war.6 This not only paints Roosevelt in a negative light and displays his limited regard for the lives of his soldiers, but also carries the cold and calculating message that Roosevelt didn’t appear to care because he knew the attack would occur.
With reference to the codes, the New York Times review credits Stinnett for having gathered valid evidence suggesting that America did intercept the Japanese codes, though emphasizing that the evidence should be reviewed.7 However, the review heavily criticizes Stinnett for exaggerating the importance the evidence that he does have. Bernstein argues that Stinnett fails to acknowledge the sheer amount of information gathered.8 The mountain of evidence pouring in daily combined with understaffed intelligence agencies prevented the damning intelligence from being interpreted correctly and sent to the president.9 Historian Roberta Wohlstetter comes to a similar conclusion in her revisionist book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. She argues that the navy was gathering so much data and evidence that they could not interpret it properly10. Furthermore, esteemed navy officers Husband Kimmel and Edwin Layton didn’t consider the information to be of importance when they had received it.11 “I didn’t consider that as being of vital importance when I received it”12 testified Kimmel. Stinnett ignores these details of the breaking of the diplomatic codes which would shift blame off of Roosevelt. Additionally, the NSA report on the US Cryptologic history states that after July of 1941, no Japanese naval codes were sent to the US by the decryption software MAGIC, the program used to decode the majority of Japanese messages at the time.13
Finally, Stephen Budiansky argues Stinnett’s evidence for the breaking of diplomatic codes was misguided for 4 main reasons: he presents incomplete, misleading, misquoted and selective evidence. 14
Budiansky explains that though Stinnett has collected valid evidence suggesting that codes were intercepted, he presents nothing relating to the interpreting of those messages, thereby rendering them useless.15
Misleading
Some of the interpretations of codes that Stinnett does present in his work were decrypted in 1945 and 46, 4 years after the US had already declared war on Japan and a year after Roosevelt had passed away.16 This is because intelligence bureaus had attempted to make it seem as though they had decrypted it at the time in order to save face.17
Misquoted
Stinnett emphasizes that some of the damning evidence taken from official naval documents is very misleading. This is due to Stinnett altering quotations in order to fit his story. Budiansky argues that Stinnett specifically identified the wrong ship when referring to codes intercepted, in order to make it look like the ship whose codes they intercepted was one headed for Pearl Harbor, when in reality it was not.18 This would suggest that Stinnett is deceiving the American public and informing them that the US had more knowledge than they actually did. He paints an incomplete picture.
Selective
Finally, Stinnett is criticized for selectively choosing evidence to fit with his argument, rather than acknowledging and analyzing the all of the evidence available to him. According to Budiansky Stinnett selects evidence to make it appear as though the Americans were capable of intercepting vital diplomatic codes before the Pearl Harbor attack, while Budiansky argues that in reality they were not.19
Back Door to War-
This Back Door to War Theory consisted of two main events and policies initiated by then-president Roosevelt, which revisionist historians argue ensured an Allied victory. This was their generous aid to allies and the largest peacetime draft in American history. The first step entailed the US revising their neutrality acts in order to create loopholes for them to help the British and French in the fight against fascism (Aid).20 However, this amendment had the stipulation that the transaction must be made in cash and must take place immediately so as not to provoke the axis powers into threatening the United States. Additionally, the Destroyers For Bases Deal of September 1940, which, though presented as a simple trade agreement, was actually a strategic deal designed to ensure allied victory against the Germans. The second step was the largest ‘peacetime’ draft in American history which came just days following the destroyers for bases agreement. 21
Aid
The everyday citizens of America were becoming anxious about the threat of the looming war, and it was clear that they believed Roosevelt’s administration would instigate one. After all, Roosevelt himself said that while he could sign neutrality into law he could “Not ask that every American remain neutral in the heart as well.”22
While not explicitly declaring war on Japan, Roosevelt’s actions express an integral part of Japan’s “provoked” decision to attack the United States, whether advertently or inadvertently. In 1940 and ‘41, President Roosevelt formalized his aid to the devastated China, and began to tighten his restrictions on Japan through the Lend-Lease bill of March 1941. Under this bill, the United States could provide aid to any nation that was “vital to the defense of the United States.” About 1.6 billion dollars was given to China23 in order to combat Japan. Furthermore, the United States took additional measures in order to hinder the Japanese in their quest for territory. The Japanese embargo which began on July 26th essentially seized all Japanese assets within the United States in an attempt to cripple the Japanese economy.24 This was a response to Japan’s decision to invade the Cam Ranh naval base in the Philippians, a camp where the Americans and British had troops. This embargo crippled Japan as she lost 88% of her imported oil and three quarters of her overseas trade.25 These extreme economic sanctions and straining of Japan were not met without repercussions, which Roosevelt may or may not have anticipated. Instead of backing down, Japan’s foreign minister communicated to the Japanese ambassador just 5 days after the embargo had taken effect that “Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas.”26 This indicates that the Americans knew of Japan’s hostile intentions and their willingness to resort to war five months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, it must be taken into consideration that this knowledge might not have been relayed to the President himself as this was said in the private correspondence between the Japanese ambassador to the United States and Japan’s foreign minister. However, Stinnett argues that American cryptographers uncovered not only this correspondence but many others indicating the location of this coordinated attack. Again, while an American soldier of cryptographer may have heard news of a planned attack on Pearl Harbor, this does not necessarily implicate the president, as he most likely had never heard of these interceptions of confidential information.
On September 2nd, 1940, the administration announced an historic deal with Great Britain (the Destroyers-for-Bases deal).27 This revolutionary deal solidified America’s position as a non-neutral power in the now-global conflict, a loophole.28 The Americans agreed to deliver 50 destroyers to the British navy in exchange for territory in the British colonies. Not only did this bring America into the war, but Hasley-Ross argues in his book How Roosevelt Failed America in WWII that it intimidated the axis powers into forming a stronger bond.29 This is evidenced by the Tripartite Pact signed in Berlin by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Galaezzo Ciano and Sabrō Kurusu just 3 weeks later on September 27th 1940. This was the reason for Hitler declaring war on America after Pearl Harbour, as the Germans and Japanese were now allied under this pact. Halsey-Ross argues that ultimately, in attempting to intimidate the Axis powers, the Americans did nothing but unite the anti-American cause in the Far East and in Europe. 30
Peacetime Draft
The Roosevelt administration announced the largest peacetime draft in American history in September of 1940. It required all men between the ages of 21 and 45 to enlist. The president would argue that these actions only signified a stronger defence in an increasingly hostile world. He defended his actions in a message to a polarised congress on September 3rd 1940 by saying “[u]nder present circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defence that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental.”31 Given the serious threat to the American way of life by overseas fascism at the time, this message had an impact on the American population at the time who believed that Roosevelt was doing the right thing. It is only with hindsight that historians question the incentives behind Roosevelt’s draft. This ‘defensive’ act was invoked in the middle of what Churchill claimed to be Britain’s Darkest Hour.32 Fascist Nazi forces had taken almost all of continental Europe, with the fall of France in June 1940.33 Despite this, Churchill himself argued instead that it was this historic deal which made Americas involvement in World War 2 an inevitability.34 He noted in his August 20th speech titled “The Few” that “Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general one can stop it”35 which further insinuates the inevitability of US involvement in the war. This agrees with Stinnett’s back door to war theory. However, instead of blaming Roosevelt for intentionally starting a war behind the backs of the American public, Churchill interestingly and poetically blames fate for uniting these two ideologically compatible allies against Fascism in Europe.
The McCollum Memo
Stinnett’s smoking gun however, is the McCollum Memo. Though he provides context with his “back door to war”, the proof of Roosevelt’s betrayal lies in the infamous memo from October 1940. General Arthur McCollum, the author of the memo was an American who was born and raised in Japan under the brutal, expansionist Japanese regime. Japanese was his first language.36 He moved to America as a teenager but returned to Tokyo shortly thereafter after graduating from the US Naval Academy.37 Therefore, he would have insight into the Japanese way of life and could possibly understand the ways in which the Japanese might react to certain US sanctions and blockades.38 His memo, written on October 7th, 1940, lists 8 specific ways which McCollum believed that the United States could potentially provoke Japan into starting a war. The memo described the current geopolitical situation across the world; it included information on the state of the US territory in the pacific as well as the ongoing war in Europe. However, 8 lines of the 4-page memo is how Stinnett forms his argument. These are 8 ways in which the McCollum found that the US could go to war without the permission of the American public. McCollum suggested the United States take the following actions:
• “A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
• B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
• C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
• D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or
Singapore.
• E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
• F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity
of the Hawaiian Islands.
• G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue
economic concessions, particularly oil.
• H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a
similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.”39
This memo made Stinnett’s book a hit among the American public, they had never seen it before (it was requested by Stinnett through the freedom of information act)40. As a result, Stinnett carried a substantial amount of power. The McCollum memo is the basis of the Pearl Harbour conspiracy.41 He could manipulate the interpretation of the McCollum memo for generations to come, and the Washington Post argued shortly following the books release (1999) that this was exactly what Stinnett had done42.
“The McCollum memo was the smoking gun of Pearl Harbour”
Stinnett believed this piece of evidence to be a “smoking gun”. He viewed it as hard evidence implicating Roosevelt. The McCollum memo includes a line which says, “If you adopt these policies then Japan will commit an overt act of war”. Critics would argue that it is unclear whether or not Roosevelt ever saw this memo. However, Roosevelt did enact every single policy and suggestion given to him by McCollum. Further damning is the fact that some of these policy changes were enacted through the use of an executive order, which is uncommonly used in emergency circumstances in American politics. Additionally, the memo was then sent to Roosevelt’s top advisors. While it remains unclear whether Roosevelt received the memo, Dudley Knox not only read the memo but agreed with it and sent it to the other advisor, Anderson.43 He wrote to Anderson “I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both”44. With such a strong opinion from his advisors, it is difficult to believe that Roosevelt did not see this message. Furthermore, Stinnett himself suggested in an interview that this was not the first time that McCollum had supposedly had communication with the president.45 Stinnett also claims that Roosevelt himself ordered the hacking of Japanese codes by general McCollum and asked him to brief Roosevelt should any important messages arise.46This would indicate that Roosevelt trusted general McCollum and would be likely to have seen an important document such as the memo addressed directly to him. 47 Stinnett centers his entire argument on the General McCollum. Eugene Jarecki argues that Stinnett bases his arguments around General McCollum’s role in the region as a senior intelligence officer.
Finally, a critical issue with the McCollum memo is its tone. In reading the memo, it becomes clear that the author was fully aware of America’s incapability to implement the policy changes suggested in the memo. In page 4 of the memo McCollum writes (his 9th point) “It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado.”48 This is highly controversial as it perfectly articulates Roosevelt’s back door to war and confirms what people at the time feared and the one thing Roosevelt would never admit: that he had intended to start a war in the Pacific all along. This revelation allows historians to call all of Roosevelt’s policy decisions into question. Furthermore, this point implies the direct intent to deceive the American people. He knew he would not be able to successfully convince the American people to go to war, and instead he decided to provoke Japan into starting a war, in direct contradiction with the American public.
However, as Stinnett himself will admit, there is no evidence that Roosevelt even saw the memo, which would ultimately render it insignificant in terms of implicating the President. Furthermore, Eugene Jarecki argues that though the McCollum memo “demands attention”49, “no single memo by a midlevel functionary should be given too large a role in the shaping of the President’s policy”50. This thereby implies that though the memo might have been intended to provoke a war, and though Roosevelt might have read it, no single memo would have been attributed as great significance as Stinnett implies. No president would have based their entire foreign policy, nor a decision to go to war, on the word of one mid ranking general.51 However, the most scathing criticism of the significance of the McCollum Memo stems from military historian Conrad Crane. He dismisses Stinnett’s theories as nothing more than a conspiracy, and attributes their popularity as Americans being drawn to wild theories.52 “Americans have always been fascinated by conspiracy theories.”53 With regards to the McCollum memo in particular, Crane argues that his interpretation of the memo drastically differs from Stinnett’s. He says “Moreover, the McCollum proposal was designed to prevent war, not provoke it”54. This would agree with Budiansky who argued that Stinnett was manipulating evidence in his book to serve his argument, rather than looking at it objectively. Furthermore, the idea that “he adopted all eight of the provocations”55 was called into question by Crane, who exposed Stinnett by stating that “he [Stinnett] can only link FDR’s actions to only six of the eight items on the list”56. This calls Stinnett’s credibility as an historian into questions and also limits the credibility of his information on the McCollum memo.
To conclude, though Stinnett does provide a sound argument implicating the US president, his methodology and evidence are called into question by many historians. His interpretation of the McCollum memo was groundbreaking, as not only was he responsible for uncovering the memo, his interpretation was widespread and widely believed. Furthermore, the memo itself, combined with Roosevelt’s actions indicate that he at least anticipated a war with Japan. If nothing else, this directly contradicts his promise to the American people that they would remain out of the war. 57 Additionally, according to Stinnett, Roosevelt implemented all of the actions which would draw America into the war. Although there was no evidence that Roosevelt saw the memo, the fact that he implemented every single one of these actions is telling. Furthermore, Jarecki argues that specific language used in the McCollum memo was echoed by Roosevelt on November 27th and 28th 1941, when he said: ‘The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act’.58 The phrasing ‘overt act’ “hauntingly”59 echoes the words of the McCollum memo “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”60 Jarecki sites Stimson, who conducted a statement stating that FDR gave this order, and goes on to insinuate that FDR was “at least superficially familiar with either the specific language of the McCollum memo, or at least its underlying strategy”61. This would indicate that Roosevelt knew of a plan to provoke Japan into starting a war. Furthermore, America was able to intercept Japanese naval codes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. A message intercepted on the 25th of November would prove especially damming argued Stinnett, as it specified an attack on Hawaii.
It is crucial to note that the New York Times regards this book as captivating however lacking the “smoking gun” Stinnett would need in order to be able to prove wrongdoing by the Roosevelt administration.62 Furthermore, less radical explanations for the data that Stinnett collected when writing the book are overlooked in favor of more complicated explanations which fit the narrative.63 The New York Times continues to argue that this book is taking an inflammatory stance on an already controversial topic, simply for the sake of being inflammatory.64
Works Cited:
1. Beard, Charles A. President Roosevelt And The Coming Of The War, 1941: Appearances and Realities. ROUTLEDGE, 2017.
2. Beckstrand, Alex. “Perspective | How 1940 Provides the Way Forward for the United States in a Treacherous World.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 3 Dec. 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/03/how-provides-way- forward-united-states-treacherous-world/.
3. Bernstein, Richard. “'Day of Deceit': On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew?” The New
York Times, 15Dec.1999, archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/99/12/12/daily/121599stinnet t-book-review.html.
4. Budiansky, Stephen. Battle of Wits: the Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. Simon & Schuster, 2002.
5. Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Shubhi Publications, 2015.
61 Beard, pg. 8
62Bernstein, Day of Deceit: on Dec.7th, Did we Know we Knew?, New York Times 63 ibid
64 ibid
6. Cirignano, Douglas. “Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor.” Independent Institute, 11 Mar. 2002, www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=408. Accessed 21 Jan. 2020.
7. Clauson, Henry C. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement: The Shocking True Story of the Military Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor and the Fourteen Men Responsible for the Disaster . Open Road Media, 2015.
8. Crane, Conrad. “Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor.” The Free Library, 2001,
www.thefreelibrary.com/Day+of+Deceit%3A+The+Truth+About+FDR+and+Pear
l+Harbor-a073000559.
9. Dallek, Robert. “Pearl Harbor and the ‘Back Door to War’ Theory.” Encyclopædia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 7 May 2018, www.britannica.com/topic/Pearl-Harbor-and-the-back-door-to-war-theory- 1688287.
10. Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor.” Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, by Robert B. Stinnett, Touchstone, 2004, pp. 302, 1.
11. How Many People Died at Pearl Harbor during the Attack?” Visit Pearl Harbor, 2020, visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during- the-attack/.
12. Hull, Cordell. “Destroyers for Bases Agreement, 2 September 1940.” Received by Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, Naval History and Heritage Command, The Navy Department Library, 2 Sept. 2018, pp. 1–1, www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list- alphabetically/d/destroyers-for-bases-agreement-1941.html.
13. Jarecki, Eugene. The American Way of War: Guided Missiles, Misguided Men, and a Republic in Peril. Free Press, 2010.
14. Library of Congress archive “Session 2 of the 76th Congress” Nov 4th 1939
15. McCormick, Robert. “FDR's War Plans.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 4 Dec. 1941, pp. 1–
16. McNiel. America, Britain and Russia p. 778
17. Morgenstern, George. Pearl Harbor: the Story of the Secret War. Literary Licensing,
2011.
18. Napolitano, Andrew P. Suicide Pact: the Radical Expansion of Presidential Powers
and the Lethal Threat to American Liberty. Nelson Books, an Imprint of Thomas
Nelson, 2014.
19. Office of the Historian. “The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941.” U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf.
20. Parker, Frederick D. “Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications
Intelligence 1924–1941.” United States Cryptologic History, NSA, 2013, www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical- figures-publications/publications/wwii/pearl_harbor_revisited.pdf
21. Perni, Holliston. A Heritage of Hypocrisy. 2005.
22. Prados, John. “Rumors of War.” Washington Post, 2000,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-03/05/047r-030500-idx.html.
23. Rusbridger, James, and Eric Nave. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured
Roosevelt into World War II. Michael O'Mara, 1991.
24. United States, Congress, “Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and the
Peace of the United States and to Secure the Safety of Its Citizens and Their Interests.” Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and the Peace of the United
States and to Secure the Safety of Its Citizens and Their Interests, Library of Congress, 1939, pp. 4–6. 76th Congress, 2nd session, bill, www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/76th-congress/session- 2/c76s2ch2.pdf.
25. War Comes to America .” The Grand Alliance, by Winston Churchill, Easton Press, 1989, pp. 528.
Did Roosevelt have prior knowledge into the attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941?
An exploration into the Pearl Harbor Conspiracy
September 11th, 2001 was a dark day in American history. The country came together in mourning after almost 3000 lives were lost on American soil due to foreign terrorists. And yet, already today we see publications of plausible conspiracy theories and even a British politician (Michael Meacher) calling for independent investigations into the Bush-Cheney administration of the time.1 We revise and revisit the catastrophe, and in some cases, blame our leaders. Pearl Harbor was the American Greatest Generation’s September 11th--a great catastrophe with thousands of lives lost, and an enemy made.2 The country unified with the intent of defeating fascism in Asia, more specifically, the aggressive expansionist Hirohito and his militaristic Japanese empire. In the 1990s, the motives behind this seemingly inevitable catastrophe were revised and were more critical of Roosevelt and his administration, with some theories even going as far as to say that Roosevelt had planned the attack.3 The pioneer of these theories, Robert Stinnett, wrote the controversial revisionist book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor in which he implicates then president Roosevelt for both directly and indirectly contributing to such a massive loss of life. Stinnett argues three main factors implicate the Roosevelt administration: The American hacking of Japanese diplomatic codes, Roosevelt’s “back door to war” and Stinnett’s smoking gun: the infamous McCollum Memo. This essay will examine these factors with the intent of determining whether Roosevelt had prior knowledge into the December 7th attacks.
Diplomatic Codes
Stinnett argues that by obtaining documents through the Freedom of Information Act, he was able to draw the conclusion that Roosevelt knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor and chose to do nothing about it due to the Americans intercepting audio from the Japanese where the idea of attacking Pearl Harbor was discussed.4 The contents of these messages were inflammatory as if they were indeed heard by anyone in the US military or administration, the attack could have been prevented two weeks before it occurred (November 25th, 1940). The message, if intercepted, would prove quite damming to the case that Roosevelt knew “...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow...”5. Stinnett argues that the existence of this intelligence alone implicates Roosevelt. Furthermore, Roosevelt met with founder of Offices of Strategic Services William Donovan on the evening of December 7th1941 to discuss possible next steps. Donovan recalls the President seeming less interested in the attack itself but rather how the public would view Roosevelt’s declaration of war.6 This not only paints Roosevelt in a negative light and displays his limited regard for the lives of his soldiers, but also carries the cold and calculating message that Roosevelt didn’t appear to care because he knew the attack would occur.
With reference to the codes, the New York Times review credits Stinnett for having gathered valid evidence suggesting that America did intercept the Japanese codes, though emphasizing that the evidence should be reviewed.7 However, the review heavily criticizes Stinnett for exaggerating the importance the evidence that he does have. Bernstein argues that Stinnett fails to acknowledge the sheer amount of information gathered.8 The mountain of evidence pouring in daily combined with understaffed intelligence agencies prevented the damning intelligence from being interpreted correctly and sent to the president.9 Historian Roberta Wohlstetter comes to a similar conclusion in her revisionist book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. She argues that the navy was gathering so much data and evidence that they could not interpret it properly10. Furthermore, esteemed navy officers Husband Kimmel and Edwin Layton didn’t consider the information to be of importance when they had received it.11 “I didn’t consider that as being of vital importance when I received it”12 testified Kimmel. Stinnett ignores these details of the breaking of the diplomatic codes which would shift blame off of Roosevelt. Additionally, the NSA report on the US Cryptologic history states that after July of 1941, no Japanese naval codes were sent to the US by the decryption software MAGIC, the program used to decode the majority of Japanese messages at the time.13
Finally, Stephen Budiansky argues Stinnett’s evidence for the breaking of diplomatic codes was misguided for 4 main reasons: he presents incomplete, misleading, misquoted and selective evidence. 14
Budiansky explains that though Stinnett has collected valid evidence suggesting that codes were intercepted, he presents nothing relating to the interpreting of those messages, thereby rendering them useless.15
Misleading
Some of the interpretations of codes that Stinnett does present in his work were decrypted in 1945 and 46, 4 years after the US had already declared war on Japan and a year after Roosevelt had passed away.16 This is because intelligence bureaus had attempted to make it seem as though they had decrypted it at the time in order to save face.17
Misquoted
Stinnett emphasizes that some of the damning evidence taken from official naval documents is very misleading. This is due to Stinnett altering quotations in order to fit his story. Budiansky argues that Stinnett specifically identified the wrong ship when referring to codes intercepted, in order to make it look like the ship whose codes they intercepted was one headed for Pearl Harbor, when in reality it was not.18 This would suggest that Stinnett is deceiving the American public and informing them that the US had more knowledge than they actually did. He paints an incomplete picture.
Selective
Finally, Stinnett is criticized for selectively choosing evidence to fit with his argument, rather than acknowledging and analyzing the all of the evidence available to him. According to Budiansky Stinnett selects evidence to make it appear as though the Americans were capable of intercepting vital diplomatic codes before the Pearl Harbor attack, while Budiansky argues that in reality they were not.19
Back Door to War-
This Back Door to War Theory consisted of two main events and policies initiated by then-president Roosevelt, which revisionist historians argue ensured an Allied victory. This was their generous aid to allies and the largest peacetime draft in American history. The first step entailed the US revising their neutrality acts in order to create loopholes for them to help the British and French in the fight against fascism (Aid).20 However, this amendment had the stipulation that the transaction must be made in cash and must take place immediately so as not to provoke the axis powers into threatening the United States. Additionally, the Destroyers For Bases Deal of September 1940, which, though presented as a simple trade agreement, was actually a strategic deal designed to ensure allied victory against the Germans. The second step was the largest ‘peacetime’ draft in American history which came just days following the destroyers for bases agreement. 21
Aid
The everyday citizens of America were becoming anxious about the threat of the looming war, and it was clear that they believed Roosevelt’s administration would instigate one. After all, Roosevelt himself said that while he could sign neutrality into law he could “Not ask that every American remain neutral in the heart as well.”22
While not explicitly declaring war on Japan, Roosevelt’s actions express an integral part of Japan’s “provoked” decision to attack the United States, whether advertently or inadvertently. In 1940 and ‘41, President Roosevelt formalized his aid to the devastated China, and began to tighten his restrictions on Japan through the Lend-Lease bill of March 1941. Under this bill, the United States could provide aid to any nation that was “vital to the defense of the United States.” About 1.6 billion dollars was given to China23 in order to combat Japan. Furthermore, the United States took additional measures in order to hinder the Japanese in their quest for territory. The Japanese embargo which began on July 26th essentially seized all Japanese assets within the United States in an attempt to cripple the Japanese economy.24 This was a response to Japan’s decision to invade the Cam Ranh naval base in the Philippians, a camp where the Americans and British had troops. This embargo crippled Japan as she lost 88% of her imported oil and three quarters of her overseas trade.25 These extreme economic sanctions and straining of Japan were not met without repercussions, which Roosevelt may or may not have anticipated. Instead of backing down, Japan’s foreign minister communicated to the Japanese ambassador just 5 days after the embargo had taken effect that “Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas.”26 This indicates that the Americans knew of Japan’s hostile intentions and their willingness to resort to war five months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, it must be taken into consideration that this knowledge might not have been relayed to the President himself as this was said in the private correspondence between the Japanese ambassador to the United States and Japan’s foreign minister. However, Stinnett argues that American cryptographers uncovered not only this correspondence but many others indicating the location of this coordinated attack. Again, while an American soldier of cryptographer may have heard news of a planned attack on Pearl Harbor, this does not necessarily implicate the president, as he most likely had never heard of these interceptions of confidential information.
On September 2nd, 1940, the administration announced an historic deal with Great Britain (the Destroyers-for-Bases deal).27 This revolutionary deal solidified America’s position as a non-neutral power in the now-global conflict, a loophole.28 The Americans agreed to deliver 50 destroyers to the British navy in exchange for territory in the British colonies. Not only did this bring America into the war, but Hasley-Ross argues in his book How Roosevelt Failed America in WWII that it intimidated the axis powers into forming a stronger bond.29 This is evidenced by the Tripartite Pact signed in Berlin by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Galaezzo Ciano and Sabrō Kurusu just 3 weeks later on September 27th 1940. This was the reason for Hitler declaring war on America after Pearl Harbour, as the Germans and Japanese were now allied under this pact. Halsey-Ross argues that ultimately, in attempting to intimidate the Axis powers, the Americans did nothing but unite the anti-American cause in the Far East and in Europe. 30
Peacetime Draft
The Roosevelt administration announced the largest peacetime draft in American history in September of 1940. It required all men between the ages of 21 and 45 to enlist. The president would argue that these actions only signified a stronger defence in an increasingly hostile world. He defended his actions in a message to a polarised congress on September 3rd 1940 by saying “[u]nder present circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defence that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental.”31 Given the serious threat to the American way of life by overseas fascism at the time, this message had an impact on the American population at the time who believed that Roosevelt was doing the right thing. It is only with hindsight that historians question the incentives behind Roosevelt’s draft. This ‘defensive’ act was invoked in the middle of what Churchill claimed to be Britain’s Darkest Hour.32 Fascist Nazi forces had taken almost all of continental Europe, with the fall of France in June 1940.33 Despite this, Churchill himself argued instead that it was this historic deal which made Americas involvement in World War 2 an inevitability.34 He noted in his August 20th speech titled “The Few” that “Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general one can stop it”35 which further insinuates the inevitability of US involvement in the war. This agrees with Stinnett’s back door to war theory. However, instead of blaming Roosevelt for intentionally starting a war behind the backs of the American public, Churchill interestingly and poetically blames fate for uniting these two ideologically compatible allies against Fascism in Europe.
The McCollum Memo
Stinnett’s smoking gun however, is the McCollum Memo. Though he provides context with his “back door to war”, the proof of Roosevelt’s betrayal lies in the infamous memo from October 1940. General Arthur McCollum, the author of the memo was an American who was born and raised in Japan under the brutal, expansionist Japanese regime. Japanese was his first language.36 He moved to America as a teenager but returned to Tokyo shortly thereafter after graduating from the US Naval Academy.37 Therefore, he would have insight into the Japanese way of life and could possibly understand the ways in which the Japanese might react to certain US sanctions and blockades.38 His memo, written on October 7th, 1940, lists 8 specific ways which McCollum believed that the United States could potentially provoke Japan into starting a war. The memo described the current geopolitical situation across the world; it included information on the state of the US territory in the pacific as well as the ongoing war in Europe. However, 8 lines of the 4-page memo is how Stinnett forms his argument. These are 8 ways in which the McCollum found that the US could go to war without the permission of the American public. McCollum suggested the United States take the following actions:
• “A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
• B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
• C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
• D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or
Singapore.
• E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
• F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity
of the Hawaiian Islands.
• G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue
economic concessions, particularly oil.
• H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a
similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.”39
This memo made Stinnett’s book a hit among the American public, they had never seen it before (it was requested by Stinnett through the freedom of information act)40. As a result, Stinnett carried a substantial amount of power. The McCollum memo is the basis of the Pearl Harbour conspiracy.41 He could manipulate the interpretation of the McCollum memo for generations to come, and the Washington Post argued shortly following the books release (1999) that this was exactly what Stinnett had done42.
“The McCollum memo was the smoking gun of Pearl Harbour”
Stinnett believed this piece of evidence to be a “smoking gun”. He viewed it as hard evidence implicating Roosevelt. The McCollum memo includes a line which says, “If you adopt these policies then Japan will commit an overt act of war”. Critics would argue that it is unclear whether or not Roosevelt ever saw this memo. However, Roosevelt did enact every single policy and suggestion given to him by McCollum. Further damning is the fact that some of these policy changes were enacted through the use of an executive order, which is uncommonly used in emergency circumstances in American politics. Additionally, the memo was then sent to Roosevelt’s top advisors. While it remains unclear whether Roosevelt received the memo, Dudley Knox not only read the memo but agreed with it and sent it to the other advisor, Anderson.43 He wrote to Anderson “I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both”44. With such a strong opinion from his advisors, it is difficult to believe that Roosevelt did not see this message. Furthermore, Stinnett himself suggested in an interview that this was not the first time that McCollum had supposedly had communication with the president.45 Stinnett also claims that Roosevelt himself ordered the hacking of Japanese codes by general McCollum and asked him to brief Roosevelt should any important messages arise.46This would indicate that Roosevelt trusted general McCollum and would be likely to have seen an important document such as the memo addressed directly to him. 47 Stinnett centers his entire argument on the General McCollum. Eugene Jarecki argues that Stinnett bases his arguments around General McCollum’s role in the region as a senior intelligence officer.
Finally, a critical issue with the McCollum memo is its tone. In reading the memo, it becomes clear that the author was fully aware of America’s incapability to implement the policy changes suggested in the memo. In page 4 of the memo McCollum writes (his 9th point) “It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado.”48 This is highly controversial as it perfectly articulates Roosevelt’s back door to war and confirms what people at the time feared and the one thing Roosevelt would never admit: that he had intended to start a war in the Pacific all along. This revelation allows historians to call all of Roosevelt’s policy decisions into question. Furthermore, this point implies the direct intent to deceive the American people. He knew he would not be able to successfully convince the American people to go to war, and instead he decided to provoke Japan into starting a war, in direct contradiction with the American public.
However, as Stinnett himself will admit, there is no evidence that Roosevelt even saw the memo, which would ultimately render it insignificant in terms of implicating the President. Furthermore, Eugene Jarecki argues that though the McCollum memo “demands attention”49, “no single memo by a midlevel functionary should be given too large a role in the shaping of the President’s policy”50. This thereby implies that though the memo might have been intended to provoke a war, and though Roosevelt might have read it, no single memo would have been attributed as great significance as Stinnett implies. No president would have based their entire foreign policy, nor a decision to go to war, on the word of one mid ranking general.51 However, the most scathing criticism of the significance of the McCollum Memo stems from military historian Conrad Crane. He dismisses Stinnett’s theories as nothing more than a conspiracy, and attributes their popularity as Americans being drawn to wild theories.52 “Americans have always been fascinated by conspiracy theories.”53 With regards to the McCollum memo in particular, Crane argues that his interpretation of the memo drastically differs from Stinnett’s. He says “Moreover, the McCollum proposal was designed to prevent war, not provoke it”54. This would agree with Budiansky who argued that Stinnett was manipulating evidence in his book to serve his argument, rather than looking at it objectively. Furthermore, the idea that “he adopted all eight of the provocations”55 was called into question by Crane, who exposed Stinnett by stating that “he [Stinnett] can only link FDR’s actions to only six of the eight items on the list”56. This calls Stinnett’s credibility as an historian into questions and also limits the credibility of his information on the McCollum memo.
To conclude, though Stinnett does provide a sound argument implicating the US president, his methodology and evidence are called into question by many historians. His interpretation of the McCollum memo was groundbreaking, as not only was he responsible for uncovering the memo, his interpretation was widespread and widely believed. Furthermore, the memo itself, combined with Roosevelt’s actions indicate that he at least anticipated a war with Japan. If nothing else, this directly contradicts his promise to the American people that they would remain out of the war. 57 Additionally, according to Stinnett, Roosevelt implemented all of the actions which would draw America into the war. Although there was no evidence that Roosevelt saw the memo, the fact that he implemented every single one of these actions is telling. Furthermore, Jarecki argues that specific language used in the McCollum memo was echoed by Roosevelt on November 27th and 28th 1941, when he said: ‘The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act’.58 The phrasing ‘overt act’ “hauntingly”59 echoes the words of the McCollum memo “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”60 Jarecki sites Stimson, who conducted a statement stating that FDR gave this order, and goes on to insinuate that FDR was “at least superficially familiar with either the specific language of the McCollum memo, or at least its underlying strategy”61. This would indicate that Roosevelt knew of a plan to provoke Japan into starting a war. Furthermore, America was able to intercept Japanese naval codes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. A message intercepted on the 25th of November would prove especially damming argued Stinnett, as it specified an attack on Hawaii.
It is crucial to note that the New York Times regards this book as captivating however lacking the “smoking gun” Stinnett would need in order to be able to prove wrongdoing by the Roosevelt administration.62 Furthermore, less radical explanations for the data that Stinnett collected when writing the book are overlooked in favor of more complicated explanations which fit the narrative.63 The New York Times continues to argue that this book is taking an inflammatory stance on an already controversial topic, simply for the sake of being inflammatory.64
Works Cited:
1. Beard, Charles A. President Roosevelt And The Coming Of The War, 1941: Appearances and Realities. ROUTLEDGE, 2017.
2. Beckstrand, Alex. “Perspective | How 1940 Provides the Way Forward for the United States in a Treacherous World.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 3 Dec. 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/03/how-provides-way- forward-united-states-treacherous-world/.
3. Bernstein, Richard. “'Day of Deceit': On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew?” The New
York Times, 15Dec.1999, archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/99/12/12/daily/121599stinnet t-book-review.html.
4. Budiansky, Stephen. Battle of Wits: the Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. Simon & Schuster, 2002.
5. Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Shubhi Publications, 2015.
61 Beard, pg. 8
62Bernstein, Day of Deceit: on Dec.7th, Did we Know we Knew?, New York Times 63 ibid
64 ibid
6. Cirignano, Douglas. “Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor.” Independent Institute, 11 Mar. 2002, www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=408. Accessed 21 Jan. 2020.
7. Clauson, Henry C. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement: The Shocking True Story of the Military Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor and the Fourteen Men Responsible for the Disaster . Open Road Media, 2015.
8. Crane, Conrad. “Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor.” The Free Library, 2001,
www.thefreelibrary.com/Day+of+Deceit%3A+The+Truth+About+FDR+and+Pear
l+Harbor-a073000559.
9. Dallek, Robert. “Pearl Harbor and the ‘Back Door to War’ Theory.” Encyclopædia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 7 May 2018, www.britannica.com/topic/Pearl-Harbor-and-the-back-door-to-war-theory- 1688287.
10. Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor.” Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, by Robert B. Stinnett, Touchstone, 2004, pp. 302, 1.
11. How Many People Died at Pearl Harbor during the Attack?” Visit Pearl Harbor, 2020, visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during- the-attack/.
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