European Society and the New 20th Century
At
the start of the century, European countries were part of a self-confident
civilisation. Organised into separate nation-states and empires, Europeans
nonetheless in many ways shared a common worldview. Within Western civilisation,
some states (known as Great Powers) played dominant roles in international
affairs, whereas other states aspired to such a role.
Great Powers
Great Britain
i)
An industrial and commercial power that had spearheaded the Industrial
Revolution, Britain also possessed a world empire that encompassed 20 percent
of the world’s land mass.
ii)
Britain’s
own population was 45 million.
iii)
Dependent on trade, it had made itself the pre-eminent naval power and preferred to maintain “splendid isolation” from the
affairs of the European continent.
iv)
A constitutional monarchy, Britain had a liberal
government.
v)
London was the banking capital of the world as
it precariously remains today.
Germany
i)
Imperial Germany had been created by war in 1870–1871, when the German kingdom
of Prussia had led German armies to victory against France.
ii)
The “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, peerless practitioner of Realpolitik
(power politics), had engineered German unification around the hard
Prussian militarist core by wars against Austria (1866) and against France.
iii)
Germany became the strongest power on the continent, with proud Prussian
militarist traditions. Its population was 65 million, while its booming economy
likewise made it a powerhouse.
iv)
The creation of the German Empire was of such importance to international
affairs that it was called the “German Revolution.” The “German Question”
concerned what role Germany would play in European affairs: Would it be a
source of stability or instability?
v)
Bismarck pursued policies that aimed to reassure the other Great Powers of
Germany’s peaceful intentions.
vi)
When the young Kaiser Wilhelm II of the House of Hohenzollern ascended to the
throne in 1888, he soon dismissed Bismarck in 1890.
vii)
Determined to win respect and status for Germany, Wilhelm II sanctioned an
aggressive foreign policy that shortly alienated many powers. All this forms
the basis of Fall of Eagles and was
covered in Grade 9-10.
viii)
Though it had a parliament called the Reichstag, the empire was an
uneasy mix of constitutionalism and authoritarianism.
ix)
German domestic politics were fragmented along class, regional, and religious
lines. Rapid and late industrialisation, however, would also bring social
disruption.
x)
A new political force was the S.P.D., the Social Democratic Party of Germany.
Founded in 1875, the S.P.D. adhered to Marxist ideas and was so well organised
that it was a model for other socialists worldwide. To the horror of German
elites, the S.P.D. became the largest party in Germany in 1912.
xi)
Nationalist leagues (the Navy League, the Army League, the Colonial League, and
the Pan-German League) agitated for more assertive foreign policy, as a way of
escaping internal woes.
xii)
A mood of crisis and pessimism about the future pervaded German elites.
France
i)
Once
the dominant power in Europe in the 18th century, France had suffered a
crucial defeat in its 1870–1871 war with Germany, downgrading its power status.
ii)
France remained anxious about Germany, whose
population overshadowed its own of 35 million, and also longed to regain Alsace
and Lorraine annexed by Germany (Treaty of Frankfurt).
iii)
France was a republic, beset by serious internal
divisions among conservatives, republicans, and socialists.
iv)
France
also had a colonial empire, through which it sought prestige to compensate for
its losses in Europe.
v)
France sought allies with which to oppose
Germany.
Russia
i)
Russia was an enormous multinational empire
under the Romanov dynasty, spanning Europe and Asia. With a population of 164
million, it was vast in potential but still backward in development, compared
with Central and Western Europe.
ii)
Tsar Nicholas II ruled over a traditional
autocratic system that was already under strain.
iii)
In 1905, two disasters overtook the empire. It
was defeated in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, and the Revolution of 1905
within its own borders nearly brought the regime down.
iv)
Russia sought to develop its potential
economically and militarily, with ambitious reform plans. As the serfs had only
been freed as recently as 1861, there was much ground to make up.
v)
A varied revolutionary movement within Russia
envisioned the overthrow of the state and the establishment of a new system, by
terrorism if necessary.
vi)
Dissatisfied nationalities (Poles, Lithuanians,
Finns, and others) saw Russia as a “gaoler of nations.”
vii)
The nationalist ideology of Pan-Slavism promoted
support for other Slavic nations and a leading role for Russia.
Austria-Hungary
1.
Also a venerable old empire under the Habsburg
ruling house, this multinational state of 50 million was presided over by the
aged Emperor Franz Josef, who had ruled since 1848.
2.
The empire consisted of twelve major ethnic
groups held together by dynastic tradition and power, not nationalism, a force
that Austrian leaders had feared.
3.
The older empire had been reorganised into a
“Dual Monarchy” of shared rule between the German- speaking Austrians and the
Hungarian elites in 1867, after defeat by Prussia in 1866.
4.
The demands of dissatisfied ethnic groups,
underdeveloped industrialisation, and anxieties as to the survival of the
empire beset its leadership.
5.
The Balkans were an area of special concern to
the empire, both as a field of activity and potential threat.
6.
Austria-Hungary’s precarious position forced it
into closer and closer partnership with Germany.
Other Countries
Ottoman Empire (Turkey)
i)
Called the “Sick Man of Europe,” its decline
contrasted with its glorious past as the Islamic sultanate, ruling from North
Africa to Persia.
ii)
Its lagging development, nationalist revolts in
remaining Balkan territories, as well as the ambitions of European powers, made
its future uncertain. How to deal with its expected demise was called the
“Eastern Question” and occupied European diplomats.
iii)
In 1908, the Young Turk nationalist
revolutionary movement came to power with the aim of reviving the empire.
iv)
Turkey came increasingly under German influence,
with military advisors, railway projects, and counsel.
Italy
i)
Italian lands were unified under the House of
Savoy from 1860.
ii)
With a population of 36 millions, Italy had
ambitions for Great Power status but faced internal problems of
underdevelopment and political disunity.
iii)
Italian nationalists still longed for
territories they called Irredenta (unredeemed lands) at the expense of
Austria-Hungary. Colonial rivalries with France also created international
animosity.
Serbia
i)
The kingdom of Serbia was a proud state that had
gained independence from the Ottoman Empire.
ii)
Its aimed lead a Balkan league uniting South
Slavs under Serbia.
iii)
Russia supported Serbia and signed an alliance
in 1903.
Japan
i)
In a remarkable self-willed transformation,
Japan adopted Western technology after the 1868 Meiji Restoration.
ii)
Determined to become an imperialist contender,
Japan went to war with China in 1894 and Russia in 1904, and annexed Korea in
1910.
United States
i)
Separated by the Atlantic Ocean, the United
States did not figure prominently in European affairs.
ii)
Its industrial development was striking, having
overtaken both Great Britain and Germany in steel production by the start of
the century.
iii)
In military terms, its power was potential.
Balance of Power
The
balance of power is the name given to the dynamic interrelation of the
Great Powers.
i)
It signifies a balance among powers with none
able to dominate the others as a hegemon. Other powers unite in coalitions to
resist such a hegemon.
ii)
Such a balance was inaugurated after the 1648
Treaty of Westphalia and the recognition of sovereign states.
iii)
The Congress of Vienna of 1815 institutionalised
the balance of power as a principle of harmony and conservative solidarity,
under the guidance of Prince Clemens von Metternich.
iv)
This system, the Concert of Europe, broke down
with the Crimean War, 1854–1856, and the wars that followed.
v)
The result was now a looser and more competitive
scene. Whether equilibrium could be maintained depended to a great extent on
the new Germany’s role.
A wave of “High Imperialism” from the 1880s led
to a scramble for colonies, carving up Africa and Asia.
i)
Britain and France were particular colonial
rivals, and Britain and Russia also mistrusted one another in Central Asia.
ii)
Germany had not participated actively in this
colonial competition under Bismarck, a reflection of his policy of restraint in
international politics, soon to be reversed by Kaiser Wilhelm II.
With growing tensions in imperial contests and
with a more aggressive German foreign policy from 1890, arms races resulted.
i)
On the seas, Germany built the world’s second
largest fleet, touching off a naval arms race with the largest fleet,
Britain’s. At vast expense, a new generation of Dreadnought battleships was
launched.
ii)
On land, mass armies were built up by France,
Germany, and Russia. From 1890 to 1914, European armies doubled in size.
iii)
Hand in hand with increased numbers of men and
equipment went carefully calibrated, minute planning for military operations in
anticipation of the next war. Railway timetables and speed were emphasised.
Essential
Reading:
John
Keegan, The First World War, pp. 1−23.
(In my classroom and school library- remember to compare his first sentence
with Strachan)
Questions
to Consider:
1.
Was the balance of power a good thing or a bad
thing? Why?
2.
Could the tensions leading up to 1914 have been
settled by negotiation? Why or why not?
Bernd Huppauf- The Blind War- A War with no Direction- revisionist WWI
Robert Wohl- A Place in the Sun- a German Need- orthodox WWI“Wilson made too many promises, and had to negotiate a peace settlement with leaders who were intent on preventing German hegemony, and not world peace”
Norman Stone- Russia getting too strong for Germany- revisionist WWI
Imanuel Geiss-Orthodox Germany to blame
Gerhard Ritter- defence of Germany
British historian Gary Sheffield:
“The battle of the Somme was not a victory in itself, but
without it the Entente would not have emerged victorious in
1918.”
Egmont Zechlin- revision WWI
Gerhard Schroeder- no one responsible- German revisionist WWI
Wolfgang Mommsen- German historian, Germany responsible for outbreak
AJP Taylor- revision, European international relations Europe: Grandeur and Decline: “The
Austrian government was not much concerned to punish the crime
of Sarajevo. They wanted to punish a different crime- the crime
that Serbia committed by existing as a free national state.”
Fritz Fischer- Germany responsible for WWI because of its aggressive pursuit of its Weltpolitik
Richard Hamilton- The Origins of World War I- revisionist
Kenneth Waltz- Man, the State, and War.- examining different views on causes of war. WWI was caused by human nature- supported also by theory of Confucius. 
George F. Kennan- 1894 alliance caused WWI
Christopher Clark (Sleepwalkers)- Italy started war with 1911 invasion of Libya which led to Ottoman collapse.- The protagonists of 1914 were "sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world."
- When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and attacked Belgrade on July 28th, 1914, it was Russia and France that bore the main responsibility for the general war that followed because they chose to resist Vienna’s move.
QUOTES
Sidney Bradshaw Fay: “A peaceable, sensible mass 500 million was hounded into war by a few dozen incapable leaders.”- "Imperialism, nationalism, militarism and alliances- “all these things meshed together to create a collective impetus to war”.
British nation: “We want eight and we won’t wait”
Kaiser Wilhelm in Daily Telegraph, 1908: “You English, are mad, mad, mad as March hares” Kaiser 1911: “When the hour comes we are prepared for sacrifices, both of blood and of treasure”
After 1911 Agadir crisis Daily Mail newspaper: “Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. Britain alone stands in the way of Germany’s path to world power and domination”
After Agadir crisis Lloyd George: “Britain’s interests were vitally affected” Lloyd George 1934: “The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay... The nations backed their machines over the precipice… not one of them wanted war, certainly not on this scale”
Serbian Prime minister Pasic after defeating Bulgaria: “the first round is won, now for the second round- against Austria.”
Revisionist Richard Hamilton- The Origins of World War I: “There was no ‘slide’ to war, no war caused by ‘inadvertence’, but instead a world war caused by a fearful set of elite statesmen and rulers making deliberate choices.”
Nicholas II to Kaiser 29 July 1914: “An unjust war has been declared on a weak country. The anger in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. …I beg you in the name of our friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.“
German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg asked General Moltke after Russian mobilisation: “Is the fatherland in danger?” “Yes” Bethmann-Hollweg: “For a mere scrap of paper, Great Britain is going to make a war?” (Treaty of London 1839)
“World was scared of present, Germany of future.”
Edgar Quinet, on the consequences of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War:
"The ceding of Alsace-Lorraine is nothing but war in perpetuity
under the mask of peace.
Professor David Fromkin, "Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914": "The international conflict in the summer of 1914 consisted of two wars, not one. Both were started deliberately. They were started by rival empires that were bound together by mutual need... The wars were about power."
Professor David Fromkin, "Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914": "The international conflict in the summer of 1914 consisted of two wars, not one. Both were started deliberately. They were started by rival empires that were bound together by mutual need... The wars were about power."
Debate on Causes
Debate began with the war itself. One key formulation was the War Guilt Clause, part of the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Treaty at the end of the war claimed in Article 231 that Germany and its allies were solely responsible for launching the war. Reflecting wartime sentiment, the clause also justified reparations.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the notion of a collective responsibility became prominent.
In the interwar years, as international tensions relaxed, opinions shifted toward the notion of shared responsibility. British wartime leader David Lloyd George suggested that all European states “slithered over the edge” into war.
In the 1960s, the Fischer Debate renewed the question of the causes of the war. Renewed debate exploded in 1961 when German historian Fritz Fischer’s Grab for World Power (published in English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War) argued that Germany launched the war to become a superpower and developed war aims that anticipated the Nazis. In the furious confrontations that followed, the debate itself changed. Fischer’s critics came to argue that Germany miscalculated its gamble, rather than that the country intended world war.
In a later book, Fischer claimed Germany had planned war from 1912. Other explanations have also been advanced by historians through the years. Other interpretations stressed different causal factors. Did alliances themselves cause the war? “Secret diplomacy” was denounced after the war as a crucial factor. Did arms races and military planning cause the war by forcing a timetable? Henry Kissinger argues that alliances and mobilization plans created a “Doomsday Machine.” Was war an accident, as British historian A. J. P. Taylor argued, turning politicians into “prisoners of their own weapons?” Was imperialism the cause? Although colonial competition certainly poisoned the atmosphere, earlier clashes were negotiated. Was capitalism the cause, as Marxists argued? On the contrary, German industry’s dominance grew in peacetime. Though this is not a scholarly theory, were the Balkans to blame (as some hinted during the Balkan wars of the 1990s)? Rather, outside involvement of the Great Powers was the crucial variable.
Debate began with the war itself. One key formulation was the War Guilt Clause, part of the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Treaty at the end of the war claimed in Article 231 that Germany and its allies were solely responsible for launching the war. Reflecting wartime sentiment, the clause also justified reparations.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the notion of a collective responsibility became prominent.
In the interwar years, as international tensions relaxed, opinions shifted toward the notion of shared responsibility. British wartime leader David Lloyd George suggested that all European states “slithered over the edge” into war.
In the 1960s, the Fischer Debate renewed the question of the causes of the war. Renewed debate exploded in 1961 when German historian Fritz Fischer’s Grab for World Power (published in English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War) argued that Germany launched the war to become a superpower and developed war aims that anticipated the Nazis. In the furious confrontations that followed, the debate itself changed. Fischer’s critics came to argue that Germany miscalculated its gamble, rather than that the country intended world war.
In a later book, Fischer claimed Germany had planned war from 1912. Other explanations have also been advanced by historians through the years. Other interpretations stressed different causal factors. Did alliances themselves cause the war? “Secret diplomacy” was denounced after the war as a crucial factor. Did arms races and military planning cause the war by forcing a timetable? Henry Kissinger argues that alliances and mobilization plans created a “Doomsday Machine.” Was war an accident, as British historian A. J. P. Taylor argued, turning politicians into “prisoners of their own weapons?” Was imperialism the cause? Although colonial competition certainly poisoned the atmosphere, earlier clashes were negotiated. Was capitalism the cause, as Marxists argued? On the contrary, German industry’s dominance grew in peacetime. Though this is not a scholarly theory, were the Balkans to blame (as some hinted during the Balkan wars of the 1990s)? Rather, outside involvement of the Great Powers was the crucial variable.
Where
does the current interpretation of the causes of the war stand
today? Most scholars today see Germany as bearing the main
responsibility for the war, as it was willing to risk general war,
though not aiming for it. Even as Germany is seen as mainly
responsible, some degree of responsibility is shared by other actors
in this tragedy. Although Fischer moved the debate forward on war
aims, his arguments on intentions are not accepted.
Historical Perspectives of the Causes of the Great War
From 1998 Exam Paper
II: Topic 1: Causes, practices and effects of war
1. To what extent
should Germany be held responsible for causing both the First and Second World
Wars?
1. German Responsibility:
Fischer’s View: (German Historian)
i) Germany was responsible for war because of
its aggressive pursuit of its weltpolitik.
Germany willed the war in order to realize expansionist ambitions and to resole an acute domestic crisis.
ii) Fear of ‘encirclement´ after the Triple Entente and Russian army reforms meant that ‘a moment so favourable from a military point of view might never occur again´.
iii) Germany put pressure on Austro-Hungary to retaliate against Serbia (even if it meant General war). evidence for this is in the ‘blank cheque´
Germany willed the war in order to realize expansionist ambitions and to resole an acute domestic crisis.
ii) Fear of ‘encirclement´ after the Triple Entente and Russian army reforms meant that ‘a moment so favourable from a military point of view might never occur again´.
iii) Germany put pressure on Austro-Hungary to retaliate against Serbia (even if it meant General war). evidence for this is in the ‘blank cheque´
Criticism of Fischer:
i) German policy before 1914 seems contradictory and
lacking in clear aims.
ii) No evidence that German leader help expansionist aims before the ‘September Programme´ (which Fischer uses to explain the German desire for war)
iii) Places too much importance on the domestic crisis in the decision to launch a war. In fact, in 1914 Bulow and Hollweg dismissed war as a solution to the socialist problem.
ii) No evidence that German leader help expansionist aims before the ‘September Programme´ (which Fischer uses to explain the German desire for war)
iii) Places too much importance on the domestic crisis in the decision to launch a war. In fact, in 1914 Bulow and Hollweg dismissed war as a solution to the socialist problem.
What you should consider:
i) Distinguish
between Germany´s contribution to the growth in international tensions from
1900-13 with her role during the July crisis itself.
All Governments were responsible for tension until 1914 but not equally responsible for the fatal turn of events — for which Germany was culpable.
All Governments were responsible for tension until 1914 but not equally responsible for the fatal turn of events — for which Germany was culpable.
Sample Student Essays:
'Hamilton & Herwig's "coteries
of the elite" thesis is the most valuable contribution to the
Historiography of the First World War since the Fischer thesis'. Discuss the
validity of this statement with reference to at least two other critiques of
the causes of the First World War.
Example 1
World War One was
undoubtedly the most influential event of the 20th century for the
development of historiography, a study of multiple historians’ perspectives,
due to diversified examination of its potential causes. The Fischer thesis,
when it was first introduced in 1961, caused a lot of debate because of the
outrageous revived idea that the political behaviour of Germany was indeed the
main stimulus for the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Therefore assessment
of the “coteries of elite” thesis would not be as accurate without a
possibility of comparison to Fischer’s advanced appraisal of the causes of the
war. This essay will mainly discuss the validity of the Hamilton and Herwig’s
“coteries of elite” thesis. which suggests that the blame is to go on specific
political groups of people within each of the powers rather than solely one
country. That idea will be presented in comparison to the outstanding
effectiveness of the Fischer thesis on the affluent historiography of the World
War One. The essay will also focus on opinions of other historians, who have
made less significant contributions; yet those are worth examining in detail
due to their beneficial relevance to the theses of the two preceding works,
either supporting or discouraging them. Hence the historians mentioned in this
essay will be Gerhard Ritter, a traditionalist and ardent opposer of the
Fischer’s controversy, Niall Ferguson, who presents Britain as the power
contributing the most to the outbreak of the World War, and Christopher Clark,
who completely clashes the prospect of the blame game as a whole and stresses
the equal faulty involvement of all powers. Throughout the essay it will be
demonstrated that the Hamilton and Herwig thesis offers possibly the most
modern view on the origins of the Fist World War, therefore being strongly
relevant to the historiography nowadays, yet not profound enough and quite
self-evident to be placed on the same level as the Fischer thesis, which with
its encouragement of discussion has become a very precious piece of work for
the historians.
The thesis by Hamilton and Herwig
is presented in the book Decisions for
War. Both argue that ‘separate and distinct sets of concerns’ of the
leaders in groups of influence in each one of the five major powers have lead
to decisions, which provoked the war. They suggested that it was the
combination of panic and fear, that took over the leaders and therefore they
could act irrationally, affected by emotions and not the circumstances
directly. Hamilton and Herwig address in their study, that the motivations of
the five major coteries were ‘moved by nationalism, militarism, and
imperialism’. The groups of people who appeared of such vital importance to the
world history were quite small, ‘decisions for war were made by coteries of
leaders; in most cases, fewer than a dozen persons were directly involved and responsible
for those decisions’, the historians suggest. Their book discusses each of the
powers separately and how, and more importantly, who made the most important
choices within each one. Herwig and Hamilton state that Germany was putting in
the ‘effort to secure the Reich’s tenuous position as a European Great War’; the
claim that is clearly is linked to Fischer’s argument. As the Chief of General
Staff Helmuth von Moltke was a member of a small German coterie, he feared to
suffer the loss of opportunity of Germany emerging as a Great Power from the
war. As a result of angst shared by him and other powerful politicians, the whole
country was involved in a serious conflict escalation in order to live up to
the expectations of the coteries. Those coteries, in fact, knew perfectly that
the war would be disastrous. Nevertheless the calculation of risk was ‘thrown
out of the window’ during the period leading up to the war. The major question
asked by the historians concentrated on the ‘mass sentiment’, whether the
coteries were ‘corresponding to the demands of the masses or to the pressures
of organizations representing them’, or were the decisions based on ‘strategic
concerns’. This would allow the possibility of the decision-making process to
be described as oblivious due to the ‘elite’ individuals being either inattentive
to the outside information or viewing it falsely. Niall Ferguson has somewhat
shared that concept expressed by Hamilton and Herwig, as he also believed, that
the decisions were made by politicians suddenly, often without an obvious cause
yet with selfish intent and out of own responsiveness to the intense course of
events.
Fischer’s thesis, which
suggested that Germany was to inflict the blame upon entirely, caused a massive
change in the stabilized opinion of many on the Germany’s degree of fault due
to its controversy. Fischer re-introduced an old claim that Germany’s foreign
policy leading to the outbreak of war, yet in a completely new light. The
thesis strongly suggested that due to a clear line of continuity between the foreign
policy aims of the Imperial Germany in 1914 and later the Nazi Germany in 1937,
the country wished to establish itself as a great power thorough all those
years, therefore ready to risk the possibility of war. According to Fischer,
Germany was under so-called “military pressure”, it assumed that the war with
Russia was bound to happen and therefore preferably before 1917. This is
because Russia was not fully recovered from the shameful defeat in war with
Japan and was still vulnerable and short of military reforms, which would have
to be worked on for the next few years. Fischer also claimed that Germany has
put pressure upon Austria-Hungary by firstly offering the ‘blank cheque’, which
ensured the Austrians that the Germans would help and support them in their opposition
towards Austria-Hungary. Making Austria-Hungary too confident it triggered a
conflict with Serbia. Fischer suggested that the Austrians were afraid that if
they did not act immediately, Germany would simply have them handle it on their
own. That concern has caused the establishment of a ten-point ultimatum to Serbia
by the Austria-Hungarian leaders. A strong piece of evidence used by Fischer to
strengthen his argument was the Schlieffen Plan. It suggested that Germans were
getting ready for the war long before it broke out, therefore allowing the
possibility of them being the main initiators. The Schlieffen Plan was a
strategic plan, which fully expressed the thoughtfulness of the Germans when it
came to aggressive international actions. It involved the possibility of an
attack and fight with France from the Western front and with Russia from the
Eastern front. Events of World War One have taken place exactly how the Germans
suspected them to. The plan was developed by German General Staff 9 years
before the war broke out, thus it could be questioned whether Germans had more
reason to depict the possibility of war than other powers.
Gerhard Ritter was the main
critique of the Fischer thesis, who was wishing to preserve Germany’s image as
the “unreasonably blamed” for the First World War due to being a conservative
German historian. Nonetheless he did suggest that the previous works on German
war-guilt had to be reviewed; he did not support the ideologies of the
Pan-German League, defining those as pure nationalism. Ritter has defended the
point of view (and so did many other German historians of 1960) that Germany
was, in fact, not acting aggressively, but defensively throughout the war. The
main issue that Ritter had with the Fischer’s thesis, was his claim that
Germany saw war as necessary in order to force Russia out of the Balkan affairs.
A Balkan alliance was developing under the Russian leadership, increasing their
power significantly in that area, which caused distress of the Germans. Ritter
has also strongly opposed the statement that Germany has indirectly forced
Austria-Hungary to act against Serbia, as that claim was not supported by any
hard evidence but largely by assumptions of how Austria-Hungary felt about it’s
political relations with Germany. Ritter believed that such rapid actions were
taken by the Germans not because they were desperately desiring war, yet because
they were terrified by the fact that Austria-Hungary ‘destroyed not only the
political and moral impression of the Sarajevo outrage but also the practical
success of every undertaking against Serbia’ by offering the ten-point
ultimatum. He saw the continuity of the German foreign policy, which Fischer
has outlined, as a myth and blamed Fischer for submitting the thesis before
conducting his research and, therefore being biased and not very selective; thus
suggesting that Fischer’s thesis may not be considered as accurate, but rather
prejudiced. Fischer’s determinism, a belief that whatever happens in the given
conditions is the only possible outcome of the event and no other outcomes are
possible, weakened his argument due to a blunder perspective and was the main
reason of discontent of Ritter towards his theses.
Another historian, who chose
to blame solely one country for the outbreak of the war, was Niall Ferguson. In
his book Pity of War, he claims that
“Britain and not Germany started the war”, as opposed to Fischer’s disputed
thesis. Ferguson considers the decision of British to interfere in the war
unexpected, made on a “Sunday
afternoon”. He refers to the fact that the British avoided warfare since the
Congress of Vienna in 1815. He also saw the British determination to
participate as unnecessary, suggesting that they had a choice not to get
involved at all. Ferguson argues that if the Germans were to attack the
Russians only, the World War I would not take place, and the British have
therefore “made a continental war a global war”; Germany did not “bid” for
world power originally. Ferguson rejects a possibility of a link between the
Anglo-German Naval race and the on-going build up of tension between the two
countries after 1912, “arms race at sea was over in 1912, it being a cause of
the World War I is a myth”. Yet whether it really was fiction, could be
questioned, as one could argue that the tension created by the naval race did
not end in 1912, but continued up until 1914, even when the built up of the
arms was officially ended by the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and Britain
was said to have won. Ferguson also questions the British foreign policy, first
introduced by Lord Palmestron, while appointed as foreign secretary in the
mid-nineteenth century (1830–1841, 1846–1851), which stated that no power should
dominate the continent. Referring back to that policy, Ferguson considers it
somewhat as a failure, since in reality the British did not follow through with
it, as if they would have, there would be no adequate reason for them to act
aggressively. Ferguson also defended the involvement of Germany by saying that
“German pre-occupation came from sense of insecurity”, therefore contradicting
the Fischer thesis as a whole, implying defensive politics from Germany’s side.
However he does not state where that insecurity of Germany could have come
from. Moreover Morgenthau’s concept of political realism would argue that if
Germany would feel threatened it would react aggressively, rather than
defensively due to being competitive and protective of self-interest, therefore
causing an unavoidable conflict. Ferguson believed that Edward Grey, the
foreign minister of Britain at the time, had a significant domination over the
actions, which proceeded into the British joining the war. According to
Ferguson, Grey has stated to his colleagues that if Britain does not interfere,
he will resign and they will therefore lose their jobs, as the Liberal Party he
represented would look weak and lead to the loss in the upcoming elections. Nevertheless
it could be argued that it is not a strong link to the real reason why British
chose to intervene rather than stay neutral, as the colleagues of Grey, even if
unemployed would remain rich and still involved in politics. Therefore it would
be quite unlikely and not reasonable enough to consider that those political
figures decided to risk a possibility of war simply to save their occupations.
Yet Ferguson’s point of view concerning the events leading up the Great War and
specifically the influence of Edward Grey’s stubbornness could be linked back
to the idea discussed by Hamilton and Herwig, which addresses the possibility
of events being caused by human weakness. All three historians believed that when
certain officials made decisions, their emotions at a particular moment could
have caused alternative reactions to what those could have been if they would
not be under pressure of their own anxiety.
Christopher Clark took a
different historical approach on the main cause of war, as he has recently
published a book about the Great War, named “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went
to War in 1914”. Throughout it he establishes a thesis that proposes the
possibility of the powers simply “sleepwalking” into the war without a direct intention
to do so. Clark suggested that people inside as well as outside the government
were in reality extremely worried about the war that was about to emerge and
were quite anxious about each proceeding action taken, which lead to a build-up
towards the conflict itself. ‘The politicians were wasteful and unseeing,
haunted by dreams’, who blindly lead their own people towards war, which was
largely unwanted. This point of view largely contradicts with the causal links
that were proposed by both Niall Ferguson and Fritz Fischer, as they both go to
the extremes to prove the guilt of a particular side. They do not believe in
“sleepwalking” but in direct and clear intent of the country to start a war,
convinced that it was definitely no coincidence that the crisis struck in 1914
and evaluated the consequences of the actions of the powers. Clark on the other
hand doubts the intents and wishes to look at them from his less harsh point of
view, admitting the human weaknesses of the leaders, such as distrust, paranoia
and anxiety. Furthermore Clark’s ideas could be linked back to the idea of
‘coteries of the elite’ making decisions. He addresses that ambitious political
figures, who were not able to hold back in pursuit of power, under effective
influence of fear yet desire for more, were the ones who dragged the whole
country along into an obvious disaster. Clark argues that the blame game is a
“false assumption that one party is wrong and one is right”, which also
disputes the ideas Fischer and Ferguson, who argue for opposing sides.
In conclusion it can be
drawn from the examination of those various points of view that the Hamilton
and Herwing’s thesis is the most far-reaching in modern historiography due to
close examination of guilt of the ‘coteries’ in each of the great powers, yet
not the most valuable. It presents quite an indisputable point of view, which
often indirectly links to the claims made by other historians, therefore making
it less advanced. Despite that the thesis discusses a rather different approach
of the blame-game. It outlines many constructive ideas as well as agrees that all
decisions made by individuals or small groups were influenced by their personal
emotional state and temporary values as well as possibly flawed views on the
situation, a line of thought also spotted in Christopher Clark’s work on the
“Sleepwalkers”. The Fischer thesis, on the other hand, is very in-depth when
recalling the study, which has been neglected by Gerhard Ritter, proving that
the theses was somewhat blemished due to it’s complete one-sidedness Ferguson’s
thesis at the same time suggests that Germany was rather faultless, while the
British were the ones to escape possible accusation due to making the war
outbreak on a much larger scale than it could have. One can argue that Fischer
has assumed that there was more direction to the foreign policy that there was
in reality, as it can appear somewhat strange to blame one country for
provoking military actions when most powers chose to be involved in the war
themselves. Yet Fischer’s argument about Germany’s war guilt, which was brought
up once again many years later, is straightforward and supported by various
documentations of events, nevertheless still debated. The Fischer’s thesis has
lead to a conclusion that Germany was not completely innocent, creating new
paths for further discussion and making historians re-consider their previous
judgements. The Hamilton and Herwig thesis has discussed the roles of various
groups of people throughout the decision-making process in 1914 and prior,
letting fresh ideas on the subject advance, which could proceed into future
debates and discoveries concerning who was really to blame for the worldwide
tragedy.
EXAMPLE 2
The
causation and correlation of events, which caused the Great War, is one of the
most frequently researched and written about topics in history. From hundred of
theses, those of Fritz Fischer (1961), and Hamilton and Herwig (2004) standout
as the most ground breaking. This essay will look to explore the comparative
value of not only Fischer’s and Hamilton and Herwig’s ideas, but also those of
Gerhard Ritter, Lenin/ Marx and William Engdahl. Through looking at several the
opinions of several historians we shall assess not only which of the theories
pose the most compelling arguments, but also, which theories had the greatest
impact on society and the historical community. Secondly, this essay will
evaluate which contribution to the historiographies on the causes of the First
World War after Fischer’s thesis (1961). When studying historiographies it is
essential to recognize the weaknesses of each historian and how those
weaknesses influence and hinder the accuracy of his opinions.
To
begin, we will look at, arguably, the most influential piece of writing on the
causes of WWI, Fritz Fisher’s, ‘Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die
Kriegzielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918’, or as it is known
in English, ‘Germany’s Aims in the First World War’ published in 1961.
Fischer, being not only German, but Bavarian, stirred up strong reactions
from both the historians’ community and the general German public by claiming
in his thesis that Germany was not only to blame for outbreak of WWI, but also
for all of the destruction caused during the war and the consequences
thereafter. The basis of Fischer’s thesis was such that Germany instigated war
with France and Russia in order to achieve its ideas of ‘Mitteleuropa’, ‘Mittelafrika’
and ‘Middle East Policy; these were, essentially, large regions of
Europe, Africa, and Asia, particularly in the Ottoman region, which would be
dominated completely by Germany. This gaining of land was part of an important
political shift in Germany from ‘Realpolitik’ under Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck, to ‘Weltpolitik’ after Bismarck’s dismissal by the Kaiser in
1890; this marked a significant change in German history as under Bismarck,
Germany had been more or less, at peace. The policy of ‘Weltpolitik’
aimed to establish Germany and a global power by expanding its navy, acquiring
overseas colonies and preparing for a war on two fronts. The Naval Race
(1906-1914) and the Schlieffen Plan are both consequences of ‘Weltpolitik’,
which are case studies for Germany’s premeditated intentions of starting a war.
The Naval Race consisted of Germany and Britain challenging each other for the
greatest navy. By 1914 Britain had acquired a sum of thirty-eight dreadnoughts
and dreadnought battle cruisers, and Germany had obtained twenty-four. The only
reason Germany would need a navy which rivalled Britain’s was if she planned to
go to war with Britain and needed it for offensive attacks. Britain had the
navy in order to look after its overseas colonies, whereas Germany had
relatively few overseas colonies and therefore did not warrant a navy of that
size and power. The Schlieffen Plan was
Germany’s second act of mens rea, which caused the war, according to Fischer.
The Schlieffen Plan was a plan devised in order to allow Germany to fight a war
on two fronts, France to the west and Russia to the east. The Plan was
originally written in 1905 by Count Alfred von Schlieffen and then altered by
the new German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke in 1906. In the act of
creating a plan which anticipated a war on two fronts, and building a navy
which competed with the Royal Navy, argues Fischer, revealed Germany’s clear
intention to enter into a large European war in the near future. Thus the
outbreak of war in 1914 was a consequence solely of Germany’s actions during
the previous months and years. According to Fischer, the shift to ‘Weltpolitik’,
a more aggressive policy than before was a large contributing factor to the
outbreak of war because a central European country operating with a highly
aggressive policy, who is in direct competition for wealth and power with
Britain and surely an obvious culprit. Britain would defend its position with
military force so by challenging Britain Germany knew there was a large risk of
war. One fault in Fischer’s arguments against Germany lay in his failure to
acknowledge France’s Plan XVII. Plan XVII was originally drawn up in 1898
following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) as a defensive
plan in the event of future conflict with Germany, however the plan underwent
several redrafts, and by 1909, offensive Plan XVI was created, then renamed
XVII in 1913. If Fischer claims that Germany’s Schlieffen Plan was evidence of
Germany’s intent of war, then surely he could also have argued that France also
intended on causing a war since they too, had an efficient offensive battle
plan draw up. This flaw in Fischer’s thesis makes readers questions Fischer’s personal
intentions when writing his thesis, whether they were intended to describe the
most accurate causes of the Great War, or to create a compelling piece of work
which would allow society to share his subjective opinion of Germany’s
involvement.
Posing
an argumentative antithesis to Fischer is conservative German historian Gerhard
Ritter. Ritter’s purpose was to find faults within Fischer’s arguments, as well
as to share his opinion that all states were equally to blame for the outbreak
of war. This is not an uncommon idea, especially when looking at the causation
of the war in hindsight. Lloyd George, former Prime Minister of Britain would
go on to say “all the powers participating in the First World War had blundered
into it, that is, that all bore the same measures of guilt.” Ritter’s intention
was to demonstrate how Germany had become involved in the war through a series
of unfortunate events, clearing its name after Fischer’s thesis in 1961. Ritter
argued that Fischer had misunderstood the intentions of the German Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg in his pre-war, post-assassination conversations with Austria.
Ritter argues that Germany entered war as an act of camaraderie, to protect and
support its sister empire, Austria-Hungary after Serbia’s violent terrorist
attack, which caused the death of Austro- Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand
and his wife Sophie. Secondly, Ritter claims Germany severely underestimated
the efficiency of the Russia military and their strong loyalty to their fellow
Slavs in Serbia. These two miscalculations of Germany’s part are what Lloyd
George considered blunders, clearly illustrating that Germany had a part in the
correlation of events that caused the war, however they were in no way the sole
perpetrators of the Great War. Ritter attempted to disprove Fischer’s theory by
providing alternative explanations for Germany’s involvement. While his
arguments are at least as justified as Fischer’s, there is nothing striking
about a German historian vouching nationalistically for Germany’s honour, and
therefore his publication cannot be regarded as the greatest contribution to
the historiography of the causes of the First World War since Fischer. Secondly, while Fischer based the majority of
his theories on events which can be evidenced with case studies, Ritter makes
most of his claims on the basis of theoretical intentions. While Ritter argues,
rather romantically, that Germany loyally stepped up to the defence of its
ally, Fischer’s explains Germany’s pre-war battle plan as substantial evidence
of its intention of starting a war. Fischer’s thesis is simply better evidenced
and realistic than Ritter’s.
In
December of 2004 Hamilton and Herwig published a book entitled ‘Decisions for
War 1914-1917’, which was detectably the greatest contribution to the works on
the causes of the First World War since Fischer. Hamilton and Herwig’s most
prominent idea was that it was ‘coteries of the elite’ in each country made
decisions, driven by capitalistic motives, which lead to the outbreak of war in
1914. Coteries of the elite were small groups of wealthy and powerful people
who manifested themselves in each and every country. Hamilton and Herwig
believed that it was these groups who saw opportunities for their individual countries
to benefit economically, who used their power to persuade their government to
enter the war. This seemingly inherent greed of the individual, which is
inextricably linked to the operation of capitalist states at the time can be
understood by looking at Hans Morgenthau’s theories about political realism.
Morgenthau said “political realism believes that politics, like society
in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human
nature.” This human nature he is referring to, goes back to the early stages of
human development, which would have been referred to by Marx as the ‘hunter
gatherer’ period of society. In these stages it was only the greediest,
quickest, strongest man who would get enough food and women to survive and
reproduce. According to Lenin-Marxists, as society has evolved through
primitive communism, solitary horticulturalists, the feudal system, an
industrial revolution, and now capitalism, each individual has been left in an
inherently greedy mind-set. This links back to the cause of World War I because
each state, government or coterie of elites consist of a collection of
individuals all sharing these same instinctive traits, they will act with the
same selfish hunger as an individual, according to Morgenthau’s theory of
political realism. This leads to war, because though war is not necessary,
countries see opportunities for greater wealth, power, prestige if they enter
into this war, thus a war begins. Unlike Ritter’s writing, ‘Decisions for War 1914-1917’ was more than simply an antithesis to
Fischer; it was a completely new set of ideas which sparked interest all over
the world. Secondly it was written in 2004, so the writers had an even longer
period of retrospect on the war than Fischer, this would have allowed their
judgements to be less clouded by the emotional repercussions of the war, thus
allowing them to base their theories on cold hard fact, instead of emotions. The
Berlin Wall, the last physical remain of WWII wasn’t taken down until 1989;
this suggests that historians writing before this time, especially German
historians, were very likely to be subjected to an anti-Germany bias as they
felt the guilt of the atrocities committed by their country in the 1940’s.
Fischer’s inevitable sensitivity towards his country at the time makes his
arguments weaker in comparison to Hamilton-Herwig’s who were written in the 21st
century, with WWI and WWII in the past, allowing them to be more objective.
As
a case study for Hamilton and Herwig’s ‘coteries of the elite’ theory we will
explore another recent publication pertaining to the causes of WWI; William
Engdahl’s ‘A Century of War’, published in 1992, whose ideas are more closely
related to those of Hamilton and Herwig, than to those of Fischer. In his book,
Engdahl talks about how in August of 1914 the British Treasury and the finances
of the British Empire were, in effect, bankrupt. However, Britain saw a war
with Germany as an opportunity to obtain Middle Eastern oil reserves, and
access to the Mediterranean Sea, which in turn would give Britain access to the
oil in North Africa as well. In the months leading up to war, Lloyd George,
Minister of Finances at time, wrote in a private memorandum: “Another influence
fanning the agitation for banking reform has been the growing commercial and
banking power of Germany, and the growth of uneasiness lest the gold reserves
of London should be raided just before or at the beginning of a great conflict
between the two countries.” The danger to which Lloyd George is alluding to, is
the devaluation of the pound, should there be a run on the British gold
reserves, since its currency is dependent on the gold; devaluation of its
currency would make Britain much weaker, especially in the face of Germany’s rapid
rise as a European threat. Lloyd George
also expressed concern about Germany’s growing navy, economy, oil reserves and
subsequently power; however, Lloyd George was correct, entering into a war with
Germany, should they be victorious would lead to great imperialistic expansion
for Britain and help them to solve their finaical issues, although surely at
the time Lloyd George did not anticipate the scale of the war which would
result as a consequence of his actions. Lloyd George’s private memorandums with
select other politicians are examples of conversations within the coteries of
the elite, a powerful group of people acting as puppeteers of the government.
Lloyd George, with France and Russia, created the Sykes- Picot Treaty in
(November 1915- March 1916) which dealt with the division of conquered Middle
Eastern and North African lands during the war. Oil was an especially important
resource for Britain as the naval race had cost them a lot of fuel, and a war
would warrant even more. Britain was to be awarded the coastal the
Mediterranean Sea and the River Jordan, as well as Southern Iraq, and small
area, which would allow access to the sea via Haifa and Acre ports. France was
to get area in southeast Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Russia was
allocated Istanbul, the Turkish Strait and the Ottoman Armenian vilayets.
Britain certainly followed through with its end of the bargain, as by 1918
there were approximately one million British soldiers stations in the Middle
East, and the Persian Gulf had become known as ‘British Lake’ by 1919. This
agreement to use the war as a cover for its expansions shows exactly to what
extent Britain, France and Russia’s imperialistic policies lead to war.
However, the policies themselves do not lead to war, it is the military who
enforce these policies that lead to war. Lenin would agree that it is primitive
need to imperialist expansions, executed by each country’s military that lead
to the outbreak of the First World War.
Vladmir
Lenin believed it was not the sole responsibility of any country or coterie,
but the fault of capitalism with lead to the Great War in 1914. We must look to his book published in 1917
entitled ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, in order to understand
his intentions, we must understand the definitions of capitalism and
imperialism. American Chair of the Federal Reserves (1987-2006) Allen Greenspan
defines capitalism as: ‘Capitalism is based on self-interest and self-esteem;
it holds integrity and trustworthiness as cardinal virtues and makes them pay
off in the marketplace, thus demanding that men survive by means of virtue, not
vices. It is this superlatively moral system that the welfare statists propose
to improve upon by means of preventative law, snooping bureaucrats, and the
chronic goad of fear.” Lenin, himself defines imperialism as: “If it was
necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should
have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism”. These two
definitions lend to each other creating what Lenin would call “the highest
stage of capitalism”, essentially in the system of capitalism corporations and
governments can and will forsake all in order to gain the greatest capital in
comparison to its counterparts. Greenspan might agree that militarism is a
significant aspect of a capitalist system which allows it to function in the
manner it does; when overriding certain rules, laws, and morals it is often the
case that a country will need its military to forcefully back its actions.
Lenin’s arguments came before Fischer’s and as such they cannot be accepted as
the greatest theories since Fischer, however Lenin’s ideas of imperialism being
at the heart of the conflict helps one to understand more deeply Fischer,
Hamilton-Herwig, and Engdahl’s arguments. Lenin published his book even closer
to the time of the war than Fischer, however unlike Fischer the time period is
not a weakness of his arguments. Lenin’s ideas take a much broader perspective
than Fischer’s, blaming a system, as opposed to an individual country; it is
necessary to notice Lenin’s objectivity on the subject despite his immediate
involvement in it as strength in his arguments. As a reader we can conclude
that Lenin has the most compelling argument of all due to that fact that
Ritter, Hamilton-Herwig, Engdahl and Fischer all have placed the blame on one
country, group or people or countries, however this is impossible, war is a repeat
occurrence in history, whereas leader, intentions, boarder of countries are
always changing. In this ever changing society, capitalism and war are the only
two constants, so it is far more logical to blame the system of capitalism for
war, than to blame any country or coterie.
In
conclusion we have determined that ‘Decisions for War 1914-1917’ is, at this
point in history, the greatest contribution to the historiography on the causes
of the First World War since Fischer. We make this conclusion, however,
understanding that Hamilton-Herwig’s ideas did not, and could not have the same
general effects as Fischer’s. Fischer published an anti-Germany thesis; he was
an educated German making evidenced claims which blamed his own country for one
of the most devastating wars in history. People were so outraged that they even
appealed to the government to have translations of his book limited, and to
cancel is American lectures in order to ensure his ideas did not become well
known; these sorts of measures were not taken for any of the works of Ritter,
Engdahl or Hamilton-Herwig. The extent
to which Germans went to prevent the spread of Fischer’s ideas encourages
readers to explore to what degree Fischer’s claims were the ugly truth about
Germany’s intentions in 1914, for surely Germany would not have so adamantly
objected to the spread of complete blasphemy. Engdahl and Ritter both make
convincing points as the to causation of the First World War, however in
comparison to Fischer’s thesis, Hamilton and Herwig’s ‘Decision for War
1914-1917’ poses the most compelling and believable theory since Fischer due to
the objectivity of their work in comparison to the others.
According to historian Walter Zapotoczny, the outbreak of war in
1914 was “inevitable”. Zapotoczny believed this inevitability of war was
brought about by a “mood for war in Europe”, caused by a convergence of
different ideals, different politics, and different views. This collision of
different perspectives during the war, has caused numerous different theses and
ideas as to the reasons for the outbreak of war. These different theses have
created an incredibly rich historiography surrounding the outbreak of the First
World War. This rich historiography provides us with valuable and controversial
arguments as to the reason the First World War occurred. Fischer’s thesis will
be highlighted as a comparison in this essay due to its controversy and its
value, as it provides historians with a German perspective in which Germany is
sentenced to the blame. Fischer believed Germany was to blame for the war, and
this essay will compare the value of Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis, to the value
of Fischer’s thesis, Ritter’s thesis, Ferguson’s Thesis, and A.J.P. Taylor’s
thesis. The value of these theses will be assessed by their objectivity, their
contribution to arguments, their development of a different perspective, and
how they have furthered historical understanding.
“There was no "slide" to war,
no war caused by "inadvertence," but instead a world war caused by a
fearful set of elite statesmen and rulers making deliberate choices.” Richard
F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, The Origins of World War I (2003). Hamilton
and Herwig’s “Coteries of the Elite” thesis can be summarized by this one
quote. Hamilton and Herwig believed that the war could not be blamed on a
nation, or on several events, but that the outbreak was caused by “a fearful
set of elite statesmen and rulers making a deliberate choice”. According to Tracie
Provost of Middle Georgia college, Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis “moves beyond
the arguments put forth by Fischer and his supporters, and refutes arguments
that rely on traditionally overarching causes like nationalism, imperialism,
alliance systems, and militarism.” This demonstrates that their thesis provides
historians with a perspective and argument that does not stem from traditional
materials and brings a different outlook on the reason war broke out. This
furthers historical arguments and understanding by introducing a new outlook in
which “a single belligerent, event, or ideal is not to blame”. Their thesis is
created with very little subjectivity as they “look at the motivations of all
belligerents” and “finally seek to prove that individuals did indeed have an
impact on the choice to go to war.” Before their thesis very few historians
believed that individuals could be responsible for the outbreak of World War I.
The value of Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis lies within its ability to develop a
new historical perspective in which individuals can be to blame for the
outbreak of the First World War. Even in more obvious cases such as the Second
World War, very few historians believe individuals such as Hitler alone caused
it. Hamilton and Herwig brought us the thesis that placed blame on the
individual statesmen of World War 1, it is valuable but varied greatly from
Fischer’s thesis.
In 1961 Fischer published a thesis in
which he blamed German military pressure, German expansionism, and German political
and social concerns for the outbreak of the First World War. His thesis was
believed to be “a fundamental attack on the usual interpretation of German
History.” (Wallace G. Mills) Fischer’s thesis is extremely opposed to Hamilton
and Herwig’s as Fischer places blame solely on a nation. Fischer’s thesis
states that Germany’s military thought war with Russia was inevitable, and the
German government went to work on war immediately to start a war after the news
of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It also states that German
expansionism in Central Europe, Central Africa, and the Middle East along with
the German government’s eagerness to go to war were to blame for the outbreak
of the First World War. This thesis has been accepted as one of the most
valuable arguments surrounding the Origins of the First World War as it is the
first time a German historian placed the blame on Germany. This not only
demonstrates a shift in the way German history is taught but also demonstrates
a high level of objectivity. It provided German historians with a new
perspective, and brought details of German social and political concerns that
were unknown by many non-German historians. This is why Fischer’s thesis is an
incredibly important argument and should be considered highly valuable.
Fischer’s thesis may have been objective, however it could be devalued by its
dependence on Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s willingness to go to war. “The
validity of Fischer’s argument is the question of whether or not B-H was
pursuing expansionist and aggressive policies.” (Mills) Fischer’s argument
could be flawed, as “B-H was very reluctant to crush unions and socialist
parties He feared the effects on national unity. On the outbreak of war, this
concern led him into urgent negotiations with socialist politicians urging them
not to oppose the granting of war credits.” (Mills) This could evidence the
idea that German government officials did not want a war, however according to
Fischer this “indicated only that B-H hoped to avoid repression of the
socialists, but that he was willing to do it if they did not fall into line.”
Although this could harm the validity of Fischer’s thesis, Fischer was also one
of the first historians to state that it wouldn’t have been a “World War” if
Britain hadn’t been involved. He mentions this when describing German
predictions for outcomes if the second Balkan crisis was pushed. This brought
even more value to Fischer’s thesis as it provided historians with the idea
that “Britain’s inclusion made the European War a World War”. This idea is
still being debated today and this is because of Fischer’s contribution in his
thesis. Overall Fischer’s thesis is sometimes accepted and is a highly valuable
contribution to the historiography of World War 1. However some historians
didn’t agree with Fischer’s thesis or its validity.
Gerhard Ritter was a German who
attacked Fischer’s thesis. He developed a thesis that would directly counter
many of Fischer’s points. He states that “there is no evidence of a unified
German plan for war or world domination”, “Germany acted defensively to
preserve tis position in the existing status quo”, “The main German aim was to
support Austria-Hungary”, “The German government realized too late that the
conflict could not be localized”, “The German government put too much reliance
on military planners, who decided war plans which were bound to lead to an
escalation of the crisis”, and “Bethmann-Hollweg tried honourably and
desperately to disentangle his country from being drawn into war, but became a
victim of the military planners.” These six points serve as a reasonably
valuable argument as they force Fischer to further his argument with evidence,
however this thesis does not bring any new perspectives to the table. These
points that Ritter argues are merely points “that a subjective Germany forced
into the minds of its people” (Victor E. Neuburg). Ritter was a soldier during
the war during which time Germany’s propaganda was heavily forced onto people,
and post war Germany was forced to believe that Germany was not to blame, and
until Fischer introduced the idea to German History, Germans were taught to
believe Germany was not to blame. This devalues Ritter’s argument heavily as
has the subjectivity of a German soldier affected heavily by propaganda and
German history teachings. This lack of objectivity and the repetition of a
German argument makes Ritter’s thesis rather devalued and further increases the
value of Fischer’s argument due to Fischer’s altering of German history.
Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis is certainly more valuable than Ritter’s.
Another historian who “opposes”
Fischer’s thesis is Niall Ferguson. Ferguson “challenged the dominant
perspectives on the origins of the First World War”, and stated in his thesis
that “Britain was to blame”. He states that “Britain’s decision to intervene
caused it to become a global war rather than a European war”. He then goes on
to say “there isn’t a necessary link between the German decision to risk a war
on the continent, and the British decision to intervene”. With these statements
he believes that Britain caused it to become a global war, and that it would
have been a smaller scale European War without Britain’s intervention. Although
he opposes Fischer completely he shares certain similarities in opinion with
Hamilton and Herwig. he states that “Britain’s intervention in the war was
caused by British politicians eagerness to go to war, and the Liberals fear for
their jobs”. However one could suggest that “These politicians
are not working class, they will be okay and so this turns their decision of
money into a partial decision of class and that is no reason to go into war”. Even so Niall Ferguson’s argument would
suggest that, to an extent, he agrees with Hamilton and Herwig’s idea that
individuals can be the cause of war. And although his thesis was published
prior to Hamilton and Herwig’s, he does not focus on the idea that the
individual is responsible for the outbreak of the war, and so Hamilton and
Herwig’s thesis maintains its value in introducing a new perspective.
Ferguson’s thesis however has large value as it forces many “Ally” historians
to take a different perspective and perhaps look at Britain’s faults during the
outbreak of World War I. His objectivity could be questioned as although he is
British he came from a middle class Scottish background in which he has stated
he was raised by his father with “a working class sense of self-discipline”, an
one could hypothesize he was raised with an anti-England mindset, which could
suggest a degree of subjectivity against the British politicians, however this
cannot be certain and so his thesis is definitely objective to an extent.
Ferguson’s thesis does not have much supporting evidence, it may not be right,
and may be contrary to many other historians beliefs, but his thesis is
definitely valuable. As, much like Fischer, he has caused people to question
the history taught in their homelands. And in fact, in 2003 historian Robert
Skidelsky stated that “Niall Ferguson’s “Pity of War” is the most important
recent book on the subject”.
In A.J.P Taylor’s “The Struggle for
Mastery in Europe” (1980) he shares a similar view to that of Fischer. He
believes that Germany was to blame for the outbreak of the First World War. He
heavily blames German expansionism for the outbreak of the First World War. He
also states in his book “The Origins of the Second World War” that “Article 231
was correct to blame Germany for World War I”. This thesis is not necessarily
valuable as it is almost exactly the same as Fischer’s, however it does aid
Fischer’s thesis. As the support of a historian like A.J.P Taylor provides
Fischer’s thesis with the support of influential non-German historians.
Although Taylor had controversial views about the Second World War, he was well
respected and his objective support provided Fischer’s thesis with more value.
In conclusion Fischer’s thesis provided
historians with an extremely valuable German objective view. Fischer was the
first German to challenge the dominant German belief and his thesis altered the
way German history is taught. Since Fischer though, there have been many
different and controversial theses that hold great historical value as well.
Hamilton and Herwig provides us with a perspective that does not blame a
nation, or an event, or the traditional ideals of Nationalism, Imperialism, Militarism,
and the Alliance Systems, but instead suggests that the outbreak of war can be
due to the individuals. Ferguson played devil’s advocate and provided
historians with a challenge towards the dominant perception of the outbreak of
World War I. Ferguson’s thesis could be as valuable as Fischer’s if more
evidence was provided, however due to this lack of evidence its only value is
in its ability to cause historians to question what they have been taught. The
lack of evidence devalues it slightly. Ritter’s thesis may not have been as
valuable as others but it did demonstrate the dominant German perception and demonstrated
just how valuable Fischer’s thesis was in altering that perception. With the
support of Taylor it is clear that Fischer’s thesis is the most valuable piece
of historiography surrounding the First World War. However since then Hamilton
and Herwig have provided us with a thesis that makes us question and change the
way we approach history, they have suggested that individuals can be responsible
for the outbreak of the War. This different perspective, this alternate thesis,
is the most valuable piece of historiography since Fischer.
Example 4
Hamilton and Herwig’s The Origins of World War I focuses on the decisions made by individuals leading up to the outbreak of the First World War. This work features an extensive collection of motives of the decision-making elites. As well as this, it assesses many of the other leading causes of the First World War. In providing a critical viewpoint, crucial to the evaluation of the existing postulations, Hamilton and Herwig’s work can certainly be praised. In their introduction particularly, Hamilton and Herwig offer a lucid argument against the Alliances as a valid cause. They clearly define the various obligations of the countries involved in the Alliances, going on the conclude – among other things - that “Russia was not obliged by any alliance to come to the aid of Serbia” and “Germany was not contractually bound […] to issue the famous ‘blank check’ to Austria-Hungary”. This criticism has oft been made, many historians, including Niall Ferguson, having stated that the countries were not required to come to the aid of their allies and thus must have had ulterior motives. In order to find out the truth, no stone may be left unturned, and in this, Hamilton and Herwig are quite successful.
Hamilton and Herwig argue that the decisions for the First World War were made by a small group of elites, be they military, political or diplomatic. This was not a revolutionary statement in the way that Fischer’s was, as it was surely not the first time that this theory was put forth, Fischer himself having asserted that Germany’s elite had steered towards war. Although Hamilton and Herwig acknowledge this repetition, they are quick to point out that their argument has been brushed aside too easily, arguing that modern-day historians are blind to these causes due to their tendency to look for “big” causes for big events. They quote Tocqueville in this, who states that historians of today “assign great general causes to all petty incidents.” In this fashion, they are not unlike Fischer in attempting to look at the war from a new angle, careful not to fall into the trap Tocqueville warns of. This attempt to revolutionize the thinking of historians of the time, is valid, yet lacks the controversy to cause a real stir.
Fischer’s Germany’s Aims in the First World War was undoubtedly a turning point in the historiography of the First World War, presenting a new angle to an often-discussed question; what caused the First World War? What made it controversial was that it was the first time a modern German historian admitted to the possibility of Germany being at fault. This went in direct contradiction of the previous claims made by various German historians and the general population that the “War Guilt” clause Treaty of Versailles was unfairly imposed upon the Germans. In this way it was a daring and valuable contribution, proposing to the Germans that the causes of the War may have been unconventional. To realize the significance of such a thesis, one must only look at the attempts made by other German historians, including Gerhard Ritter, whose antithesis we will look at later, to silence Fischer. In comparison, Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis pales, not causing nearly as much of an uproar in the public, although this may in part be due to its more recent publication date.
Acclaimed historians such as Christopher Clark clearly classify Fischer’s thesis as a major contribution, referring to texts written on the topic as “before- and post-Fischer”. The fact that Clark chooses to use the publication of Fischer’s thesis as a marking point in time is clearly a sign that Fischer’s findings were critical in changing the way historians regarded the causes of the First World War. Not only did Fritz Fischer’s treatise lead way to a new epoch in the historiography of the War, he also brought new evidence to light. In his Griff nach der Weltmacht, Fischer reveals evidence of the decision of the Germans to start a war in 1914, made in a war council held in 1912 by Kaiser Wilhelm II and the military and naval leaders of the Reich. This is quite monumental evidence, as it provides the proof necessary to be able to assess to intent of the Germans at the time. Hamilton and Herwig, however, bring only a few new ideas to the table, rather developing the ideas of others, the elitism theory having been published over two decades previously by Field and Higley. In providing a new angle as well as fighting the limitations imposed by German culture Fischer aided the pursuit of truth in which many historians are still engaged today, in a way that Hamilton and Herwig could not.
Perhaps the most notable opponent to Fischer’s thesis was Gerhard Ritter, a German historian who went to great lengths to silence Fischer and denounce his claims, especially in his work Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis? One must approach Gerhard Ritter’s thesis with caution, as the fervour with which he opposed Fischer suggests a personal connection to the matter, Ritter having gone so far as to prevent Fischer from travelling to spread his “anti-German” views.
As far as the historiography of the Great War goes, the Germans have been notorious for their attempts to censor any inculpatory evidence, largely as a result of the endeavours made by the German diplomat Bernhard von Bülow a year after the end of the Great War. However, one may argue that it is in the historians’ interest to welcome any reasonable and justified criticism, as this is beneficial in developing a solid thesis. Ritter offers up several claims to challenge Fischer’s thesis, claiming that the Germans had not acted, as Fischer professed, offensively, but rather in defence of Austria-Hungary and in response to the threatening mobilisation of the Russian troops. For the most part, Ritter claims that Fischer attributed too much significance to certain events, for example the various comments made by leading figures and accuses him of falsifying quotes, including the statement allegedly made by German general Helmuth von Moltke, that a “speedy attack” on Serbia were necessary. In addition, he sustains that Germany was actually trying to prevent the war in Bethmann-Hollweg’s caution to Vienna. Ritter believes that the Great War was a result of the internal aspects of Austria-Hungary.
One could say that Gerhard Ritter and Hamilton and Herwig’s theses are disparate to the point at which they cannot be compared, Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis not being an attack of another and not spurred by personal sentiment, however there are certain similarities. Most significantly, both theses attempt to counter a widely accepted argument – which Fischer’s wasn’t at the time, but now has come to be – and both theses concern themselves not only with their own arguments, but also with the invalidation of others. Ritter, however, had an ulterior motive, having often expressed his sense of duty to the restoration of German nationalism post-World War II. While we cannot discount a thesis purely based on the bias it may contain, and Ritter’s thesis is certainly useful in providing a critical view of Fischer’s thesis we would deem Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis more appropriate and as a result, more valuable than Ritter’s.
Niall Ferguson contributes yet another antithetical view to the debate, claiming that Great Britain was at fault, forcing Germany into a war as a product of the incompetent leadership of the British diplomats. His book The Pity Of War: Explaining World War One attracts attention for his use of hypothetical history, contending that Europe under an Imperialist German regime would have been prosperous and peaceful. Although adherent to our definition of “valuable” as a thesis which stirs debate, Niall Ferguson’s theory has yet to provide an argument of the volume that Fischer did. His speculations, largely based on hypothetical events, are difficult to evaluate. Using the benefit of hindsight, he claims that, had Britain not stepped in, the Second World War would have been prevented “And Lenin could have carried on his splenetic scribbling in Zurich, forever waiting for capitalism to collapse”. He is overly critical of Britain, accusing them of almost single-handedly causing the war to escalate worldwide. Like most other theses discussed here, Ferguson sets about refuting other causes, doing so by attacking what Ferguson describes as the ten myths of the First World War, among them the idea - of which Fischer was a subscriber - that Germany was greatly militarist before 1914, the idea that Germany and its growing naval army presented a threat to Britain and that Britain’s intervention to stop Germany was important for the well-being of the countries surrounding.
When placed in contrast with Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis, The Pity Of War seems very critical, playing, as Christopher Clark would put it “the blame-game”. While his arguments may be valid, they are quite hypothetical in their constitution and, overall very one-sided. Ferguson makes very brazen predictions, at one point stating, “If the British Expeditionary Force had never been sent, there is no question that the Germans would have won the war.” In examining past events, historians must be careful to make such strong predictions, as they will never be more than speculation. Ferguson barely seems to pause to consider the implications of the statements he makes, so daring that they can barely be compared to the ones made by Fischer and the like. By definition, hypothetical assertions are impossible to prove, forever confined to the space of “what if?” He disregards the large amount of variables present when he states that Britain’s intervention and the Second World War are inherently linked, even going so far as to claim that the Great War was the “greatest error of modern history”. While Ferguson’s thesis is of interest, it cannot be seriously considered as a step towards the truth, as he condemns the decision-makers of the time, finding potential links between events, rather than finding the cause of the First World War. In this comparison, Hamilton and Herwig’s work is superior, as it attempts to assess the causes, rather than surmise causal links.
Finally there is Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went To War in 1914 to consider. In a sobering take, Clark depicts a great number of the decision-makers involved as wary men, unhappy at the prospect of a war. He is adamant in his attempt to refresh the discussion, which, he admits, has been almost “done to death”. He disputes Fischer’s assertions, attempting to dissipate the blame rather than find one main aggressor. As Hamilton and Herwig did, Clark warns of a trap historians may blunder in to, looking for categorical causes rather than concentrating on how the war came about. These kinds of attempts should be praised, as the importance of being critical of oneself in such affairs is immense. Relating back to the title, Clark states that none of the belligerents wanted a war, but rather “sleepwalked” into it. This theory, is not, as fresh as Clark claims it to be, having been the most popular in the 1920s to 30s, many American historians, among them Fay and Barchek, coming to the defense of Germany, some even going so far as to portray Germany as a victim of the war.
Clark’s thesis can be considered equal to Hamilton and Herwig’s in the way that they both attempt to revive previous arguments, dissipating the blame from a single country or cause to all countries, and thus all coteries. Of all the theories discussed, these two are the most complementary and the most similar. They can both be considered valuable, though not to the extent that Fischer’s theory was, as they are not revolutionary, offering a different view, and not nearly as controversial. Perhaps one could argue that, as all areas of the event are being explored, few works will be able to shock in the way that Fischer’s did. Entirely new causes are rare and far between, and will continue to decrease as their number must be finite. In the grand view of things, there are only a limited amount of possible causes, however big this amount may be, and although these are up for development and exploration, historians will be hard-pressed to find a new cause. Following this line of argument, one can argue that no one thesis written recently can be considered the most valuable, especially since we do not have the benefit of hindsight in order to be able to assess the long-term impact the theses have made.
In conclusion we have assessed a few of the enormous number of theories on what caused the First World War, having first defined Fischer’s controversial thesis as a “valuable” contribution, that is, a contribution which stirs a debate and aids in finding the true cause of the war. Having looked at various other theses, including the work of Gerhard Ritter, Niall Ferguson and Christopher Clark, we have come to the conclusion that Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis, though more valuable than the other theses discussed here, cannot be deemed the most valuable contribution since Fischer’s thesis, and lacks the controversy and ability to revolutionize the thinking of historians that Fischer’s has.
Example 5
Who is to blame for the First World War has been one of the most discussed topics in History, thus it has a very rich and extensive historiography. In 1961 Fischer shook the foundations of the debate by writing from within Germany that Germany had intended for war in 1914. That is why the importance of books and thesis written after Fischer’s are constantly being compared to his Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918. Thus this essay will praise the work of Fischer and Hamilton and Herwig, but also pit them against Fischer’s nemesis Gerhard Ritter, Niall Ferguson and communist Revolutionary Lenin. First the essay will begin with an explanation and evaluation of Fischer’s thesis, followed by Gerhard Ritter’s counter arguments. Next the Coteries of the Elite by Hamilton and Herwig followed by Lenin’s “Imperialism the Highest form of Capitalism” theory and finishing with Niall Ferguson’s contribution.
Fischer’s main arguments could be categorized under two headings. Firstly Military pressure and secondly German Expansionism. Fischer writes that there was a widely held conviction among both German politicians and it’s military leaders that war with Russia was unavoidable. This was because, since the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia had embarked on curial and extensive reforms toward its military. Also that it would be better to have a war before 1917, in order to fight Russia before those reforms would become effective. Thus Fischer argued, that these elements made Germany want war the sooner the better. Next German Expansionism. Fischer states that Germany was the most unsatisfied of the Great Powers and the most eager to change the way Europe was structured. Thus there was support for German expansionism in 3 directions. Firstly MittelEuropa, this was to consist of central and eastern Europe. It supposed that Russia would greatly reduce both it’s power and territory after facing defeat at the hands of Germany. Also the annexation of the industrial north-east of France, which would be reduced to an economic satellite of Germany. Clearly France and Russia wouldn’t agree with this so as a prerequisite they had to be crushed militarily. Next was MittelAfrika. It was a concept of joining up the 3 main African colonies; South West Africa, German East Africa and Cameroon. Some of MittelAfrika’s success depended on the success of Mittel Europa, an example would be Congo. If Belgium was annexed by Germany or at least became a satellite state Congo would fall into the possession of Germany as one of its colonies. However critics of Fischer have been critical of some aspects of the theory. Firstly his timetable has been criticized as being inaccurate, specifically Hollweg’s Septemberprogramm outlining German war aims, which wasn’t produced until the war had begun.(11) Another criticism of the Fischer thesis and arguably its biggest downfall is blaming Germany entirely for the First World War. While everything Fischer wrote about Germany was accurate many similarities can be found conjunctly with the actions of the other great powers of Europe, for example both Germany’s and Britain’s behaviour in southern Africa.
In order to understand the effect that Fischer’s “Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918” we must first understand the atmosphere of early 1960s Europe. “German historians and the German public in the 1950s [early 1960s], had accepted the thesis that Hitler had unleashed the Second World War. They maintained, however, following a dictum of Lloyd George, that all the powers participating in the First World War had blundered into it”(1) Meaning that they all bore the same responsibility and measure of guilt. However as Fischer mentioned in Fischer Twenty-Five years later: Looking Back at the Fischer Controversy and its consequences, he rudely removes the soft pillow which satisfied conservative Germans had hoped to sleep on. American historian Klaus Epstein from Brown University went as far as to say that “when Fischer published his findings in 1961, he instantly rendered obsolete every book previously published on the subject of responsibility for the First World War, and Germanys aims in that war.”(2) Having had such a profound effect across both historians and the German public it is only natural that established Historians of the time would instantly begin to criticize his thesis. Historian Gerhard Ritter was the most prominent opposer to Fischer’s view on World War One and clearly believed in Lloyd George’s dictum that all powers were to blame, and furthered said train of thought by saying that World War One had been a defensive war.(3) Ritter subscribed to the idea of Political Idealism which theorizes that a strong inherent good can be found in human nature. Thus accordingly Ritter both believed and portrayed Bethmann Hollweg as a saint, a resistance fighter who fought against the emperor, party leaders and industrialists. This obviously conflicts with Fischer’s characterization of him as a man who had three plans for war; limited war, a general European war, and finally a world war.(4) Ritter believed Fischer’s theory to be so controversial that he with “together with Karl Dietrich Erdmann sent a letter to the German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Shroeder, asking him to cancel the tour of lectures in the United States to which”(5) Fischer had been invited too. Thus the extent of impact is evidenced not only by the amount of people reacting to the thesis but also by the magnitude of the reactions that Fischer’s Thesis generated.
Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis argues that small but powerful and wealthy groups of people in each country acted selfishly in order to further their own ambitions. While Fischer’s thesis argues that only Germany’s elite is to blame, similar to how Ferguson blames Britain’s elite, Hamilton and Herwig blame the elite of every nation. They wrote “First, World War 1 resulted from decisions taken by leaders of the great powers, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and Britain. Secondly, in those nations the decision to go to war was made by coteries of five, eight, or perhaps ten persons. (5) Perhaps what is most controversial of Decisions for War is the way it dissects common causes for the World War One, many of which are taught in schools around the world, and how they essentially neutralise the value of said causes.
An example would be the Alliance system Theory and how the different alliances caused a domino effect which eventually lead to war. In Decisions for War, Hamilton and Herwig examine the implications of the alliances. It specifies that if a Member of the alliance was attacked (an unprovoked aggression), the others were obligated to come to that members defence. However all the declarations of War were purely situational decisions made in response to immediate events. Germany was obligated to help Austria-Hungary only if one of the entente powers attacked unprovoked however the Dual Monarchy’s move against Serbia did not in any way obligate Germany. Proof being that Italy’s leaders recognised the move against Serbia as a provocation and quoting the terms of the alliance remained and declared themselves neutral. More so this belief that men in 1914 would be honourable and faithfully defend the treaties. In 1908 King Emanuele III of Italy said “I am more then ever convinced of the utter worthlessness of treaties or any agreements on written paper. As they are worth the value of the paper.”(6) The Coteries of the Elite thesis is not only relevant for neutralising common causes but also because it agrees with both Hans Morgenthau political realism, and Lenin’s views on how Imperialism, the highest form of capitalism caused World War One. Hans Morgenthau’s theory on Political realism states that there are six Principles of Political Realism. Mainly it focuses on how State interest is defined as the pursuit of power and since states are just a collective group of individuals and by nature individuals wish to acquire power then both state and individual interest lies in the acquisition of power. The Coteries of the Elite thesis argues that the selfish actions of groups not bigger then ten persons were responsible for World War One is viewing the cause of the world through the paradigm of Morgenthau’s Political Realism, offering thus an explanation that would result in the only reason World War One happened was because of different individual’s pursuit of power.
The leader of Russia, Vladimir Lenin published a book in 1917 called “Imperialism, the Highest form of Capitalism” In said book Lenin names Capitalism as being the primary cause of World War 1. He derives his socio-political analysis from another book written by John A. Hobson called Imperialism: A Study. Imperialism: A study states that the Imperialism is generated because the constant competition for resources generated by the Capitalist drive of nations. Lenin adapted this idea and furthered it by taking into account not only colonisation but the taking over and exploiting another country. Lenin’s ideas are important for various reasons. Firstly it talks about economical gain being the cause of the First World War, which is relatively original. Next it supports the ideas of both Fischer and Hamilton and Lewis. Lenin agrees with Fischer that its Germany’s militarism that causes World War One.
However while Fischer argues that the reasons for this being was because Germany wanted to ultimately gain more power and establish itself as the superior world power, while a part of it was to control more resources and thus expand its economic frontiers another part was simply for the power gained by becoming the strongest world power. Lenin however argues that the reason why Germany wishes to go to war against the rest of Europe is not for power but its fuelled by the capitalistic desire of not only wanting more resources but also wanting more. An example of two countries which would fit the description would be both Germany and Britain and their fight for the control of South Africa and Witwatersrand gold mines. Lenin’s argument would blame Capitalism for inciting the Boer vs British conflict. Even claiming that it was the capitalistic nature of both Sates that incited the conflict. More importantly after the First World War South-West Africa got taken over by Britain, which might show a traceable (yet far fetched) link to why Britain got involved in World War One. His capitalism ideas also link to Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis Coteries of the Elite because small groups of people would often be motivated by economic gain. The Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwest-Afrika would fit Hamilton and Herwig’s description perfectly, and their desire to obtain new resources ultimately conflicting with Britain’s territory and thus adding one more reason to go to war. If they hadn't felt the craving for wanting more, their actions wouldn’t have eventually lead to war since the only reason war is viable is to increase your relative economic strength in comparison to others, since after fighting a war, while the winner is able to maintain its economy in decent shape, losers usually fall into crisis after they can’t pay their debt. However it must not be forgotten that Lenin has very strong and prominent biased towards capitalism, as he stated “The Capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”(7) Hinting that he wishes to hang Capitalists. This clearly shows us the extent of his dislike of capitalism as well as how biased he is towards capitalism and why he would blame it for causing World War One. While Lenin’s thesis does offer a perspective of the economic factors motivating the conflict between the powers it serves more as added value towards thesis like Fischer’s or Hamilton and Herwig’s Coteries of the Elite then on it’s own.
Niall Ferguson wrote The Pity of War: Explaining World War One, with the help of research assistants in only 5 months. Prior its release the book generated much controversy. Specifically Ferguson’s suggestion that it might have been beneficial to Europe if Germany had won the War.(8) He also disagreed with the Fischer thesis by claiming that while Germany did wage a preventative war in 1914, it was largely forced by irresponsible British diplomacy. He specifically accused British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey of not maintaining a clear view on weather Britain would enter the war or not, which in turn confused Berlin over what the British attitude was on intervention in the war. Also accusing Britain of allowing a regional European War escalate into a world war. He goes against some thesis’ firstly against Fischer’s thesis on the militarisation of Germany and Fischer’s claim that it was Germanys militarism that was partly at fault for World War 1. He counter argues that in comparison to both France and Britain Germany’s militarism was insignificant.(9) He agree’s with Lenin’s interpretation of capitalism and economic gain being one of the driving forces of the war by claiming that British policy was not out of fear of Germany but instead Germany poses no threat to both Britain and France. Furthermore France and Britain act in economic self interest.(10) However perhaps the most controversial aspect of Niall Ferguson’s book is his use of counterfactual history. Counter factual history attempts to answer the question what if. The main concern with that is that its very speculative and hard to judge weather that would have happened since history isn’t something you can just change a couple variables and repeat. The Butterfly effect which is part of Chaos theory states that a small seemingly irrelevant change can result in a large difference in a later state. Thus the repetition of history is impossible, which makes it difficult to answer the question ‘what if’ since it judges intent or “mens rea” rather than what actually occurred.
This essay has evaluated Fischer’s controversial thesis, Hamilton and Herwig’s Coteries of the Elite thesis, Fischer’s archenemy Gerhard Ritter, Communist revolutionary and Leader of Russia Vladimir Lenin and lastly Niall Ferguson and his The Pity of War: Explaining World War One. After Careful evaluation and answering the original question is Hamilton and Herwig’s “coteries of the elite” thesis the most important addition to historiography on the over documented subject of causes of the first world war. Yes, due to it’s dismantling of existing causes and the revelation of not blaming Germany for World War One, but instead showcasing the new idea of the selfish agendas of elite groups through out Europe being responsible for World War One. That being said Fischer Theory created a bigger shock to historians and the public alike, however that was most likely do to the atmosphere of 1960s Germany and the attempt to resolve Germany from blame than anything else.
Bibliography
11 Wolfgang J. Mommsen,Der autoritäre Nationalstaat (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch 1990), translated as Imperial Germany 1867-1918. Politics, culture, and society in an authoritarian state (London: Arnold 1995). 1 Fischer Twenty-Five years later: Looking Back at the Fischer Controversy and its consequences. 2 Epstein, Klaus Review: German War Aims in the First World War pages 163-185 from World Politics, Volume 15, Issue # 1, October 1962 page 170 3 Fischer Twenty-Five years later: Looking Back at the Fischer Controversy and its consequences. 4 Mills, Wallace G. "Fischer." Fischer. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. . 5 Decisions for War Hamilton and Herwig 6 Decisions for War Hamilton and Herwig 7 "Lenin Quotes." Lenin Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. . 8 Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War, Basic Books: New York, 1998, 1999 pages 460–461 9 Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War, Basic Books: New York, 1998, 1999 pages 27–30 10Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War, Basic Books: New York, 1998, 1999 pages 68–76
Example 6
The
Great War is one which “seems to defy explanation.” It has caused
historians to question and analyze the causes and origins of its
commencement and has led to the formulation of many different theories
on who is to blame. Hence, it is not surprising that the First World War
has the richest amount of historiography and literature than any other
war. The thesis of Fritz Fischer, written in the mid-twentieth century,
was the first to make incredible impact on the world of First World War
debate by stating that Germany was the cause of the Great War. This led
to uproar among all Great War historians. The question statement argues
that Fischer’s contribution to Great War literature is greater than any
other piece concerning the cause of World War One. The other thesis,
that is argued in the statement to be the most valuable contribution
since Fischer is the “coteries of the elites” thesis created by Hamilton
and Herwig in the twenty-first century. In their thesis, they blame the
majority of diplomats and politicians involved in the decision making
for war in 1914. This essay will argue against the statement made in the
question. Although Hamilton and Herwigs’ thesis was important, how do
we measure the value it had over all Historiography published? It is
arrogant to state that there is ever a final word in the field of
History and that one historian’s thesis is better than another. Thus, in
this essay we will examine the key countries involved in taking the
world to war in 1914 through a consideration of a selection of
historians. In summary, the essay will conclude with the opinion that
all theses have to be considered when analyzing the origins of the Great
War and that no one historians point of view is more valuable than
another.
First, we are going to discuss the “coteries of the elite” thesis written by Hamilton and Herwig in their book ‘Origins of the First World War’. Their opinion is clearly stated in the line “There was no "slide" to war, no war caused by "inadvertence," but instead a world war caused by a fearful set of elite statesmen and rulers making deliberate choices.” Essentially, this means that war was caused by leaders and diplomats who made intentional decisions that eventually created high conflict. Their aim in making these decisions was to promote their country in some way. There are many legitimate points in this thesis, especially if we were to take the opinion that capitalism was the cause of World War One. During World War One, all the countries involved were Imperialist societies. In Lenin’s definition of Imperialism, he states that “If it was necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.” Hence, with these two pieces of information in mind, we can argue that all the countries that got involved in the 1914 conflict did so in order fulfill a capitalist-minded intent. For example, Britain arguably got into the war because they saw it as an opportunity to end bankruptcy in their country. Applying this idea to the cause of the First World War is a direct reflection on Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis. The Hamilton and Herwig thesis is an important one as it offers an important perspective for the cause of World War One. Although they show extensive knowledge on the subject, some would argue that it is only a good contribution to the endless debate.
The second thesis we are going to discuss is the thesis announced in 1961 by famous German historian, Fritz Fischer. Fischer’s thesis argues that “Germany was ready to resort to war in order to establish herself as a “Weltmacht”, a Great Power.” Fischer continues to make his point by arguing that the German government saw the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as the excuse needed to act on predetermined plans for war against France and Russia. By doing this, the German government was hoping to fulfill plans for expansionism (creating Mitteleuropa and Mittelafrika, a German dominated Europe and Africa) and deal with political and social problems at home. Fischer took a risk, a professional gamble, by taking the opinion that Germany was solely to blame. Fischer caused a stir and gained notoriety, but more importantly he took the risk of looking at the problem in a new light. He was willing to put his country on the offensive which consequently drew a lot of criticism both and home and abroad. One of Fischer’s biggest rivals was Gerhard Ritter. These two were polar opposites concerning their views on Germany’s involvement in the war and Ritter made sure he did all he could to bring Fischer down. Ritter debated against Fischer’s thesis on many levels saying, for example, that his interpretation of German/Austria-Hungary relations was fraudulent, that he had made up certain pieces of evidence to increase his opinion’s veracity, and that he was biased. Essentially, regarding anything Fischer had said, Ritter would come up with an argument against it. Ritter was so motivated to defeat Fischer that he even went to the West German Foreign Ministry to persuade them to cancel the travel funds that were to be given to Fischer for a book tour in the United States in order to prevent Fischer from spreading his “anti German” views. Another historian who criticized Fischer was Niall Ferguson who said "Yet there is a fundamental flaw in Fischer's reasoning which too many historians have let pass. It is the assumption that Germany's aims as stated after the war had begun were the same as German aims beforehand.”
Gerhard Ritter offers a third perspective, stating that Germany was not the cause of the war, although their aggressive foreign policy did risk conflict. He argues that their foreign policy was defensive due to its aim to keep Austria-Hungary in power. He also believes that Germany’s support for Austria-Hungary’s invasion on Serbia was purely supportive and had nothing to do with provoking war. Whether in describing the Schlieffen Plan or Germany’s general mobilization, Ritter normally argued in support of Germany. In summary, he believed that while Germany did play a role in the outbreak of war, they did not “deliberately, aggressively, or consciously provoke it.” He is most well known for his work in proving the falsehoods lying within the Fischer thesis though his own thesis has proven to be one which deserves equal consideration as well. Though some agree that it is an important perspective, there have been arguments against Ritter’s thesis as well. Some believe that Ritter’s thesis is making excuses for Germany. This could be supported by the fact that Germany had become a strong economic power and that they were not afraid of showing it off (the Naval Race for example). It can also be argued that Germany wanted a short war in order to help maintain Germany as the strongest European power, securing control over ports along the Channel thereby helping German trade (and thus further grow the economy). This is a position that Fischer would support. Fischer would similarly agree that the assassination of the Archduke was Germany’s opportunity to start this war. This is evidenced by Germany encouraging Austria-Hungary to make a series of tough demands of Serbia following the assassination and essentially agreeing with any decision made by Austria-Hungary, many of which made war seem more likely.
The final thesis we are going to talk about is that of Niall Ferguson. Niall Ferguson takes a very interesting yet, provocative opinion on the cause of the Great War. In his thesis he states that Britain was the blame. His view is based on the argument that if Britain would have stayed out of the war altogether, it would have remained a regional war that Germany would have won comfortably, thereby preventing the long-term catastrophe which eventually developed. Ferguson also argues that Britain was to blame due to the “recklessness and irresponsibility” exhibited by British diplomats, especially British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. Britain’s ambiguous positions ultimately caused great confusion in Berlin (something that Ritter also argued). In summary, while Ferguson agrees that Germany was the main cause for conflict in 1914, it was only after the UK’s direct involvement that the war turned from being a potentially short-lived regional war into the terrible, long-term world war that it ended up being. Ferguson’s revisionist views are a refreshing addition to the long lived Germany to blame/not to blame debate.
In conclusion, I do not agree with the statement that Hamilton & Herwig's "coteries of the elite" thesis is the most valuable contribution to the Historiography of the First World War since the Fischer thesis. I don’t think there is anyway to fatually determine whether the thesis of one historian is more valuable or important than another. It truly depends on what our personal beliefs and perspectives are. We cannot simply conclude that one historian’s thesis is more valuable that another’s just because it has had a greater impact. Examination of an issue from every angle is essential in getting us closer to the truth of an event as complicated as the cause of World War 1.
First, we are going to discuss the “coteries of the elite” thesis written by Hamilton and Herwig in their book ‘Origins of the First World War’. Their opinion is clearly stated in the line “There was no "slide" to war, no war caused by "inadvertence," but instead a world war caused by a fearful set of elite statesmen and rulers making deliberate choices.” Essentially, this means that war was caused by leaders and diplomats who made intentional decisions that eventually created high conflict. Their aim in making these decisions was to promote their country in some way. There are many legitimate points in this thesis, especially if we were to take the opinion that capitalism was the cause of World War One. During World War One, all the countries involved were Imperialist societies. In Lenin’s definition of Imperialism, he states that “If it was necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.” Hence, with these two pieces of information in mind, we can argue that all the countries that got involved in the 1914 conflict did so in order fulfill a capitalist-minded intent. For example, Britain arguably got into the war because they saw it as an opportunity to end bankruptcy in their country. Applying this idea to the cause of the First World War is a direct reflection on Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis. The Hamilton and Herwig thesis is an important one as it offers an important perspective for the cause of World War One. Although they show extensive knowledge on the subject, some would argue that it is only a good contribution to the endless debate.
The second thesis we are going to discuss is the thesis announced in 1961 by famous German historian, Fritz Fischer. Fischer’s thesis argues that “Germany was ready to resort to war in order to establish herself as a “Weltmacht”, a Great Power.” Fischer continues to make his point by arguing that the German government saw the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as the excuse needed to act on predetermined plans for war against France and Russia. By doing this, the German government was hoping to fulfill plans for expansionism (creating Mitteleuropa and Mittelafrika, a German dominated Europe and Africa) and deal with political and social problems at home. Fischer took a risk, a professional gamble, by taking the opinion that Germany was solely to blame. Fischer caused a stir and gained notoriety, but more importantly he took the risk of looking at the problem in a new light. He was willing to put his country on the offensive which consequently drew a lot of criticism both and home and abroad. One of Fischer’s biggest rivals was Gerhard Ritter. These two were polar opposites concerning their views on Germany’s involvement in the war and Ritter made sure he did all he could to bring Fischer down. Ritter debated against Fischer’s thesis on many levels saying, for example, that his interpretation of German/Austria-Hungary relations was fraudulent, that he had made up certain pieces of evidence to increase his opinion’s veracity, and that he was biased. Essentially, regarding anything Fischer had said, Ritter would come up with an argument against it. Ritter was so motivated to defeat Fischer that he even went to the West German Foreign Ministry to persuade them to cancel the travel funds that were to be given to Fischer for a book tour in the United States in order to prevent Fischer from spreading his “anti German” views. Another historian who criticized Fischer was Niall Ferguson who said "Yet there is a fundamental flaw in Fischer's reasoning which too many historians have let pass. It is the assumption that Germany's aims as stated after the war had begun were the same as German aims beforehand.”
Gerhard Ritter offers a third perspective, stating that Germany was not the cause of the war, although their aggressive foreign policy did risk conflict. He argues that their foreign policy was defensive due to its aim to keep Austria-Hungary in power. He also believes that Germany’s support for Austria-Hungary’s invasion on Serbia was purely supportive and had nothing to do with provoking war. Whether in describing the Schlieffen Plan or Germany’s general mobilization, Ritter normally argued in support of Germany. In summary, he believed that while Germany did play a role in the outbreak of war, they did not “deliberately, aggressively, or consciously provoke it.” He is most well known for his work in proving the falsehoods lying within the Fischer thesis though his own thesis has proven to be one which deserves equal consideration as well. Though some agree that it is an important perspective, there have been arguments against Ritter’s thesis as well. Some believe that Ritter’s thesis is making excuses for Germany. This could be supported by the fact that Germany had become a strong economic power and that they were not afraid of showing it off (the Naval Race for example). It can also be argued that Germany wanted a short war in order to help maintain Germany as the strongest European power, securing control over ports along the Channel thereby helping German trade (and thus further grow the economy). This is a position that Fischer would support. Fischer would similarly agree that the assassination of the Archduke was Germany’s opportunity to start this war. This is evidenced by Germany encouraging Austria-Hungary to make a series of tough demands of Serbia following the assassination and essentially agreeing with any decision made by Austria-Hungary, many of which made war seem more likely.
The final thesis we are going to talk about is that of Niall Ferguson. Niall Ferguson takes a very interesting yet, provocative opinion on the cause of the Great War. In his thesis he states that Britain was the blame. His view is based on the argument that if Britain would have stayed out of the war altogether, it would have remained a regional war that Germany would have won comfortably, thereby preventing the long-term catastrophe which eventually developed. Ferguson also argues that Britain was to blame due to the “recklessness and irresponsibility” exhibited by British diplomats, especially British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. Britain’s ambiguous positions ultimately caused great confusion in Berlin (something that Ritter also argued). In summary, while Ferguson agrees that Germany was the main cause for conflict in 1914, it was only after the UK’s direct involvement that the war turned from being a potentially short-lived regional war into the terrible, long-term world war that it ended up being. Ferguson’s revisionist views are a refreshing addition to the long lived Germany to blame/not to blame debate.
In conclusion, I do not agree with the statement that Hamilton & Herwig's "coteries of the elite" thesis is the most valuable contribution to the Historiography of the First World War since the Fischer thesis. I don’t think there is anyway to fatually determine whether the thesis of one historian is more valuable or important than another. It truly depends on what our personal beliefs and perspectives are. We cannot simply conclude that one historian’s thesis is more valuable that another’s just because it has had a greater impact. Examination of an issue from every angle is essential in getting us closer to the truth of an event as complicated as the cause of World War 1.
Is the thesis of Fischer the most compelling
justification for the outbreak of war in 1914?
With its vast historiography, the origins of the First
World War are arguably the most discussed amongst historians. Fritz Fischer’s
thesis that Germany had made an intentional decision to start a World War by
1914 not only troubled the German’s, but also influenced any other literature
produced on the origins of the war thereafter. The later work of Hamilton and
Herwig in ‘Coteries of the Elite’ suggests individual coteries were the reason
for the outbreak of the Great War, and the war was more a product of Realism
demonstrated through separate parties, politicians and diplomats. Fischer’s
nemesis, Gerhard Ritter gives arguments as to why the Fischer thesis is flawed
and suggests Germany was playing a defensive game leading up to the war. And
Niall Ferguson produces the ‘devil’s advocate’ argument that it was in fact
Britain who is to blame for the start of the Great War. This essay will compare
the works of Fischer, Hamilton and Herwig, Gerhard Ritter, and Niall Ferguson,
and conclude that although it is with fault, the Fischer thesis is the most
compelling justification for the outbreak of war in 1914.
In 1961, Fritz Fischer’s book ‘Griff nach der Weltmacht’ was published. Translated
as ‘Germany’s aims in the First World War’, a most uncomplimentary picture of
pre-First World War Germany is painted and caused havoc amongst the German
civilians at the time. Military pressure, German
expansionism, and social and political concerns are the three categories one
can place Fischer’s contentions. In Fischer’s introduction he claims that
Germany ‘bore a large part of the responsibility for the war’. Never before had
a German agreed that his nation was to blame for the war and they should accept
complete war guilt. Fischer states that because of Germany’s willingness to
expand and become a great power they felt a war would be necessary to
consolidate that power. When the book was published in 1961, his assertions
were named nothing short of audacious. More traditional historians,
particularly the Germans completely disregarded his thesis, whereas more modern
historians supported Fischer. Fischer maintained that Germany "embarked
on a course aiming at nothing less than parity with the British world empire,
if not more." With this, one could assume German foreign policy was more
exaggerated than it really was, thus showing a possible flaw in the historians
thinking. In Fischer’s book, ‘Germany’s aims in the First World War’, the idea
of expansionism is constantly referred back to when discussing Germany’s aims
for war and why a war would be necessary in order to consolidate their power in
the world. The Fischer thesis discards the idea that Germany was dragged into
war by its alliance with Austria-Hungary, and instead replaces this with the
theory that Germany used the murder in Sarajevo as a trigger to begin a
‘defensive European campaign’. Germany’s extensive build up of military and
arms was inextricably linked to a hunger for war, argues Fischer and the sharp
increase of arms could not have been linked to anything other than a want for
war. Between 1910 and 1914, Germany’s expenditure on arms rose by 74%, the
historian claims Germany planned to go to war ‘sooner rather than later’ and
thus increased her expenditure by an excruciating amount. Fischer gives viable
evidence to show Germany’s war aims when stating that while Germany had
increased military expenditure by 74%, France had only increased capital spent
on arms by 10%, probably due to the threat of Germany’s rapid expansion. At the
time, most people agreed that Germany’s entry into the war after the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was purely defensive after the
unexpected mobilisation of Russia, leaving Germany unprotected on the West
side, forcing her to have war against France, leading Britain in too. Fischer
claims that Germany already had intent for war as early as 1897 when he
uncovered old, archived documents from Germany and Prussia showing the will for
a ‘Greater Germany’, as part of their ‘Weltpolitik’ motion, to be established.
Described in the documents, was how a ‘Greater Germany’ could only be achieved
by a war. Sarajevo happened to be a convenient excuse to go to war in a bid for
world domination, as it were. The large amount of evidence Fischer collected
strengthened his case that the war was just a product of Germany’s
‘Weltpolitik’ movement incomparably to any other historian discussing the
origins of war, which made his argument so controversial yet still so valuable.
By 1912 a large number of socialist parties and workers’ unions within the
Reichstag had been formed. German officials, particularly the conservatives
found them to be a threat and wanted to get rid of them. In order to do that a
distraction would be needed, Fischer states a war would be the best way to
cause a distraction so they could suppress these parties by force. Hence
Fischer argues that although the powerful Junkers may not have been ‘actively
seeking’ a war’, they were not doing anything to stop a war out breaking so
they could settle their internal political and social affairs. Of course his
arguments are flawed, as one would not be able to say what these internal
affairs had on the effect of German foreign policy. However, they are still
credible. Fischer gained support from civilians still astounded from the Second
World War by inextricably linking the aims of Germany in the two wars together.
In 2004, in the book ‘Decisions for War’, Hamilton and
Herwig blame separate coteries for the outbreak of the war. Their book is
structured in a ‘History for Dummies’ sort of way, with each segment named
after the individual countries involved. The reader is therefore given a
largely less complicated way of understanding the origins of the First World
War than Fischer had presented in his book, published circa 50 years earlier.
Nationalism, Militarism, imperialism, and the alliance system are all disregarded
in Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis. In the first chapter of the book, the
historians argue why their coteries of elite theory is of greater importance
than the other schools of thought and articulate in a systematic and terse way
how each decision-making coterie led to the formation of a great war. Hamilton
and Herwig came to three conclusions: ‘First, The World War resulted from decisions
taken by the leaders of the five major European nations. Second, in each of
those nations the decision for war was taken by a coterie, by a group of no
more than eight or ten individuals. And third, an adequate explanation for the
war’s origins must center on the considerations that moved those groups of
decision-makers.’ The validity for these theses is proved throughout the book
and other hypotheses made by historians are argued. The authors argue that each
coterie set to ‘maintain, save, or enhance’ their power with no intentions to
strengthen another nation. Groups of between five and ten leaders of each
country, not included in these were the laborers, farmers, or church, resisted
encirclement and the risk of losing status by acting in a way that would most
probably irk a war, according to Hamilton and Herwig. They argue the French
were weak so allied with Russia to not be seen as a declining power. The
leaders of Britain intervened to keep the balance of powers stable, and not to
shield Belgium. Once war had begun the second, weaker tier of nations joined in
to gain what they could from the war, whether it be power, status, or land.
Their arguments contradict those of Fischer, Ritter and Ferguson in that their
arguments all refer back to a person or group of people, rather than to a
nation as a whole. Although useful, their arguments are flawed as they fail to mention
how each of the three elite coteries whom they claim were the main powers to
start the war (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia) were all ruled by an
autocratic monarchy, who were fighting against reform and the perspective of
more liberal nations. Confronting the nationalists and liberals with war and
keeping the traditions alive would possibly halt reform and hold their position
of power, suggesting that the three major dynasties may have all been fighting
for one common goal. Hamilton and Herwig’s book on the outbreaks of war provide
as a good source to acquire a greater understanding on the era, as their views
are moderately alternative. Although it can be praised, their work is not as
valuable to the historian as the likes of Fischer. A lack of evidence is
demonstrated in their book and their arguments are at best, plausible. It lacks
controversy and it is no surprise their work is not as highly regarded as
Fischer.
Gerahard Ritter, a conservative German historian,
categorically disregards the Fischer thesis as one of any use when examining
the causes of the First World War. As a dedicated monarchist he was a critic of
the totalitarian Nazi regime and gives equally compelling evidence as Fischer
as to how Germany was simply playing a defensive game and was dragged into war
through no fault of her own. Where Fischer claims Germany was brought in to war
by diligent planning, Ritter suggests it was pure spontaneity and she had no
aggressive policies in mind before 1914. Ritter responds to Fischer thesis of
Germany’s great increase in military expenditure between 1910 and 1914 by
claiming the only reason a country such as France did not expand their capital
spent on military to this degree was because they could not, rather than they
did not want to. With France’s democratic parliamentary system, the civilians
would not have voted for somebody who’s aims were to increase taxes on the
impoverished people with intent to strengthen the military. He states Germany
did not have this problem as their government was largely autocratic, and the
public had far less input. Thus, the only reason France did not expand military
as much as Germany, is because she was unable to, and Germany’s expansion was
simply a defensive movement. Although Ritter’s points are valid and well
argued, his ideas are neither original, nor contemporary as he simply argues
the points Fischer makes, rather than coming up with new theses. Ritter’s main
argument to Fischer is that Germany’s blame for war was merely the effect of a
‘catastrophic evaluation of European politics at the time’, rather than
predetermined war aims. The blank cheque was meant as a deterrence for war and
to intimidate Serbia, to stop a war from evolving rather than provoke them. His
argument suggests Germany aimed to help its brother by coming to
Austria-Hungary’s defense when the threat of Russia and Serbia lay over her.
Ritter claims Germany was not expecting a war as she did not expect Russia to
support a terrorist state, who had assassinated the Archduke of Austria-Hungary,
nor did Germany believe Russia would mobilise so quickly. It was due to these
miscalculations that a war started, not because Germany had pre-determined it. Ritter
insists the German’s were trying to establish peace in 1914 when the chancellor
of Germany stopped Alsace-Lorraine printing Froncophobic press. This
contradicts Fischer’s point of Germany being ‘aggressive towards their
neighbours in an expansionist way’. Ritter strongly opposed Germany signing
‘Article 231’, the war guilt clause as he believed Germany were playing a
defensive rather than aggressive game and the blame should be shared equally
between the nations involved.
Niall Ferguson, like Fritz Fischer came up with a
completely new and revolutionary thesis as to the origin of the First World
War. His book, ‘The Pity of War’, like Hamilton and Herwig’s was published in
the 21st century and gave historians a completely new outlook on the
cause of the Great War. Ferguson claims that it was not Germany who was the
aggressor, but Britain. He starts of his book by saying that the decision of
Britain to enter the war was of complete spontaneity and the decision was made
light-heartedly by ‘tired and nervous’ politicians on a Sunday afternoon. He
claims the idea of German expansionism is bogus and their motivations were
directed only at Russia because of a sense of weakness rather than wanting
world power. “The German objective was limited to a continental showdown”, says
Ferguson in an interview. This suggests Germany’s ambitions were finite and a
plan for a world war was never made. His points strongly oppose Fischer’s,
which provide for immense value to historians when studying the origins of the
war. But however groundbreaking Fergusons revelations may be, Fischer’s are
more staggering largely due to the time and circumstances at which Fischer’s
thesis was published. The idea that Britain “turned the war from a global war
to a continental war” is highlighted by Ferguson. He claims without Britain’s
intervention with her empire, the war may have been kept within the Balkans.
However, he fails to mention the growing tensions between France and Germany,
which stemmed far previous to 1914, where perhaps a war was inevitable anyway.
Many of Ferguson’s points lack evidence and for that reason his work is
devalued. He claims Germany was Europe’s most ‘anti-militarist’ country. With
one of the largest armies and a navalry competing with Britain’s this theory is
disproved by countless other historians, and at any rate, Germany was more militarist
than Sweden.
In conclusion, although the works of Hamilton and
Herwig, Gerhard Ritter, and Niall Ferguson are all valuable, Fischer’s proves
to be the most compelling justification to the outbreak of the war. With his
ground breaking revelations he produced revolutionary work on why Germany was
to blame for the war. Not least, because his book was written most recently
after the war, but because of the abundance of evidence he collected. Hamilton
and Herwig produced nothing revolutionary in their book and just provide
amateur historians with a dumbed down version of one perspective of the
outbreak of the war. Ritter’s work is beneficial to argue Fischer’s points but
he composes nothing subversive. And however seductive Niall Ferguson’s ‘The
Pity of War’, it is incomparable to the work of Fischer.
