IBDP Extended Essay
Research Question:
To what extent was Haig responsible
for the massive casualty count on the Somme?
Exam Session: May 2018
Subject: History
Word Count: 3988
Table of Contents
3. Introduction……………………………………………………………………
a. Introduction to
the Great War, the Somme and Argument
4-5. Untrained Army………………………………………….…………………
a.
Untrained Soldiers
b.
Untrained Artillery Officers
c.
Ramifications of Untrained Army
d.
Haig’s Role in the Casualties
6-10. Artillery Issues………………………………………….…………………
a.
Scarcity of Artillery Pieces
b.
British Shell Crisis and Poor
Quality Shells
c.
Ramifications of Artillery
Issues
d.
Criticisms of Haig
e.
Haig’s Role in the Casualties
10-12. Lack of Communication……………………………....…………………
a.
Disputes between Haig and
Rawlinson
b.
Issues with conveying orders
c.
Ramifications of Lack of
Communication
d.
Haig’s Role in the Casualties
12-13. New Technologies……………………………..............…………………
a.
Criticisms of Haig
b.
Other Technological issues
c.
Haig’s Role in the Casualties
13-16. Haig’s Strategies…………………………….................…………………
a.
Haig’s Strategies and their
contribution to the body count
b.
Effectiveness of Strategies
c.
Contextual limitations
d.
Haig’s Role in the Casualties
17. Conclusion……………………………...............................…………………
18-19. Bibliography………………………………………………………………x
Introduction
The Somme was an imperative offensive to the British war effort to prevent a French collapse at Verdun and break the deadlock in Europe. It totaled a devastating 420,000[1] casualties to 620,000 casualties which was a total of 21%-31% of the total British casualties in the Great War in a relatively short period of time (less than 5 months)[2]. Orthodox views generally paint this loss at the Somme as devastating and detrimental to the British war effort, and put the blame on Field Marshal Haig, citing Strategic incompetence, callousness and logistical failures. This essay will investigate to what extent Haig’s contribution to the body count can be acquitted through four main issues as argued by Hew Strachan and Gary Sheffield. These issues entail an untrained army, artillery issues, new technologies and a lack of communication, with analysis of Haig’s strategies as supporting evidence. I will be using Pritzker Literature Award Winning Historian Hew Strachan in particular in this essay to analyze the impact of Haig on the Somme as I was able to interview him personally about the subject. I will be investigating this as it has been a great point of contention for many decades and has massive historical ramifications if the BEF actually did employ a donkey to lead their lions.
Untrained Army:
The BEF at the Somme was as Sheffield described, “an army that went from being a professional force to an army of inexperience soldiers” in the span of a few weeks. [3] Sheffield attributes this to Kitchener’s call for volunteers to join the army and the introduction of conscription, which meant that people who had been normal people weeks earlier were now expected to be a highly trained and organized unit. [4] This issue was compounded by a staff meeting between the British and French generals that decided that the battle would start on “July 1st at the absolute latest”[5] instead of Haig’s planned date of august, giving him much less time to prepare and train his soldiers. Even Haig himself explicitly argued with other officers for a later date of august for this very reason, as he cited one of the three of his main goals to be “train the divisions” and he continued to argue that more time was needed to effectively prepare the soldiers.[6] However, due to the state of the French army in Verdun it was deemed impossible to postpone the date of the assault any longer, leaving Haig to command an army of barely trained soldiers. Haig even contacted Kitchener warning him that the soldiers he commanded were not an army “but a collection of divisions untrained for the field”[7]. Even Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, two very vocal critics of Haig agree that the men that would fight for Britain at the Somme were inadequately trained, citing the lack of resources, officers and equipment as the issues that plagued preliminary training programs in the UK.[8] What was arguably the most detrimental factor however when it came to the lack of training was when it was applied to artillerymen, who were so poorly trained that when it came to the day of the assault, many of their shots were often off target.[9] This as Prior and Wilson argue was highly detrimental due how imperative the bombardment was to the success of the Somme offensive, outlining how the barrage was intended to subdue German machine gun placements and provide cover for advancing British infantry.[10] Prior and Wilson speculate that the poor training on the parts of the gunners in tangent with the limited number of guns and proper ammunition meant that a favorable “creeping barrage” was unable to be adopted, and thus caused a great deal more casualties.[11] However Prior and Wilson do criticize Haig for not halting all the large scale assaults the artillery issues had been remedied and cite his insistence on a continued assault as one of the main reasons for the high body count.[12] However as explained before, Haig in this situation was forced to mold his strategy based on the contextual limitations of the time, as Hew Strachan argues that France was pushing for continual assaults on German lines as to ease up pressure on Verdun.[13] Here it can be seen that Haig’s “army” was not properly prepared for the Somme, and that some of the casualties can be attributed to the lack of preparation and not Haig’s strategic incompetence. Haig was limited in the options that he had and due to the date of the assault being far closer than he had originally anticipated, he did not have the time properly train and organize the army that he had been given. Despite this Haig has still been criticized for his lackluster use of artillery and his inability to adapt to new technologies.
Here we can see that the concept of the bombardment was sound, and that it was weighed down by logistical issues from poor quality shells, to the lack of correct shells. Andrew Roberts argues that this was the main reason as to why the Somme took such a turn for the worse, and he explains that it should not be Haig that should be blamed, as he limited in terms of resources. This was all while he was still being pressure by the French to keep the attack going, it would seem that the failure artillery bombardment had very little to do with Haig, but more the poor quality control on the shells, and the impacts of the British shell crisis of 1915.[24] Worryingly however, it appeared that Haig was unaware of the issues plaguing the artillery. Stating that “the wire has never been so well cut, ‘nor artillery preparations so thorough” the eve before the battle, providing a concise testimony to Haig’s ignorance[25]. John Terraine offers a relatively controversial explanation to this as stated by Phillip Langer, in that Haig appeared to be delusional by the fatal British tendency to “look on the bride side” when it came to conflicting reconnaissance reports[26], many Historians including Hew Strachan however view this explanation as rather puerile.[27] This does somewhat present Haig as rather far too optimistic, or incompetent, as he himself was not able to notice that the artillery preparations would be inadequate in supporting the infantry assault. Regardless of why Haig either refused to recognize these shortcomings or didn’t, it wouldn’t have mattered.[28] Hew Strachan explains that the BEF was essentially under the control of the French army at that time and even if Haig had noticed an issue with the artillery assault he couldn’t have remedied the situation, both due to previously mentioned supply issues and Haig’s obligation to continue the assault.[29] However further indicating to Haig’s possible ignorance is that Haig had sent trench heavy repair equipment with his troops in anticipation of the capture of the trenches on the first day of the Somme, as he assumed they would’ve been damaged by the artillery strikes[30]. This led to a bloodbath. The English forces that had been sent out to capture the German positions were caught in no man’s land on the barbed wire that Haig’s bombardment had failed to destroy, this meant the slow walking British infantry were easy pickings for the well positioned German gunner placements that had been unaffected by the ineffective bombardment[31]. The heavy equipment made it difficult for any advance and even retreat, a soldier-historian General Edmonds wrote that the equipment made it “difficult to get out of a trench, and impossible to move much quicker than a slow walk, or to rise, or lie down quickly”. [32]As a result of this the casualties were immense, ranging up to 64,000, with at least 18,000 killed. [33] This particular mistake made by Haig has been criticized for decades, even by popular culture such as the show Blackadder, who reserved some of their satire to explicitly mock Haig’s stupidity:[34]
Artillery Issues
The introduction of large scale artillery usage at the Somme was subject to some growing pains, as the British had only recently started incorporating artillery operations of this scale at the beginning of the war.[14] These issues were very apparent at the battle of the Somme, with one of them being just the general lack of artillery. Anthony Richards explains that the BEF did not have enough Artillery to provide a devastating “storm-like attack” that Rawlinson and Haig desired, instead settling for a long drawn out bombardment, which of course as Richards states “eliminates the element of surprise” which gave the Germans a long time to prepare for any assault that was preceded by this bombardment. [15] The issue of the scarcity of artillery is exemplified by there being a gun for every 20 yards at the Somme, whereas in previous battles there had been as much as 5 per yard.[16] Compounding this many of the high explosive shells used were of extremely poor quality, so much so that according to the Andrew Roberts and Simon Norfolk around 35% of all British shells fired were duds, which they explained may have been caused by overworked contractors who were pressured by the recent 1915 Shell Crisis.[17] Due to the poor quality of shells however many failed to go off, which meant nowhere near as much damage was caused to German entrenchments that could’ve been done, making the bombardment that was so imperative to a successful British assault so much less effective. Hew Strachan also argues that the British shell crisis of 1915 cause an overwhelming reliance on shrapnel to target infantry in the open, which caused shortages in high explosive shells, further exacerbating the already paling situation to which the artillery was facing.[18] As Strachan explained to me, the abundance of shrapnel shells in contrast meant that Haig was forced to use these shells to bombard the enemy instead of using explosive rounds, which as earlier reconnaissance revealed, would be highly ineffective due to the German usage of concrete shelters.[19],[20],[21] These things together meant that the preliminary bombardment even though effective in some areas, where the enemy artillery and defenses had been subdued, was largely ineffective and failed to completely silence the Germans. To make it even worse the bombardment had displaced the wire in such a way in some areas that made it more difficult for the English and French forces to advance, it also made them easy targets for the German defenders.[22] Prior and Wilson cite a combination of lack of planning on Rawlinson’s part in the secondary stage of the bombardment, pressure from General Head Quarters and a generally poorly supplied artillery branch.[23] Here we can see that the concept of the bombardment was sound, and that it was weighed down by logistical issues from poor quality shells, to the lack of correct shells. Andrew Roberts argues that this was the main reason as to why the Somme took such a turn for the worse, and he explains that it should not be Haig that should be blamed, as he limited in terms of resources. This was all while he was still being pressure by the French to keep the attack going, it would seem that the failure artillery bombardment had very little to do with Haig, but more the poor quality control on the shells, and the impacts of the British shell crisis of 1915.[24] Worryingly however, it appeared that Haig was unaware of the issues plaguing the artillery. Stating that “the wire has never been so well cut, ‘nor artillery preparations so thorough” the eve before the battle, providing a concise testimony to Haig’s ignorance[25]. John Terraine offers a relatively controversial explanation to this as stated by Phillip Langer, in that Haig appeared to be delusional by the fatal British tendency to “look on the bride side” when it came to conflicting reconnaissance reports[26], many Historians including Hew Strachan however view this explanation as rather puerile.[27] This does somewhat present Haig as rather far too optimistic, or incompetent, as he himself was not able to notice that the artillery preparations would be inadequate in supporting the infantry assault. Regardless of why Haig either refused to recognize these shortcomings or didn’t, it wouldn’t have mattered.[28] Hew Strachan explains that the BEF was essentially under the control of the French army at that time and even if Haig had noticed an issue with the artillery assault he couldn’t have remedied the situation, both due to previously mentioned supply issues and Haig’s obligation to continue the assault.[29] However further indicating to Haig’s possible ignorance is that Haig had sent trench heavy repair equipment with his troops in anticipation of the capture of the trenches on the first day of the Somme, as he assumed they would’ve been damaged by the artillery strikes[30]. This led to a bloodbath. The English forces that had been sent out to capture the German positions were caught in no man’s land on the barbed wire that Haig’s bombardment had failed to destroy, this meant the slow walking British infantry were easy pickings for the well positioned German gunner placements that had been unaffected by the ineffective bombardment[31]. The heavy equipment made it difficult for any advance and even retreat, a soldier-historian General Edmonds wrote that the equipment made it “difficult to get out of a trench, and impossible to move much quicker than a slow walk, or to rise, or lie down quickly”. [32]As a result of this the casualties were immense, ranging up to 64,000, with at least 18,000 killed. [33] This particular mistake made by Haig has been criticized for decades, even by popular culture such as the show Blackadder, who reserved some of their satire to explicitly mock Haig’s stupidity:[34]
Melchett: Now, Field Marshal Haig has
formulated a brilliant new tactical plan to ensure final victory in the field.
Blackadder: Now, would this brilliant plan
involve us climbing out of our trenches and walking slowly towards the enemy
sir?
Darling:
How can you possibly know that Blackadder? It's classified information.
Blackadder:
It's the same plan that we used last time, and the seventeen times before that.
Melchett:
E-E-Exactly! And that is what so brilliant about it! We will catch the watchful
Hun totally off guard! Doing precisely what we have done eighteen times before
is exactly the last thing they'll expect us to do this time! There is one small
problem.
Blackadder:
That everyone always gets slaughtered the first ten seconds.
This source being rather valuable
as it outlines how Haig’s infamous strategies at the Somme
So it would seem that although
Haig was unable to change the overall issues that plagued the artillery and was
forced to work with it, he still made some errors that potentially cost the
lives of even more soldiers. Here it can be seen that he was in fact
responsible for some of the casualties, but mainly the criticisms of Haig when
it came to the logistical failures of the Somme, were largely out of his
control. However Prior and Wilson do outline how Haig at some early points
throughout the Somme campaign made detrimental decisions, for example in an
assault on Gommecourt on July 1st 1916 in which his decision to
ignore Rawlinson’s warnings of insufficient artillery support and the
likelihood of disarray and disorganization led to a significant loss and little
ground gained.
Lack of Communication
Haig and Rawlinson had a number of disputes when it came to strategy, exemplified by the ‘grind strategy’ Haig is criticized so heavily for after being forced to be adopted by Haig after Rawlinson failed to adhere by Haig’s “clearly expressed concept of operation” and failure to capture key territories that were at the times poorly defended by the Germans such as the High wood and the Delville wood[35]. In addition, Rawlinson failed to draw upon Hubert De La Goughs reserve forces and ignored him completely upon the prospect of being able to capture key territories that could’ve turned the deadlock. Rawlinson essentially “hung aimlessly in the fourth army HQ” and failed to brief his generals on potential threats and opportunities[36]. This thusly does take some of the blame away from Haig, and makes his actions seem reactionary. Hew Strachan however does explain that this strategic dissonance between Haig and Rawlinson with their discrepancies in “bite and hold” and “penetration” tactics may have affected losses “beyond the end of September as the weather worsened”[37] and this is where the losses “become harder to justify”[38]. This Strachan explains is one of more justifiable accusations of Haig due to his inability to co-ordinate and communicate on an “operational level”[39] as Haig continued heavy bombardments that were most affective for the bite and hold strategy “even though the breakthrough still affected Haig’s thinking”[40]. Another communicational issue that plagued the Somme was the length of the lines of command, as Sheffield explains it, “orders had to be relayed to thousands of men across hundreds of miles of frontline”[41] manually. This mode of giving orders was highly inefficient and hampered operational synergy, due to it being impossible for commanders to lead at the same time because the orders would never be given to all the commanders simultaneously. This made parts of the battle extremely disjointed, as men in the trenches would rarely use radio or telegraph to communicate with their local commanders, generally using runners or carrier pigeons to carry orders from place to place.[42] This is very clearly exemplified by Prior and Wilson in their book The Somme, where they source a highly valuable first-hand account of one of the skirmishes at Contalmaison, outlining the various communicative issues that resulted in the failed capture of the area.[43] The officer cited disjointed co-ordination between neighboring units, who failed to mount a simultaneous assault and “no proper liaisons between units and those on their flanks”. He also explained that they were unable to co-ordinate with artillery to form a coherent plan as how to provide proper suppressing fire in tangent with the attacking infantry, this was mostly put down to archaic artillery officers that were present with each unit, yet had trouble actually reaching artillery command. [44] In addition to this, there were false reports given by the observation balloons that could not be verified due to the lack of portable radio on the battlefield, Sheffield attributes the seemingly incoherent loss of lives at the Somme to this, and not Haig.[45][46] Haig could do very little in terms of coherently giving orders, due to the technological limitations of the times, he was unable to micromanage the front lines and mount organized offensives of this scale due to this.
Haig’s critics outline that he very rarely used modern tactics or equipment e.g. Tanks and Mustard gas, they say that Haig was very stubborn in this aspect, and since he was a cavalryman stuck to traditional methods. However, this is simply untrue. Haig, according to Edward M. Spiers, an expert of chemical warfare requested both tanks and gas shells, yet received them in insufficient quantities during the Somme offensive and thus was unable to effectively utilize them.[47] Haig noted that the French had had a gas shell since 1916, and pressed for one, apparently ‘badgering’ the British government for one according to Spiers, yet as mentioned received minimal quantities, thus putting British forces at a technological disadvantage against an already well entrenched enemy.[48] This effectively debunks the notion that Haig was so stubborn not to use modern technology or equipment, the notes that Haig didn’t use these may just originate from the fact that Britain couldn’t or wouldn’t supply an apt amount of modern equipment. The other major issues were with reconnaissance planes, although they were highly important to determining enemy positions, strengths, trench locations and combatant locations they were also highly limited. William Philpott explains that success rates of air reconnaissance and the general usefulness and clarity of the photography captured by these aircraft were highly variable, and when coupled with weather limitations, they were exceptionally difficult to use.[49] Philpot argues that for a majority of the war reconnaissance data had to be had to be handed to artillery emplacements manually, meaning after a recon run pilots would have to land, process the images and then hand them off to artillery officers for them to start bombardments again.[50] This is another reason as to why Haig was forced to adopt a more intermittent and less constant artillery barrage strategy, due to the technological limitations of the time. This did mean that casualty counts were usually higher, yet again the variables were out of his control and he was incredibly limited by these factors.
Many of Haig’s critics were those of a political background. Lloyd George, Prime Minister at the time and the Secretary of State for war, criticized Haig as being rather tactically simplistic, going so far as to say “I never met a man in a high position who seemed to me so utterly devoid of imagination”. Paul Ham argues with access to British National Archives however, that according to letters between the two and documents concerning their affiliation that Lloyd George had an ongoing feud with Haig and may be biased in this aspect and that he continually “frustrated his plans without actually stepping in”[51], and wrote that George Lloyd was “scheming, untruthful and self-serving”[52] in regards to Haig, as George knew that he would be blamed for the human cost of the battle if it were to come as Nick Lloyd puts it[53]. In short, the intended purpose of George Lloyds public criticisms of Haig was to divert blame from him onto Haig instead to save face. Linking from this historians including Sheffield and Hew Strachan have distanced themselves from the political agendas of those who criticized Haig at the time. They argue, as he did himself, that the massive loss of life was completely necessary and was unavoidable, and that he was unable to alter his strategies in short time frames due to French pressure. To possibly support this, according to several German accounts of the battle of the Somme, the constant unperturbed offensive that Haig was insistent on continuing thoroughly wore out the opposing German forces. So much so that even General Ludendorff noted that “The German army had been fought to a standstill and had been worn out”[54]. His assault was also not without German casualties, as historians such as Prior and Wilson argue that the casualties were 230,000 men however this is hard to take at face value since it is taken from a controversial source “The Unthinkable: The Military Dead of the Great War” which does not source any tangible evidence to support the argument[55],[56]. However it is important to note that Prior and Wilson are regarded by many historians including Sheffield to be very reputable and well researched historians.[57] Montefiore however, argues with access to British and German military archives that the allied losses were around 623,000 while German losses numbered around 680,000[58]. Sheffield argues with this data that it is safe to say that Haig’s offensive was not a complete failure, as he managed to drain Germany of well-trained soldiers, the will to continue fighting and perhaps most importantly, the loss in faith in German high command. Even Captain von Hentig of German General staff noted the dramatic fall in confidence within the army, considering the Reichsleadership[59]. Sheffield in fact argues that the BEF offensive on the Somme wore out the German fighting force faster than the Germans wore out the French at Verdun and “its overall quality had declined” due to the offensive[60]. The war had become a war of attrition, in which Haig had to cripple Germany, a state with limited resources due to British blockades. In this sense his offensive was successful, as Germany lost vital manpower, in which they could not sufficiently resupply and retrain due to the attritional constraints. These attritional restraints being the lack of raw materials present within German occupied territories, and the fact that the Allies had innumerable forces from their colonies that could easily be conscripted, while Germany was left with only its core states.[61] This of course led to far higher casualties, as the grind strategy that Haig had adopted called for a constant barrage of men to break up German front lines and drain them of resources. Going against most other accounts however Prior and Wilson argue that at no point except for early august in the Somme campaign did Haig ever adopt a “wearing out” strategy. Haig believed that offensives were won by decisive battles, which goes against his own attritional warfare at the Somme, showing that Haig may have been attempting decisive victory’s, yet showing up short and achieving very little. In effect Prior and Wilson say “Haig was in denial” about the reality of warfare on the western front. He believed in swift cavalry offensives, and due to the fact that that was nigh impossible in a war riddled with trenches, barbed wire and machine gun placements was essentially backed into the only corner that netted results, constant assaults. In this we can see Haig not as an attritional general by choice, yet one by circumstances and that he originally intended to utilize a far outdated method to fight in the Somme.[62] Many apologists for Haig also make it clear that merely replacing Haig, would almost certainly, not have led to a more favorable outcome. Since of course, he was merely a cavalry commander that only had experience in Colonial conflicts, yet that was the case for all the Commanding Officers of the British Army. They had never experienced a war of this scale, and certainly had no more experience with the new technology and industry being implanted into the war. Thus simply, ‘replacing Haig with someone cleverer’ would probably not have resulted in “minimal losses” as Hew Strachan explained to me[63]. The Allies had to apply constant pressure to Germany, in a feverous war of attrition and essentially not let them advance an inch and gain momentum, thus any other Field Marshal would very likely taken the same approach as Haig did, since he would have also been pressured by the French to mount an assault.
In conclusion Haig can be partially acquitted from being completely responsible for the casualty count at the Somme. Haig was forced by his allies to commence an assault that his army was not prepared for, with artillery that was not equipped or trained to deal with enemy fortifications. The technological limitations of the time made it difficult for Haig to micromanage the battlefield and effectively direct artillery support, while also being forced to adopt a grind strategy due to the nature of trench warfare. Nevertheless, this coincidentally would ultimately be the best course of action. Haig however can be blamed for a distinct lack of operational aptitude, as Hew Strachan explained to me and for being “far too imaginative” with his unrealistic battle plans that perhaps caused even higher casualties, and finally for his disagreements with Rawlinson that cost many thousands of lives.[64][65]
New Technologies
Haig’s Strategy
Many of Haig’s critics were those of a political background. Lloyd George, Prime Minister at the time and the Secretary of State for war, criticized Haig as being rather tactically simplistic, going so far as to say “I never met a man in a high position who seemed to me so utterly devoid of imagination”. Paul Ham argues with access to British National Archives however, that according to letters between the two and documents concerning their affiliation that Lloyd George had an ongoing feud with Haig and may be biased in this aspect and that he continually “frustrated his plans without actually stepping in”[51], and wrote that George Lloyd was “scheming, untruthful and self-serving”[52] in regards to Haig, as George knew that he would be blamed for the human cost of the battle if it were to come as Nick Lloyd puts it[53]. In short, the intended purpose of George Lloyds public criticisms of Haig was to divert blame from him onto Haig instead to save face. Linking from this historians including Sheffield and Hew Strachan have distanced themselves from the political agendas of those who criticized Haig at the time. They argue, as he did himself, that the massive loss of life was completely necessary and was unavoidable, and that he was unable to alter his strategies in short time frames due to French pressure. To possibly support this, according to several German accounts of the battle of the Somme, the constant unperturbed offensive that Haig was insistent on continuing thoroughly wore out the opposing German forces. So much so that even General Ludendorff noted that “The German army had been fought to a standstill and had been worn out”[54]. His assault was also not without German casualties, as historians such as Prior and Wilson argue that the casualties were 230,000 men however this is hard to take at face value since it is taken from a controversial source “The Unthinkable: The Military Dead of the Great War” which does not source any tangible evidence to support the argument[55],[56]. However it is important to note that Prior and Wilson are regarded by many historians including Sheffield to be very reputable and well researched historians.[57] Montefiore however, argues with access to British and German military archives that the allied losses were around 623,000 while German losses numbered around 680,000[58]. Sheffield argues with this data that it is safe to say that Haig’s offensive was not a complete failure, as he managed to drain Germany of well-trained soldiers, the will to continue fighting and perhaps most importantly, the loss in faith in German high command. Even Captain von Hentig of German General staff noted the dramatic fall in confidence within the army, considering the Reichsleadership[59]. Sheffield in fact argues that the BEF offensive on the Somme wore out the German fighting force faster than the Germans wore out the French at Verdun and “its overall quality had declined” due to the offensive[60]. The war had become a war of attrition, in which Haig had to cripple Germany, a state with limited resources due to British blockades. In this sense his offensive was successful, as Germany lost vital manpower, in which they could not sufficiently resupply and retrain due to the attritional constraints. These attritional restraints being the lack of raw materials present within German occupied territories, and the fact that the Allies had innumerable forces from their colonies that could easily be conscripted, while Germany was left with only its core states.[61] This of course led to far higher casualties, as the grind strategy that Haig had adopted called for a constant barrage of men to break up German front lines and drain them of resources. Going against most other accounts however Prior and Wilson argue that at no point except for early august in the Somme campaign did Haig ever adopt a “wearing out” strategy. Haig believed that offensives were won by decisive battles, which goes against his own attritional warfare at the Somme, showing that Haig may have been attempting decisive victory’s, yet showing up short and achieving very little. In effect Prior and Wilson say “Haig was in denial” about the reality of warfare on the western front. He believed in swift cavalry offensives, and due to the fact that that was nigh impossible in a war riddled with trenches, barbed wire and machine gun placements was essentially backed into the only corner that netted results, constant assaults. In this we can see Haig not as an attritional general by choice, yet one by circumstances and that he originally intended to utilize a far outdated method to fight in the Somme.[62] Many apologists for Haig also make it clear that merely replacing Haig, would almost certainly, not have led to a more favorable outcome. Since of course, he was merely a cavalry commander that only had experience in Colonial conflicts, yet that was the case for all the Commanding Officers of the British Army. They had never experienced a war of this scale, and certainly had no more experience with the new technology and industry being implanted into the war. Thus simply, ‘replacing Haig with someone cleverer’ would probably not have resulted in “minimal losses” as Hew Strachan explained to me[63]. The Allies had to apply constant pressure to Germany, in a feverous war of attrition and essentially not let them advance an inch and gain momentum, thus any other Field Marshal would very likely taken the same approach as Haig did, since he would have also been pressured by the French to mount an assault.
Conclusion
In conclusion Haig can be partially acquitted from being completely responsible for the casualty count at the Somme. Haig was forced by his allies to commence an assault that his army was not prepared for, with artillery that was not equipped or trained to deal with enemy fortifications. The technological limitations of the time made it difficult for Haig to micromanage the battlefield and effectively direct artillery support, while also being forced to adopt a grind strategy due to the nature of trench warfare. Nevertheless, this coincidentally would ultimately be the best course of action. Haig however can be blamed for a distinct lack of operational aptitude, as Hew Strachan explained to me and for being “far too imaginative” with his unrealistic battle plans that perhaps caused even higher casualties, and finally for his disagreements with Rawlinson that cost many thousands of lives.[64][65]
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ReadHowYouWant, 2016. Page 155 [11] Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson. The Somme. ReadHowYouWant, 2016. Page 155-6 [12] ibid. Page 156 [13] Strachan, Hew. “The Effects of Haig's Leadership.” The Effects of Haig's Leadership, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 7 [14] Sheffield, Professor Gary. “Has History Misjudged the Generals of World War One?” BBC IWonder, BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zq2y87h#zy3wpv4. [15] Richards, Anthony. Somme: a Visual History. Imperial War Museum, 2016. 53 [16] Richards, Anthony. Somme: a Visual History. Imperial War Museum, 2016. 53 [17] Roberts, Andrew, and Simon Norfolk. “A Bold New History of the Battle of the Somme.”Smithsonian.com, Smithsonian Institution, 1 July 2016, [18] Strachan, Hew. The First World War. Vol 1: To Arms. Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. Pages 992-1105 [19] Strachan, Hew. “The Somme: Haig.” The Somme: Haig, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 05 [20] Sheffield, G. D. The Somme: a New History. Cassell Military, 2004. [21] Richards, Anthony. Somme: a Visual History. Imperial War Museum, 2016. 82 [22] Richards, Anthony. Somme: a Visual History. Imperial War Museum, 2016. 74 [23] Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson. The Somme. ReadHowYouWant, 2016. Page 155-56 [24] Addington, Scott. “The Battle of the Somme.” Scott Addington, Scott Addington, 1 July 2010, [25] Pois, Robert August, and Philip Langer. Command Failure in War Psychology and Leadership. Indiana University Press, 2004. Page 130 [26] Pois, Robert August, and Philip Langer. Command Failure in War Psychology and Leadership. Indiana University Press, 2004. Page 130-31 [27] Strachan, Hew. “The Somme: Haig.” The Somme: Haig, 5 Oct. 2017. [28] Strachan, Hew. “The Somme: Haig.” The Somme: Haig, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 3 [29] Strachan, Hew. “The Somme: Haig.” The Somme: Haig, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 7 [30]Taylor, A. J. P. The First World War: an Illustrated History. Penguin Books, Limited, 2012.Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence [31] Taylor, A. J. P. The First World War: an Illustrated History. Penguin Books, Limited, 2012.Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence [32] Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: a Complete History. Phoenix, 2008. Chapter 14 [33] Richards, Anthony. Somme: a Visual History. Imperial War Museum, 2016. 89 [34] Boden, Richard, director. Blackadder: Back & Forth. Roadshow, 1999. [35] Sheffield, Gary. The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. Aurum Press, 2012. Page 172 [36] Sheffield, Gary. The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. Aurum Press, 2012. Page 171 [37] Strachan, Hew. “The Effects of Haig's Leadership.” The Effects of Haig's Leadership, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 15 [38] Strachan, Hew. “The Effects of Haig's Leadership.” The Effects of Haig's Leadership, 5 Oct. 2017. Line 16 [39] Strachan, Hew. “The Effects of Haig's Leadership.” The Effects of Haig's Leadership, 5 Oct. 2017. 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