Traces of Evil: Various IBDP History Internal Assessments

Various IBDP History Internal Assessments

History Higher Level

Internal Assessment

February 01, 2008

Using an historical approach, what were the faulty tactics of presentation used by Colin Powell in his UN address on February 5^th, 2003?

A) Plan of Investigation………………………………………………..3

B) Summary of Evidence……………………………………………..4-5

C) Evaluation of Sources……………………………………………..6-7

D) Analysis……………………………………………….....................8-9

E) Conclusion…………………………………………………………..10

F) Bibliography…………………………………………………….11-12

A) Plan of Investigation

Using a historical approach, this investigation seeks to identify the faulty tactics of persuasion employed by Colin Powell, US Secretary of State on February 5^th 2003 in his speech to the UN. In order to recognize the flawed approaches of persuasion used by Powell, claims in his speech should be compared with the now-accepted counters to US allegations and each point should be analysed in a historical context to determine how Powell’s presentation methodology was mistaken. Speeches, newspaper accounts, expert testimony in interview and documentary form and government reports are mostly used to evaluate the authenticity of claims of Iraq’s possession of WMD and of the opposition. The two main sources to be evaluated are Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 address to the UN, and War on Iraq:What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You To Know, an interview-cum-analysis by Scott Ritter and William Rivers Pitt.

B) Summary of Evidence

George Bush’s State of the Union speech, delivered on January 28^th, 2003, introduced the claims made by Powell the following week, and in fact informed Congress that “United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5^th” where “Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about…Iraq's illegal weapons programs”[1]. He conveyed his intent to go to war by ending with “If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just … And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States …”[2]

On February 5^th, 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the UN Security Council the US’ case against Iraq, reminiscent of Adlai Stevenson’s UN presentation in 1958. Powell referred to promises made by Iraq to disarm and UN Resolution 1441 where it was ruled that Iraq had to comply with disarmament obligations[3].

He claimed that “the facts and Iraq's behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction”[4]. A tape recording of a conversation between an Iraqi general and colonel, dated November 22, 2002, where IAEA inspector Mohammed El-Baradei’s visit[5] was discussed and orders for a “modified vehicle” to be evacuated were introduced as evidence. He also displayed photo-enhanced images and explained them as weapons munitions facilities, active munitions bunkers, and a nearby decontamination vehicle. To contrast with that photo, he showed a photo taken of the same area on the 22^nd of December, which showed that “the tents are gone, the signature vehicles are gone”; Powell stated this evacuation was for the benefit of the UN inspection teams arriving that day. He also declared that the US had photos of Iraqi cargo trucks and missile-moving cranes engaging in unorthodox activities, presumably to move weapons before UN inspections two days later[6].

Powell also asserted that Iraq was continuing to possess and produce biological weapons such as deadly anthrax, and that an Iraqi civil engineer had witnessed production as recently as 1998. He also spoke of eyewitnesses describing mobile biological weapons factories on wheels and rails[7].

Chemical weapons were also another facet of Powell’s claims on Iraq possession of WMD; more photos of before/after timings after weapons inspections of a “chemical complex” and “unusual activity” were shown, and claims of Iraq’s possession of fatal VX agents were put forth. Powell also states that “We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry”[8].

Powell also repeatedly mentioned Iraq’s possession of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the fact that they had not been able to account for their supposed destroying of these weapons. He claimed that “Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent” as well as an array of artillery shells, and bombs that were unaccounted for by the Iraqis.

According to Colin Powell, all information provided by him came from appropriate channels of information, claiming that “every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence”[9].

The culmination of this diplomatic tour de force conducted by the American commander-in-chief and his Secretary of State Colin Powell was the invasion of Iraq on March 20^th, 2003, which was, according to President Bush, in order “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger”[10].

C) Evaluation of Sources

Colin Powell’s speech, presented February 5^th, 2003 to the United Nations Security Council, mainly regarded the possession of WMDs by Iraq, and the US’ views on this apparent transgression of UN Resolutions. According to Powell, the information originated from “a variety of sources…U.S. sources…other countries… such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites.”[11][12] He explained the purpose of the speech to have two reasons: firstly to “First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei” and secondly to “provide…additional information…about Iraq's WMD”. The underlying purpose of this speech, implied by Powell, was to present to the world the US’ case for war against Iraq, demonstrated by the timing of this speech with the State of the Union Speech and the actual invasion a month later[13]. This speech is extremely valuable in the sense that it is delivered by a key representative of the United States government, accurately representing the US governments’ beliefs and views on the situation[14]. However, limitations of this speech include the fact that specific sources are never named. Furthermore, Powell has a very specific purpose in his speech and selected facts and information especially to support these claims[15].

Scott Ritter’s and William River’s Pitt’s novel War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You To Know is a direct contrast to the claims presented in Powell’s speech, arguing facts against Iraq’s possession of WMDs. The book is co-written in 2002 by Ritter[16], a UNSCOM weapons inspector, and Pitt, the editor at “Progressive Democrats of America”. Much of the book is written in interview form between Pitt and Ritter about Ritter’s findings in Iraq, or more specifically his lack of findings. The purpose of this book was to counter the US’ government claims about Iraqi possession of WMDs; interestingly written even before Powell’s speech was made yet rebutting all claims made in the UN presentation. The value of this source lies in the fact that the information given is first-hand knowledge of the topic, as Ritter was actually conducting investigations in Iraq himself, and also that the book was written before the speech, thus eliminating accusations of it being a rebuttal specifically designed against Powell.[17] However, limitations of this source would be that Ritter would have a direct bias against the claims of the US government and perhaps select facts to support his bias or views; and the material contained is designed to be provocative and presented accordingly[18].

D) Analysis

Powell’s claims that Iraq did not fully comply with weapons inspections are supported by other sources[19] who have all agreed that Iraq did not fulfil inspection requirements and refused inspectors access to certain presidential palaces and other Iraqi sites[20]. Powell says this was to prevent inspectors from location hidden weapons caches or to ensure time to conceal weapons at these sites. However, Ritter explains it as the reluctance of Iraqi officials to expose inner areas in fear revealed layout knowledge would be used to plan future attacks[21]. However Powell did not acknowledge this different interpretation of Iraqi actions, leading to his first historical fallacy in persuasion, which was to pretend certainty in a case with ambiguities[22].

The decontamination vehicles shown by Powell were known by UN weapons inspectors to be fire-trucks[23]. Additionally, the intercepted communications between Iraqi generals discussing possession of munitions vehicles are doubtful due to the clandestine nature of Iraqi army communications and the improbability of classified discussions held over radio where high risk of interception is known. Additionally, the disappearance of vehicles and other operational equipment from sites, according to both Hans Blix and Ray McGovern, 27 year image analyst, can be attributed to “routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection”[24][25]. David Albright, nuclear weapons assessor of 20 years, also argues that there was no way to confirm the actual function of the “weapons munitions facilities” described by Powell through aerial photographs without actually entering the premises[26]. These claims by Powell are instances of him substituting a distorted, exaggerated, or misrepresented interpretation of events, as well as using illogical, unsupported reasoning, which are further historical fallacies[27].

Powell’s claims of biological weapons possession by Iraq were also countered by Ritter in his argument that anthrax held by the Iraqis would be “brown, sludge liquid,” that would be “useless today” as the shelf life of anthrax is three years and the last known production batch was in 1991[28]. Additionally, the “biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails” described by Powell are proved by UN weapons inspectors to be hydrogen generation facilities[29]. This is presentation of entirely false evidence, and the selection and omission of certain facts designed to serve a certain purpose or to support a social/political cause. This is a flawed approach to persuasion as facts are intended to be given in context with the situation’s entirety, while ensuring the veracity of the facts presented, another way in which Powell’s approach to convince the world was flawed[30].

Sarin and tabun nerve agents purportedly in possession by the Iraqis also had a shelf-life of about 5 years, rendering them useless today. VX nerve agents, the Iraqis denied having the capabilities, however production equipment was located and hence destroyed in 1996, destroying all possibility of further production of VX agents[31]. Additionally, there was no solid proof of dual-capability factories according to weapons inspectors having perused the area[32], yet the language used by Powell—“we know that…” indicates surety, which was not the case as proven by the dispute of the apparent facts. Selecting appropriate language indicates the level to which a persuasive speaker should be believed, and Powell made the mistake of demonstrating a false level of confidence.

Powell’s claims of Iraqi possession of “100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent” and the 16 122mm shells found and other artillery, were also rebutted by inspectors and organization directors. Their counterargument was that if Iraq in fact possessed these weapons, why were they not found by June 10^th, 2003, at which point over 230 sites had been inspected?[33] Furthermore, Powell’s claims that Iraq possessed WMD merely because they had not provided proof of their destruction are not grounds to declare that because they did not prove the weapons’ absence, that meant that Iraq still possessed them. According to Ritter, Iraq may have wished to retain autonomy, hence the absence of proof of destruction. However, Powell simply presented the simpler situation, exhibiting the unsound tactic of oversimplification of complex events to suit his purposes and intents.

E) Conclusion

While Powell’s presentation to the UN may have been a “masterful performance” in terms of delivery, the techniques used to present the content to convince the world of Iraqi possession of WMD were severely flawed in that they did not follow a relation of facts that was historically appropriate, meaning his delivery was more of a show than a factual representation of events that transpired. Powell’s main mistakes were pretending certainty in a case with ambiguities, substituting a distorted, exaggerated, or misrepresented interpretation of events, using illogical, unsupported reasoning, selection and omission of certain facts designed to serve a certain purpose, demonstrating a false level of confidence, and oversimplification of complex events. By pinpointing the variations in data presented by Powell and data presented by other sources, the faulty tactics of persuasion were thereby identified. In a historical context, this question shows how the simple choice of presentation of certain information can change national policies, and alter the course of history.

Word Count: 1998

Bibliography

Bush, George. "State of the Union." US Capitol. 28 Jan. 2003. Na .

Carr, Edward H. What is History? New York: Vintage Books, 1961.

Chanteloupe, M. M. Iraq: the War That Shouldn't Be - You Decide. Infinity, 2006.

Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Greenwood Group, 2003.

Corn, David. "Bush At the UN." The Nation. 22 Sept. 2003. .

Dodd, Chris. Address. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Na .

El-Baradei, Mohammed. Address. IAEA. UN Security Council. 07 Mar. 2003. Na .

Fischer, David H. Historical Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought. Harper Perennial, 1970.

Goodman, Mel. Interview. Washingtonpost.Com: Live Online. 11 Feb. 2003. .

Greenwald, Robert. "Outfoxed and Uncovered." Washington Post 25 Aug. 2004. .

Kyl, Jon. United States. Chairman. United States Senate. Backgrounder: Shining a Light on the Debate. 17 June 2003. .

Oliver, Mark. "Blix Queries US 'Evidence' on Iraq." Guardian 14 Feb. 2003. .

Powell, Colin. Speech. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Sept. 2007 .

Prados, Alfred B. United States. Cong. CRS Report for Congress: Iraq, Divergent Views on Military Action. 31 Mar. 2003. .

Ritter, Scott, and William R. Pitt. War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know. Allen & Urwin, 2002.

The Situation with Iraq and Kuwait. UN Security Council, 8 Nov. 2002, United Nations. .

Warrick, Joby. "Evidence on Iraq Challenged." Washington Post 19 Sept. 2002. .

[1] Bush, George. "State of the Union." US Capitol. 28 Jan. 2003.

[2] Bush’s justification for war was his claims of Hussein’s possession of “materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent” as well as 38,000 unaccounted for liters of botulinum toxin”. Bush, George. "State of the Union." US Capitol. 28 Jan. 2003.

[3] Interestingly, Powell failed to mention that the title of the resolution was “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait”, meaning the resolution dealt directly with these two countries and arms limitations in this specific context. The Situation with Iraq and Kuwait. UN Security Council, 8 Nov. 2002, United Nations.

[4] Powell, Colin. Speech. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Sept. 2007

[5] El Baradei’s description of his visit, on March 7, 2003, a month after Powell’s speech,clearly states there is little proof of Iraqi possession of WMD. El-Baradei, Mohammed. Address. IAEA. UN Security Council. 07 Mar. 2003. Na

[6] Interestingly, Dr. Hans Blix, who Powell quoted in his own speech, directly rebutted this exact statement in his own speech on February 14^th, 2003, stating that “two satellite images Mr Powell showed to the council on February 5 did not prove that Iraq was clearing the site of forbidden munitions” Oliver, Mark. "Blix Queries US 'Evidence' on Iraq." Guardian 14 Feb. 2003.

[7] Such claims were supported by other US Government Documents: Prados, Alfred B. United States. Cong. CRS Report for Congress: Iraq, Divergent Views on Military Action. 31 Mar. 2003.

[8] Stewart Stogel, “Iran Agrees Iraq Hid Arms,” Washington Times, June 10, 2003. A quote from an unidentified “Iranian official” with “ties to Supreme Leader Khamenei” that states that Iran had knowledge of illicit weapons being integrated into the civilian black market

[9]Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Greenwood Group, 2003. On page 464, it is claimed that Powell’s speech was primarily based on “information from a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants”

[10] Bush, George. "State of the Union." US Capitol. 28 Jan. 2003.

[11] His description of other sources was “people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to” Powell, Colin. Speech. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Sept. 2007

[12] Discussions on discovering biological warfare systems in Iraq are described to be primarily discoveries by “the US military”, “US forces” and Kurdish forces” who “subsequently turned it over to US military control”. This brings to question whether any of Powell’s sources were from agencies outside the US. , Colin. Speech. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Sept. 2007

[13] Senator Chris Dodds’ speech on February 5, 2003, as a direct response to Powell’s speech, links Powell’s speech to the decision to invade Iraq, when he stated “ Powell's presentation before the UN Security Council shed additional public light on Iraq's WMD programs”, and the only way to address that “threat” “is to invade Iraq” Dodd, Chris. Address. UN Security Council. 05 Feb. 2003. Na

[14] Washington Times Letter to the Editor, “For the Record,” June 6, 2003. Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor echoes Powell’s beliefs about Iraq’s possession of WMD.

[15][15] Ray McGovern, 27 year analyst of US government affairs, speaks about Powell’s use of placement of supporters during his speech; the placement of George Tenet, head of the CIA, right behind him as if to “that the Central Intelligence Agency stands behind…everything Colin Powell says”

[16] Ritter served in Iraq in his capacity from 1991-1998. Ritter, Scott, and William R. Pitt. War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know. Allen & Urwin, 2002.

[17] This is an advantage due to the precedent of Joe Wilson, US diplomat. He was asked to verify uranium yellowcake papers and deemed them false, upon which the White House published that Wilson was a “Democrat”, and then leaked his wife’s CIA operative identity, thus ending her career. Greenwald, Robert. "Outfoxed and Uncovered." Washington Post 25 Aug. 2004.

[18] This is shown by the title itself, with the description of the US administration as “Team Bush”, likening it to an illegal gang or suchlike. Ritter, Scott, and William R. Pitt. War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know. Allen & Urwin, 2002.

[19] Such as Scott Ritter, UNSCOM director Richard Butler, and UNMOVIC Executive Director. Greenwald, Robert. "Outfoxed and Uncovered." Washington Post 25 Aug. 2004.

[20] Nevertheless, Blix himself stated in his March 7, 2003 address that “Iraq should be given some credit” for their cooperation with inspectors. However, this cooperation was referring to recent inspection activity, and not the activity Ritter, El-Baradei, and Butler were referring to, which occurred primarily in the ‘90s. Oliver, Mark. "Blix Queries US 'Evidence' on Iraq." Guardian 14 Feb. 2003.

[21] This was echoed by David Albright, who likens placing weapons in presidential palaces as placing “crown jewels’ in the one building inspectors would request to inspect. “Evidence on Iraq challenged” Washington Post. September 19, 2002

[22] Historians' Fallacies : Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, David Hackett Fischer (pg 13)

[23] Ray McGovern again refutes the claims of the images as decontamination vehicles by criticizing Powell’s expertise as an image analyst. “CBC News In-depth: Iraq”, Ritter does the same in his book

[24] Dr. El-Baradei also echoed this sentiment. El-Baradei, Mohammed. Address. IAEA. UN Security Council. 07 Mar. 2003. Na

[25] Greenwald, Robert. "Outfoxed and Uncovered." Washington Post 25 Aug. 2004.

[26] This is supported by Mel Goodman in his interview “Did Powell Make the Case?” Goodman, Mel. Interview. Washingtonpost.com: Live Online. 11 Feb. 2003.

[27] History as representation of hazy facts can be considered as history, but with the addition of logic to piece together those facts, which was not apparently Powell’s doing. “What is History” Edward Hallet Carr

[28] Ritter, Scott, and William R. Pitt. War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know. Allen & Urwin, 2002. , also echoed in “Úncovered: The War on Iraq” documentary

[29] David Corn, Washington Editor of “The Nation” also supports this in his article Bush At the UN." The Nation. 22 Sept. 2003.

[30] Historians' Fallacies : Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, David Hackett Fischer (pg 18)

[31] Hans Blix, also states that the inspections that occurred in 1998 would mean that substances found today manufactured then would have expired. Oliver, Mark. "Blix Queries US 'Evidence' on Iraq." Guardian 14 Feb. 2003.

[32] Upon hearing Powell’s speech, a “BBC reporter” went to the exact sites exhibited in images shown by Powell, and found nothing there, according to Chanteloupe, M. M. Iraq: the War That Shouldn't Be - You Decide. Infinity, 2006. (pg 109)

[33] The US Government’s primary rebuttal to this claim (supporting Powell), as shown in the Senate’s document, was that if Iraq truly had gotten rid of all its WMD, why was there no documentation of such removal of their WMD? Kyl, Jon. United States. Chairman. United States Senate. Backgrounder: Shining a Light on the Debate. 17 June 2003.

What was the strongest dividing factor during Franco’s Reign; Football, Economy, Religion?

A: Plan of the Investigation

What was the strongest dividing factor during Franco’s Reign; Football, Economy, Religion. In order to answer this questions we must evaluate the significance of each aspect studied and how impactful said aspects are to the Spanish populous. Economic figures of both Franco’s anti-market policies (1939-59) and his post 1959 free trade policies will be measured in response to its significance with the population. Religion in the life of the population and the differences between State sponsored Catholicism and Catholicism directly from the Vatican. Also how a Football team served as a representation of citizens who did not agree with their government.

B: Summary of Evidence

Economy

During its early years, “the new regime introduced a set of anti-market policies that altered the previous behavior of the Spanish economy dramatically” International markets were closed off, and as a result the population could not export nor import goods.

This meant that there was only a limited supply of goods and excessive demand, causing prices and inflation to skyrocket. As a response “inflation was repressed through officially established prices” however as seen in Figure 1 (see appendix) by setting prices lower than the market equilibrium price a shortage is created. This meant that a large segment of the population could not access basic commodities. A British Consul in Malaga wrote “Rice, flour, sugar and many other essential foodstuffs are still practically unobtainable;potatoes have once again disappeared from the markets; meat, which in June and July could generally be bought, is now very seldom on sale, and prices of all commodities have greatly increased. But the shortage of bread is the main concern of the multitude whose main sustenance it is; for weeks during the months of August and September queues waited all night outside the bakeries, more often that not only to be bitterly disappointed by the meagre allowance they received in the morning, and there have actually been a number of entirely bread less days. This would be perceived as harboring discontent by the population with its government considering the lengths of time citizens had to wait for their rations.

Unsurprisingly the long lines and uncertainty regarding the availability of food allowed for “the development of ‘black’ markets” Where prices were raised disproportionally due to the dwindling supply of commodities. All this economic turmoil meant that “Spain did not recover its pre-Civil War per capita GDP peak levels (1929) until 1955, while Western European countries reached, on average, 1938 levels of GDP per head by 1950.” However due to strict border restrictions it wasn’t until later (1059) where the population were able to compare their per capita GDP levels with those of the tourists that came on holidays.

Among this succession of economic hardships “the Government budget did not contribute to raise effective demand by establishing unemployment benefits” meaning that unemployed people became not only a burden on their families but also on the general population due to not being able to consume, thus decreasing the consumption section of Aggregate Demand.

Religion

Initially religion served as a deterrent of factionalism, since under Franco (and through most of history) the majority of Spaniards were Catholic. In june 1941 the Catholic Church’s rights were outlined the most important ones “1. recognition of Catholicism as the official religion of the country; 2. mandatory religious instruction at all educational levels in conformity with Catholic dogma.” Homogenous religious beliefs backed by the state suggest an intent to generate a strong sense of unity. By installing mandatory religious instruction during education the government hoped national identities would shift into an all-encompassing Religious identity, thus suffocating all other identification sentiments.

However the very foundations of the Church were shaken with Pope John XXIII statement “We were all made in God's image, and thus, we are all Godly alike.” Now Catholic intellectuals and even Politicians found contradicting messages from Spanish Catholicism and the Vatican’s approach. Such was the case with José María Llanos, a “Jesuit from a wealthy family” who had pastored for the government was shocked with the conditions of the citizens from the slum El Pozo del Tío Raimundo and radically changed his views on politics. He got involved with the Workers Commission and even joined the illegal communist party. He wasn’t the only one, a new group of priests known as curas rojos or red priests.

Football

A Spanish newspaper called “La Vanguarida asks on Sunday October 7th 2012: “Only football?” [except] They know the answer: with Barcelona versus Real Madrid is never just about football.” “Today [Barcelona’s] traditional pre match mosaic will be a Senyera (catalan flag).” It’s significance is the upcoming referendum for Catalan independence. However, today is not an exception as Classico’s (Barcelona vs Madrid games) are never just football. As Marcos Alonso (played for Barcelona and Madrid) put it “ In Barcelona, you have a sense of complete identification with the club. It means a massive amount for Catalan society” That is because Barcelona’s Identity has evolved from being just a football club to something more than just a club. President Joan Gaspart phrased like this “History has transformed us into something more than just a football club: Barcelona is the defense of a country, a language, a culture.”

Such is the importance of Barcelona that Radi Antíc who managed both Madrid and Barcelona said “Being a director of Barcelona or Madrid is more important than being a minister in any country” Which while it might be an exaggeration it shows the immense representational value that Barcelona has, not only in Catalan Society but also the world. This feeling of being part of something larger stems from the belief that “When Barcelona face madrid it is ... the nation against the state, freedom fighters against Franco’s Facists” And all the participants are automatically elevated from just a football club director or player.

Catalan Sociologist Luis Flaquer attributes it to Madrid serving as a scapegoat to citizens disapproval of State. “[Citizens] couldn’t shout “Franco you murderer” on the streets so people shouted at Real Madrid players instead” Another factor is that “the regime used sport to assert its power” Which Citizens responded to by supporting Madrid’s rival Barcelona as a sign of rebellion against the state’s power. FC Barcelona player, Stoichkov, described it as “a rebellion against the Establishment” supporting the notion that “Catalonia is a country and Barcelona is its army”

C: Evaluation of Sources

Note From the British Consul in Malaga

The note originated from the Foreign office consulate in Malaga. It was written on the 22-12-1939. This situates it a couple months after the Civil War has come to an end, which means that while the rationing system was already in place the cost of war in regards to production and crops was still very high. The Consul of Malaga wanted to inform the Foreign British Office of the living conditions faced by Spaniards, “Rice, flour, sugar and many other essential foodstuffs are still practically unobtainable” The importance of this note lies in the fact that its a Human reaction and description simultaneously with the events that where unfolding. However that is also its limitation, its a human reaction based on sense perception. It offers no realistic quantifiable information as its just an observation from a Consul denouncing the living conditions of citizens.

Fear and Loathing in La Liga Sid Lowe

Fear and Loathing in La Liga was written by Sid Lowe, it was published on the 23 of September 2013 (hard cover). Sid Lowe is a British historian It describes itself as a book that has “lift[ed] the lid on sport’s greatest rivalry” so it was written to shed light and mythify the Barcelona’s and Real Madrid’s Relationship with each other. However as a book it also serves an economic purpose, while as enticing and passionate the narrative it was written to sell and make money. Its strength lies in that Sid Lowe has had to interview many people in order to get primary accounts of what happened as well as also not get carried away with the romanticism of the rivalry and instead give a detailed account of how its stood at various points in time. Also always looking at both sides of every controversy, for every segment on something Barcelona did there was always a quotation of a Real Madrid directive or player and vise versa. By showing both sides of the argument and opting for the readers to choose a middle ground it distances itself from any internal bias from the author and the people giving the account of the events. Its not without limitations, as even though Lowe attempts to give bipartisan accounts, he does not always achieve it, letting the individual who is narrating the anecdote be the sole defender of bias or leniency. Something hard to achieve when talking about your rival football team.

D: Analysis

All three factors discussed resulted in people unhappy with the state and adversity against the state with varying degrees of intensity. First the economical factors surrounding Spain immediately after the crisis. It has been observed the effect of anti-market based policies and fixed prices that lead to the discontent of the people through not being able to purchase primary commodities such as bread. However while these economic situations deeply affected the Spanish Individuals it didn’t give them a method of voicing their disapproval and not conforming to the state. However the economic turmoil served to motivate individuals to voice their criticisms through other channels, this as because due to Spain’s economy there were large sections of the population left with famine. Due to the price ceiling set on primary commodities there was a supply shortage, which either meant that the population would go malnourished (which it did) or there would be a surge in black markets. Inside these black markets the prices were higher than unadulterated market price. These economic factors impulsed the population into disagreement with the state. However it also fortified communities and neighborhoods. It was only through mutually aiding one another that neighborhoods, villages and communities were able to survive. In this sense it brought the population to coo-operate in an effort to survive the hardships of the time.

Another factor was religion. Originally believed by the State to unify Spain under 1 religious belief system and that national identities would shift into an all-encompassing Religious identity, thus suffocating all other identification sentiments. For the first ten years this was the case, however a structural change in the Vatican toppled the system of unity that linked Spaniards together. The new Pope Joan XXIII started preaching “We were all made in God's image, and thus, we are all Godly alike.” Now religious officials were conflicted. This was due to the Vatican preaching slightly different messages than state sponsored Catholicism. This lead some religious leaders to verge from the path of state sponsored Catholicism and look inward of spiritual guidance. An example was José María Llanos, a “Jesuit from a wealthy family” who had pastored for the government was shocked with the conditions of the citizens from the slum El Pozo del Tío Raimundo and radically changed his views on politics. In his instance religion served as a way for him to oppose the state, by preforming Labour Union duties (labour unions were banned) under the mantle of Religious service. He was not alone as a whole new demographic of Priests arose. They were known as red priests, red symbolizing their affinity to communist beliefs, and helped workers dialog with their employers. However while their actions were radical and against the state, there weren’t many and paled in comparison to supporters for the countries most popular sport, Football.

More than a club. Barcelona served as the weaponless army of Catalonia. Such is the importance and symbolism of the club, that it served as a “rebellion against the Establishment”. Not my words but from Hristo Stoichkov, star FCBarcelona player. It was the only section of society where one could express, through the sentiment of Barcelona’s colors, any sort of belligerence against the state. Barça evolved from a football club into a symbol of defiance, of resistance, a last piece of hope that invoked deep sentiments of nationalistic pride. A place where citizens frustrations could be voiced as sociologist Luis Flaquer has said ““Franco you murderer” on the streets so people shouted at Real Madrid players instead” It was the sentiment of the continuance of the struggle. A instance wheret the dictator would not go unopposed “When Barcelona face madrid it is ... the nation against the state, freedom fighters against Franco’s Fascists” Thats why Randi Antíc described being a director at Barcelona, more important than serving as a minister in any country. Because not only do you act as a political beacon of hope but the fate and existence of a nation rests on your every move. Its importance stems from the regime wishing to assert its power through popular activities, and none was more popular than football. Because the state asserted its power through sport, the resistance needed to match it in the same arena. Which is why teams such as Madrid and Barcelona became much more important, and their matches more significant than just a sporting event.

E: Conclusion

In conclusion, the economic situation of the country established on a general level of discontent with the government. However this discontent stemmed due to economic circumstances did not materialize itself as factionalism (as is happening now) but rather brought communities and villages together in order to affront the difficult economic times. However the discontent, misery and poverty did affect other sections that were more vocal in their opposition to the regime. Red Priests surge due to the large poverty and the living conditions that citizens experienced. This lead them to take up membership in the communist party (illegal) and also serve as Union Worker delegates under the mantle of religion. Lastly, and the most vocal forms of opposition to the government was football, more specifically FCBarcelona. It went from a football team started by a Swiss to representing a nations hopes and dreams against an oppressive regime and becoming a key pillar in the Catalan identity.

F: Bibliography

Prados De La Escosura, Leandro, Joan R. Rosés, and Isabel Sanz-Villarrya. "Economic Reforms and Growth in Franco's Spain." Diss. Carlos III De Madrid, 2011. Economic Reforms and Growth in Franco's Spain (2011): n. pag. E-Archive. Universidad Carlos III Madrid, 18 July 2011. Web. 2 Oct. 2014.

Martínez Ruiz, Elena. EL SECTOR EXTERIOR DURANTE LA AUTARQUÍA UNA RECONSTRUCCIÓN DE LAS BALANZAS DE PAGOS DE ESPAÑA (1940-1958) Study N 43 (2003): 1-191. Banko De España. Web. 2 Oct. 2014.

Llopis, E. Historia Económica De España, Siglos X-XX. By M. Hernandez. Barcelona: n.p., 2002. N. pag. Print.

Prados De La Escosura. "Growth and Macroeconomic Performance in Spain." Diss. Carlos III De Madrid, 1994. Universidad Carlos III De Madrid, Dec. 1994. Web. 2 Oct. 2014.

image. N.p.: Microeconomics World, 6 June 2013.

The National Archives (TNA), PRO, FO 371/24507, Malaga Consul Report , 22-12-1939

G Margaret. "Franco and the Catholic Church." Spainthenandnow. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Oct. 2014.

Canonisation of Blessed John Paul II and Blessed John XXIII, The National Catholic Church of the United Kingdom and Ireland, 4 July 2013

Lowe, Sid. Fear and Loathing in La Liga: The True Story of Barcelona and Real Madrid. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

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Is a reluctance to tactically innovate responsible for English Football’s lack of success post-1966?

A: Plan of Investigation

Is a reluctance to tactically innovate responsible for English Football’s lack of success post-1966? In order to answer this question the views of educated football journalists, analysts, and influential managers will be analysed. Jonathan Wilson’s “Inverting the Pyramid” will be a main source, whilst analytic works such as “Soccernomics” and “The Numbers Game” will offer insight into the statistical findings that provide reasons and evidence for England’s lack of success. Primary sources from managers such as Jimmy Hogan and Helenio Herrera will provide first hand evidence as to why the English game has failed to meet expectations since the year England were crowned World Champions in 1966. Few other sources will be used due to the vast amount of unreliable and subjective information the topic of football breeds.

B: Summary of Evidence

(See Fig. 1 for all Football Definitions)

In the earliest years of football, dribbling and all-out attack was the primary characteristic of English football with very little regard for the passing game. Scotland however evolved their game, passing and combination play becoming the norm in Scotland.[1] England and English teams maintained the more physical kick and rush game although the passing game had proven through the Scottish team Queen’s Park to be more successful. Although certain players such as G.O Smith of Corinthians adapted their style to develop the kick and rush game the majority of England remained stubborn and did not adopt a different style of play until forced to by a change in the offside rule in 1925.[2]

England’s national team has failed to reach the final of any competitive international tournament since 1966. Up to 2004 the World Cup has been won 5 times by Brazil, 3 times by Italy and Germany, twice by Argentina and Uruguay and once by France and England. With the Netherlands reaching the final twice.[3] England have failed to win the UEFA European Championship whereas Germany have won it 3 times, France have won it twice and Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and the Soviet Union have won it once.[4]

England won the World Cup in 1966 managed by Sir Alf Ramsey playing the majority of the tournament with a long ball and pace driven 4-1-3-2 (See Fig. 3).[5] 4-4-2 (See Fig. 3), a formation derived from Ramsey’s 4-1-3-2, became the default formation for the majority of English clubs with differing styles. Paisley’s Liverpool and Clough’s Nottingham Forest saw European and Domestic success through a possession based 4-4-2, whereas Wimbledon and Watford succeeded through a pressing, offensive 4-4-2.[6] 4-4-2 remained the orthodoxy for England until the mid-90s.[7]

Using stats taken since 1972, if a draw counts as half a win, England have won approximately 66% of their matches (including friendlies), Brazil have won 80%.[8] With Foreign managers winning 73% and English managers winning 64%, using a draw as half a win. Foreign managers have qualified for 5 out of 5 tournaments whereas English managers have qualified for 4/6.[9]

In the 1930s Vittorio Pozzo introduced a 2-3-2-3 (See Fig. 3) to Italy’s national team using a third back for more defensive shape and style.[10] Italy won two World Cup’s in a row in 1934 and 1938.[11] Italy did not win another World Cup until Bearzot introduced a midfield libero into Italy’s defensive Catenaccio for the World Cup 1982, with which they won.[12]

Rinus Michels’ Netherlands incorporated the highly energetic Total Football in the early 1970s[13] and although they never won a World Cup, they finished runner’s up at both the 1974 and 1978 final.[14] A

Feola’s Brazil implemented the back four in 4-2-4(See Fig.3) for the first time at the World Cup 1958 and then kept it for 1962.[15] Both of which they won.[16] Zagallo’s Brazil won in 1970 with the same 4-2-4.[17] Winning again in 1994 and 2002 with a narrow 4-2-2-2(See Fig.3) and wide 5-2-3(See Fig.3) respectively.[18]

Since the introduction of the Bosman Ruling(See Fig. 2) in 1996 the Premier League has seen an increase in international footballers. England’s win percentage (when draws count as half a win) has increased by 5.1% since 1996.[19]

C: Evaluation of Sources

Jonathan Wilson’s “Inverting the Pyramid”:

Written by Jonathan Wilson, this book on the history of football tactics is a secondary source published in 2008 and updated in 2013. Described by the Scotsman as “revelatory”[20] and the winner of the British Sports Book Award’s “Football Book Of The Year” award.[21] It is written with the purpose of selling books by informing the reader of the history of football tactics and entertaining through anecdotes and insightful arguments. Gathering information from footballing journalists of their times such as Willy Meisl and Brian Glanville, historical records of football matches, and information from primary sources of managers such as Jimmy Hogan and Helenio Herrera, to create an extremely thorough analysis and commentary on the history of tactical innovations, successes, and failures, to enhance football watching and understanding. The greatest value of this source is in the number of sources it draws from, which provide a range of knowledge on the subject. Another value is that, in a topic so flooded with sources of vast subjectivity and unreliability, this book provides intellectual and evidenced statements and points of discussion. The limitations of this source are in the limitations of football analysis in itself. The book’s observation of pre-televised football are based on potentially subjective opinion of early football writers and managers, and without a visual record of the matches football is an incredibly difficult game to judge.

“Soccernomics” by Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski

Written by Financial Times sports columnist Simon Kuper, and professor of sports management and economics, Stefan Szymanski PhD, Soccernomics is a secondary source, originally published in 2009. The purpose of this book is to evaluate the statistics behind footballing occurrences, producing arguments from numerical data and economic studies. The purpose is also to entertain and sell books. Soccernomics offers insight into the effects of background dealings on football such as the hosting of tournaments and a country’s economic standing. The value of this source is in its ability avoid the ever present subjectivity of football by merely looking at statistics. The book’s gathering data from Russell Gerrard’s football database and Optastats provides a purely objective outlook on the phenomena that occur in football. The late cup winning manager Vujadin Boskov stated that, “Football is unpredictable”[22] and therein lies the limitation of this source. Due to football’s unpredictability, events cannot be fully explained through numbers and statistics, and without the full story of each football match it is made more difficult to conclude the reasons for its outcomes.

D: Analysis

A reluctance to innovate post 1966 has caused a lack of success for English football. When England reached the peak of their football success, winning the World Cup in 1966, it was seen as the greatest thing to happen to English football. However a theory has grown, that in the long term, it was in fact, the worst thing. David Downing in his books on England’s Rivalries[23] and Rob Steen, in The Mavericks[24] argue that the victory of 1966 has set English football back. Jonathan Wilson states that “The problem is not so much the way Ramsey’s England played as the fact that, in the minds of generations of fans and coaches in England, it laid down a ‘right’ way of playing”[25] and after Ramsey’s 4-4-2 saw success at club level with Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, it had certainly cemented itself as this “right” way. The 4-4-2 remained the staple of English coaches until the mid 90s, but since 66 is yet to see any form of competitive international success. This lack of innovation amongst English coaches, which blossomed after Ramsey’s era, has demonstrated its failings as the more creative minds of foreign managers have seen greater progress with the English national team. The relative success of these foreign managers shows that innovation has bred more success for the English team than tactical stagnation. Although since 1966, England’s inability to adapt has been ever present, it has been a feature of English football since its inception.

It could be argued that England’s lack of innovation was not solely sparked by 1966, but it has been ingrained in England since football began. After annihilating the English champions Wolves in 1960, Barcelona coach Helenio Herrera stated, “When it came to modern football, the Britons missed the evolution. The English are creatures of habit: tea at five.”[26] Although from 1960, this quote reigned true in describing the 100 years prior. In the first years of football, contested only between England and Scotland “kick and rush” was the norm, and England remained happy with that, but Scotland developed a more fluid passing game. The passing game saw success with Scottish clubs and Scotland themselves, but England remained stubborn. It wasn’t until a change in the offside rule that England, reluctantly, attempted to change their style. The natural reluctance to innovate England seemingly possess didn’t end there. Football journalist of the 1950s Willy Meisl compared England’s approach to football in the 1930s to their approach to Germany in the interwar period. “Round the thirties and towards the World War II we in Britain were living through a ‘safety-first’ period.” Later in the book he then states, “The fact is that English soccer has an enormous amount to learn from the rest of the world, about training, courses, tactics, organisation and strategy.”[27] The man considered the founder of Hungarian football[28] Jimmy Hogan stated “I still maintain we have the best players, but it is our style of playing that has gone wrong.”[29] These early opinions suggest that English football’s tactical mind has always been stale and in need of rejuvenation. However to truly assess the lack of success invoked by a reluctance to innovate, the success of innovation must be observed.

It is not only Scotland who have seen relative due to new ideas. Throughout footballing history it seems that innovation has bred success. Brazil, the most successful international team in football history, have thrived with adaptation. They developed four in defence, whilst others used three, and won three World Cups. Then by narrowing their midfield won another, and won their fifth by introducing five in defence. In comparison to England, Brazil have been far superior, and seemingly through innovation. However Brazil are not the only team to see success through new ideas. Italy are another prime example, developing defensive shape as their new Catenaccio led them to two World cup victories. However they experienced a similar trophy drought to England, until the subtle innovations of their manager Bearzot in midfield saw World Cup victory and demonstrated that after a length of stagnation, innovation has been the key to success.

Due to the unpredictability of football, it could be argued that there are far too many variables to determine that innovation is the single cause for a success or lack thereof. The Netherlands are the perfect support. Praised by David Winner and many others as “The best team never to win a World Cup”[30] the Dutch reached the 1974 and 1978 final with the genius Ajax innovation; total football. However they didn’t win, suggesting other factors of luck, individual skill, and many more, can have just as much of an effect on success as tactical innovation. The most prevalent argument for England’s lack of success is that the increase of foreign players playing the English League is responsible, however Kuper and Szymanski suggest “The experience of playing against the best foreign players every week has probably helped English Internationals to improve.”[31] And support this with the statistics that since the Bosman Ruling, England’s national team has won 5% more than it did prior to the increase in foreign players.

E: Conclusion

“Seven words have long dominated football: That’s the way it’s always been done.”[32] Having assessed the evidence available, it is clear that this statement is true for the majority of England’s footballing history. Since 1966 England have obeyed the “rules” Ramsey set for football and England have failed to tactically innovate. Given events pre-1966 England have always “proved themselves unwilling to grapple with the abstract”[33] and have failed to succeed because of it. The victories of other international teams shortly after their tactical innovations suggest that innovation plays a large role in an international team’s success. However other variables such as the skill of players, luck, and more factors on football’s unending list of unpredictability, suggest that England’s failure to succeed is impossible to deduce. Nevertheless from the statistical analysis and observations of football history it is clear that tactical developments play a large role in the history of many international teams, and no matter what other factors affect them, England’s reluctance to innovate and failure to adapt have prevented them from succeeding since 1966.

F: Bibliography

Glanville, Brian. Soccer Nemesis. London: Secker & Warburg, 1955. Print

Harris, Tim. "Jimmy Hogan." Players: 250 Men, Women and Animals Who Created Modern Sport. London: Yellow Jersey, 2009. N. pag. Google. Web. 18 Aug. 2014.

Wilson, Jonathan. Inverting the Pyramid: A History of Football Tactics. London: Orion, 2008. Print.

Kuper, Simon, and Stefan Szymanski. Soccernomics: Why Transfers Fail, Why Spain Rule the World and Other Curious Football Phenomena Explained. London: HarperSport, 2012. Print.

"Previous Winners." British Sports Book Awards 2014 Previous Winners. British Sports Book Awards, n.d. Web. 20 Aug. 2014.

"Book Review: Inverting the Pyramid." The Scotsman. The Scotsman, 05 June 2008. Web. 20 Aug. 2014.

"FIFA World Cup™ Final." FIFA.com. FIFA, 01 Aug. 2010. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.

"UEFA EURO 2016 Finals - History – UEFA.com." UEFA.com. UEFA, 2014. Web. 25 Aug. 2014.

Adams, Adrian. We Love Football: Best Football Quotes On Earth. N.p.: on Demand, 2014. Print.

Steen, Robert. The Mavericks: English Football When Flair Wore Flares. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1995. Print.

Downing, David. The Best of Enemies: England v. Germany, a Century of Football Rivalry. London: Bloomsbury, 2000. Print.

England v Argentina: World Cups and Other Small Wars. London: Portrait, 2003. Print.

Herrera, Fiora Gandolfi, Tacalabala, Esercizi di magia di Helenio Herrera. Tapiro, 2002.

Winner, David. Brilliant Orange: The Neurotic Genius of Dutch Football. London: Bloomsbury, 2000. Print.

Meisl, Willy. Soccer Revolution. London: Phoenix Sports, 1955. Print.

SoccerCoachingInternational’s Glossary of Soccer Terms (n.d.): n. pag. Soccer Coaching International. 16 Apr. 2007. Web. 30 Sept. 2014

Bosman Law Citation:

Judgment on Freedom of movement for workers delivered by European Court

Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman, Case C-415/93, ECLI 1995 I-04921

"Lineup Builder." : Football Formations and Tactics. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

G: Appendix

Fig. 1:

Glossary of Football terms used: (as stated in Soccer Coaching International’s Glossary of Terms)[34]

Defence- A team's function of preventing the opposition from scoring.

Midfield- The group of players who function primarily in the centre (neutral) third of the field

Libero- (Italian for "free player") sweeper or stopper who may go forward to support the attack

Catenaccio-(Italian for "chain") - A defensive playing style (formation, etc.) developed by the Italians, often using a sweeper, that gives up few goals while degrading the game to boredom.

Total Football- a philosophy (system, style, organization) of play popularized by the Dutch in the 1970's that allows any player to attack or defend, with others moving around to cover vacated areas. Total Football requires players to be highly fit and above average in intelligence.

Third Back- A third central defender added to two central defenders for increased defensive stability.

Back Four- A formation of deep defenders comprised of the left and right outside defenders and two other central defenders.

Kick and Rush- Football played vigorously but with little skill. Involves long passing across the pitch to score, involving very few small passes.

Note: When using Nation names (ie. England) reference is to that Nation’s national football team.

Fig. 2:

Bosman Ruling- “Judgment of the Court of 15 December 1995.
Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman.
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Cour d'appel de Liège - Belgium.
Freedom of movement for workers - Competition rules applicable to undertakings - Professional footballers - Sporting rules on the transfer of players requiring the new club to pay a fee to the old club - Limitation of the number of players having the nationality of other Member States who may be fielded in a match.
Case C-415/93.”[35]

[1] Wilson p. 22

[2] ibid p. 30-35

[3] FIFA

[4] UEFA

[5] Wilson p. 179

[6] ibid p. 304-308

[7] ibid p. 446

[8] Kuper and Szymanski p. 309-310

[9] ibid p. 332

[10] Wilson p. 85

[11] FIFA

[12] Wilson p. 296