To what extent did Stalin truly influence Mao’s decision to enter the Korean conflict?
A. Plan of Investigation
After twenty years of ferocious war, both civil and against Imperial Japan, Mao’s decision to enter the Korean conflict was not taken lightly but was the result of various considerations. Chief among them was the support the USSR was willing to provide. To what extent did Stalin truly influence Mao’s decision to cross the Rubicon and enter the Korean conflict? To investigate this, the main Chinese source used will be interviews conducted by a Chinese author of the military officers during the war as well as later historians. With the different interpretations of the historians as well as the personal witnesses of these officials, their explanations will then be compared to the ones of the British as well as the Chinese that have suffered from the persecutions of the Cultural Revolution. Along with these two extreme views of Mao and his foreign policies, the addition of future historical analysis of other Western historians and primary Chinese documents, will then be used to determine the most influential aspect on Mao’s decision.
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B. Summary of Evidence
With Dean Acheson’s Defence Perimeter Speech January 1950, the Korean War broke out several months later on June 25th, 1950. During the initial beginning of the war, China had not intervened, but four months later on October 16, after sending an ultimatum on October 3, 350,000 Chinese soldiers entered the war.
Stated in Crossing Over the Yalu River, even before Inchon, China had already contacted Moscow and warned both them and Kim Il-Sung to take precautions. Zhou Enlai specifically quoted “Mao Zedong believes that in order to protect and cover Seoul, the Koreans must build a strong base in Inchon because the Americans are likely to land there.” During Zhou’s meeting with Moscow’s representative he also agreed that if the American’s were to cross the 38th parallel line, the Chinese would camouflage as North Korean soldiers and aid in their defense. But two days before Zhou’s ultimatum, Mao Zedong received a letter from Kim asking for help, with explicit descriptions of their state. But in it, there was absolutely no mentioning of Stalin.
By October 8th, Mao announced the creation of a group of volunteer soldiers for the war and at the same time he sent Zhou to Moscow to discuss the aid Stalin would provide. Zhou stated that as long as the Soviet army agrees to cover with air force, the Chinese will send in their army. Stalin replied that they would provide the air force, but since the Soviet army is not ready, he would need around two months time to prepare.
Zhang Baijia in Crossing over the Yalu River explained that Mao entered to war for four reasons. Firstly, Mao needed to protect the Northeast section of China because during the time the area was crucial in industrial development. Mao had feared that if the Americans cross the Yalu River, the industrial development section of China will be at risk. Secondly, if China did not enter the war, then the Soviet influence will increase, which will put China at a disadvantage. Thirdly, Mao believed that if they did not support North Korea, many refugees will escape to China, which will result in chaos. Lastly, Mao believed that as a Communist leader, they had the responsibility of supporting the other nations that wished to pursue Communism and in this case especially North Korea. This was because they had fought together against the Japanese and had already formed a “teeth and lip” relationship, they relied on each other and so China had to intervene.
Along with the reasons Zhang argues, Chang and Halliday describe Mao’s motives as global ambitions. They claim that many of the ways Mao dealt with other countries was a copy of Stalin’s methods. In their opinion Mao decided to enter the war was because he wanted to break from Stalin’s influence and that he wanted to show that the newly established People’s Republic of China is strong and is able to take on strong forces such as the USA. Mao believed that fighting in the war would be able to take him out from Stalin’s sphere of influence. At the same time they would be gaining Soviet technology and military equipment services, which Mao believed was essential in helping China in becoming stronger in the future.
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C. Evaluation of sources
Mao: The Unknown Story is written by both a Chinese and Western author, one of whom is a former research fellow at King’s College, University of London. The main author, Chang, is not a trained historian, but rather a linguist. She uses personal experiences and witnesses during the Cultural Revolution as a basis for her criticisms of Mao. It is valuable in that it provides alternative perspectives on the issue of the reasons for why Mao entered the war. The perspective and provided opinion clearly differs from the one provided through the war veterans in Crossing over the Yalu River, which is comprised of opinions from the Chinese. The focus is more on the ambition of Mao in an endeavor to escape from Stalin’s influence and his dream to become strong, but fail to present the reasons which were the protection of the China from the US troops as a reason for Mao entering the war. The authors provide more links between Mao and Stalin, which emphasizes that the intervention of Mao in the Korean War is mainly due to Stalin’s influence. But despite the different view which Chang presents, her entire focus in on the aspects of Mao in all of his decisions and not only the Korean War. With this breadth of knowledge she is presenting, it is difficult for her to pin down the specifics of this war. However, despite this limitation, the presentation of Mao’s entire life shows the pattern of his decisions and may lead to a greater understanding of him fighting in the Korean War.
In Crossing Over the Yalu River, the author Cheng Hong provided interviews with all the military officials and historians to explain the reasons. If Chang is accused of “a simple personalization of blame”, Cheng then goes the opposite by presenting Mao as a leader of the country, and his brave intervention with the war was for the sake of the country even the situation China was in at the moment was not the best time for war. This source is valuable in that the historians and experts providing the information from an objective view point. The publication date is after the reign of Mao, which emphasizes the extent in which the Chinese believes that Mao’s purpose were for his brothers. This source portrays China as the defenders and not the aggressors. Zhou Enlai had specifically warned the Americans to not cross the 38th parallel, otherwise they would attack. It is valuable because of the Chinese perception, but it is also unreliable because due to the publicity of the interview, Chinese governmental officials would never say anything against Mao. The public forces these interviewed officials to speak in favor of Mao, and the author himself, agreeing with Peng Dehuai, believes that Mao was the only man to understand history. Clearly he will portray Mao in a positive light.
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D. Analysis
From the perspective of the Chinese, Mao’s decision to enter the war was for two main reasons. One was to protect the newly established state and the second one was to help the North Korean brothers. Mao said himself, "if the whole of Korea were occupied by the United States, and the Korean revolutionary forces were totally defeated, the U.S. aggressor would be more arrogant, and the whole situation in the Far East would be unfavorable (to us)." As this appears, the Chinese did so for their protection, but Zhang also stated that they had international responsibility to support the countries that wished to obtain independence as well as unity. Besides this, MacArthur’s decision to bomb Beijing and attack across the Yalu River threatened Mao, but Gaddis rather puts a specific emphasis on Stalin’s creation of the war.
Besides the support for Zhang’s claims, is the influence Stalin had on Mao. Stalin agreed to help the Chinese if they fought in the war by supplying them with weapons and air power. “The Chinese would send volunteers to confront the American-led forces on the ground, while the Soviets would provide air cover”. However, the air force in which Stalin promised Mao was not prepared. This not only shows that the Soviets encouraged the Chinese to participate in this war, but also the attitude that Stalin had towards Mao. Clearly for Stalin Mao was insignificant because he did not believe Mao had the equipment and the ability to fight in the war. Overall, he just didn’t want to support Mao. This was because Communism at the time was not monolithic anymore. Although viewed by Western powers as monolithic, Stalin understood that Communism was not. If he supplied military weapons to China, he would only be strengthening the country and diminishing his position as the undisputed leader of the worldwide Communist movement.
Originally when North Korea asked for support from the Soviet Union they were turned down, but the Chinese gave a definite answer of yes and it was Mao that gave Kim in the idea to launch attack of South Korea first. Mao was determined to fight the Americans in exchange for escaping from Stalin’s control and to build his own war machine with the supplies that were coming from the Soviets. Mao did want to break from the Soviet Union, and the Korean War gave him a chance to do so along with gaining military support. Mao’s intervention with the war is also argued by many as a card used by Kim to get support from Stalin. Because Stalin had rejected Kim’s earlier request and Mao accepted it, Kim was able to use to this hint to Stalin that Mao was more practical and in a way better than Stalin. Instead of going directly to Stalin to plan ideas Kim would instead go and willingly be under the rule of Mao if Stalin did not agree to support him. Clearly this was a threat to Stalin’s position in Communism and so reluctantly Stalin agreed to help. So rather than saying it was Stalin’s influence, being used by Kim may seem more appropriate.
Another reason Mao entered the war was because of the anchoring of the Seventh Fleet in Taiwan, which had no relations with the Soviet Union. Mao saw that combat with the Americans was inevitable and Korea at the time served to be battlefield. Mao was prepared for the Americans to attack mainland China and he had in mind to completely eradicate the invading troops of USA, all he need was for the weapons that Stalin promised to supply to arrive. Mao wanted to destroy the Americans for the fear of his position and as well as the sake of his countries, especially since the Americans created the policy of “roll-back” according to NSC 68 and they had supported Chiang-Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war.. If democracy was to take over the whole of Korea, invasion and “roll-back” of Communism would be much simpler as well as the landing of Chiang-Kai-shek if he wished to pursue mainland China again.
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E. Conclusion
From the sources and the several opinions presented, Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War is a mixture of many reasons. But despite these several aspects, it can be seen that Stalin’s motivation of Mao in his provision of arms was not the main reason, seeing as Mao was not armed with the appropriate equipment. The “heroic” rescue of the North Koreans is constantly emphasized by both the officials as well as Mao, but under the circumstances of the newly established nation, this incentive does not seem strong enough, but rather the consequences of not helping seemed at the time to be a greater motivation.
The consequences of the Americans enforcing “roll-back” and the threat of the industry seem much more convincing than the “brotherhood” which the officials emphasize. These consequences and the incentives for Mao to prevent them from occurring were much more pragmatic since Mao was willing to risk another war. As for Stalin’s influence, his persuasion of Mao to enter and to continue fighting seems minimal, because Mao was doing so for his “ambitions” and not because he is controlled by Stalin.
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F. Sources
Andrew Nathan (2005-11-17). Jade and Plastic. London Review of Books. Retrieved on 2007-04-04
Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. Mao: the Unknown Story. London: Jonathan Cape, 2005.
陈 宏. 跨国鸭绿江. 北京: 蓝天出版社, 2003. (Cheng Hong. Crossing Over the Yalu River. Beijing: Lantian Publisher, 2003.)
Chen Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Collection of Mao Zedong's Writings After the Establishment of the PRC. Vol. 1. Beijing, 1989.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War. Penguin Books, 2005.
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, and Litai Xue. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford UP, 1993.
Hong, Xuezhi. Recollections on the War of 'Resisting the U.S. and Assisting Korea. Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe, 1991.
Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China Anchor Books, 1992.
Maoist Dualism and the Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935-1949. York University, 1991.
Montefiore, Simon S. "History: Mao by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday." Times Online. 25 May 2005.6Nov.2007 .
Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and his Era. New York: Norton, 2003.
Why did U.S. troops shoot at No-Gun-Ri incident?
Abstract
Over 50 years after the “Forgotten War”, the countries that fought in the war, namely the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States, still blame each other for starting the war, for war crimes during the war and for many other unresolved points of contention. Also, the United States’ undeclared war in Korea continues today because the fighting was stopped only stopped by a ‘ceasefire’ in 1953. The Armistice Agreement was never turned into a permanent peace treaty, although such an outcome was promised in the Agreement.
This essay deals with the No Gun Ri incident in late July 1950, very close to the official start of the Korean War. This incident was mentioned at all by the media outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where nearly 400 South Korean civilians were shot to death by United States army. By comparison, 200-500 civilians were murdered by US army troops in the infamous My Lai incident in 1968. This essay will deal with the question of whether U.S troops shot on stationary Korean civilians who showed no threat to them, or whether they shot because of DPRK soldiers secretly mixed in among the civilians. In the beginning of this essay, other so called Massacres by DPRK will be discussed, and then the No Gun Ri incident will be discussed. The essay will investigate the condition of the U.S. troops’ and the villagers’ conditions. The reason why U.S. troops decided to shoot Korean villagers will be debated in the end.
The two main sources that will be used for this investigation are ‘The bridge at No Gun Ri: A hidden nightmare from the Korean War’ and ‘No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident’. It is noteworthy that these two sources contradict each other.
word count: 298
“In Sinchun country, the U.S. imperialists and their bootlickers trampled underfoot and burnt everything in all quarters. They butchered innocent people en masse. They kicked children and pregnant women into the flames and buried old folks alive.”Other U.S. massacres of Korean civilians include those at Masan, Sachon Changyong, and Ducksung. In Masan, a massacre of Korean civilians by U.S. forces was perpetrated on 11th August 1950. Masan is a village of Kokan Ri, 240 miles south Seoul. On that day U.S. troops and aircraft fired on over a hundred villagers who were hiding in their houses in the village. U.S. forces claim that on this day, 11 DPRK soldiers had tried to breakthrough the Pusan perimeter, thus actions such as this were taken to search them.
There are over 10 officially recorded major massacres of civilians in Korean War, including In Tanyang, North Chungchong Province, 400 civilians were burnt to death in a cave on 20th January 1951 and numbers of mass bombings of civilians in Pyongyang and NamPo by airplanes. This shows that the either the U.S. army held hostile attitudes toward Koreans, or there were problems with their military tactics applied in the war, or was there North Korean army hiding among the civilians that led to shooting of U.S. troops? All of these are possible answer but there is no exact answer given both sides, DPRK and U.S. are proving with evidence that it was not their fault. Thus through focusing on one of the 3 most widely-known massacres in Korean War, No Gun Ri massacre, to help us understand the situation and have clearer view over the issues.
What happened at No Gun Ri?On 25th July, 1950, soon after the official start of Korean War, approximately five to six hundred Korean villagers were evacuated from Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri, villages near No Gun Ri . The U.S. soldiers escorted them Southward, eventually to Pusan, fleeing from the war and the advance of DPRK forces. They were led to a village near a riverbank at Ha Ga Ri and the villagers were ordered to stay there for a night . The next day, as they continued their way along the Seoul-Pusan road, they soon reached the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. soldiers stopped them and ordered the group onto the railway tracks, where they were searched for prohibited items such as weapons , of which they were not found to be in posession. Even so, the soldiers ordered an air attack upon the villagers through radio communication with U.S. aircraft. Soon, planes flew over them, dropped bombs directly on them and fired guns at them, causing approximately 100 casualties . The killing did not end there, however. Those villagers who survived found protection under a small culvert underneath the railroad tracks. The U.S. soldiers brought these villagers into a large double tunnel nearby and shot them from both ends of the tunnel for over 4 days, resulting in addition approximated 300 additional deaths .
The Associated Press reported that the civilians killed were mostly women and children . What was shocking about what happened next was that no trace of the killings, nor investigation into this catastrophic incident, could be found in U.S military archives. Historians remained unaware of the incident for decades and it was not until the mid-1990s that a group of survivors decided to publicly press their case. The United States committed numerous war crimes against humanity and genocide, in violation of the international humanitarian law during the Korean War.
One report indicates that the 7th Regiment of the 1st Cav. Division was involved in Nogun-ri massacres . Among the several branches of the U.S. military, the U.S. Air Force was probably more responsible than any other branches for the huge number of civilian killings because of its indiscriminate shootings and bombings of civilian refugees, villages, towns, and cities in violation of Hague Conventions .
The Condition of U.S. Forces in July 1950U.S. soldiers who were fighting in Korea at this moment were the Army of Occupied Japan; they were mostly trained basically as police in a land under control and not as soldiers who are ready for combat . Thus they were young, under-trained, under-equipped, and not ready to fight the North Korea People’s Army (NKPA).
What their lack of combat preparedness caused them was deficiencies in training, organization, personal strength and leadership . Proper trainings were only available for a small proportion of the troops. Classes very important to combat fighters, for example, in maintenance and communications, were insufficient. Furthermore, the equipment they were using was mostly of World War II vintage, and poorly stored . The three infantry regiments in the 1st Cavalry Division had only two of the three battalions assigned properly. And to the requirement to take the 24th Infantry Division back to its strength prior to the departure for Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division transferred nearly 1000 men to the 24th, mostly top four senior non-commissioned officer grades . This weakened the soldiers’ cohesion and reduced the number of leaders with combat experience at the small-unit level.
The most U.S. soldiers were not adequately prepared for the war condition to fight in Korea in that period from June and July 1950. They neither were experienced to deal with a strong NKPA that applied both guerilla tactics, conventional warfare, or with a large number of refugee population, which NKPA might have infiltrated or disguised among them as a refugee.
Refugee Control Policies of the U.S. and the Republic of KoreaOne problem that U.S. soldiers always faced was their inexperience to deal with large numbers and unhandled refugees who complicated the battlefield. At the beginning of the War, U.S. soldiers fought against the NKPA’s infiltrating soldiers, who dressed as civilians among them . Once they crossed the lines into U.S. positions, these infiltrated soldiers conducted guerilla-style combat operations against U.S. forces.
By late July 1950, close to the date of No Gun Ri incident, the government of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Army Headquarters drafted refugee control policies, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” , to defend and protect U.S. and ROK troops from the North Korean army. These policies were aimed at reducing large refugee groups’ negative impact on U.S. troops. These policies were mainly handled by the ROK National Police on uncontrolled refugee populations. Therefore, the movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cav. Division was limited to specific times of the day, and to specific purposes. The National Police were responsible for enforcing these policies.
On 26th of July, 1950, the Republic of Korea, along with the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea established a plan to control refugee movement “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” that:-Rule out movement of refugees across battle lines (All times)-Evacuation of villages without general officer approval is not allowed-Korean civilians not allowed moving at night. This policy enactment by the Eighth Army was an attempt to stop the NKPA’s use of infiltration tactics, and furthermore, to protect refugees from crossing battle lines where combat would occur. Other policies included keeping refugees off roads, not letting them pass or else searching them before they passed. However, the policy did not state anything about refugees movement across friendly lines where there was little likelihood of combat.
A memo within the U.S. Fifth Air Force written by United States Air Force Colonel Turner C. Rogers regarding the “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” notes in paragraphs 3 and 4 that the Air Force had requested that they strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching their positions. The bands of civilians have either been infiltrated by or are under the control of DPRK soldiers, but recommended that official policy to have discriminate in targeting civilians only when they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts.
This memo was written on July 25, 1950, the day before the refugees were shot at No Gun Ri.
This show that the U.S.’s policy toward strafing civilians was only applicable when they cross the line to enter U.S. forces zones or approaching their positions.
Gen. Kean’s order to the 25th Infantry Division says civilians should be considered enemy. The accompanying overlay map outlined an area covering the entire warfront.
The Tactical SituationOn 22nd July 1950, in Yongdong, nearby No Gun Ri, the 1st Cav. Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division. The 7th Cav. Regiment and 2nd Battalion moved toward the Yongdong area . With friendly forces stronger than the NKPA, the Eighth Army made a strategy to withdraw behind the last defensible area, the Naktong River in Yongdong . The 1st Cav. Division withdrew from Yongdong through a series of delaying actions adhering to the Eighth Army strategy and avoided a threatened envelopment. On the evening of 25th July, 1950, the 7th Cav. Regiment was supporting the 5th Cav. Regiment in positions east of Yongdong.
On the night of 25th July, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the sector to the norh of the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s. Thus, in the early morning hours of 26th July the 7th Cav. Regiment believed that they were enveloped without a specific order. They thus conducted a disorganized withdrawal from the position in Yongdong , and the 2nd battalion went to No Gun Ri. They spent the rest of the day recovering from undisciplined personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, there were repeated fights reported between the 7th Cavalry and NKPA, therefore they were aware that there were no friendly forces around No Gun Ri. By nine at night, they found that about 120 troops were missing , mostly of whom had been killed. Given these casasualties, there was ostensibly continuous fighting between the 7th Cavalry and NKPA, and the refugees had attacked them.
Movement of Villagers (Leading to the incident in No Gun Ri)The Eighth army policy on refugee movement, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets”, clearly stated that refugees should not be evacuated without officer’s approval and entering the battle lines at all times. Until now, it is unclear why was there were refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri. Some U.S. veterans remember escorting refugees from villages , but they cannot remember the names of the villages or the specific dates that they evacuated them, only remembering that it was late July. Thus it is possibile that U.S. soldiers, who were not 7th Cavalry, told the villagers to evacuate from Im Gae Ri. On the other hand, contrary to above, there is still a question as to why U.S. forces would travel 3 miles off their designated path to the village of Im Gae Ri, while there is a busy withdrawl for the mean of adding more than 400 refugees onto the crowded roads and worsening conditions. The general officers were not aware of this action and the soldier, if there was, who evacuated, it will be because of the fear of NKPA infiltrators present in refugee concentration.
But still the possibility of U.S. army evacuating the village should not be ruled out. Some veterans of the 5th Cavalry Regiment state that sometime in late July they had escorted evacuated villagers from a village that they’ve forgotten the name of . Based on these accounts there is still a possibility soldiers not of the 7th Cav. Regiment had evacuated the village.
Shooting on CiviliansU.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri from 26-29 July 1950. On 26th July, refugees were strafed and bombed on the railroad tracks. Some escaped into the double railroad overpass tunnel where they were fired upon by U.S. forces from different sides.
The existence of NKPA infiltrators among the civilians is still debatable. Some veterans argue that they saw the firing of different weapons including machine guns, artillery and rifles from Koreans in civilians dress. They argue that they were fired upon from the civilians’ position in the double railroad tunnel. They argue that their return fire was an act of self-defense.
A letter was sent from the U.S. ambassador to Seoul on 24th July 1950, informing the State Department that U.S. soldiers would shoot refugees approaching their lines. This letter is dated the day of No Gun Ri incident, which strongly indicates that this policy existed for U.S forces in Korea"If refugees do appear from north of US lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot," wrote Ambassador John J. Muccio, in his message to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
In an interview with the Associated Press, Lawrence Levine and James Crume, who worked at the headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, said that the U.S. soldiers were ordered by commanders or officials to open fire because they believed that there was NKPA hiding among the peasants. They repeatedly said that they had been fired upon by the refugees and that their return of fire was only in self-defense.
Some veterans argue that they were not ordered to attack and kill civilian refugees who pose no threat to the unit in No Gun Ri. This group of veterans totally denies the fact that there was an order to shoot. The only order given, they claimed, was to stop civilians and not to let them pass the position . They believed that if the refugee didn’t stop, then for their own defense, they could use force to stop them passing.
There were many different views toward this incident. One well noted contradiction that made investigation more difficult was the case of veteran Edward Daily. He claims to have witnessed both the massacre and the order to bring this out. He was interviewed by both U.S. News & World Report and NBC and stated that he was present at the incident and that he heard an order to kill all civilians . However, in their later investigation, the US News & World Report found that he was not a machine gunner, and he was not part of any unit at No-Gun Ri, nor anywhere near the village during the period in question.
Some veterans state that there were in fact orders to fire upon the civilians. When interviewed, they don’t remember where specifically this order came from and all state that they didn’t personally receive this order but that other soldiers passed it on to them . He had very little evidence to support his point, but the fact that they used artillery and mortar rounds that could hit innocent civilians would indicate that there was an order to allow them.
Evidence found later to prove there was an actual order to let them shoot appeared in an 8th Cav. Regiment message, dated on 24th July 1950.
The 8th Cavalry Regiment’s journal, or communications log, records at 1000 hours, or 10 a.m., on July 24, 1950, instructions from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters to "fire everyone," including refugees, trying to cross the front line. The "G-3 Ln" is the regiment’s liaison to the division operations staff. Meanwhile, it says use discretion in case of women and children. This show they did not plan to shoot women and children, but only defending itself from NKPA.
Another source that could be called upon is the the painter, Pablo Picasso. However, this source is questionable and limited since he was not in Korea or anywhere near No-Gun Ri, but only saw what was reported in the media.
Pablo Picasso’s ‘Massacre in Korea’, completed in 1951 presented what happened in the No-Gun Ri massacre. On the left side of the painting, there are five women, one of whom is pregnant, and two children. They are butchered and shot by well-armed white men with swords and mortar rounds.
As mentioned above, in Kim Il Song’s biography he has written that “the U.S. imperialists and their bootlickers trampled underfoot and burnt everything in all quarters. They butchered innocent people en masse. They kicked children and pregnant women into the flames and buried old folks alive.”This is a question on which source is more reliable; that the U.S. veterans argue they shot only those showed threat to their unit, NKPA, no women and children were shot . Meanwhile, Picasso’s painting and Kim Il Sung’s biography show a diametrically opposed viewpoint. If Picasso’s painting and Kim Il Sung’s statements can be taken as reliable sources, then the U.S. forces would have broken International Humanitarian Law, violating and attacking people who do not or cannot take part in the hostilities, killing surrendered civilians.
On 12th January 1999, President Clinton expressed great regrets over No Gun Ri incident . He said:On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950. The intensive, yearlong investigation into this incident has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the scars they leave behind on people and on nations.
Although we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri, the U.S. and South Korean governments have concluded in the Statement of Mutual Understanding that an unconfirmed number of innocent Korean refugees were killed or injured there. To those Koreans who lost loved ones at No Gun Ri, I offer my condolences. Many Americans have experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war. We understand and sympathize with the sense of loss and sorrow that remains even after a half a century has passed.
The value of this source is that he is the former president of U.S., who was present when the first investigation over this massacre was done and was delivered to him as soon as it was done. The request for a response and apology for this incident was done by both DPRK and Republic of Korea’s government and people, based on the proves we have today that shows the victims, or parts of them, were innocent civilians. However, he has only said that “we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri,” but at least as a president, he was conscious that “regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri” and this apology is accepted by North and South Koreans today. This speech has ended the intense hostility of some South and North Korean civilians today.
ConclusionWhat happened at No Gun Ri is referred to as an ‘incident’ by the U.S. and as a ‘massacre’ by DPRK today. It was as a result of U.S. action in Korean War. One thing now certain is that the U.S. troops were inexperienced who were previously working in Occupied Japan, and they were suddenly ordered to join ROK forces to fight experienced NKPA. Thus the reason why the U.S. troops shot on the villagers can be narrowed down to the possibility that there were a large number of NKPA disguised among the villagers who shot on U.S. positions, or that U.S. forces misunderstood the order to stop civilians from approaching U.S. position and alarm fires could be given, or was it truly a cold-blooded massacre, as described by Kim Sung Il and painted by Pablo Picasso.
This investigation was severely limited by the lack of resources supporting the view that the shooting was a deliberate killing of Korean civilians. Within the DPRK there is much more that would have been available, but but during my two years of IB I have not had the opportunity to return to my country.
These limitations notwithstanding, this essay and investigation supports my view that the U.S. soldiers present at that time lacked sufficient combat experience and that they may have fired out of fear in response to a real or perceived threat which may have also been augmented by having been fired on by Korean civilians.
ibliography:Books -- Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: Free P, 1988.
- Choe, Sang-Hun, Martha Mendoza, and Charles Hanley. The Bridge At No Gun Ri: a Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War. 1st ed. New York: Owl Books, 2001.
- Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. 1st ed. Vol. 2. New York: Cornell UP, 2004.
- Feldman, Ruth. The Korean War. Singapore: Lerner Group; Library Binding Edition, 2003.
- Holzer, Henry M., and Erika Holzer. Fake Warriors: Identifying, Exposing, and Punishing Those Who Falsify Their Military Service. 1st ed. Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2003.
- Kim, Il Sung. Kim Il Sung, Biography II. 1st ed. Pyongyang: Miraisha, 1970.
- Robert, Bateman. No Gun Ri: a Military History of the Korean War Incident. 3rd edition Vol. 1. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002.
Magazines -- Li, Jongchol. "Masan Massacre." Mal Magazine 12 Jan. 2001, Winter ed.: 41-48.
Reviews -- Department of the Army, Inspector General. "No Gun Ri Review." Rev. of No Gun Ri Incident. Jan. 2001:Speeches -- Clinton, Bill. "No Gun Ri." Opening Weeks of Korean War. 11 Jan. 2001. 15 Oct. 2006 .
Web sites –- Cumings, Bruce. "Korean My Lai." The Nation (1999). 5 Nov. 2006
Appendix A
The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and civilian property. Neither the civilian population as whole nor individual civilians may be attacked.
-Attacks may be made solely against military objectives. People who do not or can no longer take part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and for their physical and mental integrity. Such people must in all circumstances be protected and treated with humanity, without any unfavorable distinction whatever.
-It is forbidden to kill or wound an adversary who surrenders or who can no longer take part in the fighting.
-Neither the parties to the conflict nor members of their armed forces have an unlimited right to choose methods and means of warfare. It is forbidden to use weapons or methods of warfare that are likely to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.
-The wounded and sick must be collected and cared for by the party to the conflict which has them in its power. Medical personnel and medical establishments, transports and equipment must be spared.
-The Red Cross or Red Crescent on a white background is the distinctive sign indicating that such persons and objects must be respected.
-Captured combatants and civilians who find themselves under the authority of the adverse party are entitled to respect for their lives, their dignity, their personal rights and their political, religious and other convictions. They must be protected against all acts of violence or reprisal. They are entitled to exchange news with their families and receive aid. They must enjoy basic judicial guarantees.
Appendix B
On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950. The intensive, yearlong investigation into this incident has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the scars they leave behind on people and on nations.
Although we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri, the U.S. and South Korean governments have concluded in the Statement of Mutual Understanding that an unconfirmed number of innocent Korean refugees were killed or injured there. To those Koreans who lost loved ones at No Gun Ri, I offer my condolences. Many Americans have experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war. We understand and sympathize with the sense of loss and sorrow that remains even after a half a century has passed. I sincerely hope that the memorial the United States will construct to these and all other innocent Korean civilians killed during the war will bring a measure of solace and closure. The commemorative scholarship fund that we will launch will serve as a living tribute to their memory.
As we honour those civilians who fell victim to this conflict, let us not forget that pain is not the only legacy of the Korean War. American and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder in the harshest of conditions for the cause of freedom, and they prevailed. The vibrancy of democracy in the Republic of Korea, the strong alliance between our two countries, and the closeness of our two peoples today is a testament to the sacrifices made by both of our nations fifty years ago.
Kim Il Sung: Biography pg 315Mal Magazine pg 41The Origins of the Korean War pg 55IbidThe Origins of the Korean War pg 55IbidKorean My Lai pg 2IbidNo Gun Ri review pg 3Ibid pg 5No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident pg 31Ibid Pg 33The Cause of War, pg 15No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident pg 84Ibid pg 92Ibid pg 93The bridge at No Gun Ri: A hidden nightmare from the Korean War pg 114IbidIbidNo Gun Ri review pg 5IbidIbidNo Gun Ri review pg 6Korean My Lai pg 1Korean My Lai pg 3Korean My Lai pg 2Korean My Lai pg 3Fake Warriors, pg 71Kim Il Sung: Biography pg 315The Korean War pg 96Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
The consequences of the Korean War in International Relations.
The Korean War was one of the bloodiest wars in the history. After World War II, in order to maintain political prestige among the uncommitted nations of world, neither side could allow any advantages or concession. The Soviets tried to blockade Berlin, but still could not prevent from the war, and which led to the creation of the Korean War.
The Korean War started on June 25, 1950. The war began between 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea' and South Korea and it had strongly affected the Cold War between the US, USSR and China. It also harshly strengthened the intentions between them.
The war lasted for three years from June 25 1950. North Korea had a communist system and the south was capitalist. In World War Two, both USSR and USA helped defeat the Japanese in Korea, which eventually divided Korea into two parts. One with the communist system (North) from USSR, and capitalists (South) from the USA. The line that divided them was the 38th parallel. It began with North Korean soldiers crossing the 38th parallel after the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) outlined a perimeter, which South Korea wasn't included, therefore the north Korean leader Kim Il Song decided to 'unite' Korea. When they almost accomplished the mission, UN army (mainly US army) backed south up from July. It resulted China to join the war when UN army (US army and MacArthur 'rolled back' to the border to China on River Yalu. Finally, this war lasted for 3 years, more than a million people were killed all together, and the armistice was signed in the 38th parallel again. Both North and South Korea had no geographical change, but money, industries, populations were gone, also effected on the Cold.
As a result of the Korean War, nearly 58000 UN troops and 1600000 communist troops were either killed, wounded or reported missing. The loss seemed in vain for many people because they thought the war was unnecessary. On June 25, 1950, the first war between South Korea and North Korea started, and the invasion of South Korea gave a rise to the military advantages for the communists. And the result of the first war gave UN to play a military role. This gave UN a excuse to hit with the communists, so they created a UN military force which was led by McArthur to defend South Korea. UN force didn't expect that China would attack, but to their surprise, China attacked and pushed back the UN force. Another fact which influenced in the Korean War was the death of Stalin in 1953, as Stalin said himself, if he's done, Russia's done. As the result of his death, the USSR realized that they could not continue this war, so they decided to be a pacifist, and settled the conflict by peace and negotiation. UN also thought that there wasn't any point to continue the war, so Armistice was signed between UN and North Korea, which ended the war in the summer of 1953.
From the standpoint of the Korean War, we can see that the result might be a good thing for the development of the Cold War, because it decreased the power of USSR, and could have some peace for a while. However, there wasn't really a peace agreement signed between South Korea and North Korea, and led to the division of the Korea until today.
From the US viewpoint, it was more worried about communism and wanting a stronger 'containment' policy. Before, the Cold War was all about European countries, but suddenly China, which is in Far East, fell into communism in 1949. It was a shock to Americans and it was willing to spread throughout like dominoes. Truman was under severe domestic pressure for being too soft on communism. Especially vocal were those who accused the Democrats of having 'Lost China'. The intervention was also an important implementation of the new Truman Doctrine, which advocated the opposition of communism everywhere it tried to expand. The lesson of Munich in 1938 also influenced the American decision, believing that appeasing communism would only encourage further expansion. 302,483 US 'military advisors', in fact soldiers, were sent to Korea to fight expansion of communism, North Korean, Chinese and Soviet Air Force. 33,685 US soldiers were killed in the war. In the end, the US wasn't very happy about the result, but at least, the least missions were achieved. Socially, it stopped from expanding of communism in Asia, otherwise, if Korea fell to communism, Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and so on would have probably fell to communist as domino theory. Militarily, US soldiers stayed in Republic of Korea (South) to defend Korea, which stand a threat to China and other Asian countries from falling to communism. Economically, US saved Asian markets. If those countries fell, then US would have lost their markets. Politically, it has strengthened the power of the West. It was stopped expanding of Communism, it has shown to Soviets that West wouldn't appease no more. Finally, the relationship of USSR and China with US is worsened.
From the Soviets' and Chinese points of view, this war exacerbated the hostility between them and the US. First, China has been unable to recover Taiwan for supporting Korea, but then US claimed to protect Taiwan. Secondly, China has totally killed, wounded or lost about a million soldiers. Thirdly, MacArthur wanted to nuke China, it only grew the hostilities between them. Also, they saw from this war that the West and US are even more worrying about expansion of communism and they were preparing to spread it even faster. West European countries were worrying about Soviets would take over the West Germany during the wartime; therefore they had a bigger rivalry now.
As we can see, the Korean War has a great impact on Cold War and both sides were not willing to stop. After a decade, the Vietnamese war against the Americans had begun.
To what extent did economic considerations influence the American decision to go to war in Korea?
Although Acheson's "Defensive Perimeter" speech in Jan 12, 1950 did not include Korea, when the war broke out the US was involved immediately. The aim of this investigation is to find out to what extent did economic reasons influence the USA's decision to go to war in Korea. The main sources will be books that relate to the Korean War. Internet sources will be used if it is necessary for the summary of evidence. In B, the changes of the American economy will be after and before the involvement Korean War, Acheson's "defensive perimeter" speech, and the expansion of communism after WWII. Then I will evaluate the values and limitations of the two Korean books that relate to Korean War with regarding to the extent of economic reason for the USA involvement in Korean War. The possible political and economic reasons why the USA intervened in the Korean War will also be analysed before reaching a conclusion in E.
B Summary of Evidence
The economic situation of the USA from 1940 to 1953.
The USA's economic situation was rapidly growing during the war with Japan because it had put much effort on military spending, and thus decreasing unemployment. However because of the surrender of Japan, the US's economy started to decrease again. The USA saw another chance to have economic growth due to the Korean War. Indeed, the USA's economy started to grow from 1950.
The USA's declaration of war upon Japan in December 8, 1941 led to the growth of its economy. Industrial factories were at first slow to convert to military output, but by 1942, 33% of the economy was devoted to the war effort. Between 1941 and 1945 the US spent approximately $250 million a day in efforts to produce the military products to defeat its enemies. By the end of the war in 1945, farm income had more than doubled. Corporate profits rose by 70 percent over their 1940 level, and real wages of industrial workers increased by 50 percent. Perhaps most notably, the earnings of the bottom fifth of workers climbed 68 percent. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) nearly doubled, from $832 billion in 1940 to $1559 billion, measured in constant 1987 dollars. Living standards improved significantly.1
Rapid demobilization dropped the government's share during the period 1946-50 to the range of 11-15 percent, slightly below the prewar level.
The outbreak of the Korean War led to another steep increase of the government's share, from about 13 percent in 1950 to 22.5 percent in 1953. Although some retrenchment followed cessation of the fighting in Korea, government's share has remained at a high level, about one-fifth of GNP, ever since. Notably, this postwar plateau of the past three decades holds government's share of GNP at approximately three times the level sustained before World War I. By this measure, then, the government during the twentieth century has become three times as important in relation to the economy.3
USA's foreign policy regarding Korea (Acheson's speech)
The purpose of Acheson's speech of "defensive perimeter" in JAN 12, 1950, was stopping Stalin and Mao's expansionism. As seen in the diagram,
But Korea and Taiwan was excluded, and it was blamed that it was the reason of start of Korean War.
The growth of communism after the WWII (China, Eastern Europe, Asia)
After WWII, the Soviets started to occupy Eastern Europe in order to prevent the invasion from Germany in future making them communism. Many Eastern Europe countries and Asian countries fell to communism continuously during 1940's such as the buffer states of USSR, Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, and Vietnam.4 And when Communist North Korea, invaded South Korea, the USA started to worry if South Korea would fall to communism, too thus endangering Taiwan and Japan according to the Domino Theory.
C Evaluation of Sources,
Chull Baum, Kim Korean War and USA.
Kim Chull-Baum is a pioneer on the study of the origins of the Cold War in Korea. He is a political science doctor, the professor of National Defense College, and the president of Korean War investigation group. He has written many books about Korean War and is considered an expert on Korean politics and its war. The book itself is based on many secret documents which were newly released in 1970 from American archives and from Western countries, and the footnotes and endnotes are all there in detail.
The book at times emphasizes too much the point that if Korea fell to communism, the whole of Asia would fall too. His main claim is that the USA intervened because of the threat of communism, neglecting other valid reasons such as economic. Additionally, Kim had no personal experience of the Korean War, but depended on outside sources.
Seung Uk, Park's Both the 38th line and Korean War were USA's works.
The Author's life was noteworthy. He was born in 1919 and adopted into a Japanese family serving as a Japanese naval ensign during WWII. He moved to the US and worked for the CIA from 1947 to 1980 in Far East.
This book was based on the author's own experience and the information he got while working in the CIA, so it is both vivid and detailed. As mentioned above, he knew of and actually witnessed much secret information of the Far East, especially about the Korean War, because he worked as high official in CIA. In addition, he includes a number of first-hand dialogues between him and high officials of the US.
Based as it is on his own experiences, it is at times a subjective account. No footnotes or endnotes have been supplied, limiting the value of his information and opens him to accusations of bias and exaggeration because he was born in Korea and he is critical of the US role during the Korean War.
D Analysis
The economic situation of the USA during 1940's recovered from the depreciation and inflation caused by the Great Depression in 1929, mostly as a result of producing military products in WWII. But after the war ended, the USA economy seemed to depress, because the war ended so quickly, so there was a lot of surplus. Thus the USA needed a new war to recover their economy. The USA thought that Korea could offer a good chance to recover their economy by reducing military damage, using Japan as their base and the Korea is their front-lines. What the US wanted was to destroy all Korea's buildings so the USA could provide them surplus. This partially explains why Korea was excluded from the Acheson's speech in 1950. It was all intended, because the US need to lure Soviet and North Korea to attack South Korea, so when South Korea was invaded by them, USA could change there plan to intervene Korea by using UN. Additionally, the Russia was absent in UN conference, so they couldn't veto it. This is the economical reason in the book wrote by Park why USA intervened Korea War.
However, another interpretation of why Korea WAS excluded from the speech exists. In the late 1940's, some European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Rumania were conquered by the Soviets. In 1949, China fell to Communism, too. So Truman believed and was worried that if the US did not intervene, then the next countries would be Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. Therefore it issued the "Perimeter of Defense" including many Asian countries. So this is the political reason in the book written by Kim as to why USA intervened the Korea War.
However, the economic reason is more reliable than the political reason, because in the book written by Kim, Syngman Rhee didn't know that North Korea would invade the South, but in the book Park said that Sygngman knew it, Syngman even told Truman that the South will be invaded by North soon. But USA didn't recognized it, even they knew it by the CIA. Because what USA needed is the war. Kim also claims that Truman didn't receive any reports about the imminent North invasion, but Park believes that Truman was warned by the CIA and simply ignored it. Truman denied receiving such warnings, so that the situation can coincide with the Acheson's Speech. So briefly, the US knew the North would invade the South, so the US excluded Korea from the "Perimeter of Defence" in Asia to make Stalin and North Korea think that the US did not care about Korea.
There are a number of shocking thing that the USA did. There were about 8240 intelligence men spread out in Beijing, Manchuria, North Korea, and Moscow. So at that time US knew everything in great detail. First, through information obtained in Hong Kong, there was military goods trade between China and UN from through the way that from Aomen to Indonesia and Sri Lanka.5 It was lead by the USA, as the information said, but denied by the US. At the same time, when the North Korean army was nearly driven back to the Yalu River, MacArthur suggested they should banish the North Korea army from Korea and unify Korea. In order to do this, MacArthur needed to bomb their supply base camp and the Yalu bridge. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they should not attack any bridge or supply camps. And when 500-thousand Chinese troops rushed in to Korea, the US ignored MacArthur's proposal of backup. Truman said to MacArthur that they would stop there, and not move north. It was ironic that the USA did not aid MacArthur's army, but sold military goods to China. The purpose was for China and North Korea to destroy all the buildings inside Korea, so if they reached a cease-fire agreement, the USA could use its surplus to rebuild Korea.
Some might argue that it was correct not to aid more armies to fight with Chinese and North Korea troops as it would start WWIII. But at that time, China had just ended a long civil war as well as the war with the Japanese, so their domestic problems were chaotic. Also at that time, the population of China was about 5 hundred million, but their economy was unable to feed up 5hundred million people. And this is the one reason why China helped North Korea, to cut down the huge population.
Secondly, the Soviet did not have the power to start World War III. After the war with the Germans and Japanese, the USSR was too damaged. The amount of damage was about 12billion dollar, the casualties were between 12~15 million. And the people who died while working in labor camps plus the soldiers who were killed were about 23million.6 Thus, from the population of 95million Soviets, 23million men were killed. There should have been a shortage of men to join the army. On Sep, 25th, 1945, the Soviets announced that they had the Atomic-bomb, but they needed 5 to 6 more years to use it in real warfare.7 As the US had a nuclear monopoly, both China and the Soviet Union were unable to start another war.
E Conclusion
As the analysis above shows, the economic reason makes more sense than the reason why USA intervened Korea as shown in the controversial and mysterious events such as the Acheson speech in Jan. 1950, leaking incorrect information, selling weapons to China secretly, and the prohibition in bombing China, matches with the economic reason rather than any real political reason. In conclusion, it was the USA which encouraged North Korea to invade the South while disguising this as a fight for justice and righteousness.
Why, and with what success, did the UN intervene in the Korean War?
The Korean War was the first war the United Nations had to face. The new world organization had come into existence a mere five years ago. The UN was established immediately after World War II and replaced the League of Nations. Its goals were to maintain international peace and security and to achieve cooperation in solving international conflicts. The name was coined by President F.D. Roosevelt and officially began January 1st 1942 when 26 countries joined. In attempts to not make the same mistakes the League of Nations made, the UN took action and played a military role in the Korean War.
After the Second World War, Korea had been divided into two halves at the 38th parallel. In 1948, rival governments were established in North and South Korea. The Korean War began June 25th 1950 when North Korean troops invaded South Korea. The Security Council demanded an immediate end to hostilities and said this invasion a "violation of international peace". They commanded the North Koreans vacate from the south but as the communists continued fighting, the UN authorized member nations to send military aid South Korea. The UN's initial reason for entering the Korean War was to push North Koreans back onto their side of the country. Though the United States contributed 90% of the troops, military equipment and supplies,( The United States spent about $67 billion on the war. ) dozens of countries sent troops, arms, money, and medical supplies as aid.
The Korean War finally came to an end on July 27th 1953 when the United Nations and North Korea signed an armistice agreement. A permanent peace treaty between the North and South has never been signed but the US still has military forces in South Korea to discourage further hostilities. The United Nations helped with truce talks. In 1951, June 23rd a Soviet delegate to the United Nations had proposed a cease-fire. Armistices were suggested various times over the next few years but the battle waged on. This delay was mainly due to the fact that several issues were undecided. For example, reparations and prisoners of war. The UN suggested that prisoners from both North and South Korea should have the choice to choose whether or not they wanted to return to their homelands. Some North Korean and Chinese captives refused to return home and protested against a forced return. Both sides were charged with torture, mistreatment and other war crimes. The North Koreans and Chinese were also accused of brainwashing their prisoners. A buffer zone was created, roughly 4 kilometres wide along the final battle line. South Korea gained 1,500 square miles of territory.
The United Nations was often seen as a copy of the League of Nations. People had little or no respect for it. The Korean War was the first opportunity the United Nations had to prove that they were going to succeed. The Korean War proved that the UN was capable of taking action and authority. That they wouldn't make the same mistakes the League of Nations made. The UN took action. After much struggle, they did do what they had promised. The United Nations pushed North Koreans back and out of the south. However, the UN was also portrayed as a puppet and an "elite" club. Some believed that the UN was the United State's lapdog and did whatever it told them to. The Soviets pointed out that the UN was simply a tool of the US. The UN was and still is, to some extent, an "elite" club. After the Korean War, Third World countries began to support the UN less.
Research Question: To what extent was General MacArthur’s Battle of Incheon successful to become turning point of the war after risking such danger?
A. Plan of the Investigation
This assessment focuses on how successful Battle of Incheon was after risking so much. To narrow down more, what was consequence of Battle of Incheon toward U.N. and ROK forces. What was consequence toward DPRK, China, and USSR force. I will find sources from Korea, U.S., and Europe to have understanding on western perspective and Korean perspective regarding the question. My primary source will be history books from Korea, U.S., and European countries while secondary source will be mainly documentary, and newspapers. Section B will be brief summary about Korea from 1950 June 25th to end of 1950. I will evaluate my sources and analyse them and compare two major sources in section C, and D. From what I got from section C, and D, I will give answer to my research question “To what extent was General MacArthur’s Battle of Incheon successful to become turning point of the war after risking such danger?” in section E.
B. Summary
25th June, 1950 – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) crosses 38th parallel to occupy Republic of Korea (ROK) and reunite Korea as one country under Communist government.
26th June, 1950 – U.S. starts to help South Korea. 7th fleet deploys from Philippines to Korea.
27th June, 1950 – U.S. air force and navy are deployed in ROK.
28th June, 1950 – Seoul is captured by DPRK. Royal Navy of Japan is temporally deployed under U.S. command.
29th June, 1950 – Royal Australian Naval Force was temporally under control of U.S.
1st July, 1950 – U.S. Task force Smith arrives to Pusan
3rd July, 1950 – Incheon is captured under DPRK. U.N aircraft carriers began to air strike DPRK
4th July, 1950 – 24th U.S. Infantry division arrives
5th July, 1950 – Task Force Smith is defeated by DPRK
7th July, 1950 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 is adopted. Now troops from all over the world concentrates to Pusan.
10th July, 1950 – 25th U.S. Infantry Division lands on Pusan
14th July, 1950 – ROK forces are placed under U.N. Command
18th July, 1950 – 1st Cavalry division arrives from U.S.
2nd August, 1950 – 1st marine brigade arrives
3rd August, 1950 – 2nd Infantry Division arrives
4th August, 1950 – Pusan defense line along Naktong River is formed.
8th – 18th August, 1950 – Battle of Naktong River ends up by DPRK retreating.
10th – 20th August, 1950 – Battle of Pohang
29th August, 1950 – 27th Infantry Brigade arrives
31st – 19th August – September, 1950 – 2nd battle of Naktong results in DPRK retreat.
15th – 28th September, 1950 – Battle of Incheon. MacArthur’s troop lands on Incheon, heads to Kimpo Airport and Seoul.
16th September, 1950 – 18th U.S. Army deviates from Naktong, defense line. They started to advance.
19th September, 1950 – Philippines’ Battalion arrives
27th September, 1950 – Seoul is recaptured by U.N. and ROK forces
28th September, 1950 – Australian soldiers arrives
30th September, 1950 – ROK forces crosses 38th parallel
3rd October, 1950 – Battalion from Thailand arrives.
4th October, 1950 – Chinese intervention in Korea
9th October, 1950 – U.N. forces crosses 38th parallel. DPRK forces retreats to defend Pyongyang from U.N.
19th October, 1950 – Pyongyang captured under U.N. forces and ROK forces. DPRK forces retreat to the north.
21st October, 1950 – Sinuiju becomes new provisional capital of DPRK. Battalion from Netherland, Brigade from U.K. arrives
7th November, 1950 – Canada sends soldiers to ROK
10th November, 1950 – 3rd Infantry Division from U.S. arrives.
21st November, 1950 – U.S. forces reached the Yalu River. Now U.S. is facing border against China
23rd November, 1950 – Another Thai reinforcement arrives
30th November, 1950 – Battalion from France arrives to help ROK to fight against Communists.
9th December, 1950 – Battalion from Greece arrives to protect ROK from becoming communist country.
Within roughly two month since MacArthur landed on Incheon, U.N. forces and ROK forces advanced to Yalu River, the border between People’s Republic of China and DPRK. MacArthur had to risk the dangers to land on Incheon and recapture Seoul. But because he took the risk, he made turning point in Korean War and save tens of thousands of soldiers in Pusan. Since MacArthur’s 40,000 troops paid a little price of landing on Incheon harbour when wave reaches its highest point. But that payment was not wasted. It was actually well used to open way to Kimpo Airport, Seoul and eventually to Yalu River. Right after the Battle of Incheon, U.N. countries are willingly sending their troops to Korea starting from Luxemburg to Ethiopia and other developing countries like Middle-East countries. Before battle of Incheon, U.N. forces and U.S. forces were locked up in Pusan and Naktong River was only mean to defend. But as MacArthur lands on Incheon harbor, DPRK retreats and U.S, and U.N. force now advancing.
To what extent did MacArthur's suggestion to nuke China made Truman to fire him?
A. Plan of
investigation
To what extent did General MacArthur’s suggestion to
drop Atomic bomb on China contributed in dismissing him?
This investigation will focus on the reasons why
General MacArthur was dismissed, especially on the impact of General
MacArthur’s suggestion acting on dismissing him from his office. In order to
offer investigation in depth, interviews, books, documents from government
archives, and documentaries will be used. Also, for unbiased information,
sources from not only both U.S. and China, but also sources from other members
of U.N and South Korea will be provided. Main two sources will be from both
Anglo-Saxon perspective and Asian perspective, providing different perspective.
B. Summary
In September 15th, 1950, General MacArthur
lands on Inchon, taking over Inchon, Kimpo, and Seoul, effectively cutting down
the supply lines, eventually force North Korean troops to retreat from Naktong
Perimeter back to the 38th parallel. General MacArthur’s successful
landing of Inchon led U.N. troops, U.S. troops and Korean troops to advance
toward the 38th parallel.
October 1st – 19th 1950. South
Korean troops advanced up to 38th parallel and moved toward the
North. In October 19th, Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, is being
captured by the South Korean, U.S., and U.N. troops. General MacArthur received
the message from Henry Truman and the Joint Chief of Staff. They were sceptical
about attacking the Beijing and China. MacArthur ignores the message and orders
to attack toward Sino-Korean border, the Yalu River. After they advanced their
frontier toward the Chung-Chun River, and Chosin Lake, Chinese
Chung-Chun, Chosin perimeter was collapsed and U.S.
troop retreat to the south of 38th parallel. In January 4th,
Seoul was recaptured by the Chinese and North Korean troops.
Bradley, Truman, Acheson, and Marshall appointed a
meeting to discuss about dismissal of MacArthur due to defeat in Chosin and
Chung-Chun. Truman tried to dismiss MacArthur, but George Marshall stops him
from dismissing him. Acheson and Truman have negative feelings toward MacArthur
while Marshall is on MacArthur’s side. The conflicts between MacArthur and
Truman regarding the atomic bomb, Chiang Kai-shek, and a public statement led most of members of Joint
Chief of Staves to agree to fire the General MacArthur. After meeting between
Truman, Acheson, Bradley, and Marshall, everyone except Marshall agrees to fire
MacArthur. Marshall asks to decide about this discreetly. They were given 3
days, and in April 9th, during meeting, Marshall finally agrees to
fire General MacArthur just like most of other members of Joint Chief of Staff,
Truman and Acheson did. As Result of this, General MacArthur was fired.
C. Evaluation of
Sources
For this section,
I need primary sources which are available in Korea. Until the summer vacation,
it will be hard for me to get Section C for Internal Assessment done.
D. Analysis
In order to
identify why MacArthur was fired, we must go back to In October 10th,
Truman summoned General MacArthur to Wake Island in the Northern Pacific to
receive first hand battle report. Truman didn’t like haughty MacArthur and he
regarded MacArthur as political rival. General MacArthur told President Truman
that MacArthur said that Chinese were attempting to intervene the Korean War,
and his air force would bomb the Yalu River and dye the Yalu River with
Chinese’ blood. Roughly after 50 days, 300,000 Chinese Soldiers crossed the
Yalu River and attacked the UN forces. As Chinese troops fought against the UN
forces in Chang-Chun and Chosin, U.N. greatly defeated by the Chinese troops
and retreated back to 38th parallel. This major retreat, letting
Chinese and North Koreans recapture the Seoul again, caused immediate meeting
between Bradley, Acheson, Truman and Marshall to take place. Truman wanted to
dismiss MacArthur. However, George Marshall thought that without MacArthur,
entire UN forces in Korea will collapse because there was no general who was as
good as MacArthur. Dean Acheson strongly suggests Truman to fire the MacArthur,
stating that MacArthur is reason why UN lost the battle in Chung-Chun, and
Chosin. Acheson also said that MacArthur is careless, talking military secrets
toward the press. As result of this, Douglas MacArthur was ordered not to make
political statements without clearance after Truman found out that MacArthur
had secret meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, asking Chiang Kai-shek to use their nationalist Chinese
troops to bomb the North-eastern part of China. In March 24th,
General MacArthur made a statement that he will push the troops toward the Yalu
River, across the river, and eventually attack China. Truman, who was trying to
make peace settlement with China, got enraged and almost fired MacArthur.
Despite all these faults that General MacArthur made, General MacArthur was
fired not because of them, but because of one letter that was publicised by
Martin, head of Republican; he was finally fired due to MacArthur’s rebellious
letter sent to the Martin, where his plans of bombing the Yalu River was
written.
After MacArthur
was dismissed, Chicago Tribune criticised Truman for firing MacArthur. They
called for impeachment of Truman stating “President Truman must be impeached
and convicted. His hasty and vindictive removal of Gen. MacArthur is the
culmination of series of acts which have shown that he is unfit, morally and
mentally, for his high office. . . . The American nation has never been in
greater danger. It is led by a fool who is surrounded by knaves. . .”
After UN troops
invaded the 38th parallel in October 1st, Chinese were surprised
by the number of U.N. troops invading North Korea. MacArthur’s suggestion of
bombing North of Yalu River to effectively cut off the supply was rejected by
Truman who wasn’t willing to make conflict with USSR by launching a missile
toward China. Henry Truman later said "I fired him [MacArthur] because he
wouldn't respect the authority of the President... I didn't fire him because he
was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for
generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail."
To what
extent did the national security problem caused China’s entry to the Korea war
in 1950?
Section
A: Plan of the investigation
This
investigation is primarily focussing on the extent to which perceived threat of
American invasion caused China to enter the Korean War. To do so, newspapers
around that time, People’s Daily and official Chinese orders from the will be
examined to determine CCP’s leaders real attitude toward Korean War. The
autobiography of General Xiao Jingguang will also be examined for view by one
who had taken part. Western sources such as by Max Hastings and by Allen
Whiting, will also be used to provide a comprehensive understanding. After
analyzing ChenJian’s and ShenZhiHua’s , I hope to provide a unbiased and
reasonable answer of the question.
Word count: 134
Section B: Summary
In early 1949, as the CCP neared final victory in China's civil war, CCP leaders became very concerned about the prospect of direct American intervention in China. In January 1949, Mao stated in conference paper of "The Current Situation and the Party's Task in 1949," that "When we make war plans, we have always taken into our account the possibility that the U.S. government may send troops to occupy some of the coastal cities and fight us directly. We should continue to prepare for this now so as to avoid being taken by surprise if it really occurs."
Although the anticipated American military intervention had not occurred, Mao and the CCP leadership preferred to believe that "after the founding of the new China it was possible for those imperialist countries, which were unwilling to see their failure in China, to make military intervention in China's affairs, just as what imperialist countries did to the Soviets after the Russian Bolshevik revolution."
Within seventy-two hours of the DPRK invasion , the United States decided to intervene and ordered the 7th fleet to enter the Taiwan Straits to protect Chiang Kai-Shek.
On 30 June, five days after the outbreak of the conflict, Zhou Enlai sent Zhai Chengwen and various military intelligence personnel to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-sung and to collect first-hand information. By July 2nd, Zhou En Lai told Soviet Ambassador?? Leighton that China already concentrated three army corps that amounted 120 thousands people in Manchuria, and Zhou emphasized that if Americans crossed the 38th parallel, China would enter the war. Nevertheless the Chinese government had more pressing matters to focus on. June 30th saw the introduction of both the new Land Reform Law and the order for demobilization. Zhou En Lai had made it clear when he described the policy to naval generalissimo Xiao Jin Guang that the demobilization of land forces and the preparation of navy and air force must be continued, also postponed the time to liberate Taiwan.
It wasn’t until 7 and 10 July that Zhou Enlai chaired two conferences focusing on military preparations for the Korean conflict during which the crucial decision was made to transform the Thirteenth Army Corps under the Fourth Field Army into the Northeastern Border Defense Army (NEBDA) to prepare for "an intervention in the Korean War if necessary." It would be another month before over 250,000 troops of the former Fourth Field Army had taken positions on the Chinese-Korean border as the North Koreans failed to force UN forces from Korea and the CCP leadership became concerned with a possible reversal of the Korean situation. On 4 August 1950,. Mao declared that: "(i)f the U.S. imperialists win the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.” The next day, Mao ordered the NEBDA to complete preparations for war operations in early September. In the meantime, logistical preparations and political mobilization for entering war operations were urgently carried out under the assumption that China would soon become a participant of the Korean War.
After UN forces' successful landing at Inchon on 15 September, the CCP leadership continued to try to avoid involvement. 10 days after Gerneral Nie Rong Zhen told Indian Ambassador Pannikkar that if the USA crossed the 38th parallel, China would join the war. October 3rd saw Zhou En Lai directly warning the American Government through Ambassador Pannikkar that the Chinese government sought a peaceful solution on Korea War with UN troops stopping at the 38th parallel otherwise China would enter the war. Truman regarded the warnings as “a bald attempt to blackmail the U.N.”
The final decision to send Chinese troops to Korea was made between 1 October and 2 October during an urgent meeting of the Party Politburo Standing Committee convened by Mao who made it clear that "(t)he question now is not whether we should send troops to Korea or not, but how fast we can do this. One day's difference will be crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions -- when should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander." That day Mao informed Stalin via telegram of China’s decision stressing both the worst and best prospects
Two important events paved the way for the decision. First, on 30 September, the Third Division of the South Korean Army crossed the thirty-eighth parallel which was followed the next day by MacArthur’s ultimatum to Kim Il-sung demanding unconditional surrender which deeply concerned China. Secondly, Kim Il-sung, his regime on the verge of collapse, turned to the Chinese on 1 October at an emergency meeting with Ni Zhiliang, Chinese ambassador to Korea, requesting that the Chinese Thirteenth Army Corps enter Korea. Pak Hon-yong, deputy Prime Minister of North Korea, was sent to Beijing to meet CCP leaders. In a letter signed by Kim and Pak, they "urgently solicit that the Chinese People's Liberation Army directly enters the war to support us."
Finally, on 8 October, Mao formally issued the order to enter the Korean War and on 19th October, the same day UN troops entered Pyongyang, the Chinese volunteer army crossed the Yalu River, joining the Korea War.
Word count: 1090
Section C. Evaluation of Sources
Source 1: ShenZhiHua/沈志华， /毛泽东 斯大林与朝鲜战争,
Shen Zhihua is currently the director of the Cold War International History Research Center and a history professor at East China Normal University. His main research includes Soviet History and Cold War International History, with an emphasis on Sino-Soviet relations and the Korean War. He was the Flag of the Chinese Cold War historians. In this book, He had analyzed newly released documents from Soviet Union and China. Also, some foreign scholar studies had been considered. The purpose of this book is to show how the relation ship between China and Soviet Union developed though Korean War. The Chapter 4 and additional Chapter 3 are mainly about why China entered the Korean War and stated that it was an accident for China’s entry to Korean War.
This book represents the Chinese orthodox view about why China entered the Korean War. And because it was finished 50 years after Korean ended, there were large amount of sources and different opinion available for him, and help him to find out what actually happened. And since it published in China, it implies that Chinese government accept or agree with the view that provided by the book.
However, the author was educated in China, so his knowledge was limited in Chinese respective, and because it published in China, the limitation is that so many debates and different views can’t be put into words, because of the ideological restrictions and diplomatic reasons.
Source 2 : ChenJian, , Columbia University Press, 1994.
ChenJian is a Chinese American Historian. He had studied in China before 1986, and after 1986 he went America and finished his doctor’s degree. He is professorial chair of Cornell University. He used many newly released Chinese materials, such as collections of Mao Zedong’s paper, as basis of his study. His purpose, as he said in the book is to retraces China’s road to the Korean War and argued that “China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border.”
Chenjian knows Chinese and English, so he could easily understand both view and source from China and USA. He had learned Chinese orthodox view as base, and the experience that studied in USA gave him a chance to compare the view of both sides. So his study is expected to be unbiased. However, Chenjian mainly considered the newly released Chinese materials, thus limited the accurate of the study.
Word count: 429
Section D. Analysis
When China, “a newly established country built upon the ruin”, decided to fight against USA, “the most powerful country on earth,” the world was shocked. MacArthur claimed that “Chinese intervention was one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historical record.” China continues to claim that it was forced to “resist America and assist Korea, defend our home and our country”. Whether justified or not, China’s decision to enter the War not only saved North Korea, but prolonged the conflict. On May 27th 2009, the North Korean government announced their dropping out the “Korean Armistice Agreement” which signed in 1953, and Korean peninsula will back to the war.
One view point is that China did not put their attention on the Korean War issue at first place. After fighting for two decades, both China’s government and people, as Shen argues, wanted to have a peaceful period to rebuild its society and develop its economy. Also in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as Xu Yan argued, the CCP did not want to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. What is more, Chinese historian such as Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai even argued that China did not support North Korean to start a war. But Chen disagreed with Hao and Zhai by saying that “China at least did not oppose Kim's intention,” and on May 14th 1950, Mao agreed with Stalin and Kim that to solve Korean problem before liberating Taiwan.
After June 25 1950, China’s attitude toward Korean War was actively defensive. China’s first concern about Korean War was China’s national security. As Kuo Mo-Jo wrote in People’s Daily August 23rd 1950, “around China in particular, their (US) designs for a blockade are taking shape in the pattern of a stretched out snake. Starting from South Korea, it stretches to Japan, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwan and the Philippines and then turns up at Vietnam.” Mao also stated in the Politburo that “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us.”
However Chen disagrees with this. He argued that the formation of the North East frontier defence army had gone beyond the simple defence of the Chinese-Korean border. As early as August 4th, Mao had ordered North east frontier defence army to “complete their preparations within this month and be ready for orders to carry out war operations.” This was far before China’s national security was threatened. As Chen argued, the CCP leaders didn’t viewed Korean War from the national defence perspective until the Inchon landing.
After Inchon Landing, Chinese government tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement by means that to warn USA several times that crossing 38th parallel will be seen as a threatening to Chinese national security. Even after US troops got across the 38th parallel, according to Wang Zeng Shu, Beijing officers still did not want to fight, they claimed that “China will only fight when war is unavoidable.” This was because, as Max Hastings said that “both of domestic political stability and military preparedness.” Agreeing this, Lin Biao argued that “the PLA was not yet ready to take on the army of the United States.” After all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas Macarthur, China was forced to joined war at the most unfavoured time, because as Allen S. Whiting argued, China’s national security was based threatened.
Nevertheless, Chen’s view point is that national defence was only “one element” that caused China to enter the War, in fact China more concerned about its responsibility toward and Asian-wide revolution and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of Chinese revolution are major causes for China’ entry to the Korean War. After national wide victory in 1949, CCP leaders were worried the country would lost its revolutionary momentum. As the Korean War started, CCP leaders aimed to use it as a possible means to mobilize the Chinese nation under CCP’s terms and to promote the momentum of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, after the established of new China, Mao believed that it was the China’s duty to support Communist revolutions and national liberation movements in other countries. As Xu Yan argued “China would in no circumstance fail to support revolutions in other countries.”
Word count: 741
Section E: Conclusion:
China’s entry to Korean War was largely caused by national security issue. And to spread a world wide revolution and to continue China’s revolution is only the incidental aims.
It is clear that US’s crossing 38th Parallel put China on a hot pan, making China directly faced enemy’s threat from the border. China had several times claimed, both to US and Soviet, that China would join the war if US troops crossed 38th parallel to secure its national security. Furthermore, at the Politburo meetings that made the final decision between October 4th and 5th, national defence was the centre topic. The question about how to continue the external and internal revolution was not even mentioned. From my stand point, national security is always the most important issue for a country. If a country cannot ensure its national security, how on earth can it spread and maintain the revolution.
Despite its causes, China’s decision to enter Korean War had permanent influence. Conflict in Korean peninsula is still not finished, North Korea again threaten the world that they will start war, but this time, China do not clearly stand with them.
Word Count 189
Total words: 2583
Section F List of sources:
Books:
λ Chen Jian, , Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, D.C) June 1992 λ Mao, I, the Press of Centre Literature/中央文献出版社, 1998 λ By William Whitney Stueck Published by University Press of Kentucky, 2004 λ Max Hastings Published by Simon and Schuster, 1987 λ Allen Whiting, , Stanford press, 1960 λ /《抗美援朝战争纪事》Liberating Army Press/ 解放军出版社 λ / Beijing: The Press of the People's Liberation Army/解放军出版社， 1989 λ Ye Yumen, / , The Press of October Literature/ 十月文艺出版社, 1990 λ Xiao jinguang/萧劲光, /萧劲光回忆录/ the memories of Xiao jinguang, Press of the People’s Liberation Army/ 解放军出版社, 1990 λ Wang Shuzeng/王树增, / Press of the People’s Liberation Army literature/ 解放军文艺出版社 λ Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui, <中国人民志愿军抗美援朝战史>/ <>, The Press of Military Science/ 中国军事科技出版社, 1988
Articles
λ Xu Yan ‘the tortuous process of Making the Final Decision to enter the Korean War’, <> (党史研究资料)No.4 1991 λ Mao, “The present Situation and the Party’s Task in 1949,”(当前的局势和党的任务) (Selected Military Papers of Mao) Beijing Soldiers’ Press/ 北京军人出版社 λ Lei Ying Fu/ 雷英夫, （The memories of several important decision in Korean War）, published in / < 党的文献》/ <>, 1993 N6 λ Mao, "Cast Away Illusion, Prepare for Struggle." (the collection of Mao’s works) People press/人民出版社 1991 λ Chen Dong Lin/陈东林 / <> published on /《台湾研究》2003 λ Zhang Xi, ‘Before and After Perng Dehuai’s Appointment to Command the CPV in Korean>’, Zhonggong dangshi ziliao(中共当代资料， Documentary Materials of the History of the Chinese Communist Party)1989
Website
λ http://baike.baidu.com/view/1197614.htm June 13, 2009
λ http://news.sohu.com/20090608/n264388982.shtml 8th June 2009
Newspaper
λ 人民日报 “People’s Daily” August 23rd 1950.
Word count: 134
Section B: Summary
In early 1949, as the CCP neared final victory in China's civil war, CCP leaders became very concerned about the prospect of direct American intervention in China. In January 1949, Mao stated in conference paper of "The Current Situation and the Party's Task in 1949," that "When we make war plans, we have always taken into our account the possibility that the U.S. government may send troops to occupy some of the coastal cities and fight us directly. We should continue to prepare for this now so as to avoid being taken by surprise if it really occurs."
Although the anticipated American military intervention had not occurred, Mao and the CCP leadership preferred to believe that "after the founding of the new China it was possible for those imperialist countries, which were unwilling to see their failure in China, to make military intervention in China's affairs, just as what imperialist countries did to the Soviets after the Russian Bolshevik revolution."
Within seventy-two hours of the DPRK invasion , the United States decided to intervene and ordered the 7th fleet to enter the Taiwan Straits to protect Chiang Kai-Shek.
On 30 June, five days after the outbreak of the conflict, Zhou Enlai sent Zhai Chengwen and various military intelligence personnel to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-sung and to collect first-hand information. By July 2nd, Zhou En Lai told Soviet Ambassador?? Leighton that China already concentrated three army corps that amounted 120 thousands people in Manchuria, and Zhou emphasized that if Americans crossed the 38th parallel, China would enter the war. Nevertheless the Chinese government had more pressing matters to focus on. June 30th saw the introduction of both the new Land Reform Law and the order for demobilization. Zhou En Lai had made it clear when he described the policy to naval generalissimo Xiao Jin Guang that the demobilization of land forces and the preparation of navy and air force must be continued, also postponed the time to liberate Taiwan.
It wasn’t until 7 and 10 July that Zhou Enlai chaired two conferences focusing on military preparations for the Korean conflict during which the crucial decision was made to transform the Thirteenth Army Corps under the Fourth Field Army into the Northeastern Border Defense Army (NEBDA) to prepare for "an intervention in the Korean War if necessary." It would be another month before over 250,000 troops of the former Fourth Field Army had taken positions on the Chinese-Korean border as the North Koreans failed to force UN forces from Korea and the CCP leadership became concerned with a possible reversal of the Korean situation. On 4 August 1950,. Mao declared that: "(i)f the U.S. imperialists win the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.” The next day, Mao ordered the NEBDA to complete preparations for war operations in early September. In the meantime, logistical preparations and political mobilization for entering war operations were urgently carried out under the assumption that China would soon become a participant of the Korean War.
After UN forces' successful landing at Inchon on 15 September, the CCP leadership continued to try to avoid involvement. 10 days after Gerneral Nie Rong Zhen told Indian Ambassador Pannikkar that if the USA crossed the 38th parallel, China would join the war. October 3rd saw Zhou En Lai directly warning the American Government through Ambassador Pannikkar that the Chinese government sought a peaceful solution on Korea War with UN troops stopping at the 38th parallel otherwise China would enter the war. Truman regarded the warnings as “a bald attempt to blackmail the U.N.”
The final decision to send Chinese troops to Korea was made between 1 October and 2 October during an urgent meeting of the Party Politburo Standing Committee convened by Mao who made it clear that "(t)he question now is not whether we should send troops to Korea or not, but how fast we can do this. One day's difference will be crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions -- when should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander." That day Mao informed Stalin via telegram of China’s decision stressing both the worst and best prospects
Two important events paved the way for the decision. First, on 30 September, the Third Division of the South Korean Army crossed the thirty-eighth parallel which was followed the next day by MacArthur’s ultimatum to Kim Il-sung demanding unconditional surrender which deeply concerned China. Secondly, Kim Il-sung, his regime on the verge of collapse, turned to the Chinese on 1 October at an emergency meeting with Ni Zhiliang, Chinese ambassador to Korea, requesting that the Chinese Thirteenth Army Corps enter Korea. Pak Hon-yong, deputy Prime Minister of North Korea, was sent to Beijing to meet CCP leaders. In a letter signed by Kim and Pak, they "urgently solicit that the Chinese People's Liberation Army directly enters the war to support us."
Finally, on 8 October, Mao formally issued the order to enter the Korean War and on 19th October, the same day UN troops entered Pyongyang, the Chinese volunteer army crossed the Yalu River, joining the Korea War.
Word count: 1090
Section C. Evaluation of Sources
Source 1: ShenZhiHua/沈志华， /毛泽东 斯大林与朝鲜战争,
Shen Zhihua is currently the director of the Cold War International History Research Center and a history professor at East China Normal University. His main research includes Soviet History and Cold War International History, with an emphasis on Sino-Soviet relations and the Korean War. He was the Flag of the Chinese Cold War historians. In this book, He had analyzed newly released documents from Soviet Union and China. Also, some foreign scholar studies had been considered. The purpose of this book is to show how the relation ship between China and Soviet Union developed though Korean War. The Chapter 4 and additional Chapter 3 are mainly about why China entered the Korean War and stated that it was an accident for China’s entry to Korean War.
This book represents the Chinese orthodox view about why China entered the Korean War. And because it was finished 50 years after Korean ended, there were large amount of sources and different opinion available for him, and help him to find out what actually happened. And since it published in China, it implies that Chinese government accept or agree with the view that provided by the book.
However, the author was educated in China, so his knowledge was limited in Chinese respective, and because it published in China, the limitation is that so many debates and different views can’t be put into words, because of the ideological restrictions and diplomatic reasons.
Source 2 : ChenJian, , Columbia University Press, 1994.
ChenJian is a Chinese American Historian. He had studied in China before 1986, and after 1986 he went America and finished his doctor’s degree. He is professorial chair of Cornell University. He used many newly released Chinese materials, such as collections of Mao Zedong’s paper, as basis of his study. His purpose, as he said in the book is to retraces China’s road to the Korean War and argued that “China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border.”
Chenjian knows Chinese and English, so he could easily understand both view and source from China and USA. He had learned Chinese orthodox view as base, and the experience that studied in USA gave him a chance to compare the view of both sides. So his study is expected to be unbiased. However, Chenjian mainly considered the newly released Chinese materials, thus limited the accurate of the study.
Word count: 429
Section D. Analysis
When China, “a newly established country built upon the ruin”, decided to fight against USA, “the most powerful country on earth,” the world was shocked. MacArthur claimed that “Chinese intervention was one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historical record.” China continues to claim that it was forced to “resist America and assist Korea, defend our home and our country”. Whether justified or not, China’s decision to enter the War not only saved North Korea, but prolonged the conflict. On May 27th 2009, the North Korean government announced their dropping out the “Korean Armistice Agreement” which signed in 1953, and Korean peninsula will back to the war.
One view point is that China did not put their attention on the Korean War issue at first place. After fighting for two decades, both China’s government and people, as Shen argues, wanted to have a peaceful period to rebuild its society and develop its economy. Also in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as Xu Yan argued, the CCP did not want to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. What is more, Chinese historian such as Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai even argued that China did not support North Korean to start a war. But Chen disagreed with Hao and Zhai by saying that “China at least did not oppose Kim's intention,” and on May 14th 1950, Mao agreed with Stalin and Kim that to solve Korean problem before liberating Taiwan.
After June 25 1950, China’s attitude toward Korean War was actively defensive. China’s first concern about Korean War was China’s national security. As Kuo Mo-Jo wrote in People’s Daily August 23rd 1950, “around China in particular, their (US) designs for a blockade are taking shape in the pattern of a stretched out snake. Starting from South Korea, it stretches to Japan, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwan and the Philippines and then turns up at Vietnam.” Mao also stated in the Politburo that “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us.”
However Chen disagrees with this. He argued that the formation of the North East frontier defence army had gone beyond the simple defence of the Chinese-Korean border. As early as August 4th, Mao had ordered North east frontier defence army to “complete their preparations within this month and be ready for orders to carry out war operations.” This was far before China’s national security was threatened. As Chen argued, the CCP leaders didn’t viewed Korean War from the national defence perspective until the Inchon landing.
After Inchon Landing, Chinese government tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement by means that to warn USA several times that crossing 38th parallel will be seen as a threatening to Chinese national security. Even after US troops got across the 38th parallel, according to Wang Zeng Shu, Beijing officers still did not want to fight, they claimed that “China will only fight when war is unavoidable.” This was because, as Max Hastings said that “both of domestic political stability and military preparedness.” Agreeing this, Lin Biao argued that “the PLA was not yet ready to take on the army of the United States.” After all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas Macarthur, China was forced to joined war at the most unfavoured time, because as Allen S. Whiting argued, China’s national security was based threatened.
Nevertheless, Chen’s view point is that national defence was only “one element” that caused China to enter the War, in fact China more concerned about its responsibility toward and Asian-wide revolution and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of Chinese revolution are major causes for China’ entry to the Korean War. After national wide victory in 1949, CCP leaders were worried the country would lost its revolutionary momentum. As the Korean War started, CCP leaders aimed to use it as a possible means to mobilize the Chinese nation under CCP’s terms and to promote the momentum of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, after the established of new China, Mao believed that it was the China’s duty to support Communist revolutions and national liberation movements in other countries. As Xu Yan argued “China would in no circumstance fail to support revolutions in other countries.”
Word count: 741
Section E: Conclusion:
China’s entry to Korean War was largely caused by national security issue. And to spread a world wide revolution and to continue China’s revolution is only the incidental aims.
It is clear that US’s crossing 38th Parallel put China on a hot pan, making China directly faced enemy’s threat from the border. China had several times claimed, both to US and Soviet, that China would join the war if US troops crossed 38th parallel to secure its national security. Furthermore, at the Politburo meetings that made the final decision between October 4th and 5th, national defence was the centre topic. The question about how to continue the external and internal revolution was not even mentioned. From my stand point, national security is always the most important issue for a country. If a country cannot ensure its national security, how on earth can it spread and maintain the revolution.
Despite its causes, China’s decision to enter Korean War had permanent influence. Conflict in Korean peninsula is still not finished, North Korea again threaten the world that they will start war, but this time, China do not clearly stand with them.
Word Count 189
Total words: 2583
Section F List of sources:
Books:
λ Chen Jian, , Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, D.C) June 1992 λ Mao, I, the Press of Centre Literature/中央文献出版社, 1998 λ By William Whitney Stueck Published by University Press of Kentucky, 2004 λ Max Hastings Published by Simon and Schuster, 1987 λ Allen Whiting, , Stanford press, 1960 λ /《抗美援朝战争纪事》Liberating Army Press/ 解放军出版社 λ / Beijing: The Press of the People's Liberation Army/解放军出版社， 1989 λ Ye Yumen, / , The Press of October Literature/ 十月文艺出版社, 1990 λ Xiao jinguang/萧劲光, /萧劲光回忆录/ the memories of Xiao jinguang, Press of the People’s Liberation Army/ 解放军出版社, 1990 λ Wang Shuzeng/王树增, / Press of the People’s Liberation Army literature/ 解放军文艺出版社 λ Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui, <中国人民志愿军抗美援朝战史>/ <>, The Press of Military Science/ 中国军事科技出版社, 1988
Articles
λ Xu Yan ‘the tortuous process of Making the Final Decision to enter the Korean War’, <> (党史研究资料)No.4 1991 λ Mao, “The present Situation and the Party’s Task in 1949,”(当前的局势和党的任务) (Selected Military Papers of Mao) Beijing Soldiers’ Press/ 北京军人出版社 λ Lei Ying Fu/ 雷英夫, （The memories of several important decision in Korean War）, published in / < 党的文献》/ <>, 1993 N6 λ Mao, "Cast Away Illusion, Prepare for Struggle." (the collection of Mao’s works) People press/人民出版社 1991 λ Chen Dong Lin/陈东林 / <> published on /《台湾研究》2003 λ Zhang Xi, ‘Before and After Perng Dehuai’s Appointment to Command the CPV in Korean>’, Zhonggong dangshi ziliao(中共当代资料， Documentary Materials of the History of the Chinese Communist Party)1989
Website
λ http://baike.baidu.com/view/1197614.htm June 13, 2009
λ http://news.sohu.com/20090608/n264388982.shtml 8th June 2009
Newspaper
λ 人民日报 “People’s Daily” August 23rd 1950.
How did the Korean War Transform the Cold War?
On the 25th of June 1950 North Korean soldiers, under the orders of Kim Il-sung, crossed the 38th parallel, attacking their southern brothers. Between 1949-1953 the nature of the Cold War changed from a containment based diplomatic and political endeavour limited to the European stage, to a heavily militaristic global conflict. This essay will argue that although events such as the USSR’s acquisition of the atom bomb and China’s turn to communism were important to such a transformation, they simply laid the groundwork for the Korean War to enact such changes.
It can be argued that other events in the same time period as the Korean war were more instrumental than it in the transformation of the Cold War. The testing of the first Soviet Atomic bomb in Kazakhstan on 29 August 1949 sent shockwaves around the world. The American monopoly of the Atomic bomb had been, up until that point, used as a repellent from soviet aggression; Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the B-29 Bombers during the Berlin Airlift being the prime examples. The loss of this advantage, just four years after it was obtained, not only decreased the US’ confidence in their military superiority, but also planted rumours of the presence of soviet sympathizers within Tuman’s government. This is crucial as it led to the beginning of thearms race, the expansion of CIA activity and what is now known as McCarthyism, rendering direct interactions between the two powers less confrontational and increasing their ideological divide. Such a change was made evident after the shift in leadership in 1953 which, as mentioned in document E, resulted in a new era of negotiations where a mood of optimism contrasted with the call and response nature of new policies such as the creation of the Warsaw pact as an answer to the strengthening of NATO. On October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong officially announced in front of a disbelieving world the founding of the communist “People’s Republic of China”. The victory of the communist party was a major defeat for the US who had poured large amounts of resources in aid of the nationalists. The failure of the non confrontational containment tactics that the US successfully employed previously in Italy (April 1948) and Greece (1948-1949) forced them to change policy, making them much more prone to engage in minor military conflicts throughout the Cold war such as Korea and Vietnam. The USSR’s acquisition of the atomic bomb and the creation of the PRC led Truman to commission NSC-68, which highlighted the US’ inadequate conventional military might, in relation to the threat of a strong Sino-Soviet bloc bent on achieving the global spread of communism, and the need for the US to commit on multiple fronts in order to defend their interests. However such a policy change wouldn’t have been funded by the congress without a dramatic event on the scale of the Korean War with the capability of swaying public opinion.
As such the invasion of South Korea served to confirm the NSC’s worries to the congress and the population, showing how, as secretary of defence Johnson stated, “communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, whenever it believes it can win”. The United States saw the conflict as an attempt to spread comunist regimes in south-east Asia, as opposed to the communist leaders’ view of an internal conflict shown in source D. As a consequence NSC-68 was implemented, and with a military budget three times its previous size the US mobilized in order to safeguard their interests in and the security of the neighbouring countries such as Indo-China, Japan and Formosa (Sources A-C), transforming the cold war by, for the first time, changing its policy from “Containment'' to “Roll-back”. Furthermore, the entrance of the United Nations led by Truman, as shown in source B, and of China into the conflict on the 19th of October 1950, meant that the clash in Korea was the first to, ironically, heat up the Cold war and drag it to a global scale. As such, the nature of the conflict changed drastically as it demonstrated to the US that minor clashes around the world wouldn’t necessarily lead to a nuclear holocaust, crucially shifting the war’s focus from the two countries’ interests in Europe to a constant fight for influence all over the world. As a result NATO was established as a strong military alliance, allowing for the remilitarization of Germany thanks to the stationing of american soldiers in bases in the heart of Europe. In addition, by helping establish China as a major world superpower, through the, at the time, inconceivable victory of the 300,000 Chinese relief forces against the western powers, the same policy implemented in Europe was put into action in the Far East through the creation of SEATO and the strengthening of Japan, extending America’s military influence from west to east and transforming the Cold War by putting to rest America’s old “containment” policy in favour of the more aggressive “roll-back” plan.
In conclusion, while other events laid the groundwork for the transformation of the Cold War between 1949 and 1953 it was the Korean war that truly led to those changes.
It can be argued that other events in the same time period as the Korean war were more instrumental than it in the transformation of the Cold War. The testing of the first Soviet Atomic bomb in Kazakhstan on 29 August 1949 sent shockwaves around the world. The American monopoly of the Atomic bomb had been, up until that point, used as a repellent from soviet aggression; Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the B-29 Bombers during the Berlin Airlift being the prime examples. The loss of this advantage, just four years after it was obtained, not only decreased the US’ confidence in their military superiority, but also planted rumours of the presence of soviet sympathizers within Tuman’s government. This is crucial as it led to the beginning of thearms race, the expansion of CIA activity and what is now known as McCarthyism, rendering direct interactions between the two powers less confrontational and increasing their ideological divide. Such a change was made evident after the shift in leadership in 1953 which, as mentioned in document E, resulted in a new era of negotiations where a mood of optimism contrasted with the call and response nature of new policies such as the creation of the Warsaw pact as an answer to the strengthening of NATO. On October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong officially announced in front of a disbelieving world the founding of the communist “People’s Republic of China”. The victory of the communist party was a major defeat for the US who had poured large amounts of resources in aid of the nationalists. The failure of the non confrontational containment tactics that the US successfully employed previously in Italy (April 1948) and Greece (1948-1949) forced them to change policy, making them much more prone to engage in minor military conflicts throughout the Cold war such as Korea and Vietnam. The USSR’s acquisition of the atomic bomb and the creation of the PRC led Truman to commission NSC-68, which highlighted the US’ inadequate conventional military might, in relation to the threat of a strong Sino-Soviet bloc bent on achieving the global spread of communism, and the need for the US to commit on multiple fronts in order to defend their interests. However such a policy change wouldn’t have been funded by the congress without a dramatic event on the scale of the Korean War with the capability of swaying public opinion.
As such the invasion of South Korea served to confirm the NSC’s worries to the congress and the population, showing how, as secretary of defence Johnson stated, “communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, whenever it believes it can win”. The United States saw the conflict as an attempt to spread comunist regimes in south-east Asia, as opposed to the communist leaders’ view of an internal conflict shown in source D. As a consequence NSC-68 was implemented, and with a military budget three times its previous size the US mobilized in order to safeguard their interests in and the security of the neighbouring countries such as Indo-China, Japan and Formosa (Sources A-C), transforming the cold war by, for the first time, changing its policy from “Containment'' to “Roll-back”. Furthermore, the entrance of the United Nations led by Truman, as shown in source B, and of China into the conflict on the 19th of October 1950, meant that the clash in Korea was the first to, ironically, heat up the Cold war and drag it to a global scale. As such, the nature of the conflict changed drastically as it demonstrated to the US that minor clashes around the world wouldn’t necessarily lead to a nuclear holocaust, crucially shifting the war’s focus from the two countries’ interests in Europe to a constant fight for influence all over the world. As a result NATO was established as a strong military alliance, allowing for the remilitarization of Germany thanks to the stationing of american soldiers in bases in the heart of Europe. In addition, by helping establish China as a major world superpower, through the, at the time, inconceivable victory of the 300,000 Chinese relief forces against the western powers, the same policy implemented in Europe was put into action in the Far East through the creation of SEATO and the strengthening of Japan, extending America’s military influence from west to east and transforming the Cold War by putting to rest America’s old “containment” policy in favour of the more aggressive “roll-back” plan.
In conclusion, while other events laid the groundwork for the transformation of the Cold War between 1949 and 1953 it was the Korean war that truly led to those changes.
