Jeremy
Black is a British modern historian and military historian who studied
at the University of Cambridge (Queen's College) and then at the
University of Oxford. He was a lecturer and then professor at the
University of Durham from 1980 and a professor in Exeter from 1996 to
2020. He's been a visiting professor at West Point, Texas Christian
University, and Stillman College and is an Advisory Fellow of the
Barsanti Military History Centre at the University of North Texas, a
senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and has served
on the Council of the Royal Historical Society. He was awarded a Member
of the Order of the British Empire in 2000 for contributions to stamp
design. He specialises in British history, especially the 18th century,
diplomatic history and military history and is the author of over 100
books. The following are links to some of his lectures conducted with The Critic's deputy editor, Graham Stewart, to download, all of which I've listened to and summarised here in order to outline his main arguments.
1. The Meaning of Interpretations of the Past: Narratives about the past—whether personal family histories, national public histories, or academic debates—are shaped by the biases, agendas, and contexts of those constructing them. These narratives often serve to validate contemporary identities, values, or institutions, rather than providing an objective account of historical events. Those who narrate the past, whether individuals or institutions, often present themselves as impartial, but their accounts are inevitably shaped by implicit or explicit biases. This is a theme he explores in his own work, such as Contesting History. He also argues about the functional role of history wherein historical narratives often serve a functional purpose, such as providing identity, meaning, or a sense of continuity between past, present, and future. This is evident in religious narratives (e.g., salvation and redemption) as well as secular ideologies (e.g., communism or Nazi ideology), which Black describes as having a "quasi-sacral" character in their attempt to impose meaning on historical processes.
2. The Meaning of the Historical Process Itself: The question of whether the process of historical change inherently has meaning is more complex and historically contingent. He approaches this question by breaking it down into several key considerations:
- The Vastness of Time: Human history occupies only a tiny fragment of the planet’s existence. For much of this time, there are no written records, and even where records exist, they are limited in their ability to reveal contemporary perspectives. This makes it difficult to assert any inherent meaning in the historical process.
- Religious Frameworks: Historically, attempts to ascribe meaning to the process of history have often been rooted in religious frameworks. For example, Christian narratives, such as those found in Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People (731 AD), frame history as a story of divine intervention, salvation, and redemption. These accounts often served to validate specific institutions, such as the Church, and were disseminated within monastic contexts, though not necessarily to a wider public.
- Secular Narratives: In more recent times, secular ideologies have attempted to provide meaning to history outside a religious context. Black cites examples such as communism and Nazism, which, despite their differences, share a common goal of creating grand narratives to explain historical change. He argues that modern historical writing, even when secular, often retains a "quasi-sacral" character, seeking to derive lessons or impose interpretations that mirror religious frameworks.
3. The Role and Dissemination of Historical Narratives: Black explores how historical narratives have been created and disseminated across time, particularly in pre-modern and modern contexts:
- Pre-Modern Contexts: In the medieval period, historical writing, such as Bede’s work, was often produced within monasteries and served as a tool for religious and institutional validation. These texts were not widely disseminated beyond monastic circles, though they influenced ecclesiastical and political narratives.
- Modern Contexts: With the advent of universities, printing, literacy, and mass communication, the production and dissemination of historical narratives expanded significantly. Black notes that universities, though initially religious foundations, became key sites for historical scholarship, particularly in the 19th century with the rise of source criticism and the German model of historical research. However, he cautions against over-emphasising the distinction between academic and popular history, noting that high-quality historical work has often been produced outside universities, especially in areas like local and regional history.
4. The Purpose of History: Black is critical of the idea that history’s primary purpose is to teach lessons or validate contemporary values. He identifies two contrasting approaches to the study of history:
- Present-Mindedness: Many people approach history as a means of validating their present-day values, identities, or political positions. This is problematic, particularly in contemporary Western culture, where he observes a trend towards "virtue signalling" and "narcissism" in historical discourse, both within and outside academia. He argues that this approach prioritises emotional validation over rational analysis, undermining the intellectual rigour of historical study.
- Understanding the Past on Its Own Terms: We should understand the past in its own context, rather than through the lens of present concerns. While acknowledging that historians are inevitably influenced by their own time, he stresses the importance of recognising the contingency of interpretations and the need for scepticism about imposed meanings.
5. Critique of Contemporary Historical Practice: Black expresses concern about the state of historical study today, both within and outside academia:
- Within Academia: He critiques the narrow specialisation of many academic historians, which he believes leads to a lack of broader contextual understanding. He also notes a trend towards "virtue signalling" in university history departments, where the emphasis on contemporary relevance can hollow out intellectual debate.
- Outside Academia: Black acknowledges the value of historical work produced outside universities, such as by popular historians or local history enthusiasts. He argues that the distinction between academic and popular history is not as sharp as often assumed, and that some of the most innovative and broad-ranging historical work comes from non-academic contexts.
Here Black argues that the common understanding of "war" is too narrow and state-centric, hindering a comprehensive grasp of the phenomenon globally and historically. His main points are:
1. Beyond the State: Defining war solely through the lens of state actors and formal militaries is a culturally specific (Western) and limiting perspective. It ignores organised, large-scale violence perpetrated by non-state entities throughout history and across different cultures.
2. Critique of Eurocentrism: Much of the existing literature on war, even broad overviews, suffers from a Eurocentric or Western-centric bias, neglecting or misrepresenting non-Western military histories and approaches (like those of China or India) unless they fit a Western narrative.
3. Integrating Culture and Technology: The study of military history and war studies should integrate both technological advancements and cultural contexts as independent factors influencing conflict. He criticises the tendency to swing between technological determinism (like the "Revolution in Military Affairs") and purely cultural explanations, especially after Western setbacks.
4. Lessons from the Past - Nuance: Whilst technology changes, strategists can learn from the non-linear nature of war and the frequent disconnect between tactical victories and strategic success (e.g., Hannibal). For soldiers, enduring factors like morale, cohesion, and tactical skill remain relevant across different eras and types of forces (including irregulars).
5. Over-reliance on Limited Theory: There's an over-reliance on a small canon of Western military theorists (like Clausewitz) in military education globally, which may not be sufficient for understanding diverse conflicts or the approaches of non-state actors.
6. China's Distinct Approach: Understanding contemporary powers like China requires recognising their unique strategic culture, influenced by their authoritarian party-state system, which may lead to a different conception and use of force compared to Western models.
7. Complex Diffusion of Military Advancements: The spread of military technology and techniques is not a simple linear process from a "core" to the "periphery." Non-Western societies could acquire advanced weaponry, and victory isn't solely determined by technological superiority. Even within Europe, diffusion was complex and varied, and copying tactics didn't guarantee success against innovative forces like Napoleonic France.
8. Importance of Logistics and Peacetime Preparedness: Often overlooked in popular accounts, logistics and the state of military readiness during peacetime are crucial, particularly for short, intense conflicts.
Black challenged the idea that the French Revolutionary Wars marked a significant shift towards more intense or effective warfare, arguing instead that the French military's resilience and adaptability were key factors in their success. He also highlighted the importance of logistics and the role of looting and conquest in supporting the French military effort.
The lecture also touched on the role of Britain in the wars, with Black arguing that the British navy was crucial in providing security for the British Isles and protecting British trade. He also discussed the various coalitions that formed against France, including the second coalition, which included Russia, Austria, and Britain. Black argued that Napoleon's basic concerns were prestige and a desire for military glory, and that he was willing to take significant risks to achieve these goals. He also discussed the limitations of Napoleon's power, including his lack of control over the weather and the difficulties of maintaining a large army in the field. Black finally concluded with a discussion of the aftermath of the wars, including the Congress of Vienna and the reorganisation of Europe that followed. Black argued that the period of relative peace that followed the wars was not solely due to the exhaustion of the major powers, but also reflected a newfound appreciation for the need for restraint and diplomacy in international relations.
Napoleon's empire had a system of expropriation and provincial autonomy, making it more powerful than its predecessors. France had an overseas empire, but Napoleon's regime was not as expansionist as the Republican regime from 1792. Napoleon destroyed the Republic, which angered many Republicans. Judging Napoleon should consider his overthrow of the Republic rather than his own overthrow. France has varied views on Napoleon, reflecting a contesting of national narratives. In the 19th century, Napoleon was a contentious figure, and his nephew, Napoleon III, also destroyed a republic. The Third Republic had no reason to love Napoleon. Some radicals still viewed Napoleon positively, but others worried about the idea of a leader seizing power.
Napoleon's will to power is criticised by Black, and his military victories provided only short-term solutions. His success was fragile, and his actions were not justifiable. Napoleon's regime is compared to Hitler's, highlighting the dangers of worshipping a will to power. Napoleon's military prowess is praised, but his strategic failures, particularly in the Battle of Waterloo, are noted.
Black also discusses the commemoration of Napoleon and the French Revolution, highlighting the complexities of defending historical figures. President Macron's defence of Napoleon is seen as nuanced, whilst Mitterrand's commemoration of the French Revolution is criticised for its simplistic portrayal (Black clearly despises Mitterand). The lecture concludes by noting the irony of justifying the Revolution's violence and disruption, similar to the justifications used for communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Many French people resisted the Revolution, highlighting the complexities of French history.
The lecture also explores the historical Franco-Ottoman alliance, dating back to the 16th century, as a counterweight to various European powers, including Russia, which France viewed as a fundamental threat to European stability, often portraying Russia as a barbaric, non-Western society. Britain’s involvement, while partly influenced by its alliance with France, was also driven by concerns over Russian expansionism, though Professor Black questions whether British interests truly lay in defending the Ottoman Empire or if the conflict reflected a failure to prioritise more pressing strategic concerns. The Crimean War, he argues, was strategically misconceived, lacking a clear purpose or effective implementation, and was marked by significant logistical and tactical failures, particularly on the British side, though these were not uncommon in early stages of British campaigns historically.
Professor Black concludes by drawing parallels to modern conflicts, cautioning against the dangers of engaging in wars over secondary priorities without adequate risk analysis, as this can misconfigure military resources and neglect more significant threats. He underscores the importance of learning from historical failures of statecraft, such as those evident in the Crimean War, to avoid similar mistakes in contemporary international relations.
Black highlights the Company’s alliances with local Indian rulers, which provided additional manpower, particularly cavalry, addressing a key weakness in the Company’s forces. He distinguishes between Indian soldiers directly employed by the Company and those from allied states, over whom the Company had little control. He also notes the presence of British and other European soldiers in the Company’s ranks, often at junior levels, and cautions against oversimplified historical narratives that ignore India’s ethnic, religious, and geographical diversity or conflate British India with modern nation-states like Pakistan and Bangladesh.
On the nature of conflicts, Black explains that the British fought both European rivals, such as the French, and Indian powers, but these were often interconnected, as both European powers allied with local rulers. He describes the frequency of conflict as varying by presidency and scale, with periods of relative calm interspersed with major campaigns, such as those against Mysore in the 1790s and the Marathas in the early 1800s. He also points out that some major regional powers, like the Persians and Afghans, did not directly engage the British during their invasions of India in the 18th century.
Regarding the Indian Mutiny of 1857 itself, Black frames it as a significant but contained crisis, not a strategic threat on the scale of, for example, the American War of Independence. He notes that while it began as a military mutiny within the Bengal Army, it escalated into a broader uprising, though not all Indian troops rebelled—about 30,000 of the 135,000 Indian soldiers in the Bengal Army remained loyal. The mutiny was triggered by the use of greased cartridges for the new Enfield rifle, offensive to both Hindu and Muslim soldiers, though Black suggests this issue was likely exaggerated due to existing tensions. The British response was rapid, bolstered by loyal Indian troops and reinforcements from elsewhere, and by mid-1858, the uprising was largely suppressed, though sporadic fighting continued.
Black critiques attempts to portray the mutiny as a proto-nationalist movement, arguing that such interpretations reflect post-independence narratives rather than historical realities. He questions what independence would have meant in 1857, given India’s diversity and the lack of a unified national identity, and warns against oversimplified accounts that ignore the brutality on both sides, including atrocities against civilians. He also discusses the aftermath, noting the British Army’s takeover of the Company’s military role, a process influenced by growing security demands in South Asia, financial pressures, and concerns about Russia, though he cautions against viewing this as inevitable, emphasising the role of contingency in historical outcomes. Throughout, Black stresses the need for nuanced historical analysis, avoiding narratives that serve modern political agendas or flatten the complexities of empire, conflict, and identity in India.
The war emerged from long-standing tensions in the federal union. While slavery was a central issue, other regional, economic and political factors contributed to the conflict. After Lincoln's election, South Carolina seceded in December 1860, with other Southern states following to form the Confederacy. The war began when South Carolina attacked Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. Lincoln's subsequent call for 75,000 volunteers prompted additional states (Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas and North Carolina) to join the Confederacy, significantly strengthening its position.
Black emphasises that although the North possessed superior manpower, industry, transportation and finances, this advantage did not guarantee victory. The Confederate strategy mirrored that of the American Revolution: maintain a presence in the conflict to increase the North's costs, establish international legitimacy and potentially secure foreign intervention. The South did not need to conquer the North; it merely needed to avoid defeat until Northern resolve weakened. The Union's initial strategy, known as the "Anaconda Plan," involved blockading Southern ports and controlling the Mississippi. However, Northern strategy faced internal tensions, particularly regarding the treatment of Southern civilians and the balance between eastern and western operations.
Black identifies the 1864 presidential election as the decisive turning point. Had Lincoln lost to Democratic candidate George McClellan, the North might have pursued peace negotiations. Lincoln's victory ensured the war would continue until Confederate surrender.
Naval power played a crucial role, with the Union developing the world's second most powerful navy to blockade Southern ports. The lecture also addressed the potential for British intervention, which posed a serious risk in 1861-62 but never materialised.
The war concluded when Confederate generals surrendered their armies rather than following Jefferson Davis's call for guerrilla warfare. Black suggests that while Confederate victory was possible earlier in the war, Lincoln's re-election and the final six months of campaigning made Southern defeat increasingly inevitable. At the strategic level, civilian governments directed the war on both sides, while generals controlled operational matters, often with poor coordination. The length of the conflict reflected not just military limitations but also the fundamental strategic asymmetry between North and South.
Black also examines the motivations behind the Scramble for Africa, particularly in the 1880s and 1890s, suggesting that economic returns from colonial control were often low compared to free trade. He highlights competition among European powers, such as France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, as a driving force, rather than purely economic or ideological factors. This competition was not unique to Africa, as similar dynamics played out in Asia and the Pacific. For example, British expansion into Egypt and Sudan was partly to counter French ambitions, while French moves into Tunisia aimed to pre-empt Italian influence. African powers, such as Egypt and the Mahdi in Sudan, also demonstrated dynamism, though they lacked the military capacity of non-European powers like Japan.
The lecture considers why European powers pursued imperial annexation rather than continuing to rely on local rulers, as they had in places like Egypt and Morocco. which he suggests was partly opportunistic, as seen in Britain’s acquisition of shares in the Suez Canal, and partly driven by competition among European powers. Different interest groups within European countries, such as missionaries, anti-slavery movements, and commercial lobbies, also influenced the process, though their goals often conflicted. For instance, French ambitions in Algeria focused on settlement and military recruitment, whilst in West Africa, the emphasis was on smaller forces and local recruitment without large-scale settlement.
Finally, Black addresses the role of slavery in the narrative of European imperialism, challenging the oversimplified view of slavery as a solely European imposition on Africa. He notes that slavery existed within African societies and that European powers, whilst often hypocritical, did attempt to suppress the slave trade, though with limited success. The lecture concludes by reflecting on the diplomatic efforts, such as the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, to regulate the Scramble for Africa, though these efforts may have encouraged further expansion by legitimising claims based on effective occupation. Overall, Black presents the Scramble for Africa as a complex process driven by competition, opportunism, and diverse interest groups, rather than a simple story of technological or military superiority.
Black explains that the Boers, despite being outnumbered and less technologically advanced, effectively utilized their knowledge of the terrain, long-range rifles, and guerrilla tactics to resist British forces. The British initially struggled due to the Boers' ability to wage a mobile, defensive war, exploiting their familiarity with the landscape and accurate marksmanship. The Boers' early successes, such as the defeat of British forces at Majuba Hill in 1881, demonstrated their tactical prowess. However, the British adapted by deploying larger forces, employing scorched-earth policies, and establishing concentration camps to suppress the Boer insurgency. He argued that the conflict in South Africa was not an entirely new kind of warfare but rather an adaptation of earlier imperial conflicts. Like previous struggles on the empire’s periphery, the war was driven by competition for strategic resources such as diamonds and gold, and by the broader ambitions of the British Empire in securing vital routes to India and maintaining influence in the region. The war also reflected the challenges that large empires face when fighting on multiple fronts, as the British were simultaneously dealing with crises in other parts of their empire, such as Egypt. The conflict ultimately ended with the British victory in 1902, but it had significant consequences. For South Africa, it led to the integration of the Boer republics into the British Empire, though native African communities remained marginalized. The war also influenced perceptions of British military capabilities, showcasing both their resilience and the challenges of combating guerrilla warfare. Black concludes that whilst the conflict did not introduce entirely new methods of warfare, it underscored the importance of adaptability and the complexities of imperial conflicts.
In the Spanish-American War, the main theatres of conflict were the Philippines and Cuba, where the United States, a rising industrial power, sought to expand its influence at the expense of Spain, a declining imperial power. In the Philippines, this led to a successful American takeover, followed by a struggle against native peoples, highlighting early 20th-century cultural and ideological clashes between a modernising America and what was perceived as a backward Islamic society. In Cuba, American intervention was driven by a mix of strategic interests and public opinion, fuelled by the yellow press, which limited the government’s room for manoeuvre. Spain, despite its weakened position, resisted surrendering its empire due to ideological and military ethos, demonstrating that non-rational factors often drive conflict.
The Russo-Japanese War, fought primarily in the waters of Korea, China, and Manchuria, similarly reflected competition between a rising Japan and an expanding Russia. Japan’s victory was facilitated by its modern navy, built with British expertise, and decisive naval battles, such as those in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima. On land, the war featured trench warfare, machine guns, and other technologies later seen in the First World War, though Japan’s inability to force a Russian surrender highlighted the limits of its power. Russia’s defeat was compounded by internal unrest, partly instigated by Japanese intelligence, and a loss of confidence following naval losses. Both sides were influenced by a mix of rational interests, such as territorial expansion, and irrational factors, including racist views of opponents.
Black also explores the broader context of these wars. In the Spanish-American War, the United States saw itself as a rising power fulfilling a progressive destiny, while Spain’s decline was evident in its inability to suppress Cuban insurgents. The explosion of the USS Maine, though not necessarily the sole cause, escalated tensions towards open conflict. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s modernisation, often linked to the Meiji Restoration, enabled it to challenge Russia, though Black cautions against oversimplifying this narrative. Both conflicts were shaped by power competition over weakening regions, such as Cuba and Manchuria, and by opportunities arising from the opponent’s vulnerabilities.
The lecture also considers the wars’ legacies. The Spanish-American War established the United States as a two-ocean power, with control over the Philippines and an informal economic colony in Cuba, while avoiding the high costs of traditional empire-building. The Russo-Japanese War marked Japan’s emergence as a modern power, though its lessons, such as the importance of willpower and decisive battles, were sometimes misapplied in later conflicts. Black notes that military lessons from these wars, particularly the Russo-Japanese War, influenced First World War strategies, though often through the filter of existing doctrines and strategic cultures.
Finally, Black highlights the role of mediation, such as the Treaty of Portsmouth, facilitated by the United States, which positioned itself as a neutral Pacific power. This reflected America’s growing global influence, though Japan felt its gains were limited by international intervention, as it had in 1895 after defeating China. Overall, Black argues that these wars remain relevant for understanding the interplay of power, ideology, and technology in shaping international conflicts.
The lecture also touches on the origins of British geopolitical theory, particularly through the work of Halford Mackinder, whose 1904 paper on the Asian heartland framed global power struggles as a contest for control of this pivotal region. Mackinder’s ideas, which saw Britain as a peripheral power resisting Russian dominance, are linked to later geopolitical anxieties, such as fears of a Russo-German alliance, and even to NATO’s strategic concerns during the Cold War. Addressing the British perspective, Black notes that post-1857, after the Indian Mutiny and the replacement of the East India Company with direct British rule, there was heightened concern about defending India, particularly against perceived Russian threats via Afghanistan. This anxiety was not just about direct invasion but also about Russia’s potential to destabilise the region by supporting local powers. The lecture draws parallels with modern geopolitical uncertainties, such as Russia’s intentions in Ukraine, suggesting that historical fears of Russian expansionism were often more about strategic pressure than outright conquest.
Black also responds to questions about the role of Persia, the impact of German involvement before the First World War, and the significance of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement, which divided spheres of influence in Persia and reduced tensions over Afghanistan. He argues that while this agreement marked a shift, the Great Game’s dynamics persisted, particularly through the Russian Civil War and into the 20th century, with cultural echoes in British literature and media. Overall, Black underscores the complexity and continuity of Eurasian geopolitics, challenging simplistic narratives of Anglo-Russian rivalry and highlighting the interplay of multiple powers across centuries.
The discussion begins by revisiting pre-war geopolitical theories, such as Mackinder’s concept of the Eurasian pivot and heartland, and their relevance to the First World War. Black highlights the German Berlin-to-Baghdad railway project, which was seen as a strategic move to challenge British dominance, particularly in India, and to extend German influence through the Ottoman Empire. Contemporary observers, such as Fraser, viewed this railway as a potential threat to British prestige and a source of geopolitical tension, though its incomplete state limited its impact during the war. Whilst it facilitated some troop movements within Anatolia, it did not shape overall strategy or operations. Black contrasts the speculative focus on grand transcontinental rail projects, such as the Berlin-to-Baghdad line or the Trans-Siberian railway, with the practical importance of domestic rail networks. For instance, France’s rail system enabled rapid troop redeployments during the 1914 Marne offensive, and Britain’s rail infrastructure supported its military-industrial mobilisation. These domestic systems proved far more significant than the grandiose geopolitical visions of transcontinental connectivity.
The lecture also critiques German geopolitical strategy during the war. Germany’s initial concerns about Russia led to a heavy troop deployment in the east, but these fears proved unfounded as Russia weakened after 1914, especially following the 1917 revolutions. Germany’s eastern victories, achieved at relatively low cost, contrasted sharply with its prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful western campaign. Black notes that German geopolitical assumptions, such as underestimating the consequences of bringing Britain and the United States into the war, were flawed and poorly executed, revealing a disconnect between strategic planning and operational realities.
The discussion extends to post-war geopolitics, particularly Mackinder’s proposals for buffer states to contain Soviet expansion and his involvement in the Russian Civil War. Black critiques Mackinder’s ideas as overly idealistic, pointing to the failure of foreign interventions in Russia due to the weaknesses of anti-communist forces and the broader exhaustion following the First World War. Britain’s withdrawal from the Caucasus, for example, reflected the impracticality of maintaining control over distant regions amidst financial constraints and competing imperial commitments in places like Ireland, Iraq, and Egypt. Black also contrasts Mackinder’s idealism with Lenin’s more pragmatic, yet equally ideological, vision of geopolitics, which saw colonial regions as a vulnerable underbelly of Western powers. Both perspectives, however, are critiqued as somewhat detached from practical realities. The lecture concludes by reflecting on the limitations of geopolitical theorising, such as Mackinder’s unrealistic proposals for Anglo-American naval cooperation, and underscores the importance of grounding strategic planning in operational and logistical realities rather than abstract map-based speculation.
Throughout, Black emphasises that geopolitical outcomes, such as the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939–1941, were not inevitable but arose from specific historical contingencies, further challenging deterministic views of geography and power.
2. Relative Stability in the Mid-1920s: Despite early violence and extremism (suppressed by the army and authorities, as seen with the failed communist uprisings and Hitler's 1923 putsch), the mid-1920s saw a degree of stabilisation. This included diplomatic normalisation with the Locarno Treaty (1925) and Germany joining the League of Nations (1926), alongside social welfare improvements like unemployment insurance (1927). He warns against buying into Nazi propaganda that retrospectively painted the entire period as chaotic.
3. The Great Depression as a Turning Point: Whilst inherent problems existed (like the relationship between regions and the centre, and the influence of extremist parties), the extreme instability and misery often associated with Weimar are more a consequence of the Great Depression from 1929-1930 onwards. The collapse of the Müller government in 1930 due to its inability to handle rising unemployment demonstrates the impact of this external shock.
4. Authoritarian Democracy but Instability: The political system's shift towards presidential emergency decrees under Brüning, appointed by Hindenburg, represented a move towards an "authoritarian democracy." However, Prof. Black suggests the real problem was the instability of this authoritarian system, rather than the authoritarianism itself being unique to the period.
5. Cultural Dynamism: The cultural vibrancy of the Weimar era (Bauhaus, Kurt Weill, Expressionist film, etc.) demonstrates the diversity and dynamism of German society and shouldn't be dismissed as merely a distraction.
Thus in this lecture, Prof. Black argues for a more nuanced view of the Weimar Republic, emphasising that many of its problems were common to post-WWI Europe, that it achieved a degree of stability in the mid-1920s, and that the economic crisis of the Depression was a critical factor in its eventual destabilisation, rather than an inevitable trajectory from its inception.
Professor Black's lecture discusses the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany during the 1930s. He highlights the complexities of historical interpretations and the different levels of analysis that can be applied to this period, arguing that there are two main approaches to understanding the rise of Hitler: one that focuses on the actions and intentions of a small group of politicians, and another that looks at the broader societal and economic factors that contributed to the Nazi party's success.
Black notes that the Nazi party's popularity grew significantly during the 1930s, with the party winning 37% of the vote in the 1932 election. He suggests that this was not just a result of the party's extremist ideology, but also due to its ability to tap into the frustrations and discontents of the German people, particularly in the context of the Great Depression. The professor also discusses the role of other political parties and leaders during this period, including the Centre Party, the Communist Party, and the conservative politician Franz von Papen. He notes that the Nazi party was able to exploit the divisions and weaknesses of these other parties, and that the conservative elite in Germany was willing to collaborate with the Nazis in order to prevent a communist takeover. Black argues that the rise of Hitler was not just a result of the actions of a small group of individuals, but also due to the broader structural and economic factors that were at play in Germany during the 1930s. He suggests that the Nazi party's success was facilitated by the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, including its proportional representation system and the lack of a strong, unified opposition to the Nazis. The professor also touches on the role of Hindenburg, the President of Germany, in the rise of Hitler. He notes that Hindenburg was a key figure in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, and that he was willing to grant Hitler significant powers in order to stabilise the government. Black suggests that Hindenburg's actions were motivated by a desire to prevent a communist takeover, and that he underestimated the threat posed by the Nazi party.
Nazi popularity stemmed partly from the promise of restoring German greatness and improving social mobility and employment. Their ideology had a populist appeal, including a distinct anti-Semitism, and promoted a nationalistic vision of a German community excluding those deemed outsiders. Propaganda, spectacles, and the cult of personality around Hitler all contributed to Nazism functioning as a kind of civic religion for many Germans. Whilst there was a failed plot against Hitler in 1938, by late 1934, options for a different political direction were largely closed off. Some in Germany saw Fascist Italy as a positive example, though the lecturer notes fundamental differences. It's incorrect to assume British Conservatives were sympathetic to Nazism; their values were fundamentally opposed. Despite appearing a one-man state, there were always some checks on Hitler's power. The Nazi state was chaotic, with competing factions and individuals pursuing their own agendas. This internal chaos, ironically, created some limitations on centralised control, as Nazi agents would often resist each other. The Nazi state was also inefficient and brutal, similar in some ways to the Soviet Union, though Soviet brutality was even more extreme and systematic. Ultimately, the Nazis' racial ideology was self-destructive. It's important to acknowledge that extreme messages were popular in the 1930s, boosted by economic and social hardship. Many who previously supported democratic parties became sympathetic to Nazism. The Nazis suppressed opposition brutally, targeting publications and political groups, making democratic resistance extremely difficult. Whilst some individuals did oppose the regime, they were largely suppressed by the state and societal pressure. By the late 1930s, there was very little space left for civil society or open dissent in Germany.
On the question of public knowledge of the Holocaust, Black argues that while the Nazis did not publicly announce the Final Solution, there was widespread awareness and complicity among ordinary Germans. The disappearance of Jews, their deportation to camps, and the distribution of their property were visible and known, even if not always openly discussed. Anti-Semitic propaganda had fostered a dominant consensus, and evidence from recorded conversations of German prisoners of war reveals a lack of remorse or responsibility. Black also highlights the persecution of other groups, such as the mentally disabled, who were killed as part of the regime’s purification efforts, and the use of forced labour, which was evident in cities and factories.
In the war’s final stages, the regime’s ideology of total destruction persisted, with no willingness to negotiate surrender, and local defence forces were mobilised under Nazi control rather than the army, ensuring political passivity among the population. Black concludes that the war left Germany in a state of total devastation, a wasteland created by both the regime and the German people’s complicity, with post-war narratives often downplaying this involvement.
1. Origins of the IRA:
The IRA’s roots lie in long-standing divisions within Irish nationalism, exacerbated by the Civil War (1922–1923). The Provisional IRA (formed in 1969) emerged as a more militant faction, advocating for Irish reunification through force. Black describes it as a “classic attempt to apply revolutionary warfare theories,” aiming to provoke British forces to such an extent that the state would collapse, allowing a socialist republic to take over. The Provisional IRA’s strategy included targeting British security forces, establishing “no-go areas” in Belfast and Derry, and using terrorism to destabilise the region.
2. British Military Deployment:
British troops were initially sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 to maintain order, akin to the US federal response to civil rights protests. However, as violence escalated, the military shifted from a counter-insurgency strategy to one focused on countering terrorism. Operations like Operation Motorman (1972) aimed to reclaim territory from the IRA but faced challenges due to the guerrilla tactics and civilian presence. The British Army’s role was described as primarily defensive, aiming to “hold the line” until political solutions could be negotiated.
3. Challenges and Strategies:
- IRA Tactics: The Provisional IRA relied on bombings, assassinations, and border smuggling (e.g., weapons via the Irish Republic). Funding came from criminal activities (drug trafficking, extortion), Soviet bloc support, and Irish American sympathisers.
- British Response: Intelligence gathering and infiltration (e.g., informants within the IRA) were effective but insufficient. The government avoided decisive military action in the Republic, critiqued as a failure to disrupt the IRA’s infrastructure.
- Public Perception: Most Catholics did not support the IRA, but the movement’s portrayal as defenders of the community fueled tensions. British troops were occasionally accused of brutality, though Prof. Black emphasises they operated professionally under difficult conditions.
4. Political and External Factors:
- The Good Friday Agreement (1998) eventually brought a political resolution, but the conflict left deep societal scars.
- External support for the IRA waned after the Cold War, removing financial and logistical resources.
- Comparisons to other conflicts (e.g., Algeria, Kenya) highlight similarities in insurgent tactics but note the IRA’s limited military effectiveness compared to groups like the French Foreign Legion.
5. Legacy:
The Troubles demonstrated the complexity of counterterrorism. While the British Army managed to contain violence, the political process was crucial. Prof. Black critiques the lack of a robust strategy to dismantle the IRA in the Republic and underscores the long-term social and political divisions. The lecture concludes by reflecting on the military’s professionalism and the eventual shift toward political reconciliation.
Professor Black argues the Falklands War was a significant, and perhaps surprisingly successful, British victory given the prevailing defence policies and geopolitical context of the time. He challenges simplistic narratives and delves into the complexities surrounding the conflict.
Defence Policy Shift: Since the 1960s, British defence policy had been shifting away from a focus on naval power and towards NATO commitments and areas further afield. This meant a weakening of the navy’s capacity for distant water operations, a trend not unique to the Thatcher government.
Argentinian Intentions: Black questions whether the perceived threat from Argentina was a genuine assessment of their intentions, or a misreading influenced by intelligence failures – drawing parallels to intelligence failures in 1941 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. He highlights the “noise” inherent in intelligence gathering.
Deterrence Failure: The core issue wasn’t necessarily Argentina’s strength, but the failure of deterrence. Black asks whether this failure was deliberate (implicitly signalling Britain wouldn’t respond), or due to miscalculation. He suggests Argentina may have believed Britain wouldn’t risk a war, particularly given perceived internal divisions within the government.
Internal British Factors: The early 1980s were a period of internal British crisis – economic difficulties, social unrest (riots in 1981) – and a general sense of malaise. This context makes the decision to respond militarily all the more surprising.
American Ambivalence: The US response was mixed. Whilst providing logistical support (access to airbases, fuel), elements within the US government were hesitant, concerned about relations with Latin America and fearing a right-wing backlash if Argentina fell.
Strategic Resolution: Black praises Thatcher’s government for acting decisively, suspending diplomatic processes to pursue a military solution. He contrasts this with the slower build-up during the Suez Crisis. He argues that a rapid response was crucial given the logistical challenges of the South Atlantic and the approaching winter.
Argentinian Weaknesses: Despite their bravery, the Argentinian forces suffered from systemic weaknesses: promotion based on political loyalty rather than merit, poor officer-troop relations, and a lack of adaptability. Their air force, whilst capable, operated at extreme range and faced a determined British response.
British Strengths: The British forces demonstrated strong infantry skills, effective artillery use, and good unit cohesion. They successfully identified Stanley as the key objective and maintained a logistical lifeline.
The Significance of Victory: The Falklands victory was more than just reclaiming islands from a fascist regime. Black argues it restored a sense of national pride and purpose in Britain, which had been lacking in the 1970s. It also had implications for the wider Cold War context, demonstrating Western resolve.
History essentially because it is the prelude to the third right established by Adolf Hitler 1933 and there are standard matters of discussion notably as to whether there was any viability more whether it's full was inevitable or the matter of contingency whether it was as it were founded under a damned inheritance i.e supposedly the victors or responsible for the rise of Adolf Hitler and I was around the bizarre but we've had the one side and whether the culture of Germany in the 1920s it's dynamism as an area of the expression of new ideas new concept art in some respects actually is a distraction from fundamental deep seated problems now you won't be surprised to hear Graham that there are no definitive answers that can be for the answers history by nature is an interim report and I think it's also fair to say that as before French British Spanish Italian American History I think as before what actually needs to do is to contextualize the situation to those people who looked at German history on its own phrase given his idea of a unique or exceptional development patterns on today actually because I need to ask questions about why given period B the 1920s or period see the impact of the subsequent depression why some country 21 so just to try and move apart from the second just give some contextualization Germany was not unique defeated he World War One nor was it treated particularly harshly by the Victoria's powers compared to the fatal for example Empire which lost much of its Empire which suffered a really serious form of civil war in effect as well as foreign invasion and it's aftermath nor was Germany is hardly treated as the Australian Empire which also in the ultimate the World War One hand all sorts of issues and problems not least the establishment communist Republic of hungry Republic leader and then to find individuals and etc compared to that Germany was more in the sort of case Bulgaria which is not comparison of historical relish but there we go as a defeated power that was relatively generously treated in terms of those whom you might consider and of course there is all sorts of definitional issues Germans there was not for example the mass expansions that you would see after World War Two there was not Germany losing what would have been considered integral German lands as for example today itself although it's subsequently derived as sort of victim narrative that would have enjoyed in terms of the quality of its exposition and it's academic backups as well as other backers victim approach scene narratives actually context so democracy is established in Germany in 1919 again if you're putting that in comparison Russia which have been defeated forced piece 18 did not have that possibility of people social cohesion institutional capital articles would set up a violation Union which is willing to murder the last large numbers of fellow so again what has to be cautious if one is looking at this in a while to context so what can we say about what we can certainly say that there is violence 1919 various little violence and I think it's reasonable to point out that extremists have left and right are a challenge to many states in the automatic World War One and certainly in two 1924 across much of Europe again many of the disruptions you received in that purity not unique the 1919 flu pandemic which was a genuinely disturbing food compared to that and also fundamentally effective old people like myself and not the argument the flute pandemic of 1919 was far more vicious at least affecting from women and younger people and on top of that high inflation after the war the economic disruption of dislocation after the war and the degree of social chaos which you see with refugees with families grieving their water none of these are unique to Germany they may have contrast it very much with a sense of German exceptionalism and pride prior to the war but an interesting comparison would be somebody has made it but noticed it the effect on France and Franco pressure relating 70 to 71 which in the short term caused political extremism comparison could be heavily divided because horrible people were killed in suppressing them died in all them every political violence with in Germany between 19 and the end of the 1920s and then subsequent to that the 1870s and 1880s moving up to the boujee attempted kuber was it our work periods of enormous uncertainty polite in French politics there were revolvacious groups many of which wanted to restore a monarchy there was only limited support for the third Republic with a profound hostility to it which you again see in the following decades of f and again compared to that Germany in the 1920s comparison German historians would like but we need to get to other countries of that period and I think again if you're thinking of major World states of that period going through transformation after political change of the 19 team which is essentially which we're talking about Germany you can argue that China would Revolution getting rid of its imperial system eventually by the end of the 1920s of consolidated around government international government or before this type which had total control over most of China principlection being a Nigeria but that's required far more use of force for the situation in Germany so you know we could run through I discussing detail in my brief history some of the particular problems of that decade I'd but I think you know needs to be aware that in many senses in the 1920s in Germany there were many who were committed to internationalism Liber Left liberals and of course you know attempts to overthrow these are not the world to certain degree reliant on the army which brutally suppressive 1920 because I say brief again but you know the Communist in 1920 I record was a failure with his tempted the approach immunity in 1923 which was very rapidly surprise and if you think about it that was obviously designed to emulate the seizures of carried out in Turkey cable had also into Mussolini people killed in the desirable it's more than for example 19 teams and but it has to be British pretends on the streets going 1919 but it has to be safe people it was arrested he was an imprisoned landsberg prison and thereafter during the 1920s there was violence associated with Nazi Bully Boys because of course he was wearing the failed that the authorities were more powerful more potential and on top of that the only showed it so able and willing to defend it so for example three it actually goes yesterday um you can see it is better obviously the issues of the current issues of German State building from the late 19th Century the relationship between regions and centre the relationships between cannibal and labor the response to international contingencies there is a Potent breeze into the system of sort of into the stew of arguments of things all been awful and everything is Terrible but it has to but you know much of the extremeism protectionist in the Misery that we associate with the early 1930s in many sense from developments of the Great Depression and what has to be very cautious of exaggerating the degree to which these were mainstream in the 1920s and reminded of whether Britain in which he argues you know these were but this was a profoundly disturbed Society what exactly how those people who returned the national government obviously the environment state the difficult Elementary democracy of operating operation of states and abandoning the monarchies with defeat and severe economic financial dislocation out of confronting Revolutionary example and expansion it was easy to create structures and Princesses of national unity produced the Republican system produced opponentary practice of government and grounded votes to women the powers of the central government increased on divine particularly with regards to finance but Germany remained a federal state and the each of allowance was responsible for the police Justice of government education much as and crucially what this did was reflected as indeed modern Germany does Switzerland does the particular structure particular inclination of individual errors could I possibly point down the part of the narrative of you know how journey with lumped with enormous reperation with the remember and France have been loved with enormous reparations in 1815 and again in 1871 that hadn't prevented such a good French liberations and and to them grow and it was understandables reposed they were imposed public because those are examples the party also compensate for broad damage important Belgium so damaging places of the British they were delighted into singing the liberation but it's worked very mind that support for very much was more significant but the hatred for it shown by people like the cycle and it's also worth wearing in mind yes there was Crisis in the world in 1933 by 1825 a considerable degrees resilient and that was a point that was subsequently be divided by those impressed for the chaos masturbating as builder of the National socialist state but I think we have to be very wary of buying into not see propaganda has a form of modern intellectual analysis of the bimar years and I think this is very very significant and the left there was tendency to argue obviously form of legitimacy and there was a tendency to regardless stage in therefore another form of unacceptable government so that view has percolated through into some more analysis it's deeply flawed it reflects an inability to understand that their distinctions between governments and it reflects a very crude form of political social analysis so if you're looking at the stabilized demand 324 the foreign ministers improved a master of reality offering a new iteration of His purpose killing that within a very different context in 1926 Germany was able to join the League of Nations so in other words similar I believe in the situation after World War Two and social welfare included the introduction in 1927 our universal and contributorial unemployment insurance now if you just take them more plenty before we discussed this and I've already mentioned that there is this Legacy of failure and in the sense of the subsequent rise of Hitler I think it's fair to say that that possibly looks less secure as of analysis once one starts to think about the difficulties that affected many European countries after ratio's economic expansion early 30s years and I think the difficulties of European state subscribed with in controlling in containing more extreme different sentences that includes the extent to which there are mainstream as well they balance them but extremely parties that exist in current journal political sphere for more cautious in evaluating the earlier situation is the bone Thank you very much black for that overview I think very interesting once you make about seeing 1920s during these problems in the context of problems other countries were dealing with at the same time and also I think the point of doing extension by the second half of the 1920s it seems to me the government got actually quite proud of they have some overcome any problems that this fledgling Republic has at the time of its formation I wonder if you just go through a payment to get your assessment of how they were overcome so firstly the system Berlin a communist revolution in Munich it will all listeners the paramilitary forces on how the first we have the government Society regain control constitution begin control over semi and Arctic situation but I think there's no doubt about it which will talk about is like most political crises only just people are active and therefore as it were dealing with or this group of succeeding developing suppressed is the clear issue 1920 the army proved very important in suppressing a position the actions were that particularly raised welcome they included the execution of prisoners and the Killing standards but you know this was on the streets of the National capital and indeed play a major role I mean he bring us the army to provide evidence of its support the VI Mark very much contrasted with the assumptions that have been made by the right order left to the left you know the soldiers workers wouldn't fight another workers which is not even stupid but the right the notion that the army is authoritarian system would naturally and support the those also afford analysis but I think that was a very important and consequential situation the defeat of the communists in 1920 and Hitler in 1923 was achieved with photography Union a far fewer people killed them when the Communist suppressed rising other rising at the naval base outside and I think it's fair to say that there was only a relatively relative limited attempt by extremists to actually over system now that may not seem you know how you would see it in background for example you know there's terrorist movement the organization pencil Terrace movement which included before the killed at least 34 people in 1920 to 22 including minister of finance and ministry foreign affairs the first example if you're looking to another new Republic in that very period the new Irish free statements Republic the new Irish free state it's suppressed the risings of the anti treaty IRA executed those executable British executed the Commodus was suppressed in hungry with many more casualties one has to put the German situation in Context the inflation to extend you see that as simply wrong monitoring policies that Central Bank was pursuing old as deliberate attempting flat away etc Recreation so this webpage and how were some inflation effectively prototype control well you know I'm not a financial expert so I don't want to pretend your skill working out what might or would have happened to The Approach have been followed I think it's fair to say that their hair been in multi what we might call constitute of easy and in countries and as we know the introduction of stable money policies so many policies was not easy it was much easier even among the victors like written in front of the Britain added so I get I wouldn't see it as uniquely a German issue I think there was too much on the encirculation I think done they would have been high inflation and you know obviously the situation is very different today but again today we see the consequences of inflatabase it's actually a lot of the Vision within particular countries as indeed was placed in the twenties tend to win Mitch Germany and got itself back into a family nation so there is the Iconic Treaty of 1925 following year he joins the League of Nations really achievements of the statesmanship of the Foreign Minister stressman was there something he brought specifically that move this process of diplomatic normalization forward or what's actually conscious decisions you think more in terms of other powers particular United States brief in France that you also in their interest to have a normalization well I think it was very interesting globalization I think there was a desperate concern to try and limit the opportunities of the of expansionism and there was a real concern Justified concern about German Soviet alignment possibilities as indeed just by concern because these words we seen it providing opportunities with the German military to Fort the design restrictions and journey testing new weapons systems so I think that's very important also I think as part of a post World War One you get a parallel with what it happens after 1815 the attempt to bring France rapidly into the new systems rather than to leave from as a discontented power that might you know provide an opportunity for a new parties or a new radicalism that would challenge the other the other States so I don't find it surprising but written and France would welcome the situation again you can see the analogy after World War 2 where the restrictions of the Victorious powers on Japan are relaxed when Japan is needed is more necessary after communist victory in China's in Korea and you could say the same thing in case of West Germany in the mid 1950s there is a need for the ubers there is there in order to act as a sort of restriction on the expansion of potential expansion societ Union plays his hand well but he is depended for playing it on the International conc Expansionism there's an awareness of Soviet infiltration espionage and active agitation in stirring up the possibility of evolution that was well so let's Germany is as it were a second order priority and to a relationship with Soviet Union if we can turn that to parliamentary politics you mentioned the vinyl Republic has universal suffrage women have the vote the essentially discussing previous episodes before they the first world war he wasn't taking anything commanding executive decisions I wouldn't say a bit more about how the constitutional balance has changed during the speed of the minor Republic I mean you moment that succeeds of the president in 1925 so the president has a little powers particularly to appoint the Chancellor and you know that's I think one it's obviously to be significant to the right there is the relationship as indeed you have today between national politics and politics at the level of the individual provinces and again there was a redrawing of the provincial system but you know pressure is a remains I suppose overly strongly contains about 60% of journalist territory and population and I think it's fair to say that the part of the different stabilization of the World War 2 was the pressure was broken down as it were and as a land as regional area I've already mentioned government was handled by provinces and I think that that tends to be underplayed if people too much focus on the right side it should be you know the difference between pre-born publish politics is there are extremist parties that the Nazis communists on which they're weren't in the kinds of strike in other respects are a lot of continuation you know the sbased for their second left and that the Catholic Center right parties yes degree of continuity and I think it's there that you see part of these strength of the biosystem but as it were existing political groups that helps to create a vibr with the principal difference being that there isn't going to be a monarchy not just the impurables etc but that continuity as we know is to be challenged eventually by the rise of the communists of the Nazis and I think it's worth saying that that I would that exists prior to the depression but is pushed Forward by the depression of Islam so you could argue that the Coach and government headed by the newer who had been the chance of being for the state since 1928 and that government collapses in March 1930 because it is able to put together a politically acceptable solution to the problems of funding rapidly rising unemployment payments which you will record is an issue in the British national governments in 1931 so prior to that there is already constraints over liquidity 80 degree applicable recognization not just in terms of an artist in the accomplished artificial but also for example in a movement to the right in the center parties all of those need to be mentioned but I think it's really the crisis of 1930 but sort of caused problem resigning he is replaced by recruiting who's appointed by Hindenburg who follows deflation policies and in the event they hitch boat Society without brings ability continues to Rise Against and with the government unpopular from unique and majority of the race today breeding uses Hindenburg to issue presidential emergency please and that creates what is an effective authoritarian democracy again I wouldn't say that's unique for this period and I would say it's not so much that there is more territorium democracy that is the problem is that this also rotary in democracy is unstable and that I would say is the is the real problem I mean I don't know whether you want to go through the this program to discuss the crisis of leads to the rise of parallel Hitler what I would say is not only is the full advantage inevitable it also shouldn't be argued because it changed its modus operandi never that necessarily meant that it also would followed less validity I think that is you know something I'd be confusing that is to just make one or two comments about the culture because I think that is part of its contribution and strength as far as essentials concerned and you know thinking for example the bad house moving to architecture if you're thinking of music vile if you're thinking of painting rather Savage realism athletics concerned it doesn't look like the expressions films notably a fruit slacks in the problem is in 1927 they're all important I think you need to go about this many of these demonstruct public approval and the viral return you know the vibrancy cultural life includes many other themes and styles of this period but when it shows is the diversity and dynamism of and I do think that is worth commenting on now in the in the next episode taking us through the vinyl Republic both the problem is encounter the notification as well as no problems and consult
