“Could the allies have been able to bomb Auschwitz?”
Plan of Investigation
“Could the
allies have been able to bomb Auschwitz?” To begin, an analysis will be
made on John J. McCloy’s argument, leading to the decline of
a bombing proposal offered by the Jewish Agency on July 6th 1944.
Later we will configure Wyman’s summarized “four possible solutions” to attack
the Auschwitz concentration camp. By contrasting these two authorities we can
analyze the chances of the allies realistically and effectively being able to
bomb Auschwitz to a point of its incapability to continue its murderous
actions. This investigation will look into the action and orders of the two
main allied powers, Britain and America, and analyze this information to see if
it was logical military protocol or a hierarchy miscommunication or even
mistreatment.
More broadly, consideration of the stances
presented by several different authorities on this topic will be made, particularly
those of John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War between 1941-1945 who
made major decisions concerning the bombing of Auschwitz, and David A. Wyman, a
Jewish historian and the Chairman for the Institute for Holocaust Studies. Furthermore, the CIA photo-analysts Dino Brugioni who
served for the CIA in the 1970’s and WW2 historian and official Churchill
biographer, Martin Gilbert, will both reinforce each of the stances towards this
question.
Word count: 213
Summary of
evidence:
Auschwitz, located 160 miles southwest of Warsaw, initially created as a Polish army barracks, was captured after the defeat of Poland in 1940. In July 1941 Heinrich Himmler toured the areas of Poland to search for potential places to conduct “The Final Solution”. [1] In September 1941 the camp was converted into a multi-use work, concentration and extermination camp divide into three sections: Auschwitz I (original concentration camp), Auschwitz II (concentration/extermination) and Auschwitz III-Monowitz (a labour camp to staff the IG Farben chemical factory). Through 1941-1945 at least 90% of prisoners in the camp were Jewish and 1 in 6 Jews who died in the Holocaust died at the camp, amounting up to one million Jews. Out of the 7000 SS camp guards in Auschwitz, 15 were put on trial and six condemned. [2]
The initial in-depth information to the Western Allies on the existence of Auschwitz was the “Pilecki's Report”. Polish Army Captain Witold Pilecki spent a total of 945 days at the concentration camp, escaped and forwarded via the Polish resistance to the British government in London a report of conditions and events occurring at the camp.[3] On March 1941, ‘The mass extermination of the Jews in German occupied Poland’ was published; details from the report were even published by “The New York Times”. The first report of gas chambers to the worldwide press being used was also described. [4] An Allied reconnaissance aircraft first overflew Auschwitz on April 4, 1944, in a mission to photograph the synthetic oil plant at Monowitz forced labor camp (Auschwitz III).[5]
The main Auschwitz complex was photographed accidentally several times during missions aimed at nearby military targets.[6] However, the photo-analysts knew nothing of Auschwitz and the political and military hierarchy didn't know that photos of Auschwitz existed.[7] For this reason, the photos played no part in the decision whether or not to bomb Auschwitz.[8] On 26 June 1944 71 B17 heavy bombers on another bomb run had flown above or close to three railway lines to Auschwitz.[9] July 7, the U.S. War Department refused requests from Jewish leaders to bomb the railway lines leading to the camps, a fleet of 452 Fifteenth Air Force bombers flew over the five deportation railway lines on their way to bomb the Blechhammer oil refineries nearby.
Buna-Werke, the I.G. Farben industrial complex located adjacent to the Monowitz forced labour camp (Auschwitz III) located 5 kilometres from the Auschwitz I camp was bombed four times, starting at 20 August 1944 until 26 December 1944.[10] On December 26, 1944, the U.S. 455th Bomb Group bombed Monowitz and targets near Birkenau (Auschwitz II). During the attack a SS military hospital was hit and a total of five SS personnel were killed.[11]
On 11 June 1944, believing that Auschwitz was a labour camp, the Executive of the Jewish Agency along with David Ben Gurion, unanimously opposed the bombing of Auschwitz. Israeli President David Ben Gurion summed up the results of the discussion: "The view of the board is that we should not ask the Allies to bomb places where there are Jews"-. This proposal was reversed after the Jewish Agencies revealed that Auschwitz was indeed a death camp and a bombing proposal was made to FDR.[12]
On August 24, 1944, U.S. Army Air Forces carried out a bombing operation against a factory next to Buchenwald concentration camp located near Weimar Germany. Despite perfect weather, 315 prisoners were killed, 525 seriously harmed, and 900 lightly wounded.[13]
Word count: 573
Evaluation of sources:
Bird, Kai ‘The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment’, Simon and Shuster 1992
Pulitzer
Prize-winning historian Bird wrote the first official biography
relating to McCloy’s legislative engagements while in office during
WWII. Bird recounts his role in the Auschwitz bombing debate while
serving as Assistant Secretary of War when he made many major decisions
regarding civil issues occurring during the war. The ‘Executive
Intelligence Review’ has described Kai’s account as “even handed” [14]
but as a biography written in 1992 can be seen as having a “20/20”[15]
hindsight that uses our morality and values of today while referring
back to accounts enacted in the heat of war. Bird occasionally suggests
the anti-Semitism and racism of McCloy when quoting McCloy’s colleague
and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, describing him as "more or less
inclined to be a fascist."[16] His role in enacting internment camps for
U.S. Japanese citizens is a well-known example of one of his enacted
policies during the war and adds to McCloy’s suggested racism. McCloy
is a useful source for us to analyse in order to understand the general
consensus in terms of the handling of civil matters in wartime Europe.
With many of the requests to liberate Auschwitz often times being sent
directly or forwarded to him by the Jewish Agency or by Anthony Eden,
Minster of British Foreign Affairs.[17]
Wyman,
David S.:
Why Auschwitz was Never Bombed. Commentary Journal. 2.14 1978
Print.
The
Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. New York: Pantheon, 1984. Print.
David
S. Wyman is the author of several books on the Holocaust and won the
National Jewish book Award for his extensive in-depth look into the
subject. In 1978 David Wyman published an article “Why Auschwitz was
never bombed”[18] and later in 1984 continued his thesis in his book
“The Abandonment of the Jews-1941-1945” in which Wyman offers four
different bombing strategies in order to liberate the camp. This thesis
supports his main argument in which Wyman suggests that bombing
Auschwitz was a possibility and that the decision to not bomb Auschwitz
was a mistake. With this in mind Wyman is criticized for his inserted
personal moral views in his book, with Peter Novic, author of “The
Holocaust in American life”, calling his proposition “a comfortable
morality tale”[19] is to be taken into account in which we need to
understand that Wyman has no military experience or extensive knowledge
into military tactics. Furthermore, being Director of the Jewish
institute for Holocaust studies, Wyman can somewhat involve the aspect
of morality in his position leading to bias on his part. With this in
mind we need to refer to our original question of the feasibility of
bombing Auschwitz and this is why Wyman’s argument is valuable for our
analysis.
Word count: 358
Analysis:
Wyman
argues four clear scenarios supporting the targeting of the Birkenau
crematoria or the rail lines leading to them concerning the diversion of
U.S. B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers from IG Farben to the crematoria ; the
employment of two-engine B-25 medium bombers, which would presumably
bomb more accurately from a lower altitude; a dive-bombing raid by
two-engine P-38 fighters, such as the U.S. Army Air Forces carried out
on the Romanian oil complex of Ploesti on June 10, 1944; and a special
mission by Royal Air Force Mosquito two-engine bombers, like the ones
executed against Gestapo prisons and headquarters in Western Europe.[20]
In 1979, CIA photo-analysts Dino Brugioni and Robert Poirier reinforced
Wyman's arguments by presenting to the public dramatic aerial
reconnaissance photos of Auschwitz taken by Allied aircraft in 1944 and
early 1945, showing prisoners being marched to the gas chambers, albeit
through the use of magnification unavailable to Allied
photo-interpreters 35 years earlier. [21]Allied intelligence had photos
of the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, but ignored them because no priority
was placed on a bombing mission, and because camps were viewed only as
places to avoid in an attack.[22] On 29th June 1944, the 32-page
Vrba-Wetzler Report was sent to John McCloy. Attached to he report was a
note requesting the bombing of vital sections of the rail lines that
transported the Jews to Auschwitz. McCloy investigated the request and
then told his personal aide, Colonel Al Gerhardt, to "kill"[23] the
matter. While receiving several requests to take military action
against the death camps, including Auschwitz, McCloy was documented to
send the following letter: "The War Department is of the opinion that
the suggested air operation is impracticable. It could be executed only
by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of
our forces now engaged in decisive operations and would in any case be
of such very doubtful efficacy that it would not amount to a practical
project." Furthermore the British PM Winston Churchill reinforced this
argument of the diversion of resources for the bombing. Martin Gilbert,
Churchill’s personal biographer, writes of how the British coincided
with the attitude of McCloy and that the redirection of resources from
synthetic oil bombings would slow down the war effort. Wymann ignores
the fact that bombing alone would have achieved little. As Gilbert
states, any bombing would, far from save lives, in fact result in more
unnecessary loss of life. To produce any significant benefit Gilbert,
who like Wymann is not specifically a military historian, argues that
any air attack would have to be followed by a ground invasion to
liberate the concentration camps including Auschwitz.[24] This is the
argument led by Israeli political leaders in 1944, like David Ben Gurion
asking “not to bomb places where there are Jews.”[25] Further more,
as explained in the summary of evidence, only squads of heavy bombers
like the U.S. Fifteenth Air force division was capable of reaching such a
distance and at such a height that would protect them from flak and
anti aircraft guns.[26] Gilbert’s analysis of these possibilities go
hand in hand with McCloy’s, referencing again how the U.S. army was
concentrating their efforts to destroying the synthetic oil plants and
diversion of resources would also slow down the liberation proses. [27]
Word count: 543
Conclusion:
Debate
continues over the realistic and plausible option of bombing Auschwitz.
Varied amounts of arguments can be used to debate the usefulness and
benefit that bombing would achieve and if unnecessary casualties and
operational failures would result. McCloy’s and Gilbert’s argument both
conclude that bombing Auschwitz was an unrealistic logistical operation,
which would not have been an option since Auschwitz was located deep in
German annexed territory. Taking this into account, a concentrated
ground invasion which would liberate the camp and which would avoid more
unnecessary loss of life would have been a rational and realistic
course of action in order to safely rescue and provide shelter to all
the prisoners. Therefore, the argument that Wymann offers that which
gives examples of bombings near and on Auschwitz, which would involve
allied resources, cannot be taken into account for the reason of limited
knowledge of the exact location of Auschwitz, major loss of life caused
by heavy bombers and legislative obstacles.
Word Count: 161
List of sources:
Bird, Kai ‘The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making
of the American Establishment’, Simon and Shuster 1992
Brugioni, Dino and
Robert Poirier, ‘The Holocaust revisited: A Retrospective Analysis of the
Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex’; CIA report 1978
Brugioni, Dino.
‘Auschwitz and Birkenau: Why the World War II photo interpreters failed to
Identify the extermination complex,’ Military Intelligence, vol. 9, no.
1 (Jan.-Mar. 1983.)
Duetch, Guy. ‘Why Did
America Not Bomb Auschwitz?’ Why Did America Not Bomb Auschwitz? (2007):
4-20. The Pica Project. Web. Date accessed: 2 Dec. 2014.
.
Gilbert, Martin. ‘Auschwitz and the Allies’.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981. Print.
Gutman, Israel and
Gidʻon Graif. ‘The Historiography of the Holocaust Period: Proceedings of
the Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, Jerusalem, March 1983.’
Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1988. Print.
Marrus, Michael R. ‘The End of the Holocaust.’ Vol.
9. Munich: K. G. Saur Verlag K. G. Saur VerlagGmbH, 1989. Print.
Novick, Peter. The
Holocaust in American Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999. Print.
Rosenblatt, Stu.
"How Mr. Fixit Nearly Wrecked the World." Executive Intelligence
Review 25.42 1998 Print
Rubinstein, William D. The Myth of Rescue, London, Routledge
1997, Chapter 4,
“The Myth of Bombing
Auschwitz”. Print.
Skolnick, Fred, ed. ‘Auschwitz Bombing Debate.’ Encyclopaedia
Judiaca. 2007.
Wyman, David S. ‘The
Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945.’ New York:
Pantheon, 1984. Print.
Wyman, David S. ‘Why Auschwitz was Never Bombed. Commentary
Journal. 2.14 1978 Print.
[1] *Found
by painter Chaim Rosenthal, Himmler’s Personal letters to his wife
Margareta. [2]. Marrus, Michael R. pg 68 [3] Marrus, Michael R. pg
72 [4] Martin G. pg 98 [5] Marrus, Michael R. pg. 93 [6] Brugioni
Dino pages 50-55 [7] Brugioni Dino, pages 50-55. [8] Rubinstein
William D. pg 57 [9] Marrus, Michael R. pg. 108 [10] Gutman, Israel
and Gidʻon Graif p.578. "Late in the morning on Sunday. August 20. 127
Flying Fortresses, escorted by 100 Mustang fighters, dropped 1,336
500-pound high-explosive bombs on the factory areas of Auschwitz, less
than five miles east of the gas chambers. The weather was excellent…
ideal for accurate visual bombing. Antiaircraft fire and the 19 German
fighter planes there were ineffective. Only one U.S. bomber went down;
no Mustangs were hit. " [11]: Gilbert M. Pg. 134 [12] Gilbert M. Pg.
135 [13] Skolnick, Fred pg 64 [14] Rosenblatt, Stu. Pg. 51 [15]
Rosenblatt, Stu. Pg. 51 [16] Bird, Kai Pg. 161 [17] Novic Pg . 62.
[18] Wyman, David S. Print. Pg. 74 [19] Novic, Pg. 45 [20] Wyman,
David S. Why Auschwitz was Never Bombed 2.14 [21] Brugioni, Dino and
Robert Poirier. Pg. 13 [22]
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/bombau.html [23]
Kai, Bird pg. 216 [24] Gilbert M. pg193 [25] Novic pg. 57 [26]
Gilbert M. pg 158 [27] Gilbert M. pg 158
Was housing policy in Germany affected by the change of government in 1933?
A. Plan of
Investigation
Was housing policy in Germany affected by the change of
government in 1933?
This will be investigated by examining housing policy from the appointment of Brünning as Chancellor in 1930 to the National Socialist (“NS”) seizure of power in 1933. Specifically the housing policies of the Weimar Republic will be compared to those pursued by the NS in their first three years of power. A key primary source will be the section concerned with housing policy in the “3. Notverordnung”[1], issued in 1931, which will provide information about the policies during the Weimar Republic. The book “Nazionalsozialistischer Siedlungsbau”, by U. Peltz-Dreckman, an expert on NS housing policy, will provide detailed information about the legislation enacted by the NS. In addition this investigation will assess the change in housing policy, through a specific case, namely the “Zahnbrechesiedlung” in Munich, as it was built spanning the change in power, meaning it was affected by the policies of both governments. Information on the economic and political context will be sourced from broader works on the Weimar Republic and the NS government[2]. Specialist monographs and academic papers will provide detail on aspects of late Weimar and NS policy and ideology[3].
B. Summary of
Evidence
Background
Due to Germany’s financial dependence on short-term loans from American banks, it was one of the states most affected by the “Wall Street Crash” on the 24th October 1929.[4] By February 1932 unemployment in Germany had risen to 6.1 million.[5] These economic circumstances remained the same until 1934.[6]
Due to Germany’s financial dependence on short-term loans from American banks, it was one of the states most affected by the “Wall Street Crash” on the 24th October 1929.[4] By February 1932 unemployment in Germany had risen to 6.1 million.[5] These economic circumstances remained the same until 1934.[6]
Weimar housing policy from 1931 to 1933
The deflationary policy that chancellor Brünning implemented to counteract the recession was unpopular.[7] Thus he relied on the support of presidential Emergency Decrees (“Notverordnungen”) to reach his goals of reducing government expenditure and making the population less reliant on social welfare.[8] One measure aimed at dealing with unemployment was contained in the “3. Notverordnung”[9] which provided so-called “Kleinsiedlungen”[10] for the long-term unemployed.[11] The decree set out three main objectives: (1) to promote permanent settlement in the countryside, (2) to reduce unemployment and (3) to facilitate the means of subsistence for the unemployed. [12] Built on the outskirts of large towns, “Kleinsiedlungen” comprised cheaply and primitively built houses[13] with large gardens, usually between 800 – 1200m2, so that they could be self-sufficient.[14] The cost of the houses was low, at a maximum of 3000RM. Government loans of up to 2500RM were available to support this. The settlers were required to contribute to the building of the houses with their own time. The decree also dealt specifically with the part of the regional budget available for these building projects, the process by which settlers were to be able to take out loans and the purpose the land should have in making settlers more economically independent.[15] The new “Kleinsiedlung” policy was very popular with the German public and take up was high.[16] In the first tranche of building under the programme, from … to ….., 48m.RM were invested. A second tranche was started on …., for which 25m. RM was initially invested. This was increased by an additional 10m. RM in December 1932, shortly before the NS took power. One example of a settlement built under this legislation is the Zahnbrechersiedlung[17] in Munich. Permission to build it was applied for on the 10th of December 1932 and granted on the 10th of March 1933.[18] The building started on the 1st of May 1933.[19]NS housing policy up to 1936
Hitler incorporated this into the NS peasant programme in March 1930[23]. Based on his advocacy of selected breeding and his views on settlement, Darré was made chief of the SS “Rasse- und Sieldungs- Hauptamt”[24] by Himmler in 1931.[25] The NS had criticized the Brüning government’s housing policy by disagreeing with the location of the settlements, the inexpensive, simple nature of the houses and the diverse background of the settlers admitted.[26] Once in power the Nazi Party continued with the building of “Kleinsiedlungen” on the basis of the programme established in the “3. Notverordnung”, constructing three more such establishments in Munich alone.[27] As under the Weimar Republic programme, these were to be built in “urban fringes” and had large, farm-like gardens.
In February 1933, the new government authorized a third tranche of funding for this programme, worth 40m. RM. In addition to the unemployed, access was to given to “job-sharers” [28], as well as war cripples and veterans.[29] At the same time, the amount available in government loans was reduced and the requirement for capital from the settlers was increased.[30] A fourth tranche of 70m. RM was agreed in July 1933. In addition to the existing categories this was also to be open to SA veterans and fully employed low-income families with four or more minor children.[31] In September 1933, the NS passed their first piece of legislation relating to housing policy[32] (“Wohnsiedlungsgesetz”).
Under this law:
1. The government was given the right to declare and appropriate areas of settlement
2. A central authority for housing (“Reichssiedlungkomissar”) was to be established, with a local hierarchy in the “Heimstättenamt”[33]
3. The building style of settlements had to be in line with the “Heimatbild”[34]
4. There were measures to ensure that new settlements would take place away for existing large cities. In March 1934 Gottfried Feder was made “Reichsisedlungskommissar"[35].
In a speech in May he described his objectives as being:
1. The dissolution of the large cities
2. To make the population settled again and give them back their roots in the soil,
3. Deliverance from big-city squalor,
4. Provision of healthy living conditions for the adolescent generation,
5. Recreation of the sense of “Heimat”[36] In October 1934, non-aryans were excluded from access to the settlement programme. In March 1935, access was restricted to applicants fitting the Nazi ideal[37].
C. Evaluation
of Sources
“Die 3. Notverordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zur Bekämpfung politischer Ausschreitungen vom 6. Oktober 1931”[38] (Focus on the 4. Chapter concerning agricultural settlements, suburban housing settlements and provision of allotments for the unemployed.)
“Nationalsozialischter Siedlungsbau – Versuch einer Analyse der die Siedlungspolitik bestimmender Faktoren am Beispiel des Nazionalsozialismus”[42] by Ute Peltz-Dreckmann
Written in 1978, this book was the first addressing the topic of housing policy under NS Germany.[43] This could be considered a limitation, as there would have been little secondary source material for Dreckmann to base her analysis on. However it has the value that her view would have developed from the primary sources without being influenced by anyone else’s interpretation. The fact that the book is still quoted in contemporary literature on the subject[44] suggest that her work is respected and that the book is valued as an authority on the subject. Her art-historical background could be considered a limitation, however the work is not restricted to architectural aspects but deliberately includes economic and political analysis, meaning it is useful for comparisons with the Weimar Republic housing policy. The book was written in 1978, meaning the author was writing with hindsight, which has value to historians, however it also means that Dreckmann had no direct experience of the events, which can be considered a limitation. The purpose of the source is to illustrate the political and economic dimensions of housing policy, thus it is valuable beyond for a comparison in policies between the two governments.[45] Because the author chose the National Socialist Governments housing policy for her case study, as she considered them experts at exploiting the immediate connection between the population and their housing in their propaganda and demographic policies, her work could be considered limited by these assumptions. Since Dreckmann specifically aimed at stimulating public interest in and critical thinking about housing policy, she may have sought to make the subject more appealing by exaggerating controversial aspects, which would be a limitation of the text. Finally, as she wanted her work to be accessible to ordinary readers, it has been criticised for its unscientific approach.[46] One deficit of the book is its lack of a subject index.
D. Analysis
It seems clear that there was little change between the Weimar Republic and the NS Regime’s policy frameworks. This is the view of Dreckmann and other historians such as German historian Blümenroth and American architectural historian Mullin. The example of the “Zahnbrechersiedlung” here in Munich appears to illustrate this continuity. The creation of this settlement straddled several administrations: it was planned on the basis of the legislation established in the Brüning’s “3. Notverordnung”, permission was applied for during the chancellorship of Von Schleicher and permission was granted after the NS came to power[47]. That the permission was then granted by the NS administration, which subsequently became involved in resolving problems relating to the financing of the settlement[48], would seem to support Dreckmann’s argument that there was significant continuity in housing policy between the Republic and the Reich, at least during the first years.
Although as emphasised by Dreckmann, the NS did also criticise aspects of the Weimar policy, such as the location of the settlements, which were primarily suburban, and the primitive nature of the houses, the popularity of the policy among Nazi voters meant that the new government was forced to maintain its implementation at least up until 1935. In addition Dreckman points out that the economic circumstances, whose consequences the “3. Notverordnung” aimed to address, remained unchanged; the economic crisis would continue until 1934.[49] Thus the housing objectives of the new government were very much in line with the aims stated in the “3. Notverordnung” Agreeing with Dreckmann, Ulrich Blümenroth focuses on economic aspects, namely the Nazi view that such settlements were necessary in raising living standards and increasing German economic independence[50], implying that the intentions guiding Nazi housing policy were in fact not very different from those guiding the Weimar Republic’s.[51] Architectural Historian, J. R. Mullin takes a similar stance to Blümenroth, pointing out that, like the Weimar Republic, the new government concentrated on increasing employment by producing housing, implying that they were continuing the same policies as the Weimar Republic with similar motives.[52]
Dreckmann argues that another reason the NS carried on with the WR housing policy was that they had not yet developed specific policies of their own. However, from the evidence it seems that there is a very clear link between the policy intentions expressed prior to elections and their actions once in power. Thus both the points in the NS manifesto relating to housing were actually enacted into legislation: 1. Conditions for settlers were changed to incorporate for example war wounded, job-sharers and large families 2. The “Wohnsiedlunggestz” gave the government the right to appropriate land for settlement. In addition the settlement programme fulfilled the expectations implicit the “Blood and Soil” doctrine which was clearly defined part of NS policy by 1930.Notwithstanding the similarity in economic aims, it can be argued that the reason the NS continued with the policy was that it presented them with tan opportunity to realise ideological objectives. This is the point made by social historian Karin Bernst who argues that through its housing policies the NS government was able to promote the declared archetype of the “four-children-family”, living in a small house with a garden and discriminate against racially “impure” settlers[53]. This is backed up by the evidence, which shows that with each successive tranche of building, the conditions for applicants were steadily aligned with NS racial ideals.
Another way that ideology shaped housing policy is the anti-urban stance inherent in Darré’s “Blood and Soil” doctrine. The fact that the WR policy involved moving poor people out of the cities naturally appealed to NS ideologues and fitted with their propaganda. This would explain why they carried on with the policy. This view is adopted by both Barbara Miller Lane and Mullin.
An area in which there appears to be a clear discontinuity between the two governments at the level of intentions is the central role of settlement policy in NS expansionist ideology, a characteristic apparently absent from Weimar motives. Robert L. Koehl highlights the NS commitment to the ideal of “Lebensraum” for the German population to explain the motives behind NS housing policy. The close links between Darré and Himmler, the driving force behind the NS plans for colonisation in the East, illustrates the connection between domestic settlement policy and the Reich’s war time aims. Koehl refers to this as “Imperialism by demography”. Thus in addition to the economic aims behind housing policy, for the NS government ideological aims seem to have been of great significance.
E. Conclusion
In conclusion the continuing difficult economic situation and the popularity of the existing housing policy may be understood as reasons for which the NS government initially persisted to implement the building of “Kleinsiedlungen”. However, that they continued with the building of “Kleinsiedlungen” was due to the possibilities that the policy offered to support and develop their social and political ideals. The real changes in housing policy can therefore be seen in the intentions of the NS government compared with those of the WR. Having started in the tracks of the WR the NS housing policy was gradually steered into an entirely new direction. Whilst the text of the “3. Notverordnung” allows for a clear view of the starting point, the value of Dreckmanns work is in the systematic detailing of the legislative steps on this journey. Whilst housing policy of the WR was concerned with decreasing unemployment and increasing housing, the aims of NS housing policy were those of their notorious ideology regarding the ideal family, “Blood and Soil” and Lebensraum. As S. R Henderson, professor of architectural history at Syracuse University, put it, he NS government built on the existing housing policy but essentially twisted it to suit its ideology.[54]
F. Bibliography
3. Notverordnung: Dritte Notverordnung des Herrn Reichspräsident zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen usw. von 6. Oktober 1931, in Deutsche Archiv für Siedlungswesen, Arbeitslosigkeit und Siedlung (Berlin: Deutsche Buchhandlung, 1932) Brenst, K., Bevölkerungsdruck und Siedlungstätigkeit in W. Karl, Dörfer auf dem Ziegeland (Munich: Buchendorfer Verlag, 2002) Blümenroth, U., Deutsche Wohnungspolitik seit der Reichsgründung: Darstellung und kritische Würdung (Münster: Institut für Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, 1975) Büttner, U., WEIMAR, Die überforderte Republik 1918 – 1933 (Stuttgart: Klett – Cota, 2008), p. 795 Evans, R., The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Press, 2003) Ferguson, N., The War of the World (London: Penguin Books, 2006) Haerendel, Dr U., “Wohnungspolitik im Nazionalsozialismus” Zeitschrift für Sozialreform (Heft 10. 1999: 843 to 879. Print.) p. 855 Henderson, S. R., Self-help Housing in the Weimar Republic: The Work of Ernst May (New York: School of Architecture, Syracuse University, 1975) Kershaw, I., Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998) Koehl, R., RKFDV: German resettlement and population policy, 1939-1945: a history oft he Reich Commission fort he strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957) Landeshauptstadt München Direktorium, Stadtchronik 1930 (Web: Portal München Betriebs-GmbH & Co. KG, 2013) Lommer, H., Letter to Lily Roggenhofer (2014) Miller Lane, B., “Architecture and politics in Germany, 1918-1945” (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968) Mullin, R., The Impact of the National Socialist Policies upon Local City Panning in Pre-war Germany (1933-1939): The Rhetoric and the Reality (University of Massachusetts – Amherst, 1981) Mullin, R., Ideology, Planning and the German City in the Inter-War Years (Town Planning Review, July 1982, Vol. 53, No 3) Nerdinger, W., & Blohm, K., Bauen im Nationalsozialismus: Bayern 1933-1945 (Munich: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1993) Pelz-Dreckmann, U., Nationalsozialistischer Siedlungsbau – Versuch einer Analyse der die Siedlungspolitik bestimmender Faktoren am Beispiel des Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Minerva Publikation, 1978) Preller, L., Sozial Politik in der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf: Athenäum Verlag GmbH, 1978) 491 Stadtarchiv: Stadtarchiv von München BwR 1495, p.35 Winkler, H-A., Weimar 1918-1933, Die Geschichte der Ersten Deutschen Democratie (Munich: Beck Verlag, 1993) Zimmermann, C. & Harlander, T., Europäische Wohnungspolitik in Vergleichender Perspektive 1900 – 1939 (Stuttgart: Fraunhofer IRB Verlag, 1997)Footnotes:
[1] “3. Notverordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zur Bekänpfung politischer Ausschreitungen vom 6. Oktober 1931” translates to “3rd Emergency decree of the 6. October 1931 by the President for safeguarding of the economy and finances and control of political excesses” [2] For example “The Rise of the Third Reich” by R. Evans, “Weimar: Die Geschichte der Erste Deutsche Democratie” By H. Winkler or “Hitler” by I. Kershaw [3] For example K. Bernst on the social aspects affecting housing policy, U. Blumenroth on the ideological factors or R. Koehl on Nazi expansionist policies [4] Winkler (1993) p 358, Kershaw (1998) p 318 [5] Büttner (2008), p.795 [6] Dreckmann (1978) p. 98 [7] [8] Stadtarchiv von München BwR 1495, p.35 [9] NotVO 6.10.1931, IV Teil, Kap. II, § 1. [10] “Little settlements” [11] Bernst (2002) p. 170-171 [12] NotVO 6.10.1931, IV Teil, Kap. II, § 1. [13] Zimmermann (1997) p.73 [14] Preller (1978) p. 492. [15] NotVO 6.10.1931, IV Teil, Kap. III [16] Harlander, Hater, Meiers, (1988) p. 143 [17] Named after its initiator Dr. Zahnbrecker [18] interview Lommer [19] Bernst, (2002) p. 190 [20] Peltz–Dreckmann (1978) p. 112 [21] Miller Lane (1988) p. 155 [22] Miller Lane (1988) p. 154 [23] Miller Lane (1988) p. 153 [24] Race- and Settlement- Main commission [25] Miller Lane (1988) p. 154 [26] Peltz-Dreckmann (1978) p.110 [27] Nerdinger & Bloem (1993) p.253 [28] Encouraging job-sharing (“Kurzarbeit”) was one of the principle measures introduced by the Nazis to reduce unemployment - see Peltz-Dreckmann (1978) p.112 [29] Peltz–Dreckmann (1978) p. 124 [30] Harlander, Hater, Meiers, (1988) p. 143 [31] Peltz – Dreckmann (1978) p. 124 [32] Peltz-Dreckmann –page? [33] translates as “Homestead commission” [34] translates as “homeland norm” [35] translates as “Reichssettlementcomissar” [36] Peltz-Dreckmann (1978) p. 127, see also Miller Lane () p. 205 [37] defined as “honourable Germans of reduced means and Aryan descent, nationally and politically relable, racially valuable, healthy and free from hereditary diseases”. Harlander, Hater & Meiers, (1988), p. 145. See also Haerendel (1999) p.856, [38] translates as “3rd Emergency decree of the 6. October 1931 by the President for safeguarding of the economy and finances and control of political excesses” [39] [40] [41] [42] translates “National Socialist Housing Policy – An Attempt at an Analysis of the Factors determining Housing Policy illustrated by National Socialism” [43] marie louise recker [44] henderson [45] [46] [47] The archivist to the settlement, Hannelore Lommer points out that it was verz important for the settlers of receiving permission under the “3. Notverordnung”, because of the significant associated financial advantages which included access to loans and tax relief. Lommer (2014) p.1 [48] Bernst (2002) p.190 [49] Peltz-Dreckmann p. 98 [50] Blümenroth (1975) p. 264 [51] Blümenroth (1975) p. 263 [52] Mullin, Housing vs. Planning p. 196 [53] Bernst (2002) p.170-171 [54] Henderson (1975) p. 326-327
