From the 2001 IBDP History Paper 2 exam
The control and use of media by rulers of single-party states were critical to consolidating their power, shaping public opinion, and suppressing dissent. Examining the cases of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China reveals how rulers of single-party states in different regions used media as a central tool of governance. Both leaders employed propaganda, censorship, and state control over communication channels to promote their ideologies, legitimize their regimes, and maintain authority. Whiste their methods were shaped by distinct historical and cultural contexts, their use of media shared similarities in its authoritarian nature and its focus on consolidating totalitarian control.
Stalin’s control of media in the Soviet Union was a cornerstone of his regime, serving to project his image as an infallible leader and to promote Marxist-Leninist ideology. Under Stalin, the media was tightly controlled by the state, with newspapers, radio broadcasts, and films subjected to strict censorship and oversight. The central publication, Pravda, became the voice of the Communist Party, disseminating propaganda that glorified Stalin’s leadership and achievements. Stalin used media to shape public perception of events, presenting industrial successes such as those of the Five-Year Plans as evidence of the superiority of socialism, even as these achievements were often exaggerated or fabricated. The media also played a key role in justifying Stalin’s policies, including the collectivisation of agriculture and the purges of the 1930s, framing them as necessary measures to safeguard the revolution.
One of Stalin’s most effective uses of media was the cultivation of a cult of personality. State propaganda depicted Stalin as the “Father of Nations” and a near-divine figure whose leadership was indispensable to the Soviet Union’s success. Portraits, statues, and carefully curated images of Stalin were ubiquitous, creating an environment in which dissent was not only discouraged but rendered unthinkable. Fitzpatrick argues that this extensive propaganda campaign was instrumental in ensuring Stalin’s dominance, as it linked his personal authority to the fate of the Soviet state itself.
However, Stalin’s use of media extended beyond propaganda to include the suppression of alternative voices. The state’s monopoly on communication ensured that dissenting views could not be disseminated. Writers, journalists, and artists who deviated from the official narrative faced imprisonment, exile, or execution. The Great Terror saw the silencing of numerous intellectuals and cultural figures, further entrenching Stalin’s control over the flow of information. This combination of propaganda and censorship created a media environment that not only promoted the regime’s ideology but also eliminated the possibility of opposition.
Mao Zedong’s use of the media in China, from 1949 to his death in 1976, mirrored Stalin’s reliance on propaganda and censorship but also reflected unique characteristics of Chinese society and Maoist ideology. From the outset, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controlled all forms of communication to consolidate power and promote socialist transformation. Newspapers, radio, literature, and visual media were centralised under the CCP’s authority, ensuring that no dissenting voices could challenge the official narrative. The *People’s Daily*, the official organ of the CCP, became a primary tool for disseminating state propaganda, while radio broadcasts extended the party’s reach to rural areas, ensuring that Maoist ideology permeated every corner of Chinese society.
Mao’s cult of personality, like Stalin’s, was a cornerstone of his media strategy. State propaganda portrayed Mao as the infallible leader of the revolution, a figure of boundless wisdom and courage who embodied the will of the Chinese people. Posters, portraits, and slogans glorifying Mao’s leadership became ubiquitous, and the publication of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, commonly known as the Little Red Book, institutionalised his thoughts as a guiding doctrine for the entire population. The media’s relentless focus on Mao reinforced his centrality within the CCP and the state, marginalising alternative leadership figures and silencing dissent. Teiwes argues that the elevation of Mao to near-divine status through media campaigns was instrumental in suppressing opposition within the CCP, as any challenge to Mao was equated with betrayal of the revolution.
During the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), Mao used the media to mobilise mass support for his radical policies, which aimed to transform China into an industrial and agricultural powerhouse. Propaganda campaigns presented exaggerated reports of agricultural and industrial successes, creating an illusion of progress that concealed the disastrous reality of widespread famine and economic collapse. The media’s role in perpetuating these false narratives not only misled the population but also created an environment in which local officials were pressured to fabricate data to align with Mao’s directives. Dikötter highlights that the media’s complicity in propagating false successes during the Great Leap Forward was a significant factor in the policy’s catastrophic outcomes, as it prevented the identification and correction of systemic failures.
The period from 1960 to 1976 saw rulers of single-party states, such as Mao Zedong, refine the media's role as a tool of control, propaganda, and suppression. Unlike Joseph Stalin, whose media strategies relied heavily on centralisation and top-down dissemination of ideology, Mao innovated by incorporating grassroots mobilisation and cultural transformation into his use of the media. Mao's ability to align media content with his political campaigns reflected his understanding of the unique socio-political conditions in China, particularly the need to engage a predominantly rural and illiterate population.
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao harnessed the media to orchestrate one of the most significant campaigns of ideological re-education in modern history. The publication of "Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong," often referred to as the Little Red Book, was not merely a medium for disseminating Maoist thought but also a symbol of loyalty to the regime. Distributed on a massive scale, the book became a fixture in schools, workplaces, and public gatherings, ensuring that Mao’s ideology permeated all aspects of Chinese life. Hinton notes that the Little Red Book was not only a political text but also a psychological tool, fostering collective identity and conformity by centring Mao’s words as the ultimate authority on all matters.
The role of media during the Cultural Revolution extended beyond textual dissemination to visual and performative propaganda. Revolutionary operas, films, and posters celebrated Maoist values while denouncing perceived enemies of socialism, including intellectuals, traditionalists, and foreign influences. The media glorified Red Guard campaigns, portraying them as heroic efforts to eradicate counter-revolutionary elements. This alignment of media with Mao’s revolutionary agenda turned cultural production into a weapon of political control, erasing traditional Chinese values and replacing them with a radical Maoist ethos. Gao contends that the media’s role in shaping cultural and social norms during this period was unparalleled, as it linked individual behaviour and belief systems to the broader goals of the state.
Despite its effectiveness in mobilising mass support, Mao’s use of the media had significant consequences for Chinese society. The glorification of violence and denunciation campaigns fostered an atmosphere of suspicion and fear, undermining social cohesion. The exclusive focus on Maoist ideology stifled intellectual and cultural diversity, leaving a legacy of trauma and stagnation that persisted after Mao’s death. The Cultural Revolution’s emphasis on media-driven political conformity contrasts sharply with Stalin’s more centralised and bureaucratic approach, highlighting the distinct methods employed by rulers of single-party states to maintain control.
The use of media by Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China reveals both the commonalities and distinct approaches employed by rulers of single-party states to control their populations and consolidate power. For Stalin, the media was a top-down instrument of propaganda and censorship, central to creating a cult of personality and justifying policies such as collectivisation and the purges. By monopolising communication channels and suppressing dissent, Stalin established an environment where his authority was unassailable, and alternative narratives were eliminated. However, this approach fostered a climate of fear and conformity that stifled cultural and intellectual creativity.
In contrast, Mao used the media not only as a tool of propaganda and control but also as a mechanism for grassroots mobilisation and cultural transformation. Mao’s emphasis on revolutionary participation, exemplified by the widespread dissemination of the Little Red Book and the glorification of Red Guard activities during the Cultural Revolution, highlighted his unique approach to using the media as a weapon of mass engagement. However, Mao’s methods also came at a significant cost, as the radicalisation of society through media-driven campaigns undermined social cohesion and left lasting scars on Chinese culture and governance.
Whilst both leaders employed media to maintain power, their approaches reflected the distinct contexts of their regimes. Stalin’s media strategy was rooted in centralised control and bureaucratic oversight, reflecting the priorities of a state with an established industrial base and a focus on internal stability. Mao, leading a largely agrarian society undergoing revolutionary transformation, used the media as a means of ideological re-education and cultural reorganisation. Despite these differences, the media under both rulers served as a critical instrument of authoritarian rule, demonstrating the centrality of communication in sustaining single-party states.