From the November 2022 Paper 3 IBDP HL History exam
The end of the First World War saw the disintegration of four major empires - Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman - leading to the emergence of a host of new successor states in Central and Eastern Europe. These nascent countries, whilst finally achieving the much-cherished dream of national sovereignty, were marred by profound instability up to 1939. The causes of this instability are multifaceted, encompassing political, economic, social, and international dimensions, each contributing to the fragility of these new nation-states.
A primary cause of instability lay in the creation of these states themselves, primarily through the treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, and Trianon, among others. The principle of national self-determination, championed by Woodrow Wilson, guided these treaties. However, as Carr asserts, the new borders were "drawn more on strategic than ethnographic principles," resulting in multi-ethnic states fraught with national tensions. Minority groups found themselves trapped within new political entities, fostering deep-seated resentment and contributing to internal discord. This ethno-national tension was further exacerbated by the absence of developed democratic traditions in these regions. The political cultures in these newly formed nations were largely shaped by centuries of autocratic rule, ill-preparing them for the challenges of democratic governance. For instance, as Rothschild points out, the leadership in these states often oscillated between democratic aspirations and autocratic tendencies, contributing to an unstable political climate.
The economic challenges were another crucial factor contributing to instability. The First World War had devastated the European economy, and the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe were particularly affected. The lack of infrastructure, capital, and access to markets, combined with the global economic downturn in the 1930s, put severe strain on these fragile economies. As Kindleberger suggests, the inability of these states to mitigate the impact of the Great Depression further eroded the people's faith in their governments, leading to political and social upheavals.
Furthermore, the role of the major European powers in creating an environment of insecurity and instability in the region cannot be overlooked. Seton-Watson argues that the geopolitical ambitions of the major powers, especially Germany and the Soviet Union, resulted in a heightened sense of vulnerability among these new states. The policy of appeasement pursued by Britain and France, culminating in the Munich Agreement of 1938, undermined the political sovereignty of the successor states, fuelling a climate of mistrust and uncertainty.
Lastly, the influence of ideologies such as fascism and communism played a crucial role in exacerbating instability. The rise of authoritarian regimes in Italy and Germany, and the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, placed enormous pressure on the political establishments in Central and Eastern Europe. As Conze notes, the ideological polarisation of Europe between communism and fascism was a significant cause of the instability that marked these states in the interwar years.
In conclusion, the instability in the successor states of Central and Eastern Europe up to 1939 was a product of an array of intertwined factors. The flawed nation-building process, the lack of established democratic traditions, the economic hardship, the geopolitical machinations of the major powers, and the ideological tensions of the era all contributed to a climate of persistent instability. While each of these factors was significant in its own right, their convergence created a complex web of challenges that the newly-formed nation-states struggled to navigate, leading to the tumultuous state of affairs in the interwar period.
