From the May 2021 IBDP History Paper 3 exam
Mikhail Gorbachev, the eighth and last leader of the Soviet Union, has left an indelible mark on the history of his country and the world. His policies of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring) aimed to reform the stagnant Soviet economy and open up the country to the wider world. The policies represented a profound shift away from the totalitarian regime that had marked Soviet rule since the time of Lenin. However, the effects of these policies were manifold and complex, leading to outcomes that Gorbachev himself may not have anticipated. While some see Gorbachev as a visionary reformer who attempted to modernise a crumbling system, others perceive him as a naive idealist whose actions led to the downfall of a superpower. This essay will evaluate the impact of Gorbachev's policies on the Soviet Union, focusing on their economic, political, and social consequences.
At the heart of Gorbachev's reforms was Perestroika, a policy aimed at restructuring the Soviet economy. Traditionally, the Soviet system had been marked by a centrally planned economy, where the government controlled all aspects of production and distribution. Under Perestroika, Gorbachev sought to move the Soviet Union towards a mixed economy, introducing elements of market capitalism while still retaining elements of state control. Economist Mark Harrison believes that Perestroika was the Soviet Union's last-ditch attempt to save its economy from total collapse. According to him, by the time Gorbachev came into power, the Soviet economy was already in a state of crisis, marked by chronic inefficiency, low productivity, and technological backwardness. Perestroika, in Harrison's view, was a bold move to resolve these issues by injecting some elements of competition and incentive into the system.
However, Perestroika had a paradoxical effect on the Soviet economy. On one hand, it did introduce some elements of economic liberalism, fostering the growth of small private businesses, allowing for some competition and market pricing, and encouraging foreign investment. Yet, on the other hand, the introduction of market mechanisms into a system that had been governed by central planning for decades led to significant economic disruption. Archie Brown, a noted scholar of Soviet politics, argues that the sudden shift in economic principles, coupled with inadequate institutional support, led to economic instability and hardship for ordinary citizens. The state industries, unaccustomed to competition, failed to adapt to the new circumstances. As a result, many factories closed down, unemployment rose, and the standard of living for many Soviet citizens declined.
The political impact of Gorbachev's policies was even more dramatic. His policy of Glasnost was a radical departure from the secrecy and control that had marked the Soviet Union's governance. It allowed for greater freedom of speech and the press, and encouraged transparency in the government's dealings. For the first time, Soviet citizens were allowed to publicly criticise the government, and they did so vociferously. Richard Pipes, a Harvard University professor, sees Gorbachev's Glasnost as a Pandora's box that once opened, unleashed forces that Gorbachev could not control. Indeed, the new freedom of speech allowed long-suppressed national and ethnic tensions to surface, leading to social unrest. Furthermore, Glasnost, coupled with the economic hardship caused by Perestroika, led to a loss of faith in the Communist Party's ability to govern effectively. This was exacerbated by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, which revealed the Soviet government's inability to handle a crisis effectively, as well as its penchant for secrecy and disinformation. In his work, political scientist Robert Service contends that Gorbachev's decision to allow elections with a multi-candidate system in 1989 was the beginning of the end for Soviet political dominance. This move essentially weakened the Communist Party's grip on power and paved the way for the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The social effects of Gorbachev's reforms were complex and multifaceted. On the one hand, Glasnost opened up Soviet society to the world. People were allowed to express their opinions freely, to criticise the government, and to expose corruption and inefficiencies within the system. This was a liberating experience for many Soviet citizens who had lived under the oppressive regime. However, Sheila Fitzpatrick, a prominent social historian, argues that the sudden and dramatic changes also led to a sense of insecurity and anxiety among the populace. The loosening of control led to the resurfacing of ethnic tensions, particularly in the Baltic states and the Caucasus, where calls for independence grew louder. The economic disruptions caused by Perestroika, combined with rising nationalist sentiments, led to social unrest and violence. While Fitzpatrick acknowledges that Gorbachev's reforms did open up avenues for individual expression and enterprise, she believes that the pace and extent of the changes were disorienting for many. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, she argues, was a traumatic event for many Soviet citizens who found themselves citizens of new nations overnight.
In evaluating the impact of Gorbachev's policies on the Soviet Union, it becomes apparent that they had profound and far-reaching effects. The economic, political, and social landscape of the Soviet Union was transformed irrevocably by Gorbachev's tenure. While his reforms did introduce elements of capitalism and democracy, they also led to economic hardship, political instability, and social unrest. Economically, while Perestroika was designed to revive a struggling economy, it led to further disruption and hardship. Politically, Glasnost and the introduction of democratic elements into the political system weakened the Communist Party's hold on power and set in motion the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Socially, while the reforms provided a much-needed release valve for pent-up frustrations and aspirations, they also exposed deep-seated ethnic tensions and led to a period of uncertainty and insecurity. Harrison, Brown, Pipes, Service, and Fitzpatrick provide varying perspectives on Gorbachev's impact, yet their assessments converge on one critical point: the complexity of Gorbachev's legacy. His reforms were undeniably revolutionary, altering the trajectory of a superpower. However, the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the economic hardship and social instability that marked his tenure, reveals the peril of radical reform in a system resistant to change.
From the May 2019 IBDP History Paper 3 Exam
To what extent were Gorbachev’s policies responsible for improved East-West relations between 1985 and 1991?
Gorbachev’s policies were instrumental in improving East-West relations between 1985 and 1991, but they were not the sole determinant of this transformation. His approach, characterised by reforms such as glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), reflected a profound shift in Soviet strategy, departing from the confrontational stance of his predecessors. Gorbachev’s willingness to engage in arms reduction, reduce military interventions, and reform the Soviet Union’s internal system of governance fostered trust and dialogue with Western leaders. However, the improvement in relations was also facilitated by external factors, including economic pressures on the USSR, the changing global context of the Cold War, and the responses of key Western leaders, particularly Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. While Gorbachev’s policies were pivotal, their impact must be assessed within this broader framework.
Gorbachev’s commitment to arms control and de-escalation of military tensions represented a fundamental departure from the Cold War brinkmanship of previous Soviet leaders. His decision to prioritise arms reduction talks with the United States culminated in landmark agreements, most notably the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This treaty eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and was the first arms control agreement to include comprehensive on-site verification measures. Gorbachev’s willingness to make significant concessions, such as agreeing to withdraw Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe, demonstrated his commitment to reducing tensions. Reagan, who initially adopted a hardline approach to the USSR, recognised this sincerity and reciprocated by engaging in constructive dialogue, leading to a period of détente. Historians such as Zubok argue that Gorbachev’s arms control initiatives were motivated by economic necessity, as the Soviet Union could no longer sustain the costs of an arms race with the United States. However, Gorbachev’s ideological shift toward prioritising diplomacy over military power also played a critical role, marking a departure from the confrontational mindset that had defined much of the Cold War.
Gorbachev’s arms control efforts extended beyond the INF Treaty, reflecting a broader strategy to reduce Cold War tensions and build trust with the West. His active participation in subsequent negotiations, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), underscored his commitment to nuclear disarmament. The START agreements, which laid the groundwork for significant reductions in long-range nuclear arsenals, demonstrated Gorbachev’s willingness to engage in mutual compromise and cooperation. By 1991, the START I agreement, signed under George H.W. Bush, formalised these reductions, reflecting a significant de-escalation of the nuclear arms race. Gorbachev’s initiative to unilaterally reduce Soviet troop numbers in Eastern Europe, announced in 1988, further exemplified his intent to defuse military tensions. The withdrawal of over 500,000 troops and thousands of tanks from Eastern Bloc countries was unprecedented, signalling a dramatic shift in Soviet policy. This reduction in military presence not only eased East-West tensions but also reassured NATO allies, fostering a more stable geopolitical climate in Europe.
The economic motivations behind Gorbachev’s policies cannot be overlooked, as the Soviet Union’s deteriorating financial situation necessitated a reorientation of priorities. By the mid-1980s, the USSR was grappling with stagnating industrial output, falling oil revenues, and unsustainable military expenditures, which consumed an estimated 25% of the national budget. Gorbachev recognised that continued confrontation with the West would further strain Soviet resources and undermine his domestic reform agenda. Historians such as Service argue that Gorbachev’s economic constraints compelled him to seek détente, as improved relations with the West offered the prospect of reduced military spending and increased trade opportunities. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, which ended a costly and unpopular intervention, reflected this pragmatic approach, as it allowed the USSR to redirect resources toward domestic priorities.
However, Gorbachev’s reforms were not solely driven by economic imperatives but also by his vision of a more cooperative international order. His New Thinking policy emphasised the interdependence of nations and the need for global solutions to shared challenges, such as arms control and environmental protection. This ideological shift resonated with Western leaders, who viewed Gorbachev as a genuine reformer committed to reducing the ideological hostilities of the Cold War. Reagan, previously a staunch critic of the USSR, described Gorbachev as a leader “we can do business with,” reflecting the trust that Gorbachev’s policies inspired. The personal rapport between Gorbachev and Reagan, cultivated through a series of high-profile summits, further facilitated East-West cooperation. These diplomatic engagements, including the 1986 Reykjavik Summit and the 1987 Washington Summit, highlighted the mutual willingness to pursue meaningful dialogue, even when immediate agreements were not reached.
Whilst Gorbachev’s arms control initiatives and reforms were central to the improvement of East-West relations, their success was contingent on broader structural and international factors, prompting debate among historians about the extent of Gorbachev’s personal responsibility. Zubok argues that Gorbachev’s willingness to prioritise arms reductions over Soviet strategic advantages was driven largely by economic pragmatism, rather than an ideological commitment to peace. He highlights the Soviet economy’s inability to sustain the enormous costs of military competition, citing military expenditure figures that consumed over a quarter of the USSR’s GDP by 1985. This analysis emphasises that Gorbachev’s reforms were less about visionary leadership and more a necessity to prevent economic collapse. However, other scholars, such as Brown, argue that Gorbachev’s personal convictions and ideological innovations—embodied in his New Thinking—were critical in shifting the USSR from its confrontational posture. Brown points to Gorbachev’s writings and speeches, which frequently advocated for a cooperative international order, as evidence that his reforms were deeply rooted in a broader vision of global interdependence.
The impact of Gorbachev’s diplomatic style on relations with the West cannot be overstated. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev demonstrated a willingness to engage directly with Western leaders, fostering a personal rapport that helped overcome decades of mistrust. The Reykjavik Summit of 1986, while initially perceived as a failure, exemplifies this dynamic. Although no formal agreement was reached, the summit laid the groundwork for the 1987 INF Treaty by enabling frank discussions about nuclear disarmhistament. Historian Gaddis praises Gorbachev’s “unprecedented transparency,” which allowed Western leaders to view him as a genuine reformer rather than a cynical tactician. However, critics like Dobrynin argue that Gorbachev overestimated the West’s goodwill, particularly in the United States, where many policymakers remained sceptical of Soviet intentions. This tension is evident in the internal divisions within the Reagan administration, where hawks like Weinberger resisted compromising on arms reductions, viewing them as concessions rather than mutual agreements. Gorbachev’s ability to navigate these dynamics reflects both his diplomatic skill and his willingness to make bold gestures, such as unilaterally reducing Soviet forces in Europe.
The broader international context also shaped the success of Gorbachev’s policies. By the mid-1980s, the Cold War had entered a phase of diminishing returns for both superpowers, as the economic and military burdens of sustained confrontation became increasingly unsustainable. Historians such as Westad argue that the improvement in East-West relations was as much a result of systemic pressures on both sides as it was of Gorbachev’s leadership. He points to the simultaneous rise of détente-oriented policymakers in the United States and Europe, who were eager to capitalise on Gorbachev’s reforms to reduce tensions. For example, George H.W. Bush’s pragmatic approach to diplomacy contrasted sharply with Reagan’s initial hardline stance, creating an environment conducive to trust-building. However, critics of this systemic view, such as Taubman, contend that Gorbachev’s unique leadership style and ideological innovations were indispensable in breaking the Cold War stalemate. Taubman argues that without Gorbachev’s personal initiatives, the entrenched hostility between the superpowers would likely have persisted into the 1990s. Gorbachev’s policies also extended beyond arms control and diplomacy, encompassing broader geopolitical decisions that reshaped East-West relations and challenged long-standing Cold War dynamics. His decision to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had justified Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe, marked a decisive break with past Soviet foreign policy. By signalling that the USSR would no longer use force to maintain control over its satellite states, Gorbachev fundamentally altered the balance of power in Europe, easing tensions with the West. The absence of Soviet interference during the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, which led to the fall of communist regimes in countries such as Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, exemplified this shift. Historians like Service emphasise that Gorbachev’s restraint was pivotal in preventing these transitions from escalating into broader conflicts, thereby fostering a climate of cooperation and mutual trust between East and West.
However, Gorbachev’s decision to relinquish control over Eastern Europe was not without controversy, both within the Soviet Union and among Western observers. Critics such as Pipes argue that Gorbachev’s policies reflected a strategic miscalculation, as they weakened the USSR’s geopolitical influence without securing significant concessions from the West. Pipes contends that by allowing the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev effectively ceded Eastern Europe to Western influence, undermining the USSR’s position as a global superpower. In contrast, Taubman defends Gorbachev’s approach, arguing that his willingness to prioritise peace and reform over traditional power politics demonstrated a profound commitment to reshaping international relations. Taubman points to the symbolic and strategic significance of the 1990 reunification of Germany, which occurred peacefully under Gorbachev’s oversight, as evidence that his policies enabled a new era of European stability.
The Western response to Gorbachev’s reforms further highlights the interplay between his leadership and external factors in improving relations. Reagan’s change in tone during his second term, shifting from confrontational rhetoric to diplomatic engagement, played a crucial role in enabling the success of Gorbachev’s initiatives. The 1988 Moscow Summit, where Reagan famously declared that the Soviet Union was no longer an “evil empire,” symbolised this transformation. Historians such as Gaddis argue that Reagan’s pragmatic acceptance of Gorbachev’s reforms created a reciprocal dynamic, where both leaders sought to build on each other’s overtures to reduce tensions. However, critics like Dobrynin caution against overstating the harmony between the superpowers, noting that significant mistrust and strategic competition persisted, particularly over issues such as NATO expansion and the future of Eastern Europe.
Economic considerations also loomed large in shaping the West’s response to Gorbachev’s policies. Western leaders recognised the economic vulnerability of the Soviet Union and sought to leverage this weakness to solidify their own geopolitical position. The granting of trade agreements and technological assistance to the USSR during the late 1980s, particularly under George H.W. Bush, reflected a calculated effort to support Gorbachev’s reforms while ensuring that the West retained the upper hand in the global order. Westad notes that this pragmatic approach allowed Western leaders to extract concessions from Gorbachev, such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, without compromising their own strategic objectives. This dynamic underscores the extent to which improved East-West relations were shaped not only by Gorbachev’s policies but also by the strategic interests of Western powers.
The extent to which Gorbachev’s policies were solely responsible for improved East-West relations between 1985 and 1991 must be critically assessed within the broader international context. While Gorbachev’s leadership undoubtedly played a pivotal role in fostering détente, systemic factors and the responses of Western leaders were equally significant in shaping the outcomes of this period. His domestic reforms, glasnost and perestroika, created an environment conducive to dialogue by signalling a genuine willingness to restructure the Soviet system and engage constructively with the West. The landmark arms control agreements he championed, such as the INF Treaty, and his decision to withdraw Soviet forces from Eastern Europe marked unprecedented gestures of cooperation that profoundly altered the geopolitical landscape. However, these successes were also shaped by external factors, including the economic and military pressures that constrained Soviet policy and the pragmatic responses of Western leaders such as Reagan and Bush.
Historians continue to debate the degree to which Gorbachev’s personal vision versus structural constraints dictated the improvement in relations. Zubok’s emphasis on the economic imperatives driving Soviet policy highlights the limitations of Gorbachev’s agency, arguing that financial necessity forced his hand in pursuing arms control and retreating from Eastern Europe. In contrast, Brown and Taubman underscore the importance of Gorbachev’s ideological innovations, framing him as a transformative figure whose New Thinking reshaped international relations by prioritising cooperation over confrontation. The peaceful resolution of the Cold War, symbolised by the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, would likely have been impossible without Gorbachev’s restraint and diplomatic engagement. Yet, the interplay between his policies and Western strategies, particularly the willingness of Reagan and Bush to engage in constructive dialogue, suggests that the improvement in East-West relations was a product of mutual adaptation rather than unilateral initiative.
By 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union underscored both the achievements and limitations of Gorbachev’s policies. While he succeeded in reducing Cold War tensions and fostering unprecedented cooperation between the superpowers, the internal fragmentation of the USSR revealed the domestic costs of his reforms. Ultimately, Gorbachev’s policies were a decisive factor in improving East-West relations, but their success was inextricably linked to the broader economic and geopolitical dynamics of the late Cold War, as well as the strategic responses of Western powers.
