From the November 2023 IBDP History paper 2 exam
The impact of war on the emergence of authoritarian states can be examined through the cases of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. Both states, though arising from vastly different contexts, utilised the consequences of war to consolidate power and establish authoritarian rule. In Germany, the First World War and its aftermath created conditions of economic collapse, political instability, and social discontent, which were exploited by Hitler to establish the Nazi dictatorship. In the Soviet Union, the Russian Civil War and the societal upheaval following the First World War provided a platform for Stalin to seize control within the Communist Party and transform the Soviet state into an authoritarian regime.
The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles created a fertile ground for the rise of authoritarianism in Germany. The war devastated Germany economically, leaving it with a collapsed currency, spiralling inflation, and an economy dependent on short-term foreign loans. The Treaty of Versailles compounded these issues by imposing reparations and significant territorial losses, fostering a deep sense of humiliation and resentment among the German populace. This created an environment in which extremist parties, including the National Socialist German Workers' Party, could thrive. Hitler capitalised on widespread dissatisfaction by blaming Germany's woes on the “stab-in-the-back” myth, which accused Jews, communists, and politicians of betraying the nation during the war. This rhetoric resonated with a populace seeking scapegoats for their suffering.
The fragility of the Weimar Republic further facilitated Hitler’s ascent. The Republic’s reliance on coalitions made it vulnerable to political paralysis, and the government’s inability to address economic hardships effectively eroded its legitimacy. Hitler exploited these vulnerabilities by positioning the Nazi Party as a force of stability and national rejuvenation. His speeches, promising a reversal of the Versailles settlement and the restoration of German pride, appealed to war veterans and others disillusioned by the Weimar system. Kershaw argues that the First World War acted as a “mobilising experience” for Hitler, providing him with a platform to articulate his vision of a racially pure, militarised Germany.
Hitler’s rise was further accelerated by the Great Depression, which acted as an indirect consequence of the First World War by deepening Germany’s economic dependency on the United States. When the Wall Street Crash of 1929 caused American loans to dry up, Germany’s economy collapsed. Unemployment soared, creating fertile ground for the Nazi Party’s propaganda, which promised economic recovery and employment. The Nazis gained political legitimacy, securing substantial electoral gains in the early 1930s. Evans contends that without the economic and social disruptions wrought by the war and its aftermath, the Nazi Party might have remained a marginal political force.
The legacy of the First World War also militarised German society, creating a culture that valorised authoritarian leadership and obedience. Hitler drew upon the war’s ethos to shape Nazi ideology, advocating a militarised state where the Führer wielded absolute authority. The creation of the paramilitary Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel (SS) mirrored the militaristic values instilled during the war, ensuring Hitler’s control over both the party and the populace. Militarism was deeply ingrained in the Nazi vision of the future, with rearmament becoming a central pillar of their agenda.The militarisation of German society post-First World War not only fostered the authoritarian tendencies that defined Nazi Germany but also eroded any remaining commitment to democratic governance within the population. The war experience had created a generation of individuals who were accustomed to hierarchical structures, unquestioning loyalty, and the prioritisation of national survival over individual freedoms. Hitler’s propaganda exploited these values by presenting himself as a soldier-statesman uniquely capable of restoring Germany’s glory. By framing his leadership as a continuation of the wartime struggle, Hitler reinforced the perception that democracy was ill-suited to the challenges facing Germany. Broszat asserts that the war’s psychological impact was instrumental in undermining the democratic experiment of the Weimar Republic, as the values it represented clashed with those shaped by years of total war.
Moreover, the experience of total war had normalised the use of violence as a political tool. The Nazi Party’s rise to power was accompanied by significant political violence, including street battles between Nazi paramilitary groups and communist factions. These confrontations served to delegitimise the democratic process and create an atmosphere of fear and instability. Hitler leveraged this environment to present the Nazi Party as the only force capable of restoring order, further consolidating his support among conservative elites and the broader public. This process culminated in Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in January 1933 and the subsequent dismantling of democratic institutions. The Reichstag Fire of February 1933, blamed on communist agitators, allowed Hitler to secure the passage of the Reichstag Fire Decree, effectively eliminating civil liberties and paving the way for the establishment of a one-party state.
The war’s cultural and ideological legacy also influenced the policies of the Nazi regime once in power. Hitler’s vision of Lebensraum, or “living space,” was deeply rooted in the imperial ambitions that had motivated German military strategy during the First World War. This concept provided the ideological justification for Nazi expansionism and the militarisation of the German state. Furthermore, the war experience reinforced notions of racial hierarchy, with Hitler drawing upon pseudo-scientific ideas popularised during the war to legitimise his policies of eugenics and racial purity. The war thus not only facilitated Hitler’s rise but also shaped the authoritarian policies he implemented.
In contrast, the emergence of Stalin’s authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union was shaped by the Russian Civil War and the broader revolutionary context following the First World War. The collapse of Tsarist Russia during the war created a power vacuum that was exploited by the Bolsheviks to seize power in October 1917. Lenin’s leadership during the civil war established a precedent for centralised authority and the suppression of political dissent, which Stalin later expanded upon. Trotsky argues that the conditions of the civil war necessitated the establishment of a “war communism” system, characterised by the nationalisation of industry, requisitioning of grain, and militarisation of the workforce. These policies not only enabled the Bolsheviks to consolidate power but also laid the foundations for the authoritarian practices of the Soviet state.
Stalin’s rise to power was facilitated by the organisational structures and ideological practices established during the civil war. The Bolshevik Party’s centralised nature, shaped by Lenin’s emphasis on democratic centralism, allowed Stalin to manipulate the party apparatus to his advantage. The war’s demand for discipline and loyalty created a culture within the party that marginalised dissent and prioritised obedience, enabling Stalin to eliminate rivals such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. The purges of the 1930s, which consolidated Stalin’s personal control over the Soviet state, can be traced back to the coercive practices normalised during the civil war.
The Russian Civil War not only shaped the organisational structure of the Soviet state but also had a profound impact on its ideological foundations. The exigencies of war led to the development of a siege mentality within the Bolshevik leadership, fostering a worldview that perceived constant threats from both internal and external enemies. This perspective was integral to Stalin’s later policies, which combined the suppression of political dissent with an emphasis on industrial and military strength. The introduction of the Five-Year Plans and collectivisation can be seen as an extension of the centralised control established during the civil war, with Stalin framing these measures as essential for defending the Soviet Union against capitalist encirclement. Deutscher contends that Stalin’s use of the civil war as a metaphor for his economic and political campaigns helped to legitimise his authoritarian methods by portraying them as necessary for the survival of socialism. The brutality of the civil war also normalised the use of terror as a tool of governance. During the war, the Bolsheviks implemented the Red Terror, a campaign of mass arrests and executions targeting perceived enemies of the revolution. This approach set a precedent for the widespread use of state violence under Stalin. The Great Purge of the 1930s, during which millions were executed or sent to labour camps, can be seen as a continuation of the repressive tactics developed during the civil war. Fitzpatrick argues that the civil war’s legacy of polarisation between “us” and “them” was instrumental in justifying Stalin’s purges, as it framed internal opposition as a direct threat to the state’s survival.
The economic policies implemented during the civil war also had a lasting impact on the development of the Soviet state. The practice of war communism, characterised by state control over the economy and the requisitioning of agricultural products, established the principle that economic planning could be used as a means of achieving political objectives. Stalin’s collectivisation policies, which aimed to eliminate the kulaks as a class and increase agricultural productivity, were rooted in the practices and ideologies of the civil war period. These policies not only consolidated Stalin’s control over the countryside but also led to widespread famine, most notably the Holodomor in Ukraine. Conquest argues that the famine was not merely a by-product of collectivisation but a deliberate policy aimed at breaking resistance to Stalin’s rule, reflecting the authoritarian tendencies that had emerged during the civil war.
The international dimension of the civil war also played a significant role in shaping Stalin’s policies. The intervention of foreign powers in support of the White Army reinforced the Bolsheviks’ belief in the inevitability of global conflict between socialism and capitalism. This perception influenced Stalin’s approach to foreign policy, which was characterised by a combination of aggressive expansionism and paranoia about external threats. The annexation of Eastern European territories during the Second World War and the establishment of satellite states in the post-war period can be seen as extensions of the defensive mindset developed during the civil war. Pipes argues that the civil war’s legacy of mistrust and hostility toward the West was a key factor in the development of the Soviet Union’s authoritarian foreign policy under Stalin.
The international ramifications of the Russian Civil War also reinforced Stalin’s consolidation of authoritarian power through the propagation of a siege mentality within the Soviet Union. The interventions of Britain, France, Japan, and the United States during the civil war were utilised by Stalin to perpetuate the notion of an ever-present external threat to the Soviet state. This justification underpinned policies that prioritised internal control and military preparedness. Stalin’s emphasis on rapid industrialisation, particularly through the implementation of the Five-Year Plans, was framed as essential to ensuring the Soviet Union’s survival in a hostile world. Collectivisation and the forced mobilisation of labour were similarly justified as sacrifices necessary for national defence. Tucker highlights that Stalin’s invocation of foreign threats resonated deeply within the collective memory of a population that had endured years of external intervention during the civil war.
Domestically, the civil war entrenched a political culture that rejected pluralism and tolerated no opposition. The Bolshevik leadership’s suppression of rival socialist factions during the civil war, including the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, established a model of governance based on the elimination of dissent. Stalin expanded this model into a system of totalitarian control, where loyalty to the regime was enforced through propaganda, surveillance, and purges. The centralisation of authority that began during the civil war reached its apex under Stalin, as the Communist Party became synonymous with the state. Service notes that Stalin’s ability to consolidate power was rooted in the institutional practices developed during the civil war, where survival depended on absolute loyalty to the Bolshevik cause.
The memory of the civil war also shaped the Soviet Union’s ideological identity under Stalin. The Bolsheviks’ victory was framed as a triumph of socialism over capitalism, reinforcing the narrative of the Soviet state as the vanguard of a global revolutionary movement. Stalin exploited this narrative to bolster his own legitimacy, portraying himself as the heir to Lenin and the defender of the revolutionary legacy. The cult of personality that developed around Stalin drew heavily on the imagery and rhetoric of the civil war, with propaganda emphasising his role as a military and ideological leader. This historical narrative not only justified Stalin’s authoritarian rule but also created a sense of continuity between the revolutionary period and the policies of the Stalinist regime.
The brutal methods employed during the civil war also normalised the use of fear and repression as tools of governance. The establishment of the Cheka, the precursor to Stalin’s NKVD, institutionalised state violence as a means of maintaining control. Under Stalin, this apparatus of repression expanded dramatically, culminating in the Great Terror of the 1930s. The civil war’s legacy of ideological purity and suspicion of internal enemies was used to justify the targeting of political rivals, ethnic minorities, and ordinary citizens. Stalin’s purges, which decimated the ranks of the Communist Party and the military, were rooted in the practices and attitudes developed during the civil war. Getty observes that Stalin’s use of terror was not merely a response to perceived threats but a deliberate strategy to consolidate power and eliminate potential challenges to his authority.
The Russian Civil War’s influence on the emergence of Stalin’s authoritarian state demonstrates how war can create conditions conducive to the centralisation of power and the erosion of democratic norms. The combination of external threats, economic upheaval, and internal divisions provided Stalin with the tools and justifications to establish an authoritarian regime. These developments, much like the legacy of the First World War in Germany, illustrate the profound and multifaceted impact of war on the emergence of authoritarian states.
The impact of war on the emergence of authoritarian states extends beyond their initial establishment, shaping the long-term policies and ideologies that define their governance. In both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, the militarisation and centralisation necessitated by war fundamentally influenced the structure and priorities of the regimes. In Germany, the Nazi state’s policies of expansionism, rearmament, and racial purification were deeply rooted in the experiences and outcomes of the First World War. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the centralisation of economic and political power during the civil war informed Stalin’s approach to industrialisation, collectivisation, and the consolidation of his personal authority. Both regimes utilised the legacy of war to legitimise their authoritarian practices, often framing their policies as continuations of wartime struggles for survival and national restoration.
In Nazi Germany, the militaristic ethos cultivated during the First World War directly influenced the policies of the Third Reich. Hitler’s rearmament programme, which violated the Treaty of Versailles, was justified as a means of restoring Germany’s military strength and reversing the humiliations of the post-war settlement. This programme not only facilitated economic recovery by providing jobs in the arms and construction industries but also strengthened Hitler’s control over the state by integrating the military and industrial sectors into the Nazi power structure. The war experience also shaped Nazi propaganda, which glorified military service and presented Hitler as the embodiment of Germany’s wartime resilience. Shirer notes that the memory of the First World War was central to the Nazi regime’s efforts to mobilise the population for its expansionist goals, framing the pursuit of Lebensraum as a continuation of Germany’s wartime ambitions.
The Nazi regime’s racial policies were similarly influenced by the First World War’s ideological and social legacies. The war had fostered a climate of nationalistic fervour and racial exclusivity, which Hitler and the Nazi Party amplified into a comprehensive programme of racial purification. The targeting of Jews, Romani people, and other minority groups was justified through pseudo-scientific theories that gained traction during and after the war. The concept of a “racially pure” Germany was central to Nazi ideology and was enforced through measures such as the Nuremberg Laws and the establishment of concentration camps. Goldhagen argues that the war’s emphasis on unity and sacrifice created a context in which ordinary Germans were more willing to accept, or even participate in, the regime’s genocidal policies.
In the Soviet Union, the economic centralisation and industrial priorities established during the civil war were further developed under Stalin’s leadership. The Five-Year Plans, which aimed to transform the Soviet Union into a modern industrial power, were rooted in the practices of war communism, where the state controlled resources and production to meet strategic objectives. These plans prioritised heavy industry and military production, reflecting the regime’s emphasis on preparing for future conflicts. Stalin framed industrialisation as a defensive measure, arguing that the Soviet Union needed to outpace its capitalist rivals to ensure its survival. Davies highlights that the economic policies of Stalin’s regime were inseparable from the militaristic and centralised approaches developed during the civil war, as the state sought to mobilise resources for both domestic development and international competition.
Stalin’s collectivisation policies also reflected the legacy of the civil war, particularly in their emphasis on state control and the suppression of opposition. The forced collectivisation of agriculture was portrayed as a necessary step to ensure the Soviet Union’s food security and to eliminate the economic power of the kulaks, whom Stalin labelled as class enemies. This policy, while achieving its goal of consolidating state control over agriculture, led to widespread famine and suffering, most notably the Holodomor in Ukraine. The brutality of collectivisation echoed the coercive practices employed during the civil war, such as grain requisitioning and the suppression of peasant revolts. Collectivisation not only strengthened Stalin’s grip on the countryside but also reinforced the authoritarian character of the Soviet state by demonstrating the regime’s willingness to use violence to achieve its goals. Lewin argues that the policies of collectivisation and industrialisation were deeply rooted in the ideological and organisational practices of the civil war, which prioritised centralisation and the elimination of perceived threats to state power.
The militarisation of Soviet society, a legacy of the civil war, was further reinforced by Stalin’s emphasis on defence and expansionism. The Soviet military underwent significant modernisation during the 1930s, with resources allocated to the production of tanks, aircraft, and other military technologies. Stalin’s focus on military strength was not only a response to external threats but also a means of consolidating internal control. The military-industrial complex became a key component of the Soviet economy, and the state’s emphasis on discipline and obedience was reflected in both civilian and military life. The purges of the Red Army, which eliminated many of its senior officers, exemplified Stalin’s approach to maintaining control through fear and repression, a strategy rooted in the practices of the civil war.
In Nazi Germany, the militarisation of society under the Third Reich was similarly central to the regime’s governance. Hitler’s emphasis on rearmament and military expansion was accompanied by the mobilisation of the civilian population through organisations such as the Hitler Youth and the National Labour Service. These institutions not only prepared young Germans for military service but also instilled loyalty to the Nazi Party and its ideology. The regime’s focus on military strength culminated in the outbreak of the Second World War, which Hitler framed as a continuation of Germany’s struggle for national survival and dominance. The war effort further centralised power in Hitler’s hands, with the regime’s authoritarian nature becoming increasingly pronounced as the conflict progressed. Kershaw argues that the Second World War was both the culmination of the Nazi regime’s militaristic ambitions and a reflection of the authoritarian practices established during its rise to power.
The use of propaganda in both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia underscores the enduring impact of war on the governance of authoritarian states. In Germany, the propaganda apparatus glorified the sacrifices of the First World War and framed Hitler’s leadership as essential for achieving Germany’s historical destiny. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, Stalin’s propaganda machine drew on the imagery of the civil war to legitimise his rule and reinforce the narrative of the Soviet Union as the defender of socialism against capitalist aggression. Both regimes utilised the legacy of war to justify their authoritarian policies, portraying themselves as embodiments of their nations’ wartime resilience and determination.
The impact of war on the emergence of authoritarian states is evident in the cases of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, where the legacies of conflict shaped their rise and governance. In Germany, the First World War and its aftermath created the economic and political instability that enabled Hitler to exploit popular discontent and dismantle democratic institutions. The war’s cultural and ideological legacies, including militarism and racial nationalism, further informed the policies of the Nazi regime, from rearmament to racial purification. In the Soviet Union, the Russian Civil War provided the organisational and ideological foundations for Stalin’s consolidation of power, normalising the use of terror and centralised control as tools of governance. The civil war’s legacy was reflected in Stalin’s economic and military policies, which prioritised state control and defence against perceived threats.
Both regimes utilised the memory and consequences of war to legitimise their authoritarian practices, framing their policies as continuations of wartime struggles. The militarisation and centralisation necessitated by war not only facilitated the rise of Hitler and Stalin but also defined the character of their regimes. The economic and social upheavals caused by war provided the conditions for the centralisation of power, while the ideological narratives of struggle and survival justified the suppression of dissent and the implementation of repressive policies. The enduring impact of war on these regimes underscores the profound influence of conflict on the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian states.
