From the May 2023 IBDP HL History paper 3 exam
Student example written under test conditions:
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, Boris Yeltsin emerged as a prominent figure leading the Russian Federation. His policies, centred around radical economic reforms and political restructuring, indelibly shaped Russia's post-Soviet trajectory up to the year 2000. While Yeltsin's tenure is controversial and met with various interpretations, there is no denying its significant impact on Russia's social, economic, and political fabric. This essay will examine the consequences of Yeltsin’s policies, evaluating the arguments of prominent scholars on their effects.
Yeltsin's economic policy, referred to as "shock therapy", marked a radical departure from the command economy structure of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin, alongside his economists, aimed to transition Russia swiftly to a market economy by implementing rapid price liberalisation, fiscal austerity, and privatisation. However, this shock therapy led to severe consequences. Richard Sakwa posits that these policies resulted in an economic catastrophe, characterised by skyrocketing inflation, widespread bankruptcy, and soaring poverty. Indeed, Russian GDP fell by nearly 40% between 1991 and 1998, reflecting the economic devastation. Yet, Michael Ellman counters that these adverse outcomes were inevitable teething issues in the transition from socialism to capitalism. He contends that Yeltsin's shock therapy, while brutal in the short term, laid the foundations for the economic growth witnessed in the 2000s.
The privatisation process, a crucial component of Yeltsin's economic policy, was also rife with controversy and had a profound impact on Russian society. This process, commonly referred to as the "loans-for-shares" scheme, resulted in the transfer of state-owned assets to a group of oligarchs, resulting in significant wealth inequality. Stephen Kotkin argues that this entrenched a system of crony capitalism and economic disparity that is still pervasive in contemporary Russia. On the other hand, Anders Aslund counters that the oligarchic system was a necessary evil in the transition process. He reasons that despite its imperfections, privatisation generated a new capitalist class, essential for the establishment of a market economy. Main
Yeltsin's political policies were equally influential. His super-presidential system centralised power in the executive branch, often at the expense of democratic norms. This resulted in a volatile political environment, culminating in the 1993 Constitutional Crisis where Yeltsin disbanded the Congress of People's Deputies and rewrote the constitution. Archie Brown contends that Yeltsin's political approach did more harm than good, setting a dangerous precedent for centralised power and undermining Russia's nascent democracy. Yet, Lilia Shevtsova asserts that Yeltsin’s political manoeuvres were required to ensure stability in the tumultuous post-Soviet period, arguing that his consolidation of power prevented potential civil unrest.
Boris Yeltsin’s policies, economic and political alike, had a profound impact on Russia's transition from a socialist to a capitalist society. It is evident that the shock therapy and privatisation strategy led to severe economic hardships and social inequality, as argued by Sakwa, Kotkin, and Brown. However, the arguments presented by Ellman, Aslund, and Shevtsova suggest that Yeltsin's policies also laid the groundwork for the economic growth witnessed in the subsequent decade and provided the stability needed during a period of immense change. Despite the conflicting interpretations, it is clear that Yeltsin’s policies shaped post-Soviet Russia in ways that are still evident today. As Russia continues to navigate its post-Soviet identity, understanding the implications of Yeltsin's policies becomes increasingly pertinent.
Example II:
Yeltsin’s policies in post-Soviet Russia between 1991 and 2000 had a transformative and often destabilising impact on the country’s political, economic, and social landscape. His attempts to dismantle the Soviet system and introduce market reforms were radical, abrupt, and deeply contested. While these policies succeeded in establishing a framework for capitalist transformation and electoral politics, they also unleashed economic hardship, social fragmentation, and institutional instability. Yeltsin’s presidency was marked by a volatile combination of reformist ambition and political authoritarianism, as he bypassed representative institutions to push through controversial measures. His economic programme, known as “shock therapy”, aimed to rapidly liberalise prices and privatise state assets but resulted in massive inflation, the collapse of industrial output, and a dramatic fall in living standards. In the political sphere, Yeltsin’s consolidation of executive power undermined democratic development, culminating in the violent suppression of parliamentary opposition in 1993. Corruption, the rise of oligarchic capitalism, and the erosion of state authority contributed to widespread disillusionment. By 2000, Yeltsin had succeeded in dismantling the Soviet system but at the cost of entrenching new forms of inequality, weakening state institutions, and leaving a legacy of political cynicism that paved the way for authoritarian consolidation under his successor.
The economic reforms introduced under Yeltsin had the most immediate and far-reaching consequences, fundamentally altering the structure of the Russian economy but also inflicting profound social damage. The liberalisation of prices in January 1992 led to hyperinflation, with prices increasing by over 2,500% in a single year, wiping out savings and destroying the real value of wages. The ruble collapsed, and by 1994 industrial output had fallen by 48% compared to 1990 levels. GDP contracted by over 40% during the 1990s, a collapse unprecedented in peacetime. The decision to implement “shock therapy” was championed by Gaidar and supported by Western financial institutions, notably the IMF and World Bank, which provided loans conditional on liberalisation and fiscal austerity. However, the consequences for ordinary Russians were devastating. Real incomes fell by over 50% between 1991 and 1995, and by the end of the decade, an estimated 40% of the population were living below the poverty line. The social safety net—pensions, healthcare, and education—collapsed, and life expectancy for Russian men fell from 64 years in 1990 to 58 by 1994.
Privatisation, one of the cornerstones of Yeltsin’s economic programme, was intended to create a class of private owners and stimulate market competition, but instead facilitated the emergence of a narrow, politically connected oligarchy. Between 1992 and 1994, over 15,000 state enterprises were privatised, often through non-transparent voucher schemes that allowed insiders to acquire valuable assets at minimal cost. The loans-for-shares scheme of 1995, designed to raise funds for the 1996 presidential campaign, transferred control of major resource-based industries—oil, gas, and metals—into the hands of a few powerful businessmen including Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky, and Abramovich. These oligarchs wielded immense influence over both the economy and the state, creating a system of crony capitalism that undermined public trust and distorted market mechanisms. Goldman argues that Yeltsin’s economic reforms were not merely flawed in implementation but structurally designed to benefit a new elite, prioritising rapid privatisation over legal and institutional development. The absence of regulatory frameworks, property rights enforcement, and independent judiciary meant that the market economy that emerged was deeply corrupt and monopolistic.
The social consequences of Yeltsin’s economic policies were catastrophic, contributing to what has been described by some as a demographic and humanitarian crisis. By 1999, Russia's population was declining by nearly one million people per year, driven by a combination of falling birth rates, rising mortality, and public health collapse. Alcohol-related deaths soared, and the suicide rate reached 45 per 100,000 in 1994—among the highest in the world. The health system, previously universal under the Soviet model, became underfunded and inaccessible to vast swathes of the population. Unemployment, virtually unknown in the Soviet period, rose rapidly, with official figures reaching 13% by 1998, though the real number was likely higher due to underreporting and disguised joblessness. Pensioners and state employees went months without payment, and strikes became widespread among teachers, miners, and doctors throughout the decade. The 1998 financial crisis, in which the ruble lost two-thirds of its value and the government defaulted on its domestic debt, marked the culmination of economic disarray. Although the crisis temporarily boosted domestic industry by making imports unaffordable, the collapse further entrenched poverty and disillusionment.
While Yeltsin framed his reforms as a necessary break from the Soviet past, the pace and nature of the transition undermined public confidence in democracy and the free market. The association of liberal reform with mass impoverishment and elite enrichment created fertile ground for political reaction. Kotkin contends that Yeltsin’s economic agenda was not merely a failure of implementation but a politically driven attempt to dismantle Soviet-era institutions without constructing viable alternatives. The result was a vacuum of authority, in which regional governors, criminal networks, and oligarchic interests filled the gaps left by a weakened central state. Tax revenue collapsed, with collection falling from 50% of GDP in 1991 to just 13% by 1997, making it impossible for the state to finance basic services. The erosion of state capacity was particularly evident in the non-payment of wages and pensions, as well as in the inability to enforce laws or regulate economic activity. By the end of Yeltsin’s presidency, key sectors of the economy were dominated by private monopolies, and the state had lost control over strategic assets and financial flows.
The evidence indicates that Yeltsin’s economic policies, while successful in dismantling the command economy, failed to construct a functioning market system capable of delivering prosperity or stability. The reforms created a class of oligarchs, impoverished the majority, and produced levels of inequality unseen in Russia since the pre-revolutionary period. While some Western observers praised the “transition to capitalism,” the lived experience for millions of Russians was one of insecurity, deprivation, and betrayal. The discrediting of liberal economics and democratic politics in the eyes of the public was one of Yeltsin’s most enduring legacies, laying the groundwork for the authoritarian retrenchment that followed.
Yeltsin’s political reforms were marked by a paradoxical combination of democratic rhetoric and authoritarian practice, ultimately weakening the legitimacy of Russia’s nascent democratic institutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left a constitutional vacuum, and Yeltsin moved swiftly to concentrate power in the executive. In the absence of a functioning party system or established legal framework, the presidency became the central force in post-Soviet politics. Yeltsin ruled largely by decree, bypassing the legislature and marginalising representative institutions. Tensions with the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet escalated throughout 1992 and 1993, culminating in the constitutional crisis of October 1993. Yeltsin’s decision to dissolve the parliament—an act of dubious legality—provoked armed resistance from hardline deputies, who barricaded themselves in the White House. After tanks shelled the building on 4 October 1993, killing over 150 people, Yeltsin emerged victorious and used the crisis to push through a new constitution that greatly expanded presidential powers. The 1993 constitution allowed the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the Duma, and rule by decree in the absence of specific legislation. This framework institutionalised a form of “super-presidentialism” that undermined the separation of powers and concentrated authority in the executive.
The 1996 presidential election further revealed the fragility of Russian democracy under Yeltsin emphasis David Heath, professor of History at the Bavarian International School. Facing a strong challenge from Zyuganov and the resurgent Communist Party, Yeltsin’s approval ratings fell to as low as 6% in early 1996. To secure re-election, the Kremlin orchestrated a campaign marked by media manipulation, state interference, and the use of illicit funds. Key television networks, owned by oligarchs such as Berezovsky and Gusinsky, saturated the airwaves with pro-Yeltsin propaganda, while opposition voices were marginalised. The controversial loans-for-shares scheme, initiated in 1995, was partly designed to secure financial support from business elites in exchange for political loyalty. Sakwa argues that the 1996 election was a turning point in post-Soviet politics, in which democratic procedures were preserved but democratic principles were sacrificed. The outcome, while hailed in the West as a victory for reform, revealed the extent to which Russia’s political system was already being hollowed out from within. The use of state resources, media bias, and elite collusion marked a shift from pluralism to managed democracy, in which electoral outcomes were shaped by behind-the-scenes manipulation rather than genuine competition.
Yeltsin’s reliance on informal networks, personalised power, and the marginalisation of political opposition eroded public trust in democratic institutions. Voter turnout declined steadily after 1996, and opinion polls throughout the late 1990s revealed widespread cynicism about the capacity of elections to produce meaningful change. By 1999, only 11% of Russians expressed confidence in political parties, and fewer than 30% believed that democracy was preferable to other forms of government. The increasing use of presidential decrees, the weakening of the judiciary, and the subordination of the legislative branch signalled a departure from liberal democratic norms. Remington argues that Yeltsin’s presidency laid the institutional foundations for authoritarianism by entrenching an executive-dominated system, dependent on personal loyalty rather than constitutional accountability. The federal structure of the Russian state was also undermined, as regional governors amassed power and frequently defied central authority, while Yeltsin, in return for their political support, allowed them to consolidate control over local budgets, law enforcement, and electoral processes. This devolution of power was not part of a coherent federalist vision but a product of political expediency, weakening the coherence of the state.
The Chechen Wars further illustrate the authoritarian and militaristic turn of Yeltsin’s presidency. The First Chechen War, launched in December 1994, was an attempt to reassert federal authority over the breakaway republic of Chechnya. The campaign was marked by brutal tactics, widespread human rights abuses, and military incompetence. The bombardment of Grozny in early 1995 resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths and international condemnation. The war ended in humiliation for the Russian army with the 1996 Khasavyurt Accord, which effectively granted Chechnya de facto independence. The conflict severely damaged Yeltsin’s credibility and fuelled nationalist resentment. It also revealed the extent to which presidential authority could be used to pursue military campaigns without parliamentary oversight or public consultation. Lieven contends that the war exposed the hollowness of democratic checks and balances under Yeltsin, as decisions of war and peace were made in the Kremlin without institutional restraint. The use of force to resolve political disputes, both domestically in 1993 and externally in Chechnya, reflected a pattern in which coercion replaced consensus, and legality was subordinated to executive will. Heath argues that although Yeltsin introduced a multi-party system, held competitive elections, and tolerated a degree of press freedom, the political system that emerged under his rule was fundamentally unstable and prone to authoritarian regression. The appearance of democracy masked the reality of elite bargaining, media manipulation, and presidential dominance. The concentration of power in the presidency, the marginalisation of parliament, and the use of military force to resolve political conflicts all contributed to the delegitimisation of democratic politics. By the time Yeltsin resigned in December 1999, democratic institutions existed in form but not in substance, and the path was clear for his successor to consolidate power with minimal resistance. The erosion of democratic norms under Yeltsin was not merely a by-product of transition but a structural feature of his rule, embedded in the constitutional and political arrangements he imposed.
Yeltsin’s policies had a profound impact on the cohesion and authority of the Russian state, contributing to a fragmentation of governance, the weakening of central institutions, and the empowerment of non-state actors. The collapse of Soviet administrative structures in 1991 left a vacuum that Yeltsin’s government struggled to fill. The rapid devolution of power to regional elites created a system in which local governors operated with significant autonomy, often ignoring federal legislation and engaging in practices of localised authoritarianism. By 1996, over forty bilateral treaties had been signed between the federal centre and individual regions, granting them varying degrees of privilege and autonomy in taxation, law enforcement, and economic policy. This asymmetrical federalism reflected Yeltsin’s need to secure political loyalty during times of crisis, particularly in the 1996 presidential election, but it deeply undermined the coherence of the Russian state. Stoner-Weiss argues that Yeltsin’s presidency saw the emergence of a “weak state” model, in which central authority was unable or unwilling to enforce uniform policy, leading to a breakdown in the vertical chain of command. The federal government often lacked the resources or political will to compel regional compliance, resulting in a patchwork of governance that varied dramatically across the country.
The rise of criminal networks and the fusion of organised crime with state institutions further eroded the authority of the post-Soviet state. The collapse of Soviet policing and judicial systems, combined with the chaos of privatisation, created fertile ground for the emergence of powerful mafia groups. By the mid-1990s, over 40,000 enterprises were believed to be under the control or protection of criminal organisations. Contract killings, extortion, and protection rackets became widespread, particularly in major cities such as Moscow, St Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. The state’s inability to enforce legal contracts or protect property rights allowed criminal groups to operate with impunity, often penetrating law enforcement and political structures. Galeotti notes that the distinction between state officials and criminal actors became increasingly blurred, with many oligarchs relying on private security forces drawn from former KGB or military personnel. The proliferation of violence, both political and economic, was a direct consequence of the collapse of state monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The judiciary, underfunded and riddled with corruption, failed to provide an effective check on either criminal or executive power, further delegitimising the legal framework of the new Russian state.
The weakness of state institutions was further exacerbated by the erosion of fiscal and administrative capacity. The federal government’s inability to collect taxes consistently or enforce budgetary discipline meant that it could not maintain control over public finances. By 1997, tax arrears had reached 88 trillion rubles, and many of Russia’s largest enterprises—including state-affiliated firms—habitually failed to pay taxes or wages on time. This fiscal crisis forced the state to rely on short-term borrowing and foreign loans, increasing its vulnerability to external shocks, as evidenced in the 1998 default. Regional governments often withheld federal revenues, further depriving the centre of resources and weakening the capacity to deliver services or maintain infrastructure. Gaddy and Ickes describe this as a system of “virtual economy,” in which formal financial structures existed, but actual transactions were based on barter, informal arrangements, and non-payment. The breakdown of formal economic governance meant that both the state and society operated through improvised and often lawless mechanisms, undermining the legitimacy of official institutions.
Yeltsin’s own erratic leadership further contributed to the degradation of state authority. Frequent changes in government—five prime ministers between 1992 and 1999—and the president’s declining health created an atmosphere of unpredictability and instability. Key decisions were often made by a narrow circle of advisors, known as the “family”, whose influence over personnel appointments and state contracts bypassed formal structures. The result was a presidency that oscillated between hyper-centralisation and administrative paralysis. The lack of institutional continuity and the personalisation of power inhibited the development of professional civil service and policy coherence. Shevtsova argues that Yeltsin’s personalised style of rule obstructed the emergence of a modern state bureaucracy, replacing institutional rationality with ad hoc political survival strategies.
The Second Chechen War, launched in late 1999, was presented as a reassertion of federal authority but also highlighted the longer-term consequences of previous failures. The incursion of Islamist fighters into Dagestan and the apartment bombings in Russian cities provided the pretext for renewed military intervention. While the war initially boosted public support and facilitated the rise of Putin as Yeltsin’s successor, it also reflected the collapse of earlier attempts at negotiated federalism. The decision to use overwhelming force, including the destruction of Grozny, was aimed at restoring state authority through coercion rather than consensus. It marked a shift towards a more militarised and centralised model of governance that would define the post-Yeltsin era. By the end of Yeltsin’s presidency, the Russian state had been fundamentally altered. The Soviet command structures had been dismantled, but no stable or effective alternatives had been established. State authority was fragmented, institutions were hollowed out, and both governance and economic activity were permeated by informal, often criminal, networks. While Yeltsin succeeded in destroying the Soviet system, he failed to construct a resilient or legitimate successor. The consequences were not only administrative and economic, but civic and psychological, as millions of Russians lost faith in the ability of the state to provide order, justice, or basic welfare. The weakness of the state, the concentration of power in the presidency, and the disillusionment with democratic institutions created the conditions for authoritarian consolidation that followed. The impact of Yeltsin’s policies was thus not merely transitional but foundational for the political trajectory of Russia in the 21st century.
Yeltsin’s policies in post-Soviet Russia up to 2000 reshaped the country’s political and economic order with consequences that were both transformative and deeply destabilising. His commitment to dismantling the Soviet legacy resulted in the rapid liberalisation of the economy, the privatisation of state assets, and the creation of a new constitutional framework. However, the pace and nature of these reforms produced profound dislocation, empowering oligarchic elites, impoverishing the majority, and undermining the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The economic collapse of the 1990s, marked by hyperinflation, mass unemployment, and the erosion of public services, was directly linked to the design and implementation of Yeltsin’s shock therapy and privatisation schemes. These policies failed to create a stable or equitable market economy and instead entrenched corruption and inequality on a scale unseen in Russia since the tsarist era.
In the political sphere, Yeltsin’s use of presidential decrees, his suppression of parliamentary opposition, and the manipulation of electoral processes hollowed out the democratic institutions introduced after 1991. While formally democratic structures remained, the substance of democracy was compromised by media manipulation, elite collusion, and the progressive centralisation of executive power. The 1993 constitution institutionalised a super-presidential system that prioritised stability over accountability, a model that facilitated the emergence of authoritarian rule under his successor. Simultaneously, the fragmentation of state authority, the empowerment of regional elites, and the entrenchment of criminal networks contributed to a collapse in governance, further diminishing the state's capacity to enforce policy or uphold the rule of law.
The legacy of Yeltsin’s presidency is one of paradox. He presided over the end of the Soviet Union and the formal introduction of democratic and capitalist systems, yet his policies undermined both. The instability, inequality, and institutional weakness that characterised the 1990s discredited liberal reform and created widespread disillusionment with democracy itself. Yeltsin’s rule ultimately paved the way for a restoration of authoritarianism, cloaked in the rhetoric of managed democracy. His impact was not confined to the immediate post-Soviet transition but shaped the structural conditions of contemporary Russia. The trajectory of the Russian Federation after 2000 cannot be understood without reference to the decisions, policies, and failures of Yeltsin’s decade in power.
