In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, Boris Yeltsin emerged as a prominent figure leading the Russian Federation. His policies, centred around radical economic reforms and political restructuring, indelibly shaped Russia's post-Soviet trajectory up to the year 2000. While Yeltsin's tenure is controversial and met with various interpretations, there is no denying its significant impact on Russia's social, economic, and political fabric. This essay will examine the consequences of Yeltsin’s policies, evaluating the arguments of prominent scholars on their effects.
Yeltsin's economic policy, referred to as "shock therapy", marked a radical departure from the command economy structure of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin, alongside his economists, aimed to transition Russia swiftly to a market economy by implementing rapid price liberalisation, fiscal austerity, and privatisation. However, this shock therapy led to severe consequences. Richard Sakwa posits that these policies resulted in an economic catastrophe, characterised by skyrocketing inflation, widespread bankruptcy, and soaring poverty. Indeed, Russian GDP fell by nearly 40% between 1991 and 1998, reflecting the economic devastation. Yet, Michael Ellman counters that these adverse outcomes were inevitable teething issues in the transition from socialism to capitalism. He contends that Yeltsin's shock therapy, while brutal in the short term, laid the foundations for the economic growth witnessed in the 2000s.
The privatisation process, a crucial component of Yeltsin's economic policy, was also rife with controversy and had a profound impact on Russian society. This process, commonly referred to as the "loans-for-shares" scheme, resulted in the transfer of state-owned assets to a group of oligarchs, resulting in significant wealth inequality. Stephen Kotkin argues that this entrenched a system of crony capitalism and economic disparity that is still pervasive in contemporary Russia. On the other hand, Anders Aslund counters that the oligarchic system was a necessary evil in the transition process. He reasons that despite its imperfections, privatisation generated a new capitalist class, essential for the establishment of a market economy. Main
Yeltsin's political policies were equally influential. His super-presidential system centralised power in the executive branch, often at the expense of democratic norms. This resulted in a volatile political environment, culminating in the 1993 Constitutional Crisis where Yeltsin disbanded the Congress of People's Deputies and rewrote the constitution. Archie Brown contends that Yeltsin's political approach did more harm than good, setting a dangerous precedent for centralised power and undermining Russia's nascent democracy. Yet, Lilia Shevtsova asserts that Yeltsin’s political manoeuvres were required to ensure stability in the tumultuous post-Soviet period, arguing that his consolidation of power prevented potential civil unrest.
Boris Yeltsin’s policies, economic and political alike, had a profound impact on Russia's transition from a socialist to a capitalist society. It is evident that the shock therapy and privatisation strategy led to severe economic hardships and social inequality, as argued by Sakwa, Kotkin, and Brown. However, the arguments presented by Ellman, Aslund, and Shevtsova suggest that Yeltsin's policies also laid the groundwork for the economic growth witnessed in the subsequent decade and provided the stability needed during a period of immense change. Despite the conflicting interpretations, it is clear that Yeltsin’s policies shaped post-Soviet Russia in ways that are still evident today. As Russia continues to navigate its post-Soviet identity, understanding the implications of Yeltsin's policies becomes increasingly pertinent.
