History Internal Assessment
May 2023
How Significant was the Hossbach Memorandum?
Word Count: 2200
Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
Using the following two sources, this investigation will answer the question: How significant was the Hossbach Memorandum? These texts are relevant to this investigation as both sources provide primary accounts of the Nazi Regime, one from the perspectives of the perpetrators and the other from the “victims”.
Source A: The Hossbach Memorandum, Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, November 10, 1937.
The purpose of this Memorandum was to summarise certain key points stated by Hitler to his top military and political advisors, while providing a guide for future discussions within the Nazi party regarding foreign policy. V aluable because of its nature as a primary source, the Memorandum offers insight directly into Hitler’s thinking and particularly his plans for expansion, which resulted in global war.1 Furthermore, the presence of Hitler’s high-ranking officials together in one room, provides one with a unique collective of debate and conversation, demonstrating evidence of the internal power struggles and competing interests within the Nazi regime. However, there are limitations of this source in regard to this investigation, most notably the fact that Colonel Hossbach was never present for the actual meeting, and instead drafted the document based on notes received from those in the room.2 As it is a summary rather than a verbatim transcript, there is room for falsification and misinterpretations. Moreover, as it was written in the context of a regime that was deeply authoritarian and prone to secrecy and deception, it is possible that it has been subject to edits and could provide an incomplete picture of the discussions leading up to the war. Nevertheless, having been used as evidence at the Nuremberg trials, the document’s validity withstands in court and provides one of the closest insights into Hitler’s governmental hierarchy and foreign policy and is therefore of great value to this investigation.
Source B: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, William Shirer, October 17, 1960.
As a correspondent for CBS during the Nuremberg trials, Shirer offers detailed descriptions of the individuals involved in the Nazi regime, as well as their motivations and actions.4 Shirer's coverage of the trials provided him with access to important historical documents and evidence, including the Hossbach Memorandum itself, which he was able to draw upon and use for analysis in his writing. He returned to Germany to research and write his book, dedicating three entire pages to discussing the value of the Memorandum. The purpose of the book was to provide a “readable” account of the rise of the Nazi party and their policies once in power, which is valuable as one is able to easily understand the perspective of those affected at the time.5 On the other hand, it has also been criticized for “inaccuracies”, especially those in relation to his tendency to rely on his own interpretations rather than objective sources for information.6 This suggests that there may be biases or gaps in information to support his own argument, especially in regard to the Memorandum, as he discusses mainly his personal interpretations of the document with limited perspectives. Additionally, this “readable account” is 1264 pages long with a very limited index, so it is easy to lose count of crucial arguments in this colossal book. That said, its influence on our modern understanding of the Nazi regime as well as Shirer’s unique access to the German archives at Nuremberg, including the Memorandum, establish the book as crucial to this investigation.7
Section B: Investigation
In November of 1937, Hitler summoned his most trusted members of government to a private meeting in his Berlin apartment. What was initially dedicated to discussing economic issues in the regime, quickly became a documentation of Hitler’s most violent aims.8 Used as primary evidence by prosecutors in the Nuremberg trials to condemn the horrific plans within the Nazi regime in the lead-up to World War II, the Memorandum “demonstrated” that Hitler and his top advisers had deliberately pursued a policy of territorial expansion and conquest, and had planned for war as early as 1937.9 However, the defence sought to downplay the significance of the Hossbach memorandum, stating it was merely a summary and did not represent any actual plans for war. As demonstrated in Netflix’s 2021 film “Munich - The Edge of War”, this controversial debate, is ongoing. Functionalists such as William Shirer argue that the Memorandum was a defining moment in Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, while intentionalist historians such as Richard Overy and Ian Kershaw argue that it simply confirmed pre-established policies. This investigation will argue that while the Memorandum offers insight into Hitler’s plans for war, its importance has been greatly inflated.
The Memorandum clearly stated Hitler's desire for territorial expansion into Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland by outlining Hitler’s projections for the future of German foreign policy. The document presents a clear plan for this expansion, which Hitler deemed necessary for the future of the German people, expressing his belief that Germany must secure Lebensraum (living space) and resources to ensure its survival.10 Hitler felt as though Germany’s territory as it stood, lacked the necessary resources to sustain its population for the future growth which he intended for the country. 11 The Memorandum acted as a “blueprint”12 for German territorial expansion across Europe and specifically in the East.13 This is evident in German military action between March of 1938 and 1939, with Hitler’s annexation of Austria in what became known as the Anschluss. Hitler wasted no time, as that very September, Germany pressured Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland, which they finally invaded in March 1939 and 6 months later replicated this invasion in Poland, leading to the outbreak of the war. 14 Shirer supports this argument, stating that Hitler’s actions following the Memorandum were fully congruent with the goals outlined, and that it marked the official start of Hitler’s policies becoming radicalised, thus proving that Hitler evidently stated his foreign expansion plans in the meeting.15 16 The Memorandum also clearly demonstrates a specific timeline on which Hitler burdened the entire success of the Nazi regime. He expressed in the meeting that it was necessary to complete German expansion by 1943, in order to prepare Germany for a larger conflict that he believed was inevitable. Stating “time is working against us”,17 and that delaying action would only make it more difficult to achieve their goals. This equally unveiled his plans for swift action and military force to acquire new territory, rather than by the previously expressed “diplomatic means”. This approach was adapted quickly after the meeting, when in 1938 Hitler coerced Britain and France to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, under the threat of military violence to achieve his aims. Hitler states in the Memorandum that the army was to be the "first and most important instrument of policy",18 which shocked even his most trusted military personnel.19 20 This is supported by foremost British historian Trevor-Roper who argues that the Memorandum revealed Hitler’s "neurotic and compulsive" desire for expansion and his willingness to use military force to achieve his objectives, demonstrating a blatant disregard for diplomacy and commitment to an aggressive timeframe.21 The Memorandum also provides valuable insight into the power-dynamic and hierarchical structures within the Nazi regime.22 Furthermore, offering a unique opportunity to gather insight into the hierarchy within Hitler’s circle. The meeting was called at his request and as per usual, and he dominated the discussion, dismissing any concerns voiced by his peers. The Memorandum shows that Hitler's ideas were “accepted” by his top officials and that he had the power and influence to override any objections or concerns raised by others. For instance, when General von Fritsch expressed concerns about the military's ability to fight a war on two fronts, Hitler dismissed his objections immediately and insisted that the military would be able to handle it. Evans agrees, writing that the Memorandum offers a “fascinating glimpse” into the dynamics of Nazi leadership and therefore demonstrates the Memorandum’s role in providing a clear insight into the hierarchical structures in Hitler’s close circle.23
However, there are serious flaws in this argument. The Hossbach “conference” was never even meant to discuss foreign expansion, in fact, it was technically chaired by Schacht in the hopes of discussing the Nazi economy. However, Hitler hijacked the meeting, perhaps as a way to test his entourage’s loyalty to the cause, in which case the Memorandum would have had internal repercussions rather than external implications.24 In this case, there is no way that it could be considered a “blueprint” as it was merely Hitler ranting and blowing off steam. If anything the Memorandum’s value stands in demonstrating Hitler’s “fluid” and “opportunistic thinking”, not the mastermind who plans every move. Furthermore, even Shirer describes the Memorandum as “general” as opposed to a detailed account, writing that it was “brief in explanation” and “lacked specificity”, which directly contradicts the very definition of a “blueprint”.25 While Hitler did express his ultimate aim of Nazi expansion, it would be a serious oversight to ignore the fact that previous to November 1937, Hitler had already spoken numerous times about his plans to expand German territory. In a speech to the Reichstag in January 1937, Hitler stated, "Germany's future is bound up with its territorial expansion. We have become a great people, and we need more living space. We will take what is ours, and we will not be stopped."26 clearly demonstrating that Hitler had already begun formulating plans for territorial expansion before the meeting ever began. In addition, many German generals who were present have suggested that the document was not intended as a “blueprint” for expansion, but rather as a loose summary of the discussion that took place.27 Army Chief Fritsch claimed that the document was not intended to be a directive, but rather a summary of Hitler's thoughts on the issue and that not only had Hitler made speeches in the years preceding the Memorandum, but had confided his longing for German Lebensraum to his military cabinet since his early time as chancellor. 28 In fact, Hitler mentions his intentions of creating “Lebensraum” for the people of Germany as far back as 1936 during his election campaign. Furthermore, by September 1937, Hitler had held a secret meeting with his top military and political advisers, at which he outlined his plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Austria. This meeting took place several months before the Hossbach Memorandum was written, and according to Overy, it indicates that Hitler's intentions were already clear. 29 30 Finally, with absolutely no mention of threats from the USSR which would have been impending prior to his invasion of Poland, Hitler's alleged "plans" in the Memorandum were ultimately vague and nowhere near the necessary level of detail to be deemed a "blueprint".
In conclusion, while yes, the Hossbach Memorandum provided an account of Hitler’s plans, they were not new ideas, not detailed and they presented no new information that had not previously been stated publicly and privately. Having been a relatively impromptu meeting, with little focus and debate, the overall importance is questionable. One could argue that the Memorandum’s role in the Nuremberg trials highly influenced the perception of its importance and over-exaggerated its role in understanding Hitler and his foreign policy. Ultimately, although it is by no means entirely unimportant, the Hossbach Memorandum’s value has been exaggerated by time, through media and through history itself.
Section C: Reflection
Immediately, I became acutely aware of how media and entertainment can impact our understanding of history, for example how Hollywood has sensationalised so many events and either dramatised or underplayed their importance. The Netflix film “Munich - The Edge of War” was one of my first exposures to the Hossbach Memorandum, and I found myself being swayed in my investigation by opinions perpetuated through aggrandised storytelling based on “truth”. This forced me to determine how I could implement media to enhance my understanding, without amplifying facts for entertainment value and instead conduct an objective investigation.
“The devil can cite scripture for his own purpose”31 is a quote that best entails my experience when researching many of the arguments pertaining to this investigation. I found that often, historians will use the same passages to prove opposing points of view, especially when a document is as debated as this one, which is entirely contradictory. As a result, I was forced to think for myself and make up my own mind about certain passages which I found cited for two antithetical arguments. Additionally, I made sure to consult a range of different sources and evaluate each one carefully for its reliability and potential biases, paying close attention to the context in which each source was produced, considering how this might have influenced its interpretation of a certain passage.
One issue I had with this investigation, was the level of organisation necessary by historians to access specific archives and sources. As someone who struggles with organisation, I found that the archives nearby in Dachau required a complex application and many weeks to approve any inquiries. This begs the question of who is able to view these documents if the application process is so unapproachable for the average citizen. Furthermore, in a country such as Germany which prides itself on freedom of information, is it ethical to create so many challenges in the pursuit of knowledge?
Finally, I often found myself getting lost in “knowledge bubbles”. Many historians write books arguing the same points of view and reference each other, which creates an infinite information loop. One may believe he is educating himself when in reality he is re-reading the same information written in different words over again. To combat this, I found sources from other countries and in other languages, which allowed me to gain not only a variety of information but other perspectives as well. All of which contribute to a more well-rounded investigation.
Endnotes
2 Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. p.435-438
3 Robert Gellately, "Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany" (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 28.
5 Shirer, William L. "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany." New Y ork: Simon and Schuster, 1960.
Preface to the First Edition, p. vii.
6 Evans, Richard J. "In Defence of History." W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 151-152
7 Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New Y ork: HarperPerennial, 1991. p.222
9 Taylor, Telford. "The Nuremberg Trials: International law in the making." The American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 1-32.
10 Hossbach, Colonel Friedrich. "Minutes of a Meeting between Hitler and Military Commanders " Memorandum. German Historical Museum, Berlin .5 November 1937.
12 Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. Penguin Press, 2009. P . 227
13 ibid.
14 Ildebrand, Klaus. “The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich.”, University of California Press p. 42.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
20 Trevor-Roper, Hugh "A. J. P . Taylor, Hitler and the War", Encounter, V olume 17, July 1961.
21 Trevor-Roper, Hugh “Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945”. Pantheon Books, 1966. p. 5-10.
22 ibid.
23 ibid. p. 39.
24 ibid. p.11
26 Adolf Hitler, “Reichstag speech”, delivered on January 30, 1939
27 ibid.
28 Williamson, Murray. "Werner Freiherr von Fritsch. Der tragische General." In: Ronald Selser, Enrico Syring (Hrsg.): Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches, Frankfurt am Main: 1997. p. 155.
30 Taylor, A. J. P . The Origins of the Second World War, Simon and Schuester., 1996. P . 230
