This student's Historical Investigation received the highest grade:
Research question: To what extent did Erwin Rommel support the 20 July 1944 plot to kill Adolf Hitler?
Word count: 2,199
Section 1: Identification and evaluation of sources
Righteous resistance fighter, or self-serving Nazi puppet? The mystery surrounding WWII German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel continues to be a source of debate among historians and the public alike.1 This raises the question: To what extent did Erwin Rommel
support the 20 July 1944 plot to kill Adolf Hitler? This will be investigated using two sources offering opposing perspectives.
Source A: The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel, a US film directed by Henry Hathaway and released in 1951 by 20th Century Fox
Hathaway's film ought to be examined due to its foundational role in popularizing the 'traditional' view that Rommel, played here by well-known English actor James Mason,2 was a brilliant yet principled commander who eventually strongly supported the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler. The film originates from the firsthand accounts of British Army officer Desmond Young, which affords the film the value of being able to draw from contemporary personal experience. The film's content is valuable because, despite its title, it mostly focuses on Rommel's relationship to the 20 July plot, which pertains to this investigation. Nonetheless, the origin as a feature film from 1951 entails limitations: The dramatisation of events makes the film a secondary source that likely prioritises entertainment over historical accuracy, and the availability of historical evidence was comparatively limited only six years after the end of WWII. This also means that certain events relevant to Rommel's relationship to the 20 July plot may not be depicted, constituting a limitation of the film's content. Described by one film critic as not "hold[ing] back in portraying Rommel as a hero",4 the film's objectivity is limited by its politically motivated purpose, as the film was part of the Western Allies' efforts to whitewash the Wehrmacht in order to promote reconciliation between WWII enemies and, thus, justify West Germany's rearmament in 1955.5 This may cause a biased misrepresentation exaggerating Rommel's support of the 20 July plot aiming to present audiences with a supposedly 'good German' they could sympathize with.
Source B: Rommel: Das Ende einer Legende, a book published in 2004 by German journalist and historian Ralf Georg Reuth under the Piper Verlag publishing company in Munich
Reuth's book, a secondary source, ought to be examined due to its comprehensive re-evaluation of Rommel,6 presenting the revisionist view that he was a self-serving Nazi puppet who neither supported nor knew of the 20 July plot.7 The book's relatively recent origin gives it the value of having hindsight as well as access to a wide range of historical evidence, allowing for a more informed analysis of Rommel's relationship to the 20 July plot. Given its subtitle, The End of a Legend, the purpose of the book is to explicitly refute the Rommel 'legend', which entails the value of providing a more critical approach that questions the biased mythologization of Rommel. Over a quarter of the book's content focuses solely on analysing Rommel's relationship to the 20 July plot, offering valuable depth to this investigation. Conversely, Reuth's origin as a journalist may constitute a limitation, as a journalistic prioritization of persuasion may lead to an oversimplified, one-sided argument. Indeed, another German historian highlights that the book is not meant for experts, but rather a wider audience.8 The book's purpose of dispelling the 'Rommel myth' could also limit its reliability by causing an overemphasis on evidence that confirms Reuth's argument in an effort to attract controversy and attention, especially considering the book's contrarian stance and its content's limiting tendency to rely on circumstantial evidence.
Section 2: Investigation
Respected by subordinates and adversaries alike, Rommel apparently epitomised a 'noble' Wehrmacht through his chivalrous, apolitical leadership of the supposedly 'clean' German campaign in North Africa from 1941 to 1943,9 with British soldier and historian Liddell Hart drawing parallels between Rommel and Lawrence of Arabia.10 Rommel's image was further glorified by the traditional view that he supported the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, which failed on 20 July 1944, resulting in Rommel's forced suicide on Hitler's orders on 14 October 1944.11 However, the 21st-century revisionist evaluation asserts that Rommel opposed the assassination of Hitler and was unaware of the 20 July plot.12 The true degree of Rommel's support for the plot is difficult for a historian to ascertain, especially considering that there is little official documentation available and the fact that an injury put Rommel in a coma three days before 20 July. 13 This investigation examines the contrasting views of Rommel to argue that, while he supported the 20 July conspirators' goal of ending the war, Rommel is unlikely to have supported the assassination of Hitler.
In 1951, the US film The Desert Fox brought Rommel into the public spotlight, promoting the traditional view that the inherently righteous Rommel, as ostensibly seen in North Africa, came to support the 20 July plot due to his opposition to Hitler, desire to end WWII, and failure to convince Hitler to make peace. Played by Mason as a morally conflicted man torn between duty and conscience, Rommel became fundamentally opposed to Hitler throughout the war. In November 1942,14 Hitler gave orders that Rommel considered suicidal and the deciding factor leading to the German defeat in North Africa.15 Then, while assigned to Normandy, Rommel became increasingly concerned about Hitler's refusal to end the now-unwinnable war.
Having heard about the conspiracy against Hitler through his friend Strölin, mayor of Stuttgart,16 Rommel urged Field Marshal Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief in the West, to join him in helping the planned post-Hitler government negotiate peace with the Allies.17 However, Rommel only wanted Hitler arrested, not assassinated.18 Rommel came into direct contact with the 20 July plot in early 1944, when Lieutenant Colonel Hofacker informed Rommel of the assassination plan and requested his approval.19 Hofacker had been sent to liaise between Rommel and the conspirators' leader in France, General Stülpnagel,20 as the support of the influential Rommel was considered crucial to the success of the planned regime change.21 Still wary of assassinating his head of state, Rommel met with the Führer on 17 June 1944,22 and after witnessing Hitler's insistence on fighting until the end,23 Rommel became "definitely committed to the plot to assassinate his Führer".24 Despite its political aims,25 The Desert Fox's depiction of events is logical and supported by firsthand accounts,26 presenting Rommel as a conflicted figure who
initially supported arresting the Führer due to his opposition to Hitler and desire to end WWII, and then came to support the assassination plan after failing to convince Hitler to make peace.
While the traditional view that Rommel wanted Hitler assassinated remains widespread, with streets still bearing his name,27 Reuth's revisionist evaluation not only refutes The Desert Fox's portrayal of Rommel as having supported the 20 July plot, but also brands him as a naïve, hubristic Nazi collaborator. Citing Rommel's non-aristocratic background, Reuth argues that, far from opposing Hitler as seen in The Desert Fox, Rommel praised and benefited from the Führer and was disliked by the mostly aristocratic 20 July conspirators.28 For instance, Colonel-General Halder, who was involved in early conspiracies against Hitler, wrote in his diary that "Rommel's deranged ambition [...] made him an unpleasant figure with which, however, nobody wanted to be in conflict with due to his [...] friends in high places", likely referring to Hitler. 29 Indeed, Rommel led the Führer's security detail during the invasion of Poland,30 soon becoming one of Hitler's favourite commanders and exploiting his good standing to receive promotions ahead of more senior officers.31 Thus, Rommel, whom many considered a Parteigeneral ('Nazi Party general'),32 would have little to gain from supporting the assassination of the man who was significantly accelerating his military career. Moreover, although agreeing with The Desert Fox that Rommel sought to end the war, Reuth contends that Rommel never saw killing Hitler as an option to achieve peace. After his meeting with the Führer on 17 June 1944, Rommel wrote another letter to Hitler on 15 July, and even after the 20 July assassination attempt, Rommel met with Hitler, both times urging him to end the war. 33 This suggests that Rommel, rather naïvely, continued to believe he could reason with the Führer, contradicting Rommel's shift in perspective after the 17 June meeting seen in The Desert Fox. Finally, Reuth rejects that Rommel even knew about the 20 July assassination plan. After Rommel heard about the attempt on Hitler's life, he told his ordnance officer, Lang, that he "now knew what Hofacker was talking about".34 In fact, Hofacker never reported receiving any indication from Rommel that he wanted Hitler assassinated.35 This discredits The Desert Fox's implication that Rommel came to explicitly support the assassination plan revealed to him by Hofacker, encapsulating Reuth's argument that Rommel's alleged involvement in the 20 July plot was a mere misunderstanding.
Nevertheless, the condemnation of Rommel is tempered by evidence not considered by Reuth, such as secretly recorded conversations between German officers in British captivity at Trent Park, England. General Eberbach was recorded saying that, in a conversation with Rommel on 17 July 1944, three days before the attempt on Hitler's life, Rommel had said that the Führer had to be "umgelegt", which can mean "transferred" or "reallocated", but is usually a euphemism for "killed".36 Eberbach was also recorded saying to his son that Rommel had told him that the assassination of Hitler was the only way out of the war for Germany.
37 Eberbach's accounts, which are echoed in a diary entry written on 30 January 1945 by General Thoma,38 would imply that Rommel eventually wanted Hitler assassinated rather than arrested. In any case, Rommel never reported the conspiracy revealed to him by Strölin and later Hofacker, and various 20 July conspirators went on to testify that Rommel had promised to assist peacemaking efforts in the event of Hitler's government being overthrown.39 Altogether, it is clear that, at the very least, Rommel supported the 20 July conspiracy insofar as its plans to end the war were concerned, partially corroborating The Desert Fox and certainly weakening Reuth's view of Rommel as naïvely oblivious to the conspiracy against Hitler.
Ultimately, Reuth's revisionist evaluation relies on questionable inferences, such as that the tension between Rommel and aristocratic officers meant they would never cooperate, that Rommel's desperate attempts to convince Hitler to end the war are incompatible with Rommel supporting the 20 July plot, and that Rommel's potential unawareness of the exact assassination plan proved that he was entirely uninvolved in the plot against Hitler. Rommel was clearly aware of plans to remove Hitler, as evidenced by his communication with Hofacker, and his support for the 20 July conspiracy certainly extended to endorsing plans to at least arrest the Führer in order to make peace with the Allies, as shown by conspirators' testimonies. Notwithstanding, Rommel was peripheral to the conspiracy at best and lay in a coma when the attempt on Hitler's life was carried out, meaning that he was likely unaware of the conspirators' exact plans for 20 July.
Additionally, the view that Rommel nonetheless supported the assassination of Hitler is only corroborated by hearsay in the form of unverifiable anecdotes from imprisoned Wehrmacht officers at Trent Park. Thus, one cannot safely conclude that Rommel supported the 20 July plot's aim of killing Hitler.
Section 3: Reflection
As a German living in Munich, a city tainted by the rise of Nazism, critically examining Rommel's role in the 20 July plot required me to confront a period of my country's history whose remnants are visible to me every day. For many Germans, particularly those with family
members who served in the Wehrmacht, Rommel holds deep emotional resonance, as the 'clean Wehrmacht' he supposedly exemplified provides a more palatable representation of Germany's past. As a result, my investigation entailed the unique challenge of having to consider the collective bias of an entire generation, and perhaps even unconscious personal biases.
Nevertheless, the emotional aspect of the topic of my investigation underscored the way in which the re-evaluation of Rommel is representative of changes in German society, as the increasingly revisionist perception of Rommel epitomises Germany's move towards a more nuanced sense of national identity and a greater awareness of its historical responsibility.
Another difficulty of historical methodology highlighted by my investigation was the uncertainty incurred by the use of sources in different languages. For instance, when examining the Trent Park recordings, the exact meaning of umgelegt, a somewhat ambiguous German word, would indicate whether Rommel wanted Hitler removed from power or assassinated.40 The significant implications of the semantics of a single word demonstrate how even the seemingly trivial act of translating a source can introduce a hidden layer of subjectivity.
Furthermore, my research process revealed the double-edged nature of certain source formats. While The Desert Fox's film format allowed for a valuable exploration of Rommel's character, it is important to consider how artworks, such as films, skew our judgement through emotion when used as historical sources, thereby necessitating special attention to underlying biases when using art in historical analysis. I was retrospectively surprised by Reuth's revisionist book's failure to address the many counterarguments to its condemnation of Rommel, suggesting that even respected academic works can be plagued by confirmation bias and, thus, dangerously misleading when not evaluated against other sources. Nonetheless, with almost no official documentation on Rommel's relationship to the 20 July plot surviving, both the traditional and the revisionist view rely on potentially unreliable evidence including hearsay, diaries, and informal conversations. This exemplifies how historians are often left to fill in the gaps of history, making the conclusions drawn merely the most reasonable judgement of the often limited evidence available, rather than a decisive verdict.
Works cited
Butler, Daniel Allen. Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Havertown, PA:
Casemate, 2015.
Caddick-Adams, Peter. Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New Y ork, NY: The Overlook Press,
2012.
Erwin Rommel. Photograph. Encyclopædia Britannica. 1941.
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Erwin-Rommel#/media/1/508989/30972.
Hathaway, Henry, dir. The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel. 1951. Los Angeles, CA: 20th
Century Fox.
Hoffman, Karl. Erwin Rommel. London: Brassey's, 2004.
Lieb, Peter. “Rommel in Normandy.” In Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 2014.
Major, Patrick. “‘Our Friend Rommel’: The Wehrmacht as ‘Worthy Enemy’ in Postwar British
Popular Culture.” German History 26, no. 4 (2008): 520 to 535.
Neitzel, Sönke. “Rommel – Das Ende einer Legende.” DAMALS.de. December 27, 2004.
https://www.wissenschaft.de/rezensionen/buecher/rommel-das-ende-einer-legende/.
Neitzel, Sönke. Tapping Hitler's Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942–45. N.p.:
Frontline, 2007.
Remy, Maurice Philip. Mythos Rommel. Munich: List Verlag, 2002.
12Reuth, Ralf Georg. Rommel: Das Ende einer Legende. Munich: Piper V erlag, 2004.
Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. London: Harcourt Brace,
1953.
Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New Y ork,
NY: Simon & Schuster, 1960.
von Tunzelmann, Alex. “The Desert Fox: does it capture the real Rommel?” The Guardian.
October 6, 2011.
https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2011/oct/06/the-desert-fox-rommel.
Wendt, Georg. “Erwin Rommel und die Demokraten.” Stadt Aalen. N.d.
https://www.aalen.de/erwin-rommel-und-die-demokraten.151621.25.htm.
Young, Desmond. Rommel: The Desert Fox. London: William Collins, Sons, 1950.
HL History Internal Assessment
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How enthusiastic was Erwin Rommel about “Operation Walküre” in July 1944?
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Examination Session: May 2014
Word Count: 1996
Section A – Plan of Investigation
In October 1944, General Rommel was charged with supposed involvement in the Stauffenberg coup and given a choice: to be found guilty and executed through trial, or to take his own life; Rommel chose the latter.[1] But How Far did Rommel Support the Plot? To determine this, three aspects will be examined: an examination of the possible military involvement Rommel may have provided, his attitude towards the idea of assassinating Hitler, and the motives of his possible involvement or rejection of the Stauffenberg’s plans. A variety of sources will be examined. As a German, I have access to German-language articles, such as “Der Spiegel” to determine the latest controversy, as well as a British biography of Rommel, which includes interviews with Rommel’s son, and a variety of other accounts from letters to recordings of conversations from the time.
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Section B – Summary of Evidence
Political and Public Standing
Rommel, regarded as Hitler’s “favourite General,”[2] enjoyed great popularity within the National-Socialist government and the German people. [3] Göbbels used him for propaganda purposes, re-writing his life story as an early member of this Nazi party.[4]In fact, considered politically unengaged, Rommel never joined the NSDAP, focussing solely on the military. He refused to allow his son Manfred to join the Waffen-SS, referring to rumours of mass-shootings and murders committed by the SS in the East. Rommel’s primary concern was to maintain or implement the honour, safety and success of his troops.[5]
Clashes with Hitler
In 1942, Rommel had defied Hitler’s orders concerning the battle of El Alamein of the Western Desert Campaign during the Second World War, in which his tank division fought against British General Montgomery’s troops, concerned that Hitler’s orders would worsen the situation for his troops in Egypt[6].By 1944, Rommel was actively engaged against Hitler concerning the battle proceedings at the Western front.[7] In the same year, Rommel was made responsible for the prevention of the landing of allied forces as well as the Army Group B on the Western Front.[8] After D-Day Germany’s military situation changed drastically. Rommel desired peace negotiations with the enemy to end the war, and considered opening the front to let enemy forces trigger the overthrow of Hitler’s regime.[9] Speaking with Karl Strölin, mayor of Stuttgart at the time, Rommel declared he had to act in support of a “German rescue”.[10] This clashed severely with Hitler’s orders.[11]
Operation Walküre
Rommel was introduced to the plans of Operation Walküre and the following coup which aimed to bring about revolution[12] and hopefully end the war through negotiations with the enemy,[13] presenting an alternative to war for Rommel.[14] During Colonel Lattman’s visit to Rommel in hospital, Rommel stated that war had to be ended under whatever circumstances,[15] leading Rommel to agree to meetings and talks with Stauffenberg’s men,[16] who required a popular face to represent the coup.[17] During a meeting with conspirator Caesar von Hofacker, Rommel stated that “Germany had made enough sacrifices” agreeing to collaborate with the plan and give support, according to the men Hofacker conversed with after the meeting.[18] Finally, the Eberbach Protocol supposedly records Rommel’s clear desire for the assassination of the Führer, reporting him as having said “there is no other opportunity for Germany other than to kill the Führer and his clanship as quickly as possible.”[19]According to his son, Rommel was always strictly against an assassination[20], but supportive of a coup.[21] After the assassination failed, Rommel wrote to his wife expressing his shock at hearing about the attempt.[22] Rommel preferred the idea of putting Hitler on trial[23] as the General remained loyal to the dictator, owing him the success of his career.[24]
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Section C – Evaluation of Sources
Rommel – David Fraser, 1993, Original: Knight’s Cross: A life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel
Fraser, a British Army Officer who had served between 1940 and 1980 intended to investigate Rommel, with focus on his standpoint to Hitler. He aimed to determine to what extent he was a national-socialist and to what extent he was involved with the resistance against Hitler. The majority of the credentials are interrogations from during and after Hitler’s regime, testimonies as well as witness reports from several accused Generals and of those who knew Rommel and worked with him. Fraser also used interviews and explanations from Manfred Rommel, Rommel’s son, adding to the analysis. Peter Badastelli, describes Fraser’s work as "outstanding", tackling the myths through primary sources and accounts of those at the time.[25]
However, Fraser leaves the portrait of Rommel somewhat incomplete, by dedicating many chapters to general history of the time (although this is helpful in providing context). Fraser also does not write objectively, describing statements by Rommel to suggest active engagement in the resistance as weak or not giving similar attention to statements that imply otherwise. Most of his evidence relies only on the memories of people involved as well as second-hand translations from the original German which could affect nuance.
Section D – Analysis
The initial sources of conflict in answering this investigation lie in Goebbels's use of Rommel to create the perfect example of a Nazi-General, describing him in his diary as an “almost mythical figure.”[27] This makes it difficult to analyse Rommel, given his persona was increasingly manipulated for public purposes. As Fraser relies on opinions from the time, the article from Der Spiegel becomes all the more important, as it recognises this limitation and attempts to overcome it.
The plan itself had two intentions, a coup, and an assassination. The idea that Rommel saw the coup as his chance to end the war (which had been his intention since D-Day) is strongly debated [28]. The “Der Spiegel” article concludes that he was faithful to Hitler’s regime,[29] however concur that Rommel was never a member of the NSDAP, and therefore both the article and Fraser make it clear that Rommel never was and is still not seen as a real Nazi. His defiance of Hitler’s orders during the battle of El Alamein in 1942, and similar rejection of Hitler’s plans in 1944 on the Western Front could work with this to suggest his attitude towards the plans were positive.
Primarily, the conspirators saw the perfect face of the coup in Rommel, suggesting they tried to persuade him extensively. Several talks between the conspirators and Rommel took place,[30] in one of which he told Colonel Lattmann that the war had to be ended, under whatever circumstances.[31] Whether with “circumstances” Rommel simply meant a coup or the assassination is not clear, yet the word “whatever” implies that Rommel was capable of going to extreme lengths to end WWII. There had also been meetings in May, earlier that year between several resistors, in which Rommel agreed to collaborate, as “Germany had made enough sacrifices.”[32] Another meeting with conspirator Ceasar von Hofacker was held on the 9th of July[33]. According to the men Hofacker spoke to after the meeting, he informed Rommel about Stauffenberg’s assassination plans, the plans for the coup and revolution in Berlin. These men later stated that Rommel replied that the “war was lost anyway”, and gave his support.[34] This evidence, however, can be considered weak, as the content of the meeting between Hofacker and Rommel was never officially divulged by either participant. However, as this evidence was provided after 1945, fear of speaking out in support of Rommel should have been eradicated, lending slightly more weight to these allegations.
For Rommel therefore, the Operation meant the end of the war and the possibility to save the last of German honour. This did not mean, according to Lieutenant Speidel, assassination of Hitler.[35] Clearly, Rommel experienced a clash between the two significant components of Stauffenberg’s operation. Most evidence presented in the sources agree Rommel was not anti-Hitler and did not support assassination. On July 21 Rommel was first informed about the attempted assassination by his adjutant Hellmuth Lang, who later described Rommel's clear shocked;[36] indeed, in a July 24 letter to his wife he declared “thank God that the assassination attempt failed”.[37] Although Fraser argues that Rommel had no choice but to speak out against the assassination in a letter that could be screened, Rommel appeared to prefer the idea of a trial for Hitler.[38]. Manfred Rommel has always maintained that his father had been strictly against an assassination[39] although whether his view on his father is objective is arguable as at the time of his father’s death he was only a teenager.
Further evidence for the General’s belief in the man to whom he owed his career were seen in his final days, where Rommel told the men in charge of his forced suicide that he “loved the Führer and still does”.[40] Whether it was an act of helpless self-defence, or to ensure the protection of his family, the truth cannot be known - but when Rommel was accused of holding back his tank division to support the coup, those who knew him, including Lieutenant Speidel, gave passionate testimonies in Rommel’s defence, stating these claims were incorrect.[41] This suggests that Rommel’s final testimony to his love of Hitler was not unsubstantiated, and he knew that there would be support to back up these words.
The only evidence that outright declares Rommel’s support of an assassination is referenced in Der Spiegel, discovered in 2005; the “Eberbach Protocol.” This record of his desire for an assassination of Hitler is based solely on what a British General overheard whilst listening in on a German officer in the autumn of 1944. [42] Although the Spiegel writes in hindsight, with access to evidence Fraser was not privy to, the tone of this statement and clear antipathy towards Rommel’s “beloved” Hitler are not in accordance with the General’s normal manner. Therefore it is not in line with the rest of the evidence provided by the bulk of sources.
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Section E – Conclusion
Rommel was clearly unhappy with Germany’s situation by 1944, especially after D-Day, and sought an end to the war. Appearing unwilling to participate in talks with resistors, one could say that he saw “Operation Walküre” as the opportunity to realize this. Clearly, one must determine his enthusiasm for such a plot by considering differentiate between its two components: the coup and the assassination. There is no clear evidence that suggests Rommel was strictly against a coup; several sources state that he saw it as a way to end war. The only evidence that suggests he supported an assassination is the “Eberbach Protocol”, which contradicts other pieces of evidence which otherwise agree that Rommel had always spoken out against an assassination. One can come to the conclusion that Rommel was enthusiastic about “Operation Walküre” in terms of the coup it would result in, and the positive consequences this would have on the army but less so about assassinating Hitler, and almost always made this point clear.
