To what extent was the Munich Agreement a mistake in terms of preparation for war for Great Britain?
Word Count: 2197
(outrageously, the IBDP only gave this IA 11/25 when I found as an examiner that year far inferior IAs consisting of a half dozen 'sources' and limited ability scored much higher.)
Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
To evaluate: ‘To what extent was the Munich Agreement a mistake in terms of preparation for war for Great Britain?’ this investigation focuses on the nature of why the decision was made and whether it can be justified as a solution to prepare Britain for war. Written well after the event, the two major sources are books; one arguing that the Agreement was a mistake (A), and the other discloses the Agreement as necessary (B). Writing roughly around the same time, these sources are central to any reappraisal of Appeasement as they offer contrasting justifications and illustrate the change of perspective on history.
Source A: The War of the World by Niall Ferguson, 2006 (New York). Ferguson is a Scottish-American Historian and a Harvard history professor affiliated to Oxford and Stanford1.
Written 68 years after the Munich Agreement, this book allows valuable hindsight; suggesting options for how Britain could have better prepared through “acquiescence, retaliation, deterrence or pre-emption”2 by judging their outcomes retrospectively. Although successful as historian, Ferguson has been criticized for being controversial3. Ferguson, a Harvard history professor, had access to both Britain’s military and RAF archives released in 19924 and Germany’s military archives opened in 19965, enabling the comparison of resources, which has been praised for its use of statistics6; valuably permitting this investigation to evaluate war preparations. For instance, novel information about Germany’s aircraft designs, were compared to Britain’s7, allowing this study to evaluate which of the two were better advanced.
However, such focus on quantitative facts often obscures social evaluations; it remains questionable that public opinion would have tolerated war in 1938 as suggested by Ferguson as the better option before arms built-up preparing for war. Although his purpose is more broadly to analyse the military-industrial slaughter of the 20th century8 of which the Munich Agreement was only as factor, Ferguson devotes considerable attention on why the Agreement was a mistake, because it forms part of his thesis: suggesting this event was part of a long term pattern building 20th century foreign policy; posing as a limitation as he uses selective points to support this argument. Ferguson’s arguments underline how pivotal the Agreement was: for Ferguson, a milestone without which the war might have been avoided.
Source B: Appeasement by Tim Bouverie, 2019 (New York). Bouverie is a British Historian and former political journalist.
The most recent book on the Agreement, adds contemporary perspectives to explore the chronological path of events and historical views9, establishing the contemporaneous struggles sculpting Britain’s policy. Centering on narrative history10 makes the book lucid and organized at the cost of details needed to compare to Ferguson’s claims and to quantitatively compare the preparations of Britain and Germany. Furthermore, Bouverie’s focus on the British perspective renders it impossible to conclude whether Britain or Germany was better prepared. Unlike Ferguson, Bouverie focuses on morality and social aspects revealing how without public support, raising taxes would have been impossible. Nevertheless, Bouverie does not focus on military preparations, therefore, omitting statistics11. In arguing for the Munich Agreement, Bouverie ignores perspectives including how the labour and liberal parties were seen as causing the war12. Nevertheless, Bouverie employs “an impressive range of sources and characters”13, valuably detailing, British public opinion on the Agreement through personal letters, and political statements from members of the government, revealing their rationalisations for the Agreement to have bought Britain time to better prepare for war.
Section B: Investigation
Inquiring whether Britain and France were foolish in signing the Munich Agreement continues to be controversial due to war only being adverted by sacrificing Czechoslovakia to the “wolves”14. Written only a generation after the war, A.J.P. Taylor controversially supported the Agreement, claiming it was a “triumph”15 for British policy.
Ferguson today disagrees, arguing it prevented an alliance with the USSR which would have built a better “united”16 front against their enemy. To re-examine this debate, this investigation analyses the extent to which the Munich Agreement helped Britain to prepare for war, by examining the effects economically, and militarily. This investigation will explore Ferguson’s argument positing the Agreement failed to prepare Britain, and Bouverie’s disclosing the Agreement as necessary, to show how, in terms of military and economic preparations, the Agreement laid the foundations for successful defences of Britain.
Bouverie begins his main argument describing that the Agreement helped Britain restore its economy17. After the Great Depression channelled national budgets away from military spending18, and the British government decided on a conciliatory position towards Germany19, the Agreement rectified this by increasing Britain’s defence expenditure by 20.4% from 1938 to 1939; therefore 18.3% greater than the increase between 1937 and 193820. Munich allowed “Government bonds [to rise] by £250 million” which were used to finance military operations21, crucially indicating public support for Britain to prepare for war; of all government spending in 1939 15.45%22 were devoted to defence, which Bouverie avers to have been crucial for Britain’s financial arrangements for war. In this, Bouverie’s idea was not new; economist Keynes during the war argued Britain’s inflation and balance of payment problems could have been solved by strictly controlling the economy with more severe taxation of consumptions23. This would have allowed Britain to pay for further necessary resources during war preparations; Keynes writing during the Blitzkrieg -experiencing the severity of Britain’s inflations before Munich - agreed that the Agreement provided an essential economic preparatory period. Given that Britain’s total dept amounted to 141% of its total annual GDP in 193924 , Ferguson refutes Bouverie’s claims stating that any extra money spent on bonds was directed at paying this national debt25. Thus, revealing the Agreement might have allowed Britain to increase defence expenditure, yet, its massive national debt strained economical preparations for war.
Bouverie argues the Agreement was necessary to gain a year for preparations, stating, “there was a serious shortage of gas masks, not to mention air defenses”26; in fact by September 1939 only 38 million gas masks27 were available, preventing the government from protecting the remaining 18% of their people in a gas attack. Bouverie stresses Britain predicted a gas attack from Hitler after Mussolini’s gas attack on Ethiopia28. Ferguson disagrees – it gave Britain time to prepare yet allowed Germany to thrust forward, producing “twenty-three million tonnes of steel a year”, compared to Britain’s mere “sixteen million”29. Thus, according to Ferguson the Agreement was more beneficial to Germany. That said, Bouverie argues that without such time, Britain would not have been able to endure a long war without sufficient resources30. This is supported by Britain’s superiority in preparing military medical services; increasing its penicillin supplies during 1939, allowed it to triple that of Germany’s, resulting in more men able to quickly return to combat by preventing sepsis31. Furthermore, Britain increased the number of military medical doctors in 1939 by 42%, helping ensure casualties could receive treatment within hours of wounding, whereas in many German army groups treatment could be prolonged for days due to less medical staff, effecting soldier numbers32. Therefore, in terms of developing sufficient resources for war the Agreement was necessary to a great extent.
Above all, Churchill credited Britain’s survival after the Battle of Britain to the “few”33, alluding to the R.A.F pilots, which is why Bouverie insisted the Agreement was crucial in gaining the time needed for making the ‘few’ fit for defense34. After the Agreement, Britain began saving economically to invest in aircraft production35 allowing the production of aircrafts to rise from 7,940 just after the Agreement to 15,049 at the end of 193936. Britain used the time bought through the Munich Agreement to increase aircraft production by 90% while Germany fell behind 3-fold increasing only 31%37. Thus, such superiority was crucial for Britain as the German planes were, on average, 15 to 20 mph faster than Britain’s fastest Hurricanes and Spitfires38; the greater numbers compensated for slower speeds, which was especially necessary for Britain in preventing the German invasion by the Battle of Britain39 . While Britain controlled the superior numbers, she was more worried about how RAF estimates reported a five-fold increase in the number of bombs the Luftwaffe could drop every day over England40, which Ferguson indicates could have been diminished had Britain gone to war in 1938 without the Munich Agreement. Questioning this perspective, a 1980 American defence report revealed that the Germans strategically deceived Britain in their estimates; German bombers dropped less than half the estimated explosives and lacked precision41. In addition, during this time the RAF developed the Dowding system raising the average interception per flight mission from 30% to 75% chance42; allowing for "force multiplication" – RAF fighters were as effective as two or more Luftwaffe fighters, greatly overturning, the initial disparity in the 1939 numbers43 which were relevant to explain the RAF disadvantage in the first phase of the battle over Britain. In combination, Britain had more planes which were more effective than those of the enemy. On the other hand, Ferguson asserts that the later the war, the stronger the Germans, illustrating the Agreement as counterproductive44. While Britain increased the number of all trained pilots to 6,646 by 1939, Germany had trained 1,450 more just between the Munich Agreement and the begin of the war45. Furthermore, Germany brought in Spanish Civil War veterans who already had comprehensive experience in aerial dogfights46, resulting in, Germany having more experienced pilots than Britain, an advantage particularly important for offensive strategies47. Ferguson neglected to mention that Britain was not ready for war in 1938. In fact, about 688 fighter planes with 2000 pilots were estimated minimally necessary to ward off German attacks; fewer than 15% of those existed pre-Munich with 84 planes and 200 pilots48.
This deficiency was communicated along with problems of the Army and Navy by Chief of the Air Staff Cyril Newall to Chamberlain before he flew to Munich49. Without at least a year of concerted efforts on preparing for war, it appeared nearly impossible for Britain to defend herself, yet with an additional year of preparation, defeat became less probable although both powers were able to build up50. Hence, the Munich Agreement was crucial in the ultimate defence of the islands, by preparing Britain for war in terms of the air force.
Overall, while Ferguson and Bouverie have different perspectives, the facts remain that the British forces were not ready in 1938 to cope with an attack from Germany, and that Britain used the time gained by the Agreement to strengthen the RAF, in particular through the investment into modern fighter planes including the Spitfire and Hurricane. This armament contradicted what Churchill demanded before the war, namely an investment into more bombers, yet turned out to have been the most important reason why Britain won the “Battle of Britain”51 and ended up winning the war. In this crucial sense, the Agreement, far from being a mistake, permitted Britain to prepare her military and economy for war.
Section C: Reflection
At his book launch in Munich, my teacher David Heath asked Harris about the Munich Agreement; he reiterated that “the spitfires must have come from somewhere”, suggesting this was Chamberlain’s achievement. This intrigued me when Mr Heath related it to me, because Harris’s sympathetic portrayal of Chamberlain contrasted perspectives explored in this IA, which became the motive driving my investigation. Although a work of fiction, Harris explains historical events such that contemporary public opinion along with Chamberlain’s personal goals became understandable. Through that I realised how public support made the Munich Agreement feasible. Harris commented that historians tend to exclude trivia; yet often, as seen in Harris’s Munich, these allow history to come to life. By studying history, we may see how and why people act and react.
Due to the lockdown, archives, including the Bavarian State Library, are currently closed or restrict access severely limiting my ability to cross-check quantitative facts, and primary research through German letters, notes, and police reports to add the perspective of the German public. Consequently, I removed a section on public opinion omitting details to keep the research more manageable.
Whilst history is taught as an area of knowledge, there are many different facets. Not being proficient in military history, I had difficulties to follow details about types of planes. Similarly, the political journalist Bouverie does not focus on statistics, while Ferguson as an economic historian does. As a result, while both historians had access to a wide scope of international sources, permitting a thorough analysis of perspectives, they argue for very different interpretations. This revealed how our perception of history is not just a question of interpreting facts, but also of the focus. From this perspective, research in history is inevitably biased.
The sheer amount of information found online from treasury and defence reports to the impact of the Agreement on preparing medicine needed for the war became overwhelming; sometimes historians have too much information to evaluate and consider.
Ferguson and Bouverie mainly used primary sources that revealed how the historical figures internalized their experiences. Upon considering which evidence to include, I realised that historians must evaluate information that may lead to selection bias. For instance, in focusing on the necessity of the Munich Agreement, Bouverie ignores perspectives including how the role of labour and liberal parties was seen as causing the war. Similarly, this investigation, limited in length, could only focus on three main themes; other aspects such as diplomacy or society may have supported different conclusions.
Endnotes
2 Ferguson, Niall. “Defending the Indefensible”. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006.319.
3 Higgins, Charlotte. “Rightwing historian Niall Ferguson given school curriculum role.” The Guardian. May 30, 2010. p. C. 20.
4 United Kingdom. National Archives on Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodies. The National Archives. Military Aviation Department in the United Kingdom. Ed. F. 1992.
5 Germany. Das Bundesarchiv. Military Records. Ed. F. Freiburg. 1996.
6 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. “Century of Rubble.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 12 Nov. 2006, p. B. 14.
8 Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006.
9 Bouverie, Tim. “Prologue”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019.
10 Szalai, Jennifer. “In ‘Appeasement,’ How Peace With The Nazis Was Always An Illusion.” The New York Times. Jun 5, 2019. p. C. 7.
11 Roberts, Andrew. “‘Appeasement,’ Review: What Were They Thinking?” The Wall Street Journal. Nov 1, 2019. p. B. 15.
13 Bouverie, Tim. “Blurb”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019.
14 Churchill, Winston. The Gathering Storm. London. Penguin Press, 1948. pp. 273.
15 Taylor, A. J. P. The Origins of the Second World War. New York. Simon & Schuster Inc. 1961.
16 Ferguson, Niall. “Defending the Indefensible”. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006. pp. 313.
17 Bouverie, Tim. “Blurb”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019. pp.327.
Pearson Education Limited, 1998. pp. 60-63.
19 Anievas, Alexander. “The International Political Economy of Appeasement: the Social Sources of
British Foreign Policy during the 1930s.” Review of International Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, 2011, pp. 616.
20 United Kingdom. HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis reports. The National Archives. HM Treasury Department in the United Kingdom. 1990.
21 Bouverie, Tim. “The Crisis Breaks”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019, pp. 264.
22 United Kingdom. HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis reports. The National Archives.
HM Treasury Department in the United Kingdom. 1990.
23 Keynes, John Maynard. How to Pay for the War, Harcourt, 1940.
24 United Kingdom. HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis reports. The National Archives.
HM Treasury Department in the United Kingdom. 1990.
25 Ferguson, Niall. “Defending the Indefensible”. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006. 327.
27 Barrow, Mandy. Britain Since the 1930s. Kent Woodland History Department. 2013.
28 Ibid., pp.270.
29 Ferguson, Niall. “Empire-States”. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 368.
30 Bouverie, Tim. “The Crisis Breaks”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019, pp. 295.
31 Harrison, Mark. Medicine and victory: British military medicine in the Second World War, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 312.
32 Ibid. pp. 275.
33 Churchill, Winston. “Never Was So Much Owed By So Many To So Few”. House of Commons of the United Kingdom. Palace of Westminster, London. 20 Aug, 1940. Speech.
34 Bouverie, Tim. “The Crisis Breaks”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019, pp. 293.
35 Overy, Richard. Wheatcroft, Andrew. “Great Britain”. The Road to War. London. Penguin Press. 1999.
37 Ibid,. pp. 68.
38 Ibid,. pp. 72.
39 McKinstry, Leo. “Did Neville Chamberlain Create the Conditions for the RAF to Win the Battle of Britain?” New Statesman, New Statesman, 24 Apr. 2018. p.30.
40 The British War Blue Book. Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008.
41 Mihalka, Michael. German Strategic Deception in the 1930s. The Rand Corporation. Secretary of Defense Department. Level 12. Jul, 1980.
42 Ibid,. pp. 72.
43 Harrison, Mark. Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany,
1938-1945. University of Warwick, Economic History Review, 1988. pp. 183.
44 Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 328.
46 Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. London: Aurum Press. 2002. pp.259.
47 Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World. New York. Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 334.
48 Reese, Peter. “Chapter 14: Post- Munich”. Transforming the Skies. Brimscombe. History Press. 2018.
49 Harris, Robert. “Chapter 1: Day One”. Munich. London. Hutchinson London. 2018. Print.
50 Bouverie, Tim. “The Crisis Breaks”. Appeasement, Tim Duggan Books, 2019, pp. 295.
51 Ibid.
A couple of internal assessments concerning the question of whether Czechoslovakia should just have fought on after Munich regardless of British advice and French betrayal:
Would Czechoslovakia have succeeded if they would had fought against Hitler’s invasion in 1939?
Word Count: 220
“Would Czechoslovakia have succeeded if they would had fought against Hitler’s invasion in 1939?” furthering an investigation into the extent that Czechoslovakia could have succeeded in defeating the Germans. Evaluating this question, an important factor is the political circumstances of Czechoslovakia’s allies as their lack of support was a deciding factor in the Czech army’s decision, further discussed in Donald Watt’s book. Another insightful source is an interview conducted with the Czech Army General Jan Syrový during 1968 in remembrance of the 30th anniversary of the Munich Agreement in 1938, which gives us a first had insight into the inner circle of the Czech Army during these crucial months.
[1]Source A: “How War Came: The immediate origins of the Second World War 1938-1939” written by Donald Cameron Watt and published in the UK in August 1989
John Keegan reviewed this book as an “unquestionable masterpiece” and “certain to be read for as long as people seek to explain the European tragedy of 1939”. Watt was an accredited British professor and official cabinet Historian known for being able to summarise historical events with great accuracy. The value in being an official cabinet historian was that he had the ability to access a lot of British evidence which many others did not. Seeing as Britain was also involved with the decision of Czechoslovakia’s fate, the access to primary sources holds great value. Watt’s book closely examines the diplomatic atmosphere during the crucial 11 month-period between 1938 and 1939, following the Munich conference in September 1938. Seeing as he has confined his writing to a short period over a couple of months, he develops a very focused analysis of why this time period was decisive in Czechoslovakia’s history and the key events that influenced their decision. Watt approaches this through the eyes of the leaders of the nations involved and uses the information from official records[2], private papers and biographies of those who took part in the process. Through him collecting his information from a variety of sources, he was able to strongly identify the inadequacy of the key players in extraordinary detail. Continuing, by further explaining why Czechoslovakia was left alone without support. Hence why, the purpose of him identifying the wrong doings of others and examine how this created a domino-effect of events is successfully demonstrated through his insightful, original and gripping analysis. Therefore, using this source to establish an account of European diplomacy, specifically the other powers involvement in evaluating the question, would provide a comprehensive and explicit insight into the inner workings and political motifs during this time.
[3]Source B: Interview with Army General Jan Syrový published in October 1968 in “Časopisu Reportér” (Report Magazine)
Army General Jan Syrový was the general inspector of the Czechoslovak Army between December 1933 and September 22nd 1938, after which he was appointed Chairman of the new Czechoslovak Government. The interview was released in the 38th issue of “Report Magazine”[4] in October 1968, dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Munich agreement. In his Interview, he shows the progression the Czech army went through at the time from when they agreed to attempt to fight back until their later grasp on reality. He provides a transparent view into the mind-set of the army during this time and what hindered them from fighting back. The purpose of his interview was to give an in-depth view, exposing personal recounts, of the events leading up to Germany’s occupation in Czechoslovakia. Sharing this through a magazine 30 years after the event is meant to be eye-opening to the public so that they also are able to gain insight into why the army failed to protect their country and what their intentions were. Furthermore, while there is statistical information about the events surrounding Czechoslovakia in 1939, there is a lack of sources that exemplify the emotions of the Czech-Slovak people and army. However, this interview displays not only the morale of the soldiers, but also shows how an army general was treated after Hitler’s takeover, which furthers our understanding of Hitler’s neglect for Czech people, including high ranking officials.
Investigation
Growing up in Czech Republic, the word Munich was often regarded as a sentiment for betrayal towards the Czech people. In 1938, Hitler proclaimed his path to his more ambitious plan of the occupation of Central Europe, which resulted in the four great powers, Britain, France, Italy and Germany meeting in Munich on September 29th. The betrayal came forth through Hitler’s demands being appeased, allowing him to annex areas of Czechoslovakia, sealing their fate. However, when Germany marched into Czechoslovakia, the Czechs held significant military and geographical advantages, hence this investigation into the question as to why they didn’t attempt to fight back and resist Hitler’s army.
A crucial aspect to Czechoslovakia’s decision was Germany’s military and political capabilities and intentions as this played a significant role in preventing the Czechs from fighting back. Hitler claimed his threat of invasion was due to this interest in helping the three million people of German descent living in Czechoslovakia, however the German-born historian Gerhard Weinberg, argues that his intensions rather lay in isolating Czechoslovakia from the outside support[5] and gain more manpower for additional army divisions to allow for an easier seizure of Eastern European territory. Yet, Hitler’s first threat to invade was soon retracted, mainly because of the possibility that the British and French would fight if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia.[6]In June Hitler had told Keitel that he would attack Czechoslovakia only if “I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that France will not march, and that therefore Britain will not intervene”.[7] Ian Kershaw argues, that Hitler regarded Munich as a defeat as he was forced to agree to pull back at the end of September 1938.[8] This meant Hitler would have attempted to redeem himself and therefore find an alternate route to achieve what he wanted. Furthermore, Germany had just forcefully united Austria and Germany through the Anschluss that occurred in 1938 which gave them access to three quarters of the Czech’s long frontier to attack.[9] Austria also offered much needed iron, alongside other raw materials and supplies of labour which would further support their attack on Czechoslovakia.[10]
While Germany’s intentions were clear, Czechoslovakia attained significant advantages over them which could have aided them in choosing to retaliate. One of the main debates around why Czechoslovakia didn’t attempt to fight Germany, is because of the Czech’s military capabilities. They were a major arms manufacturer[11] and had a modern army of twenty-five divisions, therefore if Hitler had carried out his threat and German forces crossed the border, resistance seemed possible and desirable, mainly between the Czechoslovak generals and political leaders. So what prevented them from fighting back? Jaroslav Hrbek, being a military historian, offered a direct insight into the militaristic capabilities, in arguing that it was a mistake not to fight, even without the support of the Western allies.[12] He states that those who did not support the British and French government, “the other half”, would have wanted to go to war. Evidently Czech Republic’s military was well resourced as they had excellent tanks, well trained soldiers, elite Legionaries from WW1, very experienced generals, great morale and great fortification.[13] During the Czech crisis in 1938, the German army had 3 divisions, whereas Czechoslovakia had 35 divisions (plus 5 fortress divisions).[14] This expansive resourcing was however wilfully disregarded during the Munich agreement. The evidence is supported by Donald Watt’s argument in his book, in which he claims Czechoslovakia’s military strength can also be seen after the German takeover in 1939, when Germany’s arms production increased by 15% alongside this, the arms and equipment of the former Czech army were sufficient to create 20 new German divisions. [15] The Czechs had more than 600,000 men and 4 air regiments, alongside over 350 tanks, along with around 70 armoured cars. [16] This meant they had the world’s highest amount of automatic weapons per soldier in September 1938.[17] As Czechoslovakia seemed to be ready to defend their country, the question continues to arise, why didn’t they use this weaponry to fight off the German military. Army General Jan Syrovy, General inspector of the Czechoslovak army in 1933 today believes, with the benefit of hindsight that “alone they would have no chance of success. It was a clear view of the entire command staff. The enthusiasm of people was great, soldiers wanted to fight, but we could not lead our people to slaughter”.[18]It was clear to the leaders of the Czech army that fighting against Germany would have held them off longer and shown resistance. However, a solo win, without the strong support of the allies would have not been attainable for Czechoslovakia and would rather cause unmerited suffering for the country. [19]
Additionally, they had significant geographical advantage as the Czech-Slovaks had formidable defensive terrain and fortifications along the German-Czech border, which made them extremely capable of defence.[20] Williamson Murray argues, “A German campaign against Czechoslovakia would have involved significantly higher casualties than the campaign against Poland..because of the nature of the terrain… and Czech fortifications”,[21] supporting their territorial strength. This is because, their natural border is full of mountain massifs and hills whereas all the border routes between Bohemia and Germany were tens of kilometres long small winding roads which were lined with hundreds of concrete bunkers and fortresses. This would have been a significant advantage for the Czech army as their war infrastructure aided their forces, however the strength of this was never tested. Moreover, the Czechoslovak army operated along interior lines of communication which made deliberations and commands flow easier.[22] Although Czechoslovakia possessed these advantages, what many fail to consider is if the Sudetenland were to be given to Hitler, their terrain advantage would have been diminished and lost resulting in the Czech-Slovaks unable to resist the Germans for long.
So what if Czechoslovakia had decided to fight against Germany? The Czech-Slovak army assumed that the allies would support them if they were to have fought against Germany, however this was refuted in 1939 when both Britain and France failed to assist them during Hitler’s takeover. Churchill however, firmly believed that if the Czechs had decided to fight, they would have shamed France into war. [23] He was convinced that France would step in and uphold their promise to Czechoslovakia, yet this was never carried out. Without this support, the Czech army was quite certain a win would not be achieved.[24] Their army would have been running into a battle that they would have been unable to win. Furthermore, while Germany believed they held the upper hand, utilizing all their resources was not possible as Hitler knew he was preparing for a bigger war.[25]
It is clear that both approaches provide justifiable explanations that Czechoslovakia would have certainly have been able to hold Germany off for a certain period of time, however they would have not succeeded in winning, rather resemble a battle similar to Finland in 1944. Conclusively, availing all their resources, manpower and tactics would have merely ended in many of their men dying.[26]
Reflection
This investigation has allowed me to use a much larger variety of research methods which forced me to sift through a substantial amount of perspectives. Primary sources became extremely helpful in bringing us closer to the past, as reading an original interview from Jan Syrový allowed me to identify the social and emotional effects rather than just statistical; information. However, the biggest challenge with the primary sources, was the clear miscommunication that occurred in the translation, although important to my investigation. As my question was based on Czechoslovakia, I deemed it important that they were from my native language, therefore some of my sources I used were in Czech. Although I am proficient in the language, reading historical sources in Czech and translating it into English research, showed to be a struggle as the formal words used made it complicated for me to fully understand the intent behind the language. Being fluent in five languages, Czech is notably the most complicated, hence why not only were the facts in Czech but also the names are different which often made it complex to apply this knowledge to the investigation. Specifically, when I was reading information in Czech that was not written in colloquial language, such as the work of Matěj Spurný, it became hard for me to depict.
Through my research, I encountered a wealth of information informing me about Czechoslovakia between 1938 and 1939. However, while I encountered this abundance of information pertaining to specific historical events, often times it provided an answer to a different question, mostly focusing on Germany’s perspective. Researching this question in Germany, it was hard to access information that fully delved into the Czech perspective, but the distance prevented me from frequently looking through archives in Czech Republic, as well as the split government, which means a few of the archives are in Slovakia. Researching extensively to find information supporting my investigation, I noticed how little sources there are dedicated to my country. Many sources examine the events revolving around Czechoslovakia however they don’t consider the effects on the country, rather focus on the larger countries involved. Then after accessing information and reading through different perspectives, I questioned how is history used to show a message? I encountered a lot of people who wanted to use the facts and twist it to serve their point, which brought up the idea of interpretation. I was challenged with this problem as examinations of both sides often were written in hindsight in our modern day. This solidified how important historical events still are in today’s day that we remain in constant debate about them, as well as, helped me synthesize the information from a post-revisionist perspective which helped me achieve my investigation.
Work Cited
Bakke, Elisabeth. “The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic.” University of Oslo, Loyalitäten in Der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918–1938. Politische, Nationale Und Kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten, 2004.
Barooah, Debo Prasad, and Debo Parsad Barooah. “MUNICH RECONSIDERED.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 28, 1966, pp. 470–480
Ben-Arie, Katriel. “Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 25, no. 4, 1990, pp. 431–446
“CHURCHILL: Historical Books, Memoirs, Essays, Speeches & Letters.” CHURCHILL: Historical Books, Memoirs, Essays, Speeches & Letters, by Winston Churchill, Musaicum Books, 2018.
Conference "Czech and Slovak Roads to Europe, 1989-2004", CERI, Paris, France - 8. 11. 2004
Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p. 195.
Fisk, Robert “After Visiting Hitler's Office in Munich, It's Clear to Me That There Are Still Lessons to Be Learned.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 18 Oct. 2017
Gerald Guenwook Lee, “‘I See Dead People’: Air-Raid Phobia and Britain’s Behavior in the Munich Crisis,” Security Studies, Winter 2003/4, p. 266.
“Historian Matěj Spurný: Munich Agreement Fits Czech ‘Victim Narrative’ | Radio Prague.” Radio Praha, www.radio.cz/en/section/czech-history/historian-matej-spurny-munich-agreement-fits-czech-victim-narrative.
Johnson, and David E. “In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of Medium-Armored Forces in Past Military Operations.” RAND Corporation, 2 Nov. 2008, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG709.html.
Kershaw, Ian, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, New York: W. W. Norton, 2000
Kershaw, Ian. “The Crisis of 1938 - Some Answers Seventy Years On.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 22 Aug. 2008
Lukes, Igor. “Stalin and Beneš at the End of September 1938: New Evidence from the Prague Archives.” Slavic Review, vol. 52, no. 1, 1993, pp. 28–48
Murray, op. cit., p. 231; and David Vital, “Czechoslovakia and the Powers: September 1938,” Journal of Contemporary History, October 1966, pp. 44-45.
Press, Daryl G. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s.” International Security, vol. 29, no. 3, 2005, pp. 136–169
Pánek, Tomáš, and Jan Hradecký. LANDSCAPES AND LANDFORMS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PU, 2018.
RECORD, JEFFREY INSTITUTE STRATEGIC STUDIES. APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s. LULU COM, 2014.
Richard Overy, Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945, New York: Penguin, 2001, p. 316.
Steiner, P. The Deserts of Bohemia: Czech Fiction and Its Social Context. Cornell University Press, 2000.
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