IBDP Paper 1 Exam: Move to Global War

Regarding the IB Exam leaks on Wednesday night, the leaks might not only be limited to exams that took place already. There are indications that other exams such as History have also been leaked. The situation regarding the History exam is not known, and schools are urged to assure the exam will be taken under the most strict security and fairness. It's still unclear what happens if doubts regarding its integrity are also shared.

All past IBDP History Paper 1 exams with responses from past students, usually written within exam conditions.

SPECIMEN PAPER: The move to global war

Read sources A to D carefully and answer the questions that follow. The sources and questions relate to the following aspect of the syllabus: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941): Events.

Source A  

The first three articles of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact agreed between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin on 27 September 1940.

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

Article one: Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article two: Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia.

Article three: Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts. They further agree to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese–Japanese conflict.

Source B  

Akira Iriye, a professor of History, writing in an academic book, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (1987).

By September 1940, Britain could be assured of continued American support, and the United States had already implemented some of its embargoes against Japan. Under the circumstances, there would have been no way in which an Axis pact would cause the Anglo-American powers to soften their stand.

On the contrary, the pact could be expected to give them added resolve to stand firm. This is exactly what happened.

Japanese and German negotiators were fully aware of the developing ties between America and Britain, and for this very reason they hoped their alliance would serve to check and reduce the effectiveness

of American intervention. By then, as Matsuoka [the Japanese Foreign Minister] explained at the

time, it was becoming obvious that the United States was steadily involving itself not only in European but in Asian-Pacific affairs as well. It was tying itself not just to the British in the Atlantic but to the Commonwealth in Asia and the Pacific. The United States, in fact, would establish itself as a global power, with its influence in the Atlantic, Canada, the Western hemisphere, the Pacific Ocean and Asia.

It followed, then, that it would be an American-led coalition that Japan had to confront and be prepared to fight. It would no longer be China in isolation, but China assisted by the Soviet Union, Britain, and especially the United States.

Source C  

Ian Kershaw, a professor of Modern History, writing in an academic book,Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940–1941 (2007).

The American response quickly revealed the folly of Matsuoka’s claim – that the Tripartite [Three Power] Pact would serve as a deterrent. Instead, it merely confirmed American views that Japan was a belligerent [warlike], bullying, imperialist force in the Far East, an Asian equivalent of Nazi Germany, and had to be stopped. Such views seemed confirmed by the entry of Japanese troops into French Indochina on 23 September 1940. The essential purpose of the Tripartite Pact, from the Japanese perspective, was to deter the United States from intervening to prevent the southern advance seen as necessary to ensure Japan’s control of raw materials and, therefore, her future economic and political security.

The gamble in the pact was self-evident. What if the United States did not regard the pact as a deterrent, but as a provocation? What if the effect was to reinforce the determination to prevent Japanese expansion by threatening the lifeline of oil supplies? But from a Japanese perspective at

the time, the gamble had to be taken. To take it held great dangers, but also the potential of enormous rewards. Not to take it meant long-term domination by the Anglo-American powers. It meant, too, that the China War had been in vain. The need for boldness, not caution, carried the day in such a mentality.

Source D  

Harold “Mick” Armstrong, a cartoonist, depicts Japan announcing a “new order” in greater East Asia in a cartoon published in the Australian newspaper The Argus (1940).

 

Questions for Section C

9. (a) What, according to Source B, were the effects for Britain of the signing of the Three

Power/Tripartite Pact? [3] 

(b) What is the message conveyed by Source D? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of

Source A for an historian studying the Three Power/Tripartite Pact (September 1940). [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about the significance of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the consequences of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact for Japan, China and the US up to the end of 1941. [9]

May 2017

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.

Source I 
 Andrew Gordon, a US historian, writing in the book A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003).
When Japan moved into northern Indochina, the US responded with a gradually expanding export embargo. This provoked some sections of the Japanese military to argue for a pre-emptive strike against the United States and its allies. Japan followed this by extending their hold over Indochina, gaining Vichy permission to occupy the entire peninsula in July 1941 [‘Vichy’ refers to the government of the French state between 1940 and 1944]. The agreement left Japan as the virtual ruler of the French colony.
The Americans countered this advance with a strong and threatening move. Roosevelt immediately pulled together an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil supplies to Japan. He also offered military supplies to China. Without oil Japan could not sustain its military or economy. It faced a difficult choice. It could agree to American conditions for lifting the embargo by retreating completely from China. Or it could take control of the Southeast Asian oil fields by force and negotiate for a ceasefire from that strengthened position.
For a time, it pursued both courses. Japanese diplomats sought in vain to negotiate a formula for a partial retreat in China that might satisfy both their own reluctant army and the United States.
The Japanese military, meanwhile, drew up plans for an attack that might force the Western powers to recognise its hegemony in Asia.

Source J 
Osami Nagano, Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at the Imperial Conference, 6 September 1941.

Based on the assumption that a peaceful solution has not been found and war is inevitable, the Empire’s oil supply, as well as the stockpiles of many other important war materials, is being used up day by day with the result that the national defence power is gradually diminishing. If this deplorable situation is left unchecked, I believe that, after a lapse of some time, the nation’s strength will diminish.
On the other hand, the defence of military installations and key points of Britain, the United States and other countries in the Far East, as well as military preparations of these nations, particularly those of the United States, are being strengthened so quickly that by next year we will find it difficult to oppose them. Therefore, wasting time now could be disastrous for the Empire. I believe that it is imperative [essential] for the Empire that it should first make the fullest preparations and lose no time in carrying out positive operations with firm determination, in order that it can find a way out of the difficult situation.

Source K 
Chihiro Hosoya, a Japanese professor of history, writing in the article “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: US-Japanese Relations, 1938–1941”, for the academic publication Journal of Peace Research (1968).

According to a US public opinion survey of late September [1941], the number of Americans favouring strong action against Japan had greatly increased. Furthermore, Roosevelt stated on 12 October that the United States would not be intimidated. The Tripartite Pact had worsened relations with the United States. Japanese army officers demanded an acceleration of southern expansion. Even before the Tripartite Pact, Japan had demanded permission to move troops into southern Indochina and did so on 28 July. The Japanese pressures on Indochina led the US government to freeze Japanese assets in the United States and to impose an embargo against Japan. Officers in the Japanese navy were resolved to go to war because of the oil embargo. They were anxious about the existing supply of oil turning the Japanese navy into a “paper navy” [powerless navy].

Source L
David Low, a cartoonist, depicts Japanese expansion in the cartoon “Enough in the tank to get to that filling station?” in the British newspaper The Evening Standard (8 August 1941). The sign on the side of the building is “Dutch E. [East] Indies and on the vehicle it is “Jap. [Japanese] Oil Reserves.

9. (a) What, according to Source K, were the factors contributing to tensions between Japan and the US? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about Japanese expansion? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source K for an historian studying the tensions between the US and Japan. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and J reveal about the increasing tensions between the US and Japan. [6]
12. “Mutual fear led to increasing tensions between the US and Japan.” Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement? [9]

Example from former student who ended up obtaining a 7 in the course at HL (click to enlarge):

November 2017

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: The impact of Japanese nationalism and militarism on foreign policy.

Source I 
An extract from a Japanese government statement, “The Fundamental Principles of National Policy” (August 1936).
(1) Japan must strive to eradicate [eliminate] the aggressive policies of the great powers ...
(3) ... in order to promote Manchukuo’s healthy development and to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense, the threat from the north, the Soviet Union, must be eliminated; in order to promote our economic development, we must prepare against Great Britain and the United States and bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In the execution of this policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.
(4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economic development in the South Seas, especially in the outlying South Seas area. She plans to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful means without arousing other powers. In this way, concurrently with the firm establishment of Manchukuo, Japan must expect full development and strengthening of her national power.
[Source: Republished with permission of Taylor & Francis Group LLc Books, from Japan: a Documentary History, David J. Lu, 1996; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc]

Source J 
William Beasley, a professor of the history of the Far East, writing in the academic book Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (1987).

Central to the basic propositions was the intention that Japan ... must establish cordial [friendly] relations with the peoples of the area founded on the principles of co-existence and co-prosperity. It would also undertake economic expansion on its own account by creating a strong coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and China and by extending its interests in South-East Asia in gradual and peaceful ways. There were some conditions. The army must be given forces in Korea and Kwantung [Guandong] sufficient to deal with any attack from Soviet Russia. The navy must have a fleet capable of maintaining ascendancy in the west Pacific against that of the United States.
Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] cooperation, designed to detach Nanking [Nanjing] from its communist affiliations [links], though highly desirable must not be allowed to stand in the way of treating north China as a “special region” to be brought into close relationship with Japan and Manchukuo.
It was, for example, to provide strategic materials, in order to strengthen their defences against the Soviet Union. As to the south, a gradual and peaceful approach was intended to avert fears in countries of the area concerning Japanese aims ...
From the point of view of the ministers in Tokyo, none of this was meant to bring about territorial expansion. They still thought in terms of informal empire, that is, of securing an increase in Japan’s privileges through pressure exerted on Asian governments, including that of China.
[Source: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 1894-1945 by Beasley (1987) p.202. By permission of Oxford University Press]

Source K 
Hans van de Ven, a professor of modern Chinese history, writing in the academic book War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945 (2003).

By 1933, Japan’s military strategy aimed at defending itself against the Soviet Union, China and the British and American navies. Massive investment programmes in the heavy, chemical, and machinery industries followed to give Japan the industrial base to sustain itself in time of war, and also of course to deal with the problems of the Depression. In 1936, Japan stepped up its military expenditures when a new cabinet accepted the build-up of national strength as Japan’s highest priority ...
Japan therefore developed a strategic doctrine aimed at defending Japan by aggressive offensive operations of limited duration, to be concluded before its major enemies could concentrate their forces in East Asia. To defeat China before such a war was part of this strategy. Worried about war with the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the “removal of China”, as the aggressive General Tojo stated in a telegram from Manchuria to Tokyo in early 1937, would eliminate “an important menace from our rear” and release forces for service on more critical fronts. If the military build-up and the political influence of the army in Japanese politics were causes for worry in China, so were the expansionist tendencies of the Kwantung [Guandong] Army in Manchuria.
[Source: From: War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945, Hans van de Ven, 2003, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source L John Bernard Partridge, an illustrator and cartoonist, depicts Japan threatening China in an untitled cartoon for the British magazine Punch (21 July 1937). Note: The word on the tail is Manchukuo.

S.O.S.
Chinese dragon: I say, do be careful with that sword! If you try to cut off my head I shall really have to appeal to the League again.
[Source: PUNCH Magazine Cartoon Archives www.punch.co.uk]

 

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were the challenges facing Japanese national policy? [3] 

(b) What does Source L suggest about Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] relations in 1937? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying Japanese foreign policy in East Asia. [4] 

11. Compare and contrast what Sources J and K reveal about Japanese foreign policy aims in East Asia. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the suggestion that Japanese foreign policy aims up to 1937 were to be achieved through “gradual and peaceful ways” (Source J)? [9]

Example under test conditions from student [click to enlarge]:

 May 2018

My comments: Here the IBO carelessly referred to Chiang Kai-Shek as 'Jiang Jieshi' throughout without any attempt to at least offer his name as recognised by the majority of the world. It also refers to 'GMD' instead of 'KMT', confusing students who learn the traditional name and showing contempt for Cantonese speakers, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Its description of the cartoon was completely incorrect which resulted in my Chinese-speaking students to suffer.

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: political instability in China.

Source I
Jonathan D Spence, an historian, writing in the academic book The Search for Modern China (1999).

The outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937 ended any chance that Jiang Jieshi might have had of creating a strong and centralised nation-state. Within a year, the Japanese deprived the Guomindang [the Nationalists] of all the major Chinese industrial centres and the most fertile farmland. Jiang’s new wartime base, Chongqing, became a symbolic centre for national resistance to the Japanese, but it was a poor place from which to launch any kind of counterattack. Similarly, the Communist forces were isolated in Shaanxi province, one of the poorest areas in China, with no industrial capacity. It was not clear if the Communists would be able to survive there, and certainly it seemed an unpromising location from which to spread the revolution.
For the first years of the war, the dream of national unity was kept alive by the nominal [in name only] alliance of the Nationalist and Communist forces in a united front. Communists muted [reduced the focus on] their land reform practices and moderated their rhetoric [propaganda], while the Guomindang tried to undertake economic and administrative reforms that would strengthen China in the long term. But by early 1941 the two parties were once again engaging in armed clashes with each other.

Source J 
Chang-tai Hung, a professor of humanities, writing in the specialist history book War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937–1945 (1994).

The outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937 dealt a devastating blow to the Nationalist [Guomindang] government’s efforts to recentralise its authority and revive the economy. It also ended Jiang Jieshi’s chance of crushing the Communist forces, who were isolated in the barren and sparsely populated Shaanxi province. The war displaced the Nationalists from their traditional power base in the urban and industrial centres, and forced them to move to the interior. At the same time, it provided an ideal opportunity for the Communists to expand their influence in north China and become a true contender for national power.
For many Chinese resisters, the clash with Japan turned out to be a unifying force. The Marco Polo Bridge became a compelling symbol of China’s unity. Resisters looked at war as an antidote to chaos. Despite some progress made toward economic growth and political integration by the Nationalist government on the eve of the war, the country was still largely fragmented. Regional militarists remained a serious threat to the government, and the armed conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists persisted. Political instability bred fear and fuelled great discontent in society.

Source K 
Jiang Jieshi, head of the Chinese Nationalist [Guomindang] government between 1928 and 1949, in a speech at an Officers Training Camp (July 1934).
This speech was not published until July 1937.

Now let us look at our own condition. How do we stand? Have we fulfilled the necessary conditions for resisting the enemy? We ourselves can answer that question simply and sadly in one brief sentence: “We have made no preparations whatsoever.” Not only materially are we unprepared, not only have we not organised our resources, but we are not even unified in thought and spirit. I make bold to say that if we were now to be involved in a war with Japan, groups opposed to the Government would be sure to take advantage of the situation to create trouble. This alone would be sufficient to seal our fate. Even before the enemy’s actual attack, internally there would be chaos. In such circumstances how could we possibly resist the enemy? How could we revive our race and nation? How could we ensure that our children would continue to enjoy the glorious heritage of five thousand years? From the military point
of view we have not the qualifications at present for an independent state; we are not fit to be called a modern nation. So naturally we cannot resist Japan, but must suffer at her hands.

Source L
Cai Ruohong, a cartoonist and member of the Chinese League of Left-Wing Artists, depicts a handshake between the Chinese Communist Party (left) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) (right) in the cartoon “A Sacred Handshake” (c1937). The figure in the centre of the picture is a caricature representing Japan.

9. (a) What, according to Source J, were the challenges faced by the Nationalist [Guomindang] government of China as a result of the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party [Guomindang] in 1937? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source K for an historian studying political instability in China between 1931 and 1941. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and J reveal about political instability in China up to 1941. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that Japanese aggression furthered political instability in China between 1931 and 1941. [9]

November 2018

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Responses: League of Nations and the Lytton Report.
 
Source I 
The Lytton Report (4 September 1932).

Without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind ... The justification has been that all the military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defence, the right of which is implicit in all the multilateral treaties mentioned above, and was not taken away by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League. Further, the administration which has been substituted for that of China in Manchuria is justified on the grounds that its establishment was the act of the local population, who spontaneously asserted their independence, severed all connection with China and established their own government. Such a genuine independence movement, it is claimed, is not prohibited by any international treaty or by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations.
[Source: The Lytton Report (4 September 1932). Copyright United Nations Archives at Geneva.]


Source J 
Chokyuro Kadono, a leading Japanese businessman and commentator, who had significant interests in Manchuria and China, writing in the article “A Businessman’s View of the Lytton Report” in the Japanese magazine Gaiko Jiho (November 1932).

As has been officially declared by the Imperial Government more than once, Japan has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. Japan has given formal recognition to Manchuria as an independent state [Manchukuo], assuring it full opportunity for growth and organisation ... At the same time, Japan hopes thereby to rescue Manchukuo from the destruction caused by China’s internal disorders and give it opportunity to attain free development, so that it may be able to play its part in easing the world’s economic difficulty by offering a very safe and valuable market in the Far East. This aspect of Japan’s policy should have been quite clear to the Lytton Commission. But unfortunately, the Lytton Report makes an altogether inadequate estimate of Manchuria’s economic value, and entirely fails to do justice to the previously mentioned motive of Japan in recognising Manchukuo ... Japan is fully prepared, in view of the position she rightly occupies among the nations of the world, to do her best to support China in her work of unification and reconstruction to the end that peace may thereby be assured in the Far East. This aspect of Japan’s policy should have been quite clear to the Lytton Commission.
[Source: adapted from A businessman’s view of the Lytton Report, Chokiuro Kadono, published in The Herald of Asia, Tokyo October 1932; http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=moore]

Source K 
Ryōichi Tobe, a professor of the history of modern Japan, writing in the chapter “The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino–Japanese War” in the Japan–China Joint History Research Report (2011).

The Guangdong [Kwantung] Army continued its advance into Chinese territory ... To serve as head of the new state, the Japanese took the deposed Chinese emperor Puyi out of Tianjin under cover of riots that the Japanese staged in the city and brought him to Manchuria. Japan’s position that it acted in self-defence to protect its own interests thus began to lose credibility, and the League of Nations grew increasingly suspicious. On October 24 [1931], the League Council voted for the withdrawal of Japanese troops by a specific deadline, but Japan’s opposition alone defeated the resolution. Finally, with Japan’s agreement, the League Council decided on December 10 to send a commission to the scene to investigate, and deferred any decision until the investigation was completed ... the [resulting] Lytton Report refused to recognise the Guangdong Army’s actions following the Manchurian Incident as legitimate self-defence, nor did it accept the claim that Manchukuo had been born from a spontaneous independence movement.
[Source: adapted from Japan-China Joint History Research Report March 2011: The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino-Japanese War, by Tobe Ryōichi. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pdfs/jcjhrr_mch_en1.pdf.]

Source L

 Bernard Partridge, a cartoonist, depicts the response of the League of Nations to the Manchurian crisis in the cartoon “The Command Courteous” for the British magazine Punch (12 October 1932). The wording on the woman’s cap is “League of Nations”, on the newspaper, “Lytton Report”, on the dog, “Japan” and the bone, “Manchuria”. The caption is “League of Nations, ‘Good dog—drop it!’”. 


The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Responses: League of Nations and the Lytton Report.

9. (a) What, according to Source J, was Japan’s attitude toward Manchuria/Manchukuo and
China? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about the position of Japan and the League of Nations regarding the Manchurian crisis? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source J for an historian studying Japan’s response to the Lytton Report in the early 1930s. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and K reveal about Japanese actions in China. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that the ineffectual response of the League of Nations was the main factor in encouraging Japanese expansion in China. [9]


May 2019

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Responses: international response to German aggression (1933–1938).

Source I 
Notes for the British Cabinet on conversations held in Berlin between John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor and Führer (March 1935).

John Simon thanked the Chancellor for the opportunity he had had of meeting him and for the way in which the British Ministers had been welcomed. But, observing the rule of frankness to the end, he must say that the British Ministers felt somewhat disappointed that it had not been possible to get a larger measure of agreement. They regretted that such difficulties were thought to exist on the German side in connection with some of the matters discussed. He did not regret having come to Berlin. He was sure that this meeting was the best way of continuing this investigation into the various points of view. What he regretted was that they had not been able to do more in the direction of promoting the general agreement which he was sure both sides wanted.
It showed that these things were more difficult and complicated than many believed them to be from a distance...
Hitler was also grateful to the British Government for the loyal efforts they had made in the matter of the Saar vote, and for all the other matters on which they had adopted such a loyal and generous attitude to Germany.

Source J
Bernard Partridge, a cartoonist, depicts Adolf Hitler and John Simon in the cartoon “Prosit!” [Cheers!] in the British satirical magazine Punch (27 March 1935).
The wording on the tankard is “Conscription” and in the caption it is:
Herr Hitler: “The more we arm together the peacefuller [more peaceful] we’ll be!”
Sir John Simon: “Well—er—up to a certain point—and in certain cases— provisionally—perhaps.”

 Source K 
Christian Leitz, an historian specialising in the Third Reich, writing in the academic book Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1941. The Road to Global War (2004).

Hitler’s quest to rearm Germany continued unopposed. During Anglo–French talks in London at the beginning of February (1935), Germany’s rearmament had received the blessing of the two West European powers even though they still hoped to convince Germany to join a multilateral Locarno-style pact guaranteeing the borders of Germany’s East European neighbours.
Hitler’s answer to these conciliatory approaches came quickly. He removed one of the major limitations of the Versailles Treaty and, on 16 March 1935, increased the size of Germany’s armed forces to 300,000 troops. This time, however, France, Britain and Italy seemed keen to react more firmly to the worrying growth in Germany’s strength. At Stresa in April, an attempt was made to establish a common front against Germany’s increasing attempts to revise [post-war settlements].
However, the reaction of the three former allies remained meek [feeble]. To the delight of the Nazi regime, the common front against Germany was both short lived and of limited impact. By June, Britain broke with Stresa when it agreed to a bilateral naval agreement with Germany.

[Source: reproduced from NAZI FOREIGN POLICY 1933 – 1941, 1st Edition by Christian Leitz, published by Routledge. © Routledge Christian Leitz, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source L 
Henri Lichtenberger, a university lecturer, writing in the academic book The Third Reich (1937).

Confronted by the German desire for naval rearmament, England [Britain], after a brief suggestion of displeasure, quickly decided to come to terms. British leaders believed that the best way to safeguard this primary English [British] interest would be to conclude a direct and separate agreement with Germany which would set a maximum limit to German armaments acceptable to both countries. In agreeing to this transaction Germany not only received the right to begin, with English consent, an important programme of naval construction, but also potentially caused further disagreement among the signatories of the Versailles Treaty.
The naval agreement signed in London on June 18, 1935 between England and Germany aroused great concern in France. It was the occasion for outbursts in the press and for diplomatic manoeuvres intended to moderate the disagreement which had unexpectedly developed between the two allied
nations, and hold together the Entente which was considered valuable. It was nevertheless obvious that by his bold initiative, Hitler had scored an amazing success which also strengthened his prestige in Germany. He had won the right to rearm officially both on land and on sea and this was accomplished without a violent break with France.


9. (a) What, according to Source I, were the conclusions reported to the British government regarding the March 1935 meeting in Berlin? [3]
(b) What does Source J suggest about Anglo-German relations in 1935? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying the international response to German aggression. [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about the attitudes towards German foreign policy under Hitler. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the effectiveness of the international response to German aggression between 1933 and 1938. [9]

Example of timed in-class paper from an outstanding former student who scored a final grade of 7 for the course (click to enlarge): 

 

November 2019

 

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Responses: Political developments within China — the Second United Front.

Source I 

Mao Zedong in an interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow. Mao’s secretary was the interpreter (16 July 1936).
In the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilised in its struggle with the Guomindang. China is a very big nation, and ... if Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as 100 or even 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated ...
As for munitions, the Japanese cannot seize our arsenals [military stores] in the interior, which are sufficient to equip Chinese armies for many years, nor can they prevent us from capturing great amounts of arms and ammunitions from their own hands ...
Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China’s economy also presents advantages in a war against the highly centralised and highly concentrated economy of Japan ... It is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China: China’s Northwest, Southwest, and West cannot be blockaded by Japan.
The central point of the problem becomes the mobilisation and unification of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a united front.
[Source: Marxists Internet Archive (2014)]

Source J 

Lucian Pye, a professor of Chinese history, writing in the academic book China: An Introduction (1984).

In December 1936, Jiang [Jieshi] flew up to Xian in Shaanxi province to press upon Zhang Xueliang the urgency of completing the “annihilation” of the Communists before confronting the Japanese.
Upon arrival he was kidnapped by Zhang, who had been influenced by the Communists’ argument
that the Chinese were shamefully fighting other Chinese at a time when Japan threatened ... At this point, the Soviet Union intervened. Stalin sent a telegram to the Chinese Communists declaring that unless they arranged for the release of Jiang he would publicly renounce them as Communists and declare them to be mere “bandits”. Finally, an agreement was worked out between the Communists and the Guomindang. Jiang declared that he would firmly lead the national resistance against any further Japanese demands, and the Communists committed their forces to operating under the national command and promised to cease their partisan revolutionary propaganda. Jiang was released on Christmas Eve, 1936, and the Chinese nation seemed again to be moving towards genuine national unity.
[Source: authorised by the children of Lucian and Mary Pye]

 

Source K
Removed for copyright reasons which doesn't stop the IBO from taking money for this exam.

Source L
David Low, a political cartoonist, depicts the Japanese occupation of China in the cartoon “The Red Carpet” for the British newspaper the Evening Standard (14 June 1935). The writing on the carpet is “Japanese World Power”. The figures with their backs to the carpet represent Britain, France and the US. 

9. (a) Why, according to Source I, would it be difficult for Japan to defeat China? [3] 

(b) What does Source L suggest about Japan’s expansion into China? [2]

 

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations ofSource I for an historian studying the Second United Front in China. [4]

 

11. Compare and contrast what Sources J and K reveal about the events leading up to the formation of the Second United Front. [6]

 

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the significance of the creation of theSecond United Front in China. [9]

 

November 2020

 

The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Events: Italian expansion: Abyssinia (1935–1936).

 

Source I

  Removed for copyright reasons which doesn't stop the IBO from taking money for selling this exam to schools and teachers as a past paper. Here it is having been scanned from an actual paper I managed to hunt down:

Source J

David Low, a political cartoonist, depicts Mussolini in the cartoon “Pah! They were uncivilised savages, without ideals.” in the British newspaper The Evening Standard (3 April 1936). The containers he is carrying have “poison gas” written on them.

“PAH! THEY WERE UNCIVILISED SAVAGES, WITHOUT IDEALS.”

 

Source K 

Martin Clark, an historian, writing in the academic book Mussolini (2014).

 

The Italians had invaded Abyssinia in the 1890s and had suffered a humiliating defeat at Adowa in 1896 ... Mussolini’s great ambition was to establish an African empire and the obvious place was Abyssinia, virtually the only part of Africa left uncolonised ... The British and French would not be too offended, providing their interests were safeguarded, since they too suffered from Abyssinian border raids and would welcome greater security for their own neighbouring colonies. Mussolini had domestic reasons too. He needed to maintain morale at home, especially among the young. He could hardly keep proclaiming his warlike values and the need for Empire for over a decade, without actually fighting anybody. Mussolini needed a war: a quick, easy war against carefully chosen, weak opponents. Sohe set his sights on Abyssinia. As early as 1925 he ordered military and diplomatic preparations incase Abyssinia collapsed. On 30 December 1935, he finally issued orders for the total conquest of Abyssinia ... [This] was not popular with the army high command. It was about to begin military talks with the French, and did not want to risk alienating its new partners; nor did it want to see all the available resources being swallowed up by a pointless colonial campaign.

[Source: Reproduced from Mussolini, 1st Edition by Keith Robbins, published by Routledge. © Pearson Education Limited, 2005, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

 

Source L 

John Pollard, an historian, writing in the academic book The Fascist Experience in Italy (1998). 

 

Mussolini believed that Fascism demanded a spectacular foreign policy achievement and the only one that would suffice [be enough] was the conquest of Abyssinia. But while the invasion was launched in 1935, it is clear that the decision to go to war was actually made in 1932, when Italy was still suffering the worst effects of the Depression. Thus, the traditional view that the Abyssinian adventure was almost certainly planned, at least in part, as an alternative to social reform still has some force. The resort to colonial adventures as a way of distracting attention from domestic difficulties, and even hopefully resolving them, was an established tradition among the Italian political class before the arrival of Fascism ... thus Mussolini’s proposed conquest had the additional attraction of offering to wipe out the humiliation of Italy’s defeat by the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. In any case Abyssinia, as one of the two surviving independent states in Africa, was the only realistic place for further Italian colonial expansion. [By 1935] Italy was now more than a junior partner to Britain and France: it was Mussolini’s judgement that Italy had instead become their absolutely indispensable ally.

 

 

 

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were Mussolini’s reasons for invading Abyssinia in October 1935? [3]

(b) What does Source J suggest about the Italian invasion of Abyssinia? [2]

 

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. [4]

 

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about Mussolini’s policies towards Abyssinia. [6]

 

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the factors which influenced Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia on 3 October 1935. [9]

 May 2021

The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Causes of expansion: impact of Fascism and Nazism on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany.
 

Source I 

Benito Mussolini, Italian Prime Minister, in a speech delivered during a state visit to Germany (29 September 1937).

Fascism and Nazism express the parallel historical situations which link the life of our nations ...
The Rome–Berlin Axis is not directed at other states, because we, Nazis and Fascists alike, want peace and are always ready to work for a real fruitful [productive] peace which does not ignore but resolves the problems of the coexistence of peoples ...

Not only have Nazism and Fascism everywhere the same enemies who serve the same masters, the Third International, but they share many conceptions of life and history. Both believe in violence as a force determining the life of peoples, as a dynamo [driving force] of their history, and hence reject the doctrines of the so‐called historical materialism and their political and philosophical by‐products. Both of us exalt at [glorify] work in its countless manifestations as the sign of nobility of man; both of us count on youth, from which we demand the virtues of discipline, courage, tenacity and patriotism. 

 

[Source: Griffin, R., Fascism, Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Rodger Griffin 1995, Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

 

Source J 

Paul Ordner, a French artist, depicts Hitler and Mussolini in the cartoon “Les Semeurs” (The Sowers) for the French satirical magazine Le Rire (28 April 1939).

 

 The caption reads “What will the harvest be!”

Source K

 Removed for copyright reasons which doesn't stop the IBO from taking money to provide this exam for teachers. Had to hunt down the original source to provide the extract here, although the IBO failed to properly quote the actual extract correctly:

Stephen H. Roberts, an Australian historian, writing after his visit to Nazi Germany in the academic book The House That Hitler Built (1937)

Italy and Germany have been flung together by a general antagonism to their foreign policies. Mussolini has steadily supported Hitler in his treaty-breaking... The two governments were shown to have a certain identity of views on such matters as Spain, Russia, and rearmament; but the Axis remained very uncertain...  [in fact, the actual extract reads: "threatened ‘ vertical axis ’ (from Berlin to Rome) remained very nebulous after the interviews."]

The basic truth is that the Germans have little faith in Italy’s fighting power, and they feel that events in Spain support their estimate. Moreover, the two countries are in harmony only because of their common enemies. Their policies conflict in so many essentials, and difficulties are avoided only by not being mentioned. Central Europe is a permanent barrier between them, so much so that it is difficult to envisage an Italo-German bloc based on a permanent identity of interests, however much their present isolation may force the two countries together... Yet it would be erroneous to preclude any possibility of united action between the two on such general grounds. An immediate threat might draw them together, despite Mussolini’s critical estimate of Hitler, and despite the German feeling about the Italians. 

The Italians are not popular in Germany, but Germany is not in a position to pick and choose her friends, and she at least knows that Mussolini believes in the efficacy of swift blows and will not hesitate to use force in settling international disputes. The understanding between the two totalitarian States then, however uneasy it may be, dominates international affairs for the moment.

Source L 

Reynolds M Salerno, an historian specialising in international history, writing in the book Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935–1940 (2002).

Hitler’s determination to rearm and to revise the terms of [the Treaty of] Versailles inspired Mussolini to revitalise Fascist foreign policy and to reconsider his strategy for imperial expansion. He wanted to integrate Fascist Italy’s ideological motives with its strategic objectives. Although Fascist Italy retained its strategic and economic interests in southern and east‐central Europe, Mussolini increasingly appreciated that an extensive Italian empire in the greater Mediterranean region could exist alongside a German‐ dominated continent but would directly conflict with British and French vital interests. The possibility
of becoming a strategic and ideological partner with Nazi Germany, which could challenge Britain and France to the north and help Italy achieve its imperial ambitions to the south, steadily encouraged Mussolini ...
As Nazi Germany had influenced Fascist foreign policy, Italy’s Mediterranean ambitions motivated a reconsideration of German strategy. The basis of Hitler’s foreign policy was the concept of a central European economic bloc with Germany at its core. Mussolini’s Mediterranean ambitions and willingness to challenge Britain and France worked to Germany’s strategic advantage: an Anglo‐French‐Italian tension or conflict in the Mediterranean would facilitate Germany’s military conquest of Central and Eastern Europe. For this strategic reason as well as the close ideological affinities [connections] between German National Socialism and Italian Fascism, Hitler supported and demonstrated extraordinary loyalty to Mussolini before and during the war.

9. (a) What, according to Source I, did Fascism and Nazism have in common? [3]

(b) What does Source J suggest about the foreign policies of Italy and Germany? [2]

 

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source K for an historian studying the impact of ideology on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany. [4]

 

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about German and Italian foreign policies. [6]

 

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the influence of ideology on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany. [9]

 May 2022

 

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Events: Pearl Harbour (1941).
 

Source I 

An extract from a US government proposal delivered to the Empire of Japan on 26 November 1941, “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan.” (Known as “The Hull Note”.)
 

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavour [try] to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.
Both Governments will endeavour to conclude among American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement in which each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territory of French Indochina.
The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, or economically any Government or regime in China other than the national Government of the Republic of China.
 

Source J
 The IBO conveniently removed the source for copyright reasons and incorrectly identifies the Japanese character as Hirohito- without any support at all.

 S J Ray, a political cartoonist, depicts Emperor Hirohito [sic!] and Adolf Hitler in a cartoon published a week after Pearl Harbour was attacked on 7 December 1941, in the American newspaper, The Kansas City Star.

 

Source K 

Harry A Gailey, a professor of military history, in the academic book The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbour to Tokyo Bay (1995).
 

The [Japanese] army representatives were unanimous [united] in demanding war with the United States. [General] Tojo [the Japanese Prime Minister] understood that Japan’s ... [limited] oil supply, combined with the notorious bad weather, would make the Pearl Harbor attack almost impossible if postponed past the target date of ...( 7 December Hawaii time) ... While high-level Japanese officials had been confronting the hard choices of peace or war and their armed forces were preparing for conflict, ... [the Americans] seemed ... [completely] unaware of the potential consequences of President Roosevelt’s embargo ... Again and again [US Secretary of State] Hull ... insisted upon a complete Japanese withdrawal from both China and Indochina. Perhaps the [earlier] proposed meeting between ... [the US and Japan would have settled nothing, as Hull claimed. But America refused even to negotiate]. As early as his first meeting with ... [the Japanese Ambassador] on 8 March, Hull was ... [concerned] that his policy might lead to war with the Japanese. Later it was obvious ... that only a Japanese withdrawal from China would have ... [prevented] war. Perhaps it is too much to say, in retrospect, that anyone in the US government wanted war with Japan, but obviously little was done to ... [prevent] it. At the same time that the hard-line diplomatic policy was being pursued, there was ... [a lack of action] at all levels in Washington and Honolulu.

Source L

 David J Lu, a professor of Japanese history, writing in the academic book From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbour: Japan’s Entry into World War II (1961).

General Tojo later explained that the decision to attack was adopted in view of the tense international situation due to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. American and British preparations for war, difficulties in the negotiations with the United States, and no clear means of settling the China Incident also contributed. It was therefore necessary to prepare for war and yet continue the diplomatic conversations. The deadline for the negotiations was set because November would be the best month for landing operations. December would be possible but difficult, January would be impossible because of the northeast monsoons. Japan wanted the United States to express its views regarding three major points of difference between the two governments: (1) the withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan’s commitments under the Tripartite Pact, and (3) equal access to international trade. Japan avoided specific commitments on all major issues, and so did the United States. In Japanese eyes, the United States Government was not willing to give the specific answers that Japan was looking for. Thus, negotiations were getting nowhere.

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were the proposals made to Japan by the United States? [3]
(b) What does Source J suggest about the attack on Pearl Harbour? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying relations between Japan and the United States before the attack on Pearl Harbour. [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour in December 1941. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the reasons for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. [9]

 

Sample example from student [click to enlarge]:

 

May 2023

Read sources |to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion(1933-1940)— Causes of expansion: Appeasement.

Source I

Winston Churchill, a British politician, in a speech to Parliament (5 October 1938).

 

I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget, but which must nevertheless be stated, namely that [at Munich] we have sustained a total and absolute defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have. When I think of the hope for peace which still existed inEurope at the beginning of 1933, when Hitler firstobtained power, and of all the opportunities of slowing the growth of Nazi power which have been thrown away, I|cannot believe that a similar situation exists in history. So far as this country is concerned, the responsibility must rest with those who have had control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they [the British government] rearm themselves in time. They discredited the League of Nations and neglected to make alliances, leaving us without adequate national defence or effective international security.

Source K 

Stephen G Walker, a professor of politics,writing in the article “Solving the Appeasement Puzzle” for the British Journal of International Studies (1980).
 

The British government recognised Hitler’s unreasonable plans but were incapable of stopping him. British parliamentary and public opinion would not support the measures necessary to stop Hitler before 1939. Memories of the First World War made it difficult for British leaders to justify rapid armament, alliances and military intervention when a policy of negotiations existed as an alternative. The pointlessness of negotiations did not become clear until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Similarly, Britain’s global commitments meant that during the 1930s British interests faced threats from Germany in Europe, Italy in Africa and the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East, which could no longer be defended by the Royal Navy. It has been estimated that two or three years were required to increase British armament to the necessary levels. Britain needed to have begun rearmament in the early 1930s to have built a strong military force by the late 1930s. However, the British government’s appeasement policy could be seen as a sensible strategy at the time.

 

Source L 

 Donald E Shepardson, a professor of history, writing in the article “A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered” for the journal The Midwest Quarterly (2006).

 

One point of view claims that Britain and France betrayed a loyal ally, Czechoslovakia, for “peace in our time” at Munich, in September 1938. However, since the spring of 1936, when Hitler occupied the Rhineland and began rearming Germany, along with the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October of 1936 it had become obvious to Chamberlain that war might be coming, and a repeat of the horrors of the First World War should be avoided at all costs. The British and French knew that they must rearm and prepare for war while doing everything they could to avoid it. There was the chance,Chamberlain believed, that a war could be avoided by a negotiated agreement that recognised German interests. In Britain, most of Chamberlain’s Conservative Party supported this policy of appeasement, but many did not, most notably Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. The opposition parties were also divided. Many in Britain and France believed they could not win another war against Germany, and they certainly could not win a war against Germany,Italy,and Japan. Chamberlain’s promise of “peace in our time” became absurd when Hitler seized the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. 

Read sources I to L in the source booklet and answer questions 9 to 12. 

The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933-1940) - Causes of expansion: Appeasement. 

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were Churchill's criticisms of the British government policy of appeasement? [3]

(b) What does Source J reveal about British defence spending in the 1930s? [2] 

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying appeasement. [4] 

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about the policy of appeasement. [6] 

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the effectiveness of the British government's policy of appeasement. [9]

I am most grateful to a former student who paid the IBO money to get her work returned with examiner's comments, such as they are.

 November 2023

 Most of the sources were "Removed for copyright reasons" so yet again even after paying the IBO I still had to hunt down an actual copy:

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: Japanese domestic issues: political and economic issues, and their impact on foreign relations
 

Source I

Eliot Janeway, a political economist, in the article "Rich Land is the Goal of Japanese Army", published in The New York Times newspaper (15 August 1937).  

Disappointed with the limited resources of her Manchurian possessions, Japan is determined to push her empire south. Her success here will mean far more than the shrinking of China's boundaries. Japan requires the raw materials of China's central and southern provinces for her own uses. Even if she had not required the resources, Japan would have had to expand here in order to block China's industrialisation and the unification which Japan fears would result from it... If Japan's steel industry is ever to become self-sufficient, she must secure for herself the tons of iron ore which lie in Shanxi. Similarly, Japan's coal shortage is becoming dangerous as her coal is of a low grade and she needs to import coal from Shanxi for her smelting industries. Japan's difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of raw cotton are well-known. She paid 900,000,000 yen to India and the United States last year and needs to obtain Chinese cotton to become more self-sufficient. The raw materials in China are vital to the expansion of Japan's empire.

Source J  

David Low, a cartoonist, depicts the Japanese military (on the left), politicians (in the middle) and industrialists (on the right) during the invasion of China in the Evening Standard (19 January 1938).

 Source K

Anonymous, "Japan's Quest for Power and World War II in Asia", in the academic publication Asia for Educators (2022). 

 The military's policy to expand Japanese territory [in Manchuria] to achieve economic security was particularly attractive... However, the Japanese military faced a particular problem as certain raw materials, especially oil and rubber, were not available within the Japanese sphere of influence. Japan received most of its oil from the United States and rubber from British Malaya. By 1937, increasing Chinese resistance drew Japan into an exhausting war in central China. Thus, when the navy pressed for a "southern" strategy of expanding into Dutch Indonesia to get its oil, and Malaya to control its rubber, the army agreed. It is clear that economic factors were instrumental in explaining Japanese expansion in East Asia.  The political structure of Japan was increasingly dominated by the military. From 1931, when Japan took control of Manchuria, the military behaved autonomously on the Asian mainland and with increasing authority in domestic politics. The government was never able to gain real control of the economy as the zaibatsu [Japanese corporations] were increasingly supportive of the military's expansionist policies and the emperor took no action to restrain the military, despite his preference for peace. 

Source L 

 Chih Meng, a professor of economics, in the article “Some Economic Aspects of the Sino-Japanese Conflict”, published in the academic journal The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1938).
The situation in China today is the direct result of Japan’s political policy rather than the pressure of her economic problems. Since 1931, it has become obvious from Japan’s policy of conquest that “security” and “self-defence” mean control of Chinese resources and territory. In recent years, the overpopulation argument has been effectively used to justify Japanese expansion because of its emotional appeal, but this has no real basis in economic reality. In 1931, the Japanese people were told that the occupation of Manchuria would solve their economic problems. They were disappointed. After six years Japan had not benefited from Manchuria, but she had to invest heavily there for military purposes. Unfortunately, in Japan political policy dictates economics. The result is that Japanese militarists have overcome the opposition of liberals and have gone far in deciding government policy. Although China is by far the greater sufferer economically, Japan has not escaped the consequences of the war. Japan’s military operations are becoming more expensive as her armies expand further into China. 75 % of the gasoline Japan used in 1936 for tanks, bombers and warships came from the United States. One-third of the steel Japan produced in 1937 came from American raw materials.

Read sources I to L in the source booklet and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: Japanese domestic issues: political and economic issues, and their impact on foreign relations.
 

9. (a) Why, according to Source I, did Japan invade China in 1937? [3] 

(b) What does Source J suggest about the Japanese invasion of China? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of
Source I for an historian studying the reasons for Japanese expansion in the 1930s. [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about Japan’s political and economic
motives for expansion in East Asia. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the impact that Japanese political and economic policies had on foreign relations. [9]

May 2024

 

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933-1940) - Responses: International response to German and Italian aggression (1940).

Source I 

Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain [and northern Ireland, IBO], in a letter to Franklin D Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, marked secret and personal (7th December 1940). 

Dear Mr. President

It seems to me that the vast majority of the American people are convinced that the safety of the United States as well as the future of our two democracies are dependent upon the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth. The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy is essential to the security of our trade routes and the best way of preventing the war spreading to the shores of the United States. The urgent need is to limit the loss of shipping on the Atlantic routes to our islands. This may be achieved by increasing the naval forces which deal with enemy attacks. The gift, loan or supply of a large number of American warships, above all destroyers already in the Atlantic, is vital to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. The United States Navy also needs to ensure that protection is given to the new bases that the United States is establishing in British islands in the Western Hemisphere.

 

Source J

David Low, political cartoonist in the London Evening Standard, 18th June 1940, depicting a British soldier responding to Germany's invasion of Western Europe.

"Very Well, Alone then"

Source K

Andrew Roberts, an historian, writing in the academic book The Storm of War (2009).

It has been claimed that between June 1940 and June 1941 the British were completely alone [after the fall of France]. This is not true, as they had the support of the British Commonwealth and Empire, as well as their alliance with Greece. However, there was very little to oppose a German invasion of Britain if this had come in 1940. Roosevelt largely rearmed the British army after Dunkirk. Before the United States entered the war, the Roosevelt Administration had provided Britain with invaluable help. As well as allowing Britain to buy much needed arms and other supplies, the United States had given the Royal Navy fifty destroyers in return for long leases on various British military bases in September 1940, and had begun patrolling areas of the Western Atlantic against U-Boats. Roosevelt continually sent encouraging support to Churchill and [through 1940] pushed for the Lease-Lend Act until it was passed in 1941. Britain had maintained its freedom by resisting alone. Other countries tried to preserve their freedom by declaring their neutrality. These include Turkey, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. However, Switzerland allowed German and Italian military supply trains to pass through its country, while in July 1940 Sweden gave Germany the right to move troops over her borders.

 

Source L

Max Hastings, an historian, writing in the academic book Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord 1940-45 (2009).

On May 2nd, 1940, Churchill appealed for American aid and begged for the loan of fifty destroyers. Roosevelt decided that this would breach the 1939 Neutrality Act and vetoed the request. The language used by Roosevelt and Churchill created a myth of American generosity in 1940 and 1941. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, wrote of supplying vast quantities of weapons to Britain in the summer of 1940. However, the value of these shipments made a minimal contribution to Britain's fighting power. American-supplied artillery and small arms were obsolete. The fifty old destroyers loaned by the US in September 1940 in exchange for British colonial bases were of little practical value. At the end of 1940, only nine of the destroyers were operational and US guns, tanks and planes shipped across to Britain were not gifts. Under the terms of the Neutrality Act imposed by Congress, war materials had to be paid for in cash resulting in huge profits for US companies from arms sales. Roosevelt told the British Ambassador to Washington that there could be no American subsidy [financial support] while Britain could still pay, as Congress would never allow it... Relations between the dominions and London were poor, often because Churchill treated colonial governments of the Commonwealth and Empire with indifference.

Read sources I to L in the source booklet and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933-1940)-Responses: International response to German and Italian aggression (1940).

9. (a) What, according to Source I, should the United States do to support Britain? [3]

(b) What does Source J suggest about Britain's situation in June 1940? [2]

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying the British response to German and Italian aggression in 1940. [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about international responses to German and Italian aggression. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the extent of international support for Britain in 1940. [9]