From the November 2022 IBDP HL History Paper 3 Exam
The Second World War was marked by strategic complexity, military innovation and geopolitical shifts, the analysis of which continues to engage historians. The question of whether the Axis' defeat was primarily due to their poor strategic decisions is indeed a contentious one. Historians such as Beevor and Gilbert argue that the defeat was multifaceted and not solely attributable to their strategic failures. However, the significance of strategic decision-making cannot be overlooked. Evans, for example, sees strategic blunders as a decisive element in the downfall of the Axis powers. This essay will navigate through the labyrinth of these competing perspectives, evaluating the influence of strategic decisions on the fate of the Axis and exploring other potential reasons for their defeat.
The first major Axis strategic error was the decision by Adolf Hitler to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. Code-named Operation Barbarossa, this initiative aimed to establish German supremacy in Eastern Europe, exploiting the vast natural resources of the USSR. However, the tactical blunders committed during this operation were numerous and, ultimately, catastrophic. Evans maintains that the primary error was a gross underestimation of Soviet military capability, compounded by the assumption that the USSR would capitulate rapidly under German assault, as France had done in 1940. This underestimation not only undermined the strategic planning of the operation but also led to logistical oversights, such as the failure to prepare adequately for the harsh Russian winter. Hitler's ideological conviction that the Soviet Union was a 'colossus with feet of clay,' ready to crumble under a determined assault, blinded him to the logistical and practical challenges of the operation. This approach, based on ideological preconceptions rather than sound strategic reasoning, was also evident in Hitler's declaration of war on the United States following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This was another strategic blunder, effectively doubling the number of major powers against which Germany had to fight. Even if Japanese pressure on the US Pacific Fleet was to be factored in, Hitler's decision, made without any commitment from Japan to reciprocate by declaring war on the USSR, dramatically expanded the scope of the war in a way that Germany was ill-equipped to manage. Furthermore, the German leadership ignored the lessons of the First World War, particularly the perils of unrestricted submarine warfare. The U-boat campaign against Allied shipping in the Atlantic was not only a violation of international law but also a strategic error. It provoked the United States into entering the war in 1917, a mistake repeated in 1939-1941 with a similar outcome. The failure to learn from past mistakes was a critical flaw in the Axis strategic decision-making process.
The second major error, argued by Gilbert, was the strategic blunder committed by Japan when they attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The goal was to eliminate the Pacific Fleet as a potential obstacle to Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. However, this attack incited an incandescent American response, eventually leading to Japan's downfall. One of the key errors in the Pearl Harbor attack was the failure to destroy the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers, which played a critical role in later battles. The Japanese command also underestimated the capacity of the United States to mobilise its vast industrial resources for war, a miscalculation that gave rise to the concept of a 'production war,' coined by historians like Tooze. Further to this, Japan's decision to advance into British-held territories like Singapore and Hong Kong - whilst strategically sound in terms of resource acquisition - ultimately dragged more players into the Pacific Theatre, complicating Japan's strategic position. While these decisions made sense in terms of Japan's immediate strategic needs, the broader implications - primarily the inevitability of war with the United States and the commonwealth nations - were underestimated. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent offensives in Southeast Asia were indeed strategic blunders that effectively sealed Japan's fate. In Italy, Mussolini's decisions to invade Greece and later, to join the war against Britain and France, were fundamentally misguided. Mussolini's strategic vision was clouded by aspirations of re-establishing a Roman Empire in the Mediterranean, leading him to overestimate Italy's military capacity and underestimate the military capability of Greece and the Allies. Moreover, his decision to join the war on the side of the Axis was based on the belief that the conflict would be short and that Italy could share in the spoils without expending significant resources or military might. This was a catastrophic miscalculation. Churchill's description of Italy as the "soft underbelly" of the Axis was telling. The diversion of resources to stabilise the Italian front strained German resources and opened up another front that Germany had to defend. These poor strategic decisions by the Axis powers were indeed significant in their defeat. However, it is essential to appreciate that these were not the sole reasons for the downfall of the Axis.
As compelling as the argument is for poor strategic decisions being the primary reason for the Axis defeat, it must be contextualised within broader considerations. Beevor posits that a significant factor in the defeat of the Axis was the overwhelming material and manpower advantage enjoyed by the Allies. The combined industrial and population resources of the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire dwarfed those of the Axis. The Axis, particularly Germany and Japan, simply could not match the output of armaments, aircraft, tanks and other war materials of the Allied powers. These resources were crucial in both the European and Pacific theatres of the war, enabling the Allies to replace losses, expand their forces and continually improve their weaponry and equipment.
Moreover, another crucial aspect was the superior strategic and operational leadership on the Allied side. Allied leaders like Eisenhower, Montgomery and Zhukov made their share of mistakes, but they were also able to learn from them and adapt. By contrast, Hitler's increasing interference in military operations, exemplified in the disastrous Stalingrad campaign, was detrimental to the Axis cause. Furthermore, the inability of the Axis to form a cohesive and coordinated alliance severely impaired their strategic effectiveness. Unlike the Allies, who pursued a truly joint strategy, the Axis powers often operated independently and without full knowledge of each other's intentions.
Lastly, the strategic bombing campaign by the Allies was a factor that historians such as Hastings identify as pivotal in disrupting the Axis war economy and undermining civilian morale. The bombing campaign against Germany, though morally controversial, was successful in destroying critical infrastructure and hindering production capabilities, while the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki decisively ended the war in the Pacific.
In conclusion, the assertion that the Axis was defeated due to poor strategic decisions is substantiated to a considerable extent. The decisions to invade the Soviet Union and to initiate the war with the United States, alongside other poor choices, fundamentally shaped the trajectory of the war in a way that was unfavourable to the Axis powers. However, this does not entirely encapsulate the complexity of the reasons behind the Axis defeat. It is clear that a confluence of factors – including the vast resource and industrial disparity between the Allies and the Axis, the effectiveness of strategic leadership on the Allied side, and the disruptive impact of the Allied strategic bombing campaigns – played a vital role. While strategic blunders were a significant factor, the outcome of the Second World War was shaped by a matrix of elements, each interacting with and influencing the others in ways that reinforce the complexity and dynamism of historical events. The interplay between strategic decisions, material factors and leadership quality underscores the richness of historical study and the nuances that defy simplistic explanations.
Example II:
From the November 2022 Paper 3 IBDP HL History exam
As one grapples with the complexity and nuances of the Second World War, the question of whether the Axis Powers lost due to poor strategic decisions continues to generate intense debate. This essay will critically evaluate this proposition, making use of numerous examples and analysing the positions of key scholars in the field.
In analysing the unfolding of the war, poor strategic decisions do appear as a significant element contributing to the defeat of the Axis. A compelling example can be found in Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s ill-fated decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. Edward J. Erickson, renowned for his studies on military history, made a compelling argument that this was a strategic blunder of epic proportions. He pointed out that Hitler underestimated the vastness and harsh conditions of the Russian terrain, alongside the resilience and sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army. Erickson further argued that the decision to declare war on the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbour, despite being embroiled in a two-front war in Europe, was another catastrophic strategic mistake. Germany, thus, spread its resources too thin, weakening its war effort.
Dissenting from Erickson's view is David M. Glantz, an expert on Eastern Front operations, who posited that Operation Barbarossa was not necessarily a poor strategic decision, but rather suffered from flawed execution and over-ambition. Glantz suggested that Hitler's strategy initially bore fruit, as the Wehrmacht enjoyed a series of stunning victories, capturing vast swaths of territory and decimating the Red Army in the process. However, Hitler's later decision to divert forces to Kiev and the failure to take Moscow before winter set in, combined with overextended supply lines, resulted in the operation's ultimate failure. Therefore, Glantz asserted that it was less a case of flawed strategy, and more a case of flawed execution and tactical missteps.
Another compelling narrative surrounds Japan's role in the Axis defeat. Ian W. Toll, an authoritative voice on the Pacific War, argued that Japan's decision to wage war against the United States was a disastrous strategic blunder. He posited that Japan underestimated America's industrial capacity, which eventually outproduced and overwhelmed Japan's war machine. In Toll's analysis, the attack on Pearl Harbour, far from crippling the US Pacific Fleet, only succeeded in galvanising American will to wage a total war against Japan.
Contrasting with Toll's viewpoint, Haruo Tohmatsu and H.P. Willmott, both experts on the Pacific War, suggested that Japan's strategic decisions, while indeed problematic, were driven by an increasingly dire geopolitical situation. They asserted that Japan's leaders felt cornered by American embargoes, and saw war as the only way to secure the resources necessary for the country's survival. This perspective posits that Japan's strategic decisions, although indeed contributing to their defeat, were made in response to circumstances that offered few good options.
Analyzing the defeat of Italy, the third Axis power, MacGregor Knox, a scholar focusing on Italian and German history, argued that Italy's poor strategic decisions and inadequate military capabilities were significant contributors to the Axis' defeat. Knox suggested that Italy's decision to invade Greece in 1940 was a strategic misstep that delayed Germany's invasion of Russia, contributing to the eventual failure of Operation Barbarossa. Furthermore, Knox stressed that Italy's inability to successfully wage war in North Africa, requiring German intervention, further strained the Axis war effort.
Whilst acknowledging the validity of these arguments, R.J.B. Bosworth, a distinguished scholar of Italian history, contended that Italy was less an active participant and more a coerced ally. According to Bosworth, Italy's defeat, while indeed affected by poor strategic decisions, was more profoundly influenced by the fundamental mismatch between Italy's imperial ambitions and its limited resources.
Having delved into the specifics of strategic failures of the Axis Powers, it is crucial to remember that the defeat of the Axis cannot be attributed solely to poor strategic decisions. The superior resources and strategic positioning of the Allies, the moral and material aid provided by the United States prior to its entry into the war, the monumental industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, and the galvanising effect of ideologies opposing fascism and promoting democracy and communism - these factors all played crucial roles in the Axis' defeat.
Nevertheless, as Erickson, Glantz, Toll, Tohmatsu, Willmott, Knox, and Bosworth have each illuminated in their work, the strategic decisions made by the Axis powers indeed had significant, and often detrimental, effects on their war effort. In conclusion, while not the sole cause, poor strategic decisions certainly played a pivotal role in the Axis' defeat. We must remember, however, that history is not determined by singular elements, but by a complex interplay of myriad factors, and the Second World War was no exception.
