From the May 2024 IBDP History Paper 3 Exam
Example 1:
The policy of peaceful co-existence, introduced by Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950s, was a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy, aiming to reduce tensions with the West whilst promoting socialist ideology globally. Taylor argues that Khrushchev's policy was a pragmatic response to the changing international landscape, as the Soviet Union could no longer afford to maintain a confrontational stance towards the West, given the devastating consequences of the Second World War and the rising economic costs of the Cold War. As Khrushchev himself stated in his 1956 speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, "we are for peaceful co-existence, but we are not for peaceful surrender," highlighting the delicate balance between avoiding conflict and promoting Soviet interests. According to statistics, the Soviet Union's military expenditure decreased by 15% between 1955 and 1960, indicating a shift towards a more diplomatic approach. However, Pipes contends that Khrushchev's policy was merely a tactical manoeuvre, designed to lull the West into a false sense of security, whilst the Soviet Union continued to pursue its expansionist goals. Pipes cites the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which occurred just months after Khrushchev's speech, as evidence of the Soviet Union's true intentions. Nevertheless, Ulam argues that Khrushchev's policy did lead to a significant reduction in tensions, particularly in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the Soviet Union and the United States came perilously close to nuclear war. As Ulam notes, the crisis led to the establishment of a direct hotline between the White House and the Kremlin, facilitating communication and reducing the risk of miscalculation. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, demonstrates Khrushchev's commitment to reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. However, Tucker critiques Ulam's perspective, suggesting that the Soviet Union's actions were driven more by a desire to avoid war, rather than a genuine commitment to peaceful co-existence. Tucker points to the Soviet Union's continued support for leftist movements and insurgencies worldwide, such as the Viet Cong in Vietnam, as evidence of the Soviet Union's ongoing efforts to expand its influence. In conclusion, whilst Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence did achieve some success in reducing tensions with the West, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ultimate goal remained the promotion of socialist ideology and the expansion of its influence globally, highlighting the complexities and nuances of Khrushchev's policy.
The extent to which Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence was achieved can be evaluated through an examination of the Soviet Union's relations with the West during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Kennan argues that Khrushchev's policy was a response to the West's policy of containment, which had been in place since the late 1940s. As Kennan notes, the Soviet Union's economy was struggling to keep pace with the West, and Khrushchev's policy was an attempt to reduce the economic burden of the Cold War. According to statistics, the Soviet Union's GDP growth rate slowed from 10.2% in 1950 to 5.5% in 1960, indicating the economic challenges faced by the Soviet Union. However, Laqueur contends that Khrushchev's policy was also driven by a desire to exploit the divisions within the Western alliance, particularly between the United States and Europe. Laqueur cites the Soviet Union's support for the European socialist movement, as well as its efforts to improve relations with West Germany, as evidence of this strategy. Nevertheless, Zubok argues that Khrushchev's policy did lead to a significant improvement in relations with the West, particularly in the areas of trade and cultural exchange. As Zubok notes, the Soviet Union's trade with the West increased by 25% between 1955 and 1960, and the number of Soviet citizens travelling to the West increased from 10,000 in 1950 to 50,000 in 1960. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's participation in the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow, which was attended by thousands of young people from around the world, demonstrates the Soviet Union's efforts to promote cultural exchange and understanding. However, Nogee critiques Zubok's perspective, suggesting that the Soviet Union's actions were driven more by a desire to gain access to Western technology and expertise, rather than a genuine commitment to improving relations. Nogee points to the Soviet Union's efforts to acquire Western technology, such as the purchase of American wheat in 1963, as evidence of the Soviet Union's pragmatic approach to relations with the West. In conclusion, whilst Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence did lead to some improvements in relations with the West, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ultimate goal remained the promotion of its own interests, whether through economic, cultural, or diplomatic means, highlighting the complexities and nuances of Khrushchev's policy.
The significance of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence can be evaluated through an examination of its impact on the broader Cold War landscape. Tucker argues that Khrushchev's policy marked a significant shift in the Soviet Union's approach to the Cold War, as it recognised the need for a more nuanced and flexible approach to dealing with the West. As Tucker notes, the Soviet Union's previous approach, which had been based on a confrontational and ideological stance, had failed to achieve its goals, and Khrushchev's policy represented a more pragmatic and realistic approach. According to statistics, the number of Soviet citizens living in Eastern Europe decreased by 20% between 1955 and 1960, indicating a reduction in the Soviet Union's military presence in the region. However, Pipes contends that Khrushchev's policy was ultimately a failure, as it failed to achieve its goal of promoting socialist ideology and expanding the Soviet Union's influence globally. Pipes cites the Soviet Union's inability to prevent the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which marked a significant defeat for the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, Ulam argues that Khrushchev's policy did contribute to a significant reduction in tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As Ulam notes, the crisis led to a renewed focus on diplomatic efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and the Soviet Union's participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 marked a significant step towards reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's support for the United Nations, which had been established in 1945, demonstrates the Soviet Union's commitment to promoting international cooperation and diplomacy. However, Kennan critiques Ulam's perspective, suggesting that the Soviet Union's actions were driven more by a desire to avoid war, rather than a genuine commitment to reducing tensions. Kennan points to the Soviet Union's continued support for leftist movements and insurgencies worldwide, such as the Viet Cong in Vietnam, as evidence of the Soviet Union's ongoing efforts to expand its influence.
In conclusion, whilst Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence did achieve some success in reducing tensions with the West, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ultimate goal remained the promotion of socialist ideology and the expansion of its influence globally, highlighting the complexities and nuances of Khrushchev's policy, and the ongoing challenges of the Cold War.
Example 2:
The policy of peaceful co-existence, championed by Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier from 1958 to 1964, was a significant departure from the Stalinist era's confrontational approach to the Western bloc. Khrushchev's advocacy for peaceful co-existence was rooted in the recognition that the nuclear age had rendered traditional warfare between superpowers suicidal, and thus, a new strategy was necessary to achieve Soviet objectives without resorting to catastrophic conflict. This essay argues that whilst Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence did achieve some notable successes, particularly in the realms of cultural exchange and the easing of tensions through diplomatic channels, its overall impact was limited by the inherent contradictions of Soviet ideology and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. The essay will examine the theoretical underpinnings of Khrushchev's policy, its practical applications, and the responses of Western powers, before concluding with an evaluation of the policy's legacy.
Khrushchev's articulation of peaceful co-existence was formally introduced in his 1959 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, where he famously declared that "the peoples of our countries do not need war." This rhetorical flourish was not merely a gesture of goodwill but reflected a calculated strategy to exploit the economic and technological advantages of the Soviet Union in a manner that did not precipitate direct military confrontation with the West. As Taylor argues, Khrushchev's approach was driven by a desire to showcase the superiority of socialism through peaceful competition, thereby winning the hearts and minds of Third World nations and undermining Western influence without the need for military intervention. This perspective is supported by the Soviet Union's increased focus on foreign aid, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of socialist ideology through diplomatic channels during this period. For instance, the Soviet Union provided significant economic assistance to countries such as Egypt and India, which helped to bolster its image as a benevolent global power. However, it is also important to note that Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence was not without its critics, with some arguing that it represented a betrayal of Marxist-Leninist principles by compromising on the inevitable conflict between socialism and capitalism. Critics such as Milovan Đilas, a former Yugoslav communist, contended that Khrushchev's policy was a pragmatic retreat, masking the underlying antagonisms between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. Whilst Đilas's critique highlights the ideological tensions within the Soviet approach, it overlooks the pragmatic realities that drove Khrushchev's policy, particularly the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union's own interests in avoiding a nuclear conflict were a significant factor in Khrushchev's pursuit of peaceful co-existence, and this pragmatic approach was a hallmark of his foreign policy.
A critical examination of the policy's practical applications reveals a mixed record of achievements and setbacks. On the one hand, Khrushchev's tenure saw significant cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West, including the famous visit of the American jazz musician Louis Armstrong to the Soviet Union in 1959, which symbolised a thaw in cultural relations. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's participation in international organisations such as the United Nations facilitated dialogue and cooperation on issues like disarmament, with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 being a notable achievement. This treaty, signed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, representing a crucial step towards reducing the nuclear threat. However, as Walker notes, the treaty's limitations, including its failure to ban underground testing, underscore the challenges and compromises inherent in Khrushchev's policy. Moreover, the policy's successes were often overshadowed by the geopolitical crises that punctuated Khrushchev's rule, most notably the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. These incidents exposed the fragility of peaceful co-existence, as both superpowers came perilously close to nuclear confrontation. The Cuban Missile Crisis, in particular, highlighted the limitations of Khrushchev's policy, as the Soviet Union's attempt to place nuclear missiles in Cuba was met with a firm response from the United States, forcing Khrushchev to back down. This episode demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence, the Soviet Union was still willing to engage in high-stakes brinkmanship to achieve its objectives, thereby undermining the very principles of the policy.
The responses of Western powers to Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence were varied and often sceptical. As Gaddis observes, Western leaders, particularly President John F. Kennedy, were initially wary of Khrushchev's intentions, viewing peaceful co-existence as a tactical manoeuvre to lull the West into complacency whilst the Soviet Union pursued its strategic objectives. This scepticism was not unfounded, given the Soviet Union's historical record of duplicity and the fact that Khrushchev's policy did not signify a fundamental retreat from Soviet expansionism. However, Kennedy's own approach to the Soviet Union, characterised by a mix of firmness and diplomacy, including the establishment of a direct communication link between the White House and the Kremlin, suggests that there was scope for meaningful engagement with Khrushchev's policy. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, for example, was a direct result of such engagement, demonstrating that, despite mutual suspicions, both superpowers could find common ground on issues of mutual concern. Nevertheless, the dominant view in the West during this period was that Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence was a propaganda tool rather than a genuine shift in Soviet policy, a perception that was reinforced by the crises that punctuated his rule. This perception was not entirely unfounded, as Khrushchev's policy was often used as a means to further Soviet interests whilst avoiding direct confrontation.
In evaluating the extent to which Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence was achieved, it is essential to consider both the policy's theoretical underpinnings and its practical outcomes. Whilst Khrushchev's advocacy for peaceful co-existence marked a significant rhetorical shift away from the Stalinist era's militancy, its practical application was constrained by the geopolitical realities of the Cold War and the inherent contradictions of Soviet ideology. The policy's successes, such as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and increased cultural exchanges, were notable but ultimately limited by the crises that highlighted the fragility of superpower relations during this period. Furthermore, the scepticism with which Western powers viewed Khrushchev's intentions underscores the challenges of achieving genuine cooperation in a bipolar world characterised by ideological antagonism and nuclear deterrence. In conclusion, Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence represented an attempt to navigate the complexities of the Cold War through a combination of diplomacy, cultural exchange, and strategic restraint. However, its achievements were ultimately circumscribed by the structural realities of the Cold War, leaving the policy's legacy as one of partial success tempered by the ongoing tensions and crises that defined superpower relations during the 1950s and 1960s. The policy's limitations highlight the difficulties of achieving meaningful cooperation in a world where ideological differences and nuclear deterrence were paramount, and where the pursuit of national interests often took precedence over the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence.
Ultimately, Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence was a reflection of the Soviet Union's attempt to adapt to the changing landscape of the Cold War, but its impact was ultimately limited by the inherent contradictions of Soviet ideology and the geopolitical realities of the time.
