2022 Internal Assessment
To what extent was Lin Biao actively involved in the so-called "Lin Biao Incident”?
History Internal Assessment Word Count: 2198
History IA jhd047
Section A: Identification and Analysis of Sources
This investigation seeks to answer “To what extent was Lin Biao actively involved in the so-called ”Lin Biao Incident”?” Both originating over a decade after the Incident, two sources provide possible chronologies of events. A is the first major challenge to the official report, arguing Lin was in fact not on the plane as it crashed, and instead was bombed in his limousine leaving a banquet after his own failed “Jade Tower Mountain Scheme”. B is the second radical reinterpretation of events, shedding light on the relationships and psychology of key characters and arguing that it was Lin’s son who planned a coup, leading to the subsequent escape where Lin Biao dies.
Source A: “The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao” by Yao Ming-Le (a pseudonym)1, 1983 (Alfred and Knopf)
The source is translated from a Chinese manuscript written anonymously and smuggled out of China under a pseudonym. Virtually nothing is known of the author’s true identity or background to protect them from Chinese prosecution. Credence is granted to the author and origin with its alleged endorsement by several “China specialists”2 (though they are not named and no explicit reasoning is provided) and 7 major publishing houses3 in 8 countries.4 It claims the true version of events at a time when only the official report and rumours amongst civilians were available. However, the publishers endorsing the source also blatantly advertise it as a “bizarre” and “sensational” account, even announcing that it “[assumes] that the story it tells is true” on its front cover.5
Dramatic details may have been exaggerated or even completely fabricated with the goal of commercial profit, much like the Hitler diaries scandal of the same year. The source’s value lies largely in the impressive and extensive range of primary sources used to develop and evidence the argument. Though their origins are questionable, what information can be cross-referenced holds true, such as the glossary of 131 key characters which is described as “strikingly accurate”, including those of minor military base guards not mentioned elsewhere in research literature.6 These minor details proved useful in confirming the schedules and movements of those implicated in the coup. Nonetheless, minor mistakes are present, including misnaming Lin Liheng’s fiance when accusing him of a secondary blackmail scheme.7
Source B: “The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution” by Jin Qiu, 1999 (Stanford)
As a leading expert on the Cultural Revolution with “significant contributions to scholarship on the period”8 and unparalleled access to key characters and unpublished materials, Jin presents a new perspective using previously unseen evidence to challenge both the official and Western viewpoints of absolute culpability and innocence respectively.9 Nevertheless, her personal con- nection to the subject matter undermines the source’s objectivity. Jin’s primary motivation is clearing her father’s name following his purging and 17-year imprisonment in 1981 on claims of his involvement in the incident.10 The same can be said for the interviewees regarding their family or acquaintances. Several interviewees, such as Lin Liheng herself, have come forward with updated information over a decade later after the source’s publication when repercussions may be less severe. Published in the United States 28 years after the event, the threat of censorship and prosecution by the CCP is largely avoided,11 though much of the primary sources still originate from Chinese citizens where evidence could be altered to reflect the state’s attitude. The source primarily focuses on the dynamics within the Lin family and Politburo, along with the psychology of individuals, providing valuable insight into potential motives. Combined with a detailed chronology of events, the RQ is addressed from multiple angles. However, its psychological analysis is outdated (particularly the obsolete DSM-3 specifications for senile paranoia12) and used as a blanket explanation for actions without detailed clarification.13
Section B: Investigation
The Lin Biao incident was a watershed moment that not only highlighted Mao’s attitude dur- ing the Cultural Revolution but also had “profound and long-lasting effects on the country”,14 including but not limited to a major purge of over 1000 senior officials,15 the rise of the Gang of Four, and drastically altering public perception of the Chairman himself. Lin Biao, then defence minister and Party vice chairman, defected on a Hawker-Siddeley Trident 1E flying from Qinhuangdao Shanhaiguan Airport following a failed coup attempt when the plane crashed over O ̈ndo rkhaan,Mongolia.TheseriesofeventsandactionsofkeyactorsleadinguptotheIncident have been a mystery and subject of debate shaped by various major theories proposed in the decades following the incident concerning his involvement. This essay will examine the veracity of two sources’ radical viewpoints with respect to three key aspects—the planned coup(s), Lin Biao’s death, and the Trident crash—to reach a conclusion on Lin’s role leading up to his death.
The Incident is commonly understood to begin with Project 57116, an attempted coup of- ficially attributed to Lin. When news broke of his death on December 7, 1980,17 documents publicisedbyleftistnewspaperWenhuiBaoincludedacopyofplansdrawnup.18 Theseconsisted of intercepting Mao in his personal train following an inspection tour of the south, which was abruptly cut short thus unintentionally foiling the coup. Due to the haphazard nature of the plan and circumstances at the time, it is much likelier that Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo, masterminded this. For a legendary war general who won two of the three decisive campaigns during the Chinese Civil War with highly strategic encirclements and ambushes to defeat the GMD, 571 was com- pletely deficient in foresight and did not demonstrate any competent planning. The document did not contain any specifics regarding resources required, only loosely listing “vehicles”19 and ”self-made weapons”20, amongst other undeveloped points.21 More consideration is placed on developing vague revolutionary slogans and narratives such as “The whole party unite!”22 or “[Mao] turned the political life of the party and the country into a feudal autocratic dictatorial patriarchal life.”23 to be implemented after successful cooperation with the USSR to stage a coup.24 This ineptitude can be explained by attributing the plan to his son Lin Liguo, a PLAAF deputy director with sufficient influence in key military divisions to carry out the coup. Lin Liguo’s Air Force office was furthermore obtained through nepotism rather than military experience, explaining the discrepancy in planning quality.
Additionally, Lin Biao’s health had begun to deteriorate in the early 1950s, and he withdrew from public office as a result. Mao’s personal physician, Dr Li Zhisui, had also attended to the late Lin Biao, recalling his state in the late 1960s as “obviously mentally unsound”, a “troubled soul, unfit to lead”.25 This could account for 571’s poor planning, though his withdrawal from politics and passive and reactive nature during this time directly contradict the active planning involved.26
Jian Tenjiao’s later testimony during the 1980-81 special trial supported Lin Liguo’s involvement in planning the 571 coup without his father through mentions of 3 potential plans called off last minute by Lin Biao once he was made aware of his son’s proposal.27 Though testimony from a CCP court alone cannot be considered reliable due to the common practice of forced confessions conforming to the Party’s political aims, its combination with publicised documents and other accounts contradicts the official narrative and support Lin Liguo as the plotter.
Yao supplements this by implicating Lin Biao in a separate “Jade Mountain Scheme” wherein a border dispute with the USSR is used to lure Mao into the Western Hill bunkers to be gassed allowing Lin to take over and rekindle Sino-Soviet relations. This contradicts the actions of key political players in the weeks following September 12, indicating Lin played a reactive role leading up to the crash. Yao28 and the official account29 are in agreement that the family’s plans were leaked by Lin Liheng to Zhou Enlai on the night of September 12. Supposing the Scheme did exist and was leaked this way, it would not have been possible for several named co-conspirators to resume official duties weeks after September 12, as Mao would have at least taken action to relieve them. This was not the case; Lieutenant General Qiu Huizuo, a main co-conspirator later sentenced to 16 years in prison, was noted almost two weeks later to have sent off a visiting party led by congressman Li Xiannian to Hanoi on September 24 before being confronted.30 The same is true of General Wu Faxian, who was implicated in the coup and sentenced to 17 years in 1981; the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu Hao recalls Wu’s presence at a meeting reviewing accident scene photographs, an event he would not have attended had Lin Liheng made the call before. The improbability of the Jade Mountain scheme further absolves Lin Biao of any responsibility for the coupes that precipitated his escape and death.
Lastly, the nature of the jet crash over O ̈ndo ̈rkhaan killing Lin Liguo and possibly Lin Biao amongst nine other passengers is called into question. Given Lin Biao’s questionable involvement in the planning of the coup that forced the escape, it follows that he likely did not plan to board the Trident. In fact, his health and psychological state had deteriorated to the point where he refused to leave his residence without Li Wenpu, his personal bodyguard, much less get in a car without Li’s accompaniment. Although under testimony in 1981 Li states Lin was aware of plans to travel to Irkutsk in the USSR after inquiring about the distance, this cannot be corroborated by others and it was “not uncommon” to commit perjury in fear of Party retaliation.31 Zhang Ning corroborates this in an interview, recounting how Lin’s acquaintances were instructed to produce reports satisfactory to the CCP’s Special Case Group.32 Furthermore, Lin Biao’s close relationship with his daughter Lin Liheng 33 despite his declining mental state meant Lin Biao would refuse to leave for the USSR without her. The only possible explanation would be that Lin left for Shanhaiguan Airport after being convinced or forced by family members involved in the coup. Having been informed of Lin’s imminent escape, Mao famously quoted《何典》34 in response: “Rain will fall, widows will remarry. What can we do? Let him go.” 35 This reaffirms the Lin family’s initial suspicions of Mao premeditating a purge, possibly using Lin Biao as a scapegoat for the failures of the Great Leap Forward. Allowing Lin to leave and be seen as a traitor working with the USSR would remove the need to explain why one of the revolution’s figureheads suddenly turned.
Though there is insufficient high-quality evidence, theories from Sources A and B can be used to reasonably infer that it was indeed Lin Liguo and not Lin Biao that attempted the Project 571 coup. Lin Biao may have individually entertained the idea of a border dispute with the USSR after a similar skirmish at Zhen Bao island as suggested by Yao, but no concrete plans ever materialised. In the end, Jin’s view that Lin’s family, particularly his controlling son, took advantage of his health deterioration and forced the escape flight is consistent with the late Lin’s other reported behaviours.
Section C: Reflection
Throughout the investigation, secrecy within the Chinese government and its attitude towards select historical events posed the greatest challenge, including generating the mystique surrounding the topic to begin with. All sources employed base themselves at least in part on official documentation or the accounts of characters closely related to the government. Therefore, it was important to corroborate sources independently to appraise their validity. State archives are also not open to the public, depriving me of key sources such as the aviation investigation report which could be used to definitively determine the nature of the Trident crash.
Historians strive to present issues in an objective manner, but this cannot be completely achieved. A particularly influential set of sources36 on the modern understanding of the incident had an unintended impact of developing a sympathetic attitude towards Lin Biao,37 character- ising him as a consequence of Mao’s unpredictable purges, thus downplaying Lin’s own role in establishing the personality cult.
Furthermore,
there was a noticeable difference in the perspective presented by
sources from the West and Chinese sources, particularly in 20th-century
sources. Of the English sources used, it was clear that the differing
perspectives were strongly correlated to the geographical divide.
Chinese language sources placed heavy emphasis on the people’s attitude
towards the communist government, recognising the value of potentially
fraudulent evidence in reflecting common opinion.
Chinese sources both primary and secondary were key in establishing a narrative, though they posed a significant challenge not just in translating the language precisely, but also in capturing and conveying the nuanced cultural and social understandings. Certain sayings or quotations were difficult to explain in English, such as Mao conveying his nuanced attitude towards Lin’s future by merely bringing up the tale of Liu Bang killing Han Xin. Such linguistic challenges are not limited to western scholars, with Jin Qiu explaining Mao’s pun on the name Wu De incorrectly.38
Another issue was the vast amounts of sources and theories for me to consider. I managed this by refining the RQ to only focus on the role of one person as opposed to a more holistic investigation. An overabundance of information can pose problems for historians and a wide variety of perspectives need to be synthesised to reach a satisfactory conclusion.
Chinese sources both primary and secondary were key in establishing a narrative, though they posed a significant challenge not just in translating the language precisely, but also in capturing and conveying the nuanced cultural and social understandings. Certain sayings or quotations were difficult to explain in English, such as Mao conveying his nuanced attitude towards Lin’s future by merely bringing up the tale of Liu Bang killing Han Xin. Such linguistic challenges are not limited to western scholars, with Jin Qiu explaining Mao’s pun on the name Wu De incorrectly.38
Another issue was the vast amounts of sources and theories for me to consider. I managed this by refining the RQ to only focus on the role of one person as opposed to a more holistic investigation. An overabundance of information can pose problems for historians and a wide variety of perspectives need to be synthesised to reach a satisfactory conclusion.
1. a homonym for “will sound [an alarm]”
8. John Hickman, American Journal of Chinese Studies 8, no. 2 (October 2001): pp. 228, jstor.org/stable/ 44288681.
9. Qiu Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 163, isbn: 9780804735292.
10. Qiu Jin, “Distorting History: Lessons From The Lin Biao Incident,” Old Dominion University Quest 3, no. 2 (June 2000): 4–8, odu.edu/ao/instadv/quest/LinBiao.html.
11. Ibid.
12. Alistrair Munro, “Paranoia Revisited,” British Journal of Psychiatry 141, no. 4 (1982): pp. 42-49, https: //doi.org/10.1192/bjp.141.4.344; Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution.
13. Tony Saich, The American Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 550–551, issn: 00028762, 19375239, accessed November 14, 2022.
14. 高华 and 御坂美琴, 南大高华教授讲座:再探林彪事件, 重读中华人民共和国史讲座系列 (Nanjing University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology: 人文社会科学学院文化研究中心, December 2020), “深远的影 响”, youtube.com/watch?v=yDN5nIMpvq8.
15. Jin, “Distorting History: Lessons From The Lin Biao Incident,” pp. 6.
16. 571 is a Chinese homonym for ”armed uprising”
17. Nine years after the incident
18. [In Chinese], 文汇报, China News Service (Shanghai), December 1980,
19. ”车辆”
20. ”武器领自造”
21. 中央专案组, 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二) [in Chinese], 中发(1972) 4 (January 1972). 22. ”全党团结起来!”
23. ”把党内和国家政治生活变成封建专制独裁式家长制生活。”
24. 中央专案组, 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二).
25. Blaine Taylor, “Even as he spurred on Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Lin Biao plotted to
depose him.,” Military History 23, no. 3 (May 2006): 66–69, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db= khh&AN=21310499&site=hrc-live.
26. Frederick C Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural lution, 1966-1971 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), isbn: 9780824818111.
27. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 179.
28. Yao, The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao, pp. 135.
29. Peter Hannam and Susan V. Lawrence, “Solving a Chinese Puzzle,” U.S. News & World Report, January
1994, 4.
30. Central Intelligence Agency, Appearances And Activities of Leading Personalities of the People’s Republic of
China, pp. 108 (Washington, United States: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972), pp. 108.
31. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 196.
17. Nine years after the incident
18. [In Chinese], 文汇报, China News Service (Shanghai), December 1980,
19. ”车辆”
20. ”武器领自造”
21. 中央专案组, 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二) [in Chinese], 中发(1972) 4 (January 1972). 22. ”全党团结起来!”
23. ”把党内和国家政治生活变成封建专制独裁式家长制生活。”
24. 中央专案组, 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二).
25. Blaine Taylor, “Even as he spurred on Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Lin Biao plotted to
depose him.,” Military History 23, no. 3 (May 2006): 66–69, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db= khh&AN=21310499&site=hrc-live.
26. Frederick C Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural lution, 1966-1971 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), isbn: 9780824818111.
27. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 179.
28. Yao, The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao, pp. 135.
29. Peter Hannam and Susan V. Lawrence, “Solving a Chinese Puzzle,” U.S. News & World Report, January
1994, 4.
30. Central Intelligence Agency, Appearances And Activities of Leading Personalities of the People’s Republic of
China, pp. 108 (Washington, United States: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972), pp. 108.
31. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 196.
32.
Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural
Revolution, pp 196. 33. Lin nicknamed her Lin Doudou as a sign of
affection
34. A contemporary novel
35. Translation: 天要下雨，娘要嫁人，无法可设，由他去吧。
36. 王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭, “林彪是“文化大革命”中特殊的观潮派、逍遥派” [in Chinese], 爱思想, November 2008, 王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭, “毛泽东逼出来的“九·一三林彪出逃事件”” [in Chinese], Modern China Studies (《当 代中国研究》) 2004, no. 2, issn: 2160-0317.
37. 高华 and 御坂美琴, 南大高华教授讲座:再探林彪事件.
38. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 242.
References
Bernstein, Richard. “New Book Says Mao Ordered Lin Biao Killed.” New York Times, May 1983, 13.
Central Intelligence Agency. Appearances And Activities of Leading Personalities of the People’s Republic of China. Pp. 108. Washington, United States: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972.
Forster, Keith. Pacific Affairs 73, no. 3 (2000): 427–428.
Hannam, Peter, and Susan V. Lawrence. “Solving a Chinese Puzzle.” U.S. News & World Report,
January 1994, 4.
Hickman, John. American Journal of Chinese Studies 8, no. 2 (October 2001): 227–228. jstor. org/stable/44288681.
Jin, Qiu. “Distorting History: Lessons From The Lin Biao Incident.” Old Dominion University Quest 3, no. 2 (June 2000): 4–8. odu.edu/ao/instadv/quest/LinBiao.html.
. The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999. isbn: 9780804735292.
Munro, Alistrair. “Paranoia Revisited.” British Journal of Psychiatry 141, no. 4 (1982): 344–349. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.141.4.344.
Saich, Tony. The American Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 550–551. issn: 00028762, 19375239, accessed November 14, 2022.
Schell, Orville. “A Chinese Puzzle Missing Some Pieces.” New York Times, May 1983, 3. issn: 0362-4331.
Taylor, Blaine. “Even as he spurred on Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Lin Biao plotted to depose him.” Military History 23, no. 3 (May 2006): 66–69. search.ebscohost.com/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=khh&AN=21310499&site=hrc-live.
Teiwes, Frederick C, and Warren Sun. The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cul- tural Revolution, 1966-1971. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996. isbn: 9780824818111.
Uhalley, Stephen, and Qiu Jin. “The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later.” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (1993): 386–98. https://doi.org/10.2307/2759617.
Yao, Ming-Le. The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1983. isbn: 9780394525433.
中央专案组. 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二) [in Chinese]. 中发(1972) 4. January 1972.
Page 8
History IA jhd047 [In Chinese]. 文汇报, China News Service (Shanghai), December 1980.
王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭. “林彪是“文化大革命”中特殊的观潮派、逍遥派” [in Chinese]. 爱思想, November 2008.
. “毛泽东逼出来的“九·一三林彪出逃事件”” [in Chinese]. Modern China Studies (《当代 中国研究》) 2004, no. 2. issn: 2160-0317.
高华 and 御坂美琴. 南大高华教授讲座:再探林彪事件. 重读中华人民共和国史讲座系列. Nanjing University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology: 人文社会科学学院文 化研究中心, December 2020. youtube.com/watch?v=yDN5nIMpvq8.
34. A contemporary novel
35. Translation: 天要下雨，娘要嫁人，无法可设，由他去吧。
36. 王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭, “林彪是“文化大革命”中特殊的观潮派、逍遥派” [in Chinese], 爱思想, November 2008, 王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭, “毛泽东逼出来的“九·一三林彪出逃事件”” [in Chinese], Modern China Studies (《当 代中国研究》) 2004, no. 2, issn: 2160-0317.
37. 高华 and 御坂美琴, 南大高华教授讲座:再探林彪事件.
38. Jin, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 242.
References
Bernstein, Richard. “New Book Says Mao Ordered Lin Biao Killed.” New York Times, May 1983, 13.
Central Intelligence Agency. Appearances And Activities of Leading Personalities of the People’s Republic of China. Pp. 108. Washington, United States: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972.
Forster, Keith. Pacific Affairs 73, no. 3 (2000): 427–428.
Hannam, Peter, and Susan V. Lawrence. “Solving a Chinese Puzzle.” U.S. News & World Report,
January 1994, 4.
Hickman, John. American Journal of Chinese Studies 8, no. 2 (October 2001): 227–228. jstor. org/stable/44288681.
Jin, Qiu. “Distorting History: Lessons From The Lin Biao Incident.” Old Dominion University Quest 3, no. 2 (June 2000): 4–8. odu.edu/ao/instadv/quest/LinBiao.html.
. The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999. isbn: 9780804735292.
Munro, Alistrair. “Paranoia Revisited.” British Journal of Psychiatry 141, no. 4 (1982): 344–349. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.141.4.344.
Saich, Tony. The American Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 550–551. issn: 00028762, 19375239, accessed November 14, 2022.
Schell, Orville. “A Chinese Puzzle Missing Some Pieces.” New York Times, May 1983, 3. issn: 0362-4331.
Taylor, Blaine. “Even as he spurred on Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Lin Biao plotted to depose him.” Military History 23, no. 3 (May 2006): 66–69. search.ebscohost.com/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=khh&AN=21310499&site=hrc-live.
Teiwes, Frederick C, and Warren Sun. The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cul- tural Revolution, 1966-1971. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996. isbn: 9780824818111.
Uhalley, Stephen, and Qiu Jin. “The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later.” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (1993): 386–98. https://doi.org/10.2307/2759617.
Yao, Ming-Le. The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1983. isbn: 9780394525433.
中央专案组. 粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争(材料之二) [in Chinese]. 中发(1972) 4. January 1972.
Page 8
History IA jhd047 [In Chinese]. 文汇报, China News Service (Shanghai), December 1980.
王年一, 何蜀, and 陈昭. “林彪是“文化大革命”中特殊的观潮派、逍遥派” [in Chinese]. 爱思想, November 2008.
. “毛泽东逼出来的“九·一三林彪出逃事件”” [in Chinese]. Modern China Studies (《当代 中国研究》) 2004, no. 2. issn: 2160-0317.
高华 and 御坂美琴. 南大高华教授讲座:再探林彪事件. 重读中华人民共和国史讲座系列. Nanjing University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology: 人文社会科学学院文 化研究中心, December 2020. youtube.com/watch?v=yDN5nIMpvq8.
