From the November 2024 IBDP HL History Paper 3 exam
The Bolshevik seizure of power in October/November 1917 represented a dramatic rupture in Russian political history, toppling the Provisional Government and inaugurating a new era of Soviet rule. The extent to which this revolution was driven by popular support for Lenin’s policies remains a subject of intense historical debate. Some argue that Lenin’s ability to channel the demands of the masses—summarised in slogans such as “Peace, Bread, Land” and “All Power to the Soviets”—enabled him to mobilise significant popular backing, particularly among urban workers and soldiers. Others contend that the Bolsheviks capitalised on the failures of the Provisional Government and the disintegration of state authority, rather than enjoying widespread grassroots support. The revolution’s success owed less to mass enthusiasm for Lenin’s ideological vision and more to strategic opportunism, the exploitation of political chaos, and the dominance of radicalised Petrograd workers and garrison soldiers. Whilst Lenin’s policies resonated with key constituencies, the evidence suggests that popular support was fragmented, instrumental, and unevenly distributed, raising doubts about the extent to which the revolution was a direct expression of popular will.
The demand for peace in 1917 was not only widespread but increasingly desperate, and Lenin’s unambiguous position on ending the war gave the Bolsheviks a significant advantage over other political forces. Russia’s participation in the First World War had led to catastrophic losses—by 1917, over 1.7 million Russian soldiers were dead, with several million wounded or missing. Desertion rates had risen dramatically, reaching 365,000 in the first six months of 1917 alone. The Provisional Government’s decision to continue the war, including the June Offensive under Kerensky, alienated soldiers and workers alike, deepening the sense of betrayal. In contrast, Lenin’s April Theses, delivered shortly after his return from exile, demanded “an immediate end to the war.” This uncompromising anti-war stance distinguished the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Kadets, who all vacillated on the issue of peace. The resonance of Lenin’s position was evident in the growing influence of the Bolsheviks in soldiers’ soviets and factory committees during the summer of 1917. In Petrograd, the Bolsheviks gained majorities in both the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets by September. The Kronstadt sailors—previously supporters of the Socialist Revolutionaries—shifted allegiance to the Bolsheviks by October, citing the party’s commitment to ending the war as decisive. Rabinowitch argues that the anti-war appeal of the Bolsheviks was not merely rhetorical but embedded in their consistent refusal to cooperate with the Provisional Government, which they denounced as a continuation of imperialist war aims under a republican façade. This radical clarity attracted increasing support from front-line troops and garrison soldiers who had lost faith in the Provisional Government's ability—or willingness—to extricate Russia from the conflict.
However, the extent of popular support for Lenin’s peace policy was geographically and socially uneven. While Petrograd and some garrison towns showed increasing Bolshevik sympathies, the broader peasantry, who made up the bulk of the army, often deserted without necessarily endorsing Bolshevik ideology. Fitzpatrick notes that for many soldiers, peace was a practical necessity rather than a political alignment. The Bolsheviks’ slogan “Peace without annexations or indemnities” was too abstract for most rural conscripts, whose immediate concern was survival and return to their villages. Moreover, the Bolsheviks’ actual implementation of peace—the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918—provoked widespread outrage due to the severe territorial losses it entailed, suggesting that support for Lenin’s peace platform was conditional and limited by context. Pipes argues that many soldiers who defected or mutinied in 1917 were motivated less by ideological conviction than by exhaustion and disillusionment, meaning that their actions, whilst beneficial to the Bolsheviks, didn't represent a coherent endorsement of Bolshevik rule or Lenin’s broader vision. The Provisional Government’s failure to address popular demands for peace created a political vacuum, but it was the Bolsheviks’ skill in presenting themselves as the only viable anti-war force that allowed them to gain traction. Lenin’s policies did not enjoy universal or consistent support, but they aligned with the most pressing demands of critical sectors of the population at a moment of national crisis. Service contends that Lenin effectively manipulated the climate of frustration and militarism to convert transient discontent into revolutionary momentum. Yet the very transience of this support raises doubts about its depth. The revolution’s success in October was not built on a nationwide mass movement but on the strategic mobilisation of urban centres, particularly Petrograd, where the Bolsheviks could dominate the political narrative and seize power with limited resistance. The widespread yearning for peace helped legitimise Bolshevik claims, but this should not be conflated with an enduring or ideologically coherent popular mandate.
The promise of land reform was central to the Bolsheviks’ appeal among the peasantry according to David Heath, professor of History at the bavarian International School, though the degree to which this constituted genuine support for Lenin’s policies remains contested. The rural population, comprising over 80% of the Russian Empire’s inhabitants, had long been agitating for the redistribution of land. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 had failed to resolve the land question, leaving peasants burdened by redemption payments and confined to inadequate allotments. By 1917, land seizures were occurring spontaneously across the countryside, with peasants expropriating estates, burning manor houses, and attacking landowners in a wave of localised revolt that intensified following the February Revolution. The Provisional Government, constrained by liberal elements and their commitment to private property rights, refused to sanction immediate redistribution. The Socialist Revolutionaries, who dominated the peasant vote in the summer of 1917, offered only vague assurances of future reform through the Constituent Assembly. In contrast, the Bolsheviks co-opted the peasant agenda by promising to legalise land seizures, most notably in Lenin’s decree on land issued on 26 October 1917. This decree, which declared the abolition of landed estates and endorsed the peasant practice of redistribution, was not a product of Bolshevik theory but an appropriation of the Socialist Revolutionary land programme. Lenin admitted as much, recognising that the Bolsheviks lacked a detailed agrarian policy and were compelled to adopt the peasantry’s demands to secure rural support. The extent to which this policy shift reflected popular support for Lenin himself is debatable. Whilst the Bolsheviks gained some traction among rural soviets, particularly in areas close to urban centres, the majority of the countryside remained either indifferent or suspicious of Bolshevik rule. The Socialist Revolutionaries continued to dominate the Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917, securing over 40% of the vote nationally, compared to the Bolsheviks’ 24%. In rural districts, the Socialist Revolutionary share exceeded 60%, indicating that the peasantry’s loyalty lay elsewhere. Figes argues that the Bolsheviks’ land decree was a tactical manoeuvre designed to neutralise peasant resistance during the critical early months of Bolshevik power, rather than a reflection of genuine ideological alignment. He notes that most peasants interpreted Bolshevik slogans through their own localised traditions of land justice, rather than Marxist theory, and often viewed the new Soviet regime as a temporary facilitator of their aims rather than a legitimate authority. The eruption of peasant rebellions against Bolshevik grain requisitioning campaigns in 1918 and 1919, particularly in Tambov and the Volga region, further underscores the fragile and instrumental nature of peasant support. These uprisings, which involved tens of thousands of armed peasants, directly challenged Bolshevik control and revealed the deep disconnect between Lenin’s centralising vision and the peasantry’s expectations of autonomy.
The temporary alignment between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry in late 1917 was therefore more a matter of expedient overlap than ideological convergence. Lenin’s willingness to appropriate the Socialist Revolutionary land programme was a pragmatic attempt to harness rural unrest in the service of urban revolution. Carr emphasises that Lenin understood the necessity of peasant acquiescence in order to consolidate power, but he also stresses that the Bolsheviks never trusted the peasantry as a revolutionary class. This mistrust manifested in the increasing use of coercion and repression once the Bolsheviks were in power. The formation of Committees of the Poor (kombedy) in late 1918, intended to enforce grain requisitions and suppress kulak resistance, was met with widespread hostility in the countryside. Rather than solidify support, these measures alienated even previously sympathetic peasants, who saw them as an attack on village solidarity and customary rights. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, in which the Socialist Revolutionaries held a commanding majority, further eroded the legitimacy of Bolshevik rule in the eyes of the rural population. By removing the only institution through which the peasantry had expressed its political will, Lenin’s regime revealed its fundamental disregard for rural electoral preferences.
Despite this, the Bolsheviks managed to maintain a tenuous grip on the countryside through a combination of propaganda, selective concessions, and force. The land decree gave immediate material benefits to millions of peasants, allowing them to occupy and redistribute over 150 million acres of land by mid-1918. In this sense, the Bolsheviks became the de facto beneficiaries of a revolution they had not initiated. McCauley contends that the October seizure of power was legitimised post hoc by the land decree, which transformed the Bolsheviks from urban insurrectionists into apparent champions of the rural majority. However, he also notes that this legitimacy was shallow and contingent. The peasants’ support was not for Bolshevik socialism but for land, and once that demand had been satisfied, the relationship rapidly deteriorated. The ensuing conflict between the Bolshevik state and the peasantry during War Communism, marked by requisitions, famine, and rebellion, reveals the extent to which the revolution’s rural dimension was never truly under Lenin’s ideological control. Thus, whilst Lenin’s policies on land reform did attract short-term support from the peasantry, this support was neither uniform nor enduring in Heath's final assessment. The Bolsheviks’ success in October cannot be attributed to a nationwide rural endorsement of Lenin’s vision, but rather to a momentary convergence of interests between a politically radicalised urban party and an agrarian population engaged in its own revolutionary struggle. The evidence indicates that Lenin’s land policy was reactive and opportunistic, designed to exploit a pre-existing peasant revolt rather than to lead or direct it. The revolution’s rural dynamics were shaped less by Bolshevik ideology than by the autonomous actions of the peasantry, whose subsequent disaffection would manifest in violent resistance to the very regime they had briefly enabled.
The Bolsheviks’ success in October 1917 was deeply rooted in their ability to mobilise the urban working class, particularly in Petrograd and key industrial centres, yet the nature and extent of this support raises questions about whether it constituted genuine endorsement of Lenin’s policies or was simply a reaction to the failures of the Provisional Government. The urban proletariat, especially factory workers and militant trade unionists, had become increasingly radicalised over the course of 1917. Strikes proliferated across major cities—over 3,000 by September—and workers’ militias, or Red Guards, were being organised independently of state control. The Provisional Government’s inability to address rising food prices, inflation, and unemployment alienated this core demographic. Workers’ wages had stagnated while the cost of living in Petrograd had soared by over 700% since the outbreak of war. The Bolsheviks’ promises of workers’ control over production, coupled with their demand for “All Power to the Soviets,” gave them a platform that directly appealed to the disillusioned industrial proletariat. Lenin’s April Theses explicitly rejected any cooperation with the Provisional Government, calling instead for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” through soviet power—a message that resonated with the growing view among workers that only direct control could alleviate their suffering. The increasing Bolshevik presence in factory committees and soviets throughout the summer and autumn of 1917 indicates that their influence was not merely top-down but embedded in the grassroots organs of working-class power. In Petrograd, the Bolsheviks gained a majority in the Soviet by early September, and Trotsky, recently returned from exile, was elected its chairman. The Moscow Soviet followed a similar pattern by October. These shifts were not imposed but reflected the growing popularity of Bolshevik slogans among workers who saw in them a channel for their demands for food, security, and control over production. Smith argues that the Bolsheviks were unique among revolutionary parties in integrating themselves into the daily struggles of the working class, often participating in strikes and factory meetings, and adjusting their programme in response to these interactions. The Bolsheviks’ call for workers’ control of industry was particularly influential, with over 500 factory committees by October demanding supervision of hiring, wages, and the regulation of output. This created a context in which Bolshevik rhetoric was not abstract theory but a reflection of workers’ immediate experience and aspirations.
Despite the Bolsheviks' growing popularity in urban centres, it is critical to assess whether this support reflected a coherent endorsement of Lenin’s overarching political ideology or was driven by immediate material concerns and a lack of viable alternatives. Many workers were not committed Marxists, nor did they necessarily understand or support the implications of a Bolshevik dictatorship. Their support was often provisional, rooted in the perception that the Bolsheviks were the only party willing to act decisively in their interests. The collapse of other socialist parties’ credibility—particularly the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries who had supported the Provisional Government’s continuation in power—amplified the appeal of the Bolsheviks by default. As Hasegawa notes, the Bolsheviks did not so much win the support of the masses as inherit it through the political bankruptcy of their rivals. The Kornilov Affair in August 1917, where right-wing military forces under General Kornilov attempted a coup against the Provisional Government, further radicalised the urban population. The Bolsheviks’ role in organising resistance to Kornilov, including the arming of Red Guards and mobilisation of workers, established them as the defenders of the revolution against counter-revolutionary threats. This event significantly boosted their credibility among workers and helped reframe them as patriots of the revolution rather than merely extremists.
Yet, the Bolsheviks’ shift from advocating soviet democracy to establishing a centralised party dictatorship after October suggests a divergence between their rhetoric and their intentions. The suppression of rival socialist parties, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, and the banning of independent trade unions in the subsequent years signalled a rapid retreat from the participatory ideals that had attracted many urban workers to the Bolsheviks in the first place. In the immediate aftermath of the October Revolution, workers’ support began to fracture as the realities of Bolshevik economic policies, including forced requisitioning and the militarisation of labour under War Communism, came into effect. In 1921, the Kronstadt Rebellion—launched by naval personnel and workers who had once been among the Bolsheviks’ most fervent supporters—exposed the extent of disillusionment with Lenin’s regime in the very sectors that had enabled its rise. The Kronstadt rebels demanded the restoration of soviet democracy, freedom of speech, and the end of Bolshevik repression, accusing the regime of having betrayed the revolution. Their calls for “Soviets without Bolsheviks” underscored the growing perception that Lenin’s government no longer represented the will of the workers. The evidence suggests that while Lenin’s policies in 1917 resonated with the urban working class, this support was conditional, pragmatic, and subject to rapid erosion once the Bolsheviks consolidated power. The Bolsheviks’ ability to articulate workers’ grievances and present themselves as the only viable alternative gave them a critical advantage, but the subsequent disillusionment indicates that their support base was not ideologically committed to Lenin’s broader political project. Rather, the revolution’s urban success relied on a convergence of crisis conditions, political vacuum, and Bolshevik opportunism. Popular support existed, but it was neither uniform nor enduring, and it quickly unravelled in the face of authoritarian governance and economic coercion.
In conclusion, while Lenin’s policies in 1917 secured significant support among key sectors of Russian society, the October/November Revolution cannot be regarded as the straightforward result of popular enthusiasm for Bolshevik ideology. The demand for peace, land, and workers’ control created conditions in which the Bolsheviks could position themselves as the only party prepared to act decisively, yet this support was fragmented, opportunistic, and often driven by immediate needs rather than ideological alignment. In the armed forces, particularly among garrison troops and urban soldiers, Lenin’s anti-war stance provided a clear alternative to the Provisional Government’s failed militarism, but this support was often shallow and did not survive the realities of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. In the countryside, the Bolsheviks’ adoption of the Socialist Revolutionary land programme temporarily aligned them with peasant aspirations, but the subsequent use of coercion and centralised control rapidly alienated the rural population. Among urban workers, Bolshevik slogans resonated with industrial discontent and the collapse of liberal and moderate socialist credibility, yet support began to erode almost immediately once the Bolsheviks abandoned soviet pluralism and imposed a one-party dictatorship.
The revolution’s success was made possible not by a coherent or widespread mandate for Lenin’s vision, but by the political collapse of the Provisional Government, the disintegration of state authority, the discrediting of rival socialist parties, and the Bolsheviks’ ability to exploit the political crisis with strategic precision. Lenin’s policies were effective in mobilising discontent, but they did not enjoy uniform national support, nor did they reflect a mass desire for Bolshevik rule. The revolution was driven as much by the failures of others as by the appeal of Bolshevism, and its success rested on the ability of a disciplined minority to seize power at the right moment rather than on broad-based popular endorsement. The October seizure of power, while facilitated by slogans that addressed the grievances of workers, soldiers, and peasants, ultimately marked a transition from mass agitation to party dictatorship. The evidence thus suggests that while popular support for Lenin’s policies played an important role, it was limited in scope and temporality, and cannot fully explain the outcome of the revolution. The Bolsheviks succeeded not because they commanded majority support, but because they understood how to convert fragmented discontent into political dominance.
