Among the lectures I've bought from The Great Courses company is this from Dr. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius which, through 24 lectures, examines a full century of our most violent history with the goal of understanding the roots of terror in order to prevent even greater horrors in the centuries to come. I've summarised each as a way to have students follow and appreciate his main points and see how he structures his arguments. Professor Liulevicius is especialy valuable to my students here in Munich as he specialises in modern German history, with a particular focus on German relations with Eastern Europe.
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius's introductory lecture, "Defining Utopia and Terror," sets a sombre yet compelling stage for this course on 20th-century violence. He immediately confronts the listener with the uncomfortable paradox of the era: a time of unprecedented technological and social progress, yet simultaneously a period of unparalleled state-sponsored brutality and mass murder. The lecture effectively establishes a framework for understanding this seeming contradiction by examining the interconnectedness of utopian ideals and the use of terror as a means to achieve them.
Liulevicius begins by highlighting the sheer scale of the violence. He cites R.J. Rummel's research, noting the estimated 38 million deaths from wars and civil wars, and a staggering 169 million victims of government-perpetrated atrocities. These figures, while inherently imprecise, serve to underscore the magnitude of the issue. It's not just about isolated incidents, but a systemic pattern of violence that spanned the globe, from the trenches of World War I to the killing fields of Cambodia. The geographical spread Liulevicius mentions—Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the Balkans—demonstrates the global nature of this phenomenon. He could have expanded, drawing more globally, like to South America for example, Operation Condor.
The core of the lecture lies in its definition and linkage of "utopia" and "terror." Liulevicius traces the concept of utopia back to Plato's Republic and, crucially, to Thomas More's Utopia (1516). He points out the inherent ambiguity in More's naming of his ideal society – "utopia" as "no place," acknowledging the inherent unachievability of perfection. However, he also emphasises the enduring allure of the utopian impulse: the desire to create a perfect society, free from conflict and contradiction. This is a vital point. Utopianism, in Liulevicius's framework, isn't simply about fanciful daydreams, but a persistent human drive to imagine and strive for a better world. This deep history is relevant, thinkers for example, like Campanella, with his City of the Sun, or even the earlier, millenarian movements, with their promise to bring about heaven on earth.
The definition of "terror" is equally important. Liulevicius moves beyond the simple notion of fear and defines it as a deliberate and systematic tool of political power. It's the organised use of violence against civilians, non-combatants, to achieve specific political goals. He highlights the conscious targeting of innocents as a key characteristic of terror. He acknowledges that it goes further. The Jacobin "Reign of Terror" during the French Revolution is a historical precedent, though perhaps not at the scale or with the technology, as in later times.
The connection between utopia and terror is established through the concept of "ideology." Liulevicius argues that the pursuit of utopian ideals, when confronted with resistance (either active or passive), often led to the justification of violence. If individuals or groups refused to conform to the envisioned perfect society, then coercion – terror – was deemed necessary. This terror, in turn, was rationalised and legitimised by an overarching ideology, a system of thought that promised a bright future and thus justified present suffering. He frames these ideologies as "political religions," demanding absolute faith and commitment, and offering a sense of meaning and belonging in return. Examples could include the Marxist-Leninist promise of a classless communist utopia, or the Nazi vision of a racially pure Aryan society.
Liulevicius then introduces his four-part framework for understanding ideological regimes: masses, machines, mobsters, and master plans. This provides a concise and memorable way to analyse the structure and functioning of these regimes.
Masses: He highlights the mobilisation of large populations, often exploiting social upheaval and the atomisation of individuals. This resonates with the work of thinkers like Hannah Arendt, who emphasised the role of "lonely crowds" in the rise of totalitarianism.
Machines: This refers not only to literal technology (weapons, transportation) but also to the apparatus of the modern state – propaganda, bureaucracy, and the secret police. The development of mass communication technologies, like radio and film, played a crucial role in disseminating propaganda and controlling populations.
Mobsters: This refers to the leadership of these movements, often characterised by their ruthlessness, conspiratorial nature, and willingness to use criminal methods. Think of Stalin's purges, or the SS leadership within Nazi Germany.
Master Plans: These are the overarching ideologies, the blueprints for the future utopia. They are presented as comprehensive and infallible, even if they are adapted to changing circumstances.
Liulevicius acknowledges that confidence, as well as fear, played a crucial role in the success of these regimes. People weren't simply coerced; many were genuinely convinced by the ideological promises. He also points out that the story of the 20th century is not solely one of oppression, but also of resistance. He mentions Hannah Arendt as a key figure who both witnessed and analysed the totalitarian movements of the era.
The lecture concludes by setting the stage for the rest of the course. It highlights the inherent instability of these regimes, as evidenced by their eventual overthrow in many cases. However, it also warns of the recurring susceptibility of modern societies to these impulses, suggesting a potential vulnerability within the human condition itself.
Liulevicius's second lecture, "The Legacy of Revolutions," examines the intellectual and social foundations laid in the 19th century that profoundly shaped the events of the 20th. He argues that the "dual revolution" – the political upheaval of the French Revolution and the transformative power of the Industrial Revolution – created a legacy of both immense promise and potential for destruction. These revolutions, he contends, established the framework for the ideological conflicts and utopian aspirations that would fuel much of the 20th century's violence.
Liulevicius identifies the 19th century as a crucial period of intellectual ferment, with ideas originating then playing out their consequences in the following century. The dual revolution, encompassing both political and industrial spheres, is presented as a defining characteristic of this era. This dual revolution generated a pervasive sense of "progress," a belief in the onward march of constant and ultimately inevitable betterment. This optimism, fuelled by advances in both democratic governance and scientific innovation, expanded the sense of what was possible for humanity.
The lecture first explores the political revolution, focusing on the American and French Revolutions. Liulevicius highlights the influence of Enlightenment ideas – reason, scientific inquiry, religious toleration, secularism, and the concept of popular sovereignty as articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau – on the revolutionaries. The lecture notes. that whilst connected through enlightenment thinking, the two differ, especially as the french revolution moves to greater violence.
The French Revolution, in particular, is presented as a pivotal event. The storming of the Bastille, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the declaration of the French Republic in 1792 are all cited as crucial moments that ushered in the era of mass politics. The revolutionary slogan "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" is identified as embodying the core ideals of the revolution, giving rise to the ideologies of liberalism and nationalism. Liulevicius also emphasises the strong element of utopianism present in the French Revolution, particularly during its most radical phase, including the attempt to de-Christianise France and the creation of a new revolutionary calendar.
He then turns to the Reign of Terror (1793-1794). The establishment of the Committee of Public Safety, dominated by Maximilien Robespierre, and the systematic use of the guillotine are presented as manifestations of revolutionary terror, defined by Robespierre as prompt, total justice aimed at creating a Republic of Virtue. The estimated 50,000 deaths and the radicals' self-identification as "terrorists" are noted. Although the Terror eventually consumed itself, with Robespierre's execution, Liulevicius stresses that the French Revolution, despite its failures and excesses, provided a powerful and enduring model for those seeking radical social and political change. It established the terms of political conflict for the 19th century and beyond, forcing politics to engage with the "masses" for legitimacy.
The second half of the lecture focuses on the Industrial Revolution. Liulevicius identifies this not simply as technological advancement, but as a fundamental shift in the organisation of work and the imposition of new disciplines aligned with the factory system. The uneven spread of industrialisation, starting in northwestern Europe and expanding globally, is noted. The lecture highlights the profound social and political consequences of industrialisation, including the remaking of landscapes and the disruption of traditional ways of life.
The rise of the "heroic engineer" is presented as a symbol of the era's faith in technology and progress. Figures like Henry Ford, with his mass-produced Model T automobile, are cited as emblems of "scientific management" and the belief in technology's potential to solve human problems. However, Liulevicius also acknowledges the anxieties expressed by social critics about the potential for mechanisation to alienate and dehumanise workers.
The lecture concludes by exploring the emergence of "sciences of the masses." The rise of mass media and the need for political parties to appeal to mass constituencies are presented as evidence of a new world oriented towards the masses. Liulevicius connects this to a "revolution in expectations," with expanded visions of what the future could hold for ordinary people.
The immense prestige of science in the 19th century, sometimes supplanting traditional religious belief, is discussed. Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) is presented as a pivotal work, with its theory of evolution through natural selection. The application of Darwinian ideas to human society – Social Darwinism – is highlighted, along with the rise of eugenics, which sought to encourage the reproduction of the "fittest." Liulevicius notes how these doctrines contributed to a modern form of "scientific racism" and the transformation of traditional anti-Semitism into a biological form.
Finally, the lecture examines the growth of the Socialist idea. The utopian Socialists, such as Robert Owen with his New Harmony community, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Charles Fourier, are presented as early proponents of cooperative societies. However, Liulevicius indicates the crucial development in the history of this ideology: the arrival of the supposedly, 'scientific Socialism' of Marx and Engels.
In Lecture Three, "Omens of Conflict," Liulevicius explores the complex interplay of optimism and foreboding that characterised the early 20th century. As the century began, there was a prevailing belief in progress, underpinned by liberal ideas such as human rights, constitutional governance, and scientific advancements. However, this optimistic outlook was countered by the emergence of political philosophies that embraced conflict as a means to achieve societal improvement.One of the primary philosophical movements discussed is Marxism, developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx, born in Germany, faced obstacles in academia due to his atheism, leading him to journalism and political activism. His ideas, first articulated in the 1848 "Communist Manifesto" and later expanded in "Das Kapital," positioned Marxism as a scientific analysis of social change. Unlike earlier utopian socialists, Marx rejected idealism, proposing that material conditions, rather than ideas, drive historical progress. This perspective, termed historical materialism, framed human existence primarily in economic terms. Marx's vision of history revolved around class struggle, with the proletariat's conflict against the bourgeoisie at the centre of his narrative. He posited that historical progression follows a dialectical process, leading to revolutionary change. Marx anticipated a final proletarian revolution that would establish a classless society, wherein the state would ultimately wither away. This vision, despite its vagueness, resonated with many, and Marx's influence on political activism grew significantly during his lifetime.
In parallel with Marxism, the lecture addresses the rise of anarchism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A wave of political violence characterised by high-profile assassinations created a climate of fear. Many of these acts were attributed to self-identified anarchists, who believed that terrorism could incite mass uprisings. This "propaganda of the deed" aimed to destabilise established authorities and prompt revolutionary change, but it often resulted in heightened anxieties among the ruling classes.
Liulevicius also examines the phenomenon of imperialism, which reached its zenith during the late 19th century. European powers aggressively expanded their empires, often at the expense of local populations. The brutal exploitation witnessed in places like the Belgian Congo, where millions died under colonial rule, serves as a stark example of the darker aspects of imperialism outside the British experience. Proponents of imperialism framed it as a civilising mission, yet this perspective was often intertwined with racist ideologies that justified domination and violence.
The technological advancements of the era facilitated imperial expansion, enabling colonial powers to exert control with unprecedented efficiency. Battles like Omdurman in 1898 highlighted the devastating impact of modern weaponry, as European forces easily subdued larger indigenous armies. Such military campaigns often employed terror as a tactic, with punitive expeditions and concentration camps used to suppress resistance.
As the lecture progresses, Liulevicius notes the growing premonitions of a looming world war. Observers of conflicts such as the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War began to recognise the destructive potential of modern warfare. Despite efforts to establish rules for civilised conflict through treaties, some theorists, including Friedrich Nietzsche, celebrated the chaos of war. Meanwhile, figures like Lenin sought to harness international conflict as a catalyst for revolutionary change.
Liulevicius concludes with an exploration of the widespread belief among political leaders and intellectuals that a "Great War" was imminent, reflecting a pervasive sense of anxiety and anticipation in the face of escalating international tensions. This period, marked by a clash of ideologies and the spectre of conflict, set the stage for the profound upheavals that would soon engulf the world.
The discussion of trench warfare underscores its transformation of combat into a static, industrialised struggle. Liulevicius contrasts initial public enthusiasm with the grim reality faced by soldiers, citing the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the emergence of prolonged stalemates on the Western Front. The physical conditions of trenches—exposure to artillery, machine-gun fire, and chemical weapons—are detailed, alongside the psychological toll documented in medical reports on shell shock. Battles such as Verdun and the Somme are presented as examples of attritional warfare, with casualty figures illustrating the scale of loss: Verdun resulted in approximately 700,000 casualties over ten months, while the Somme saw over one million casualties in five months. He examines the psychological adaptation of soldiers to industrialised violence, focusing on specialised units like Germany’s Sturmtruppen and Italy’s Arditi. These groups, trained for infiltration tactics, are framed as products of battlefield brutalisation rather than traditional heroism. Ernst Jünger’s memoirs are referenced to illustrate the glorification of combat experience, though the analysis avoids endorsing his perspectives.
The concept of total war is explored through its societal and economic dimensions. Liulevicius notes the mobilisation of civilian populations for war production, the expansion of state control over economies, and the targeting of non-combatants through blockades and strategic bombing. The British naval blockade of Germany, which contributed to civilian malnutrition, and the German Zeppelin raids on British cities are cited as examples. The lecture also addresses the political consequences of total war, including the erosion of civil liberties, the use of propaganda, and the exacerbation of social divisions, such as tensions between frontline soldiers and civilian populations.
The lecture concludes by situating World War I as a catalyst for 20th-century geopolitical upheavals, including revolutions, colonial unrest, and the reconfiguration of state boundaries. It references post-war treaties and the principle of self-determination while avoiding explicit judgments on their long-term efficacy. Academic works like John Keegan’s military history and primary sources such as Jünger’s writings are positioned within broader historiographical debates about the war’s legacy, although Liulevicius himself refrains from taking a definitive stance on these interpretations.
Lecture Five, "Total War—Mobilisation and Mass Death," considers the transformation of warfare after 1914 into a more radical form, a phenomenon described as total war. This lecture explores how this development necessitated the mobilisation of entire populations, economies, and cultural spheres, alongside the military forces. It examines the associated rise in violence against civilians, the expansion of state power, the use of propaganda, the exacerbation of social tensions, and the Armenian genocide within the Ottoman Empire in 1915.The concept of total war is presented as a novel type of industrial warfare, engaging not just soldiers but whole societies and their economic resources. This comprehensive nature had extensive consequences across all aspects of life. The lecture posits that total war is significant due to its implications for the future, including the increased targeting of civilians, the growth of centralised states, the reduction of private life, and the diminished status of the individual, trends identified as continuing throughout the 20th century. The inherent aim of total victory in total war is suggested to have led the First World War away from decisive engagements towards a war of attrition.
The mobilisation of entire societies involved the conscription of vast armies, with an estimated 70 million individuals serving globally, and around 10 million losing their lives. Industrial production was significantly intensified to supply armaments, causing disruption to civilian economies. Women were integrated into the workforce, taking on roles previously held by men in factories, including hazardous occupations, while also managing domestic responsibilities. This shift is noted as affecting perceptions of women's social roles. Children were also involved, through militarised education in schools and participation in collecting materials for the war economy.
Despite pre-war agreements, the targeting of civilians increased by all sides, as the home front became integral to the war effort. Research indicates that during the initial invasion of Belgium and northern France in 1914, German forces killed over 6,000 civilians, either suspecting partisan activity or as a form of reprisal. This had a considerable negative impact on international opinion regarding Germany. British naval power was employed to blockade Germany, an act of economic warfare designed to restrict supplies. After 1915, the economic advantage shifted towards the Allied powers. Germany sought substitute materials and foodstuffs, and the winter of 1916–1917, known as the "Turnip Winter" due to the failure of the potato crop, saw civilians face severe hardship. While the precise human impact is still a subject of academic discussion, civilian mortality in Germany saw a notable increase. Germany's response included submarine warfare, initially limited but later unrestricted, presented as a comparable form of economic warfare to the blockade. However, the sinking of civilian vessels, such as the Lusitania in May 1915, caused significant diplomatic tension with the United States, a factor in the American entry into the war in April 1917.
The demands of the war led to an expansion of government functions to manage the complexities of mobilisation and economic control. Walther Rathenau, a German-Jewish industrialist, is mentioned for his role in re-organising Germany's civilian economy for war production. In the United States, after 1917, Herbert Hoover, an engineer, served as Food Administrator. From 1916, Germany was effectively governed by the military figures Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, who marginalised the Emperor. They pursued the coordination of the German economy and labour mobilisation under a system referred to as War Socialism, adapting socialist concepts of state economic control. The increased role of government and the demand for decisive action are linked to a growing reliance on singular leaders, exemplified by the erection of a large wooden statue of Hindenburg in Berlin as a symbol of national unity.
Propaganda is discussed as a significant wartime phenomenon, extending beyond censorship to actively shape public opinion and motivate support for the total war effort. Initially having religious connotations, the term "propaganda" took on secular applications. A significant amount of propaganda was produced spontaneously, such as the million war poems written in Germany in the war's early months. Propaganda was also used to obscure the realities of the war, which, in the German case, made the 1918 defeat difficult for many to accept given prior positive reports. Enemy dehumanisation was another aspect, fostering animosity through negative stereotypes, as seen in Ernst Lissauer's "Hymn of Hate." Government propaganda agencies employed innovative methods, such as the American Committee on Public Information, led by George Creel, which utilised numerous speakers to influence the populace. Some propaganda efforts resulted in the spread of false rumours, for instance, the 1917 myth of a German "corpse factory." Over time, public scepticism towards official propaganda increased. It is noted that this scepticism later led to initial disbelief regarding reports of Nazi atrocities during the Second World War. Propaganda was also used offensively, with the German military facilitating the journey of the Russian revolutionary Lenin from Switzerland to Russia in April 1917 to promote revolution.
The extensive pressures of total war are presented as eroding initial enthusiasm and exacerbating social divisions along class and political lines. Within the socialist movement, the radical faction associated with Lenin gained influence. The search for those responsible for the war's suffering led to the singling out of groups, such as German Jews in the army, scrutinised in the "Jewish Census" of 1916. Even before the war's end, elements of a conspiracy theory, the "stab-in-the-back legend," emerged in Germany, blaming domestic minorities for supposedly undermining the military.
Liulevicius addresses the Armenian massacres of 1915 within the Ottoman Empire, where between half a million and a million Armenians were killed. State officials, fearing collaboration between this Christian minority and the Russian enemy to achieve independence, ordered their deportation. The ruling Young Turks, originating from the Committee for Union and Progress, are identified as encouraging these measures, although the existence of a single order for the killings is debated among historians. Total war is presented as creating conditions conducive to genocide, normalising mass violence. In April 1915, Turkish authorities targeted Armenian community leaders, arresting and executing several hundred. Over the following two years, two to three million Armenians were deported from eastern Anatolia towards Syria and Mesopotamia. Estimates suggest a significant portion were massacred, perished during the forced marches, or survived the expulsions. The death toll is estimated at between half a million and one million, through direct killing or the effects of exposure. The lack of substantial international response to these events is suggested to have set a precedent. Despite calls for intervention from the American ambassador and German missionaries, global events overshadowed the atrocities. While distinct from the industrialised murder of Jews by the Nazis, the Armenian experience is described as a precursor. A reported later statement attributed to Hitler questions the remembrance of the Armenians, cited in the context of justifying his own plans. The Turkish government continues to deny the characterisation of these events as genocide.
Here Liulevicius examines the Russian Revolution as a consequence of the First World War, presenting it as a radical socialist seizure of power in a collapsing empire. The lecture argues that the Bolsheviks, under Lenin, initiated a revolutionary project aimed at global systemic change, marking 1917 as a crucial turning point in modern history and the start of enduring ideological conflicts. The lecture posits that the Russian Empire's involvement in the First World War exposed its fundamental weaknesses, leading to social and political breakdown.One key argument presented is that despite some modernisation efforts, Russia remained ill-equipped for the demands of total war. Contemporary perspectives viewed Russia's Tsarist autocracy as economically and politically backward. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, while initially successful, resulted in staggering casualties and further eroded public morale, exemplifying Russia's military shortcomings. The pre-war reforms implemented by Pyotr Stolypin, aimed at creating a class of independent peasant farmers, had not progressed sufficiently to modernise the agrarian economy.
Liulevicius also explores the fracturing of Russian society during the war. While initial support existed, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin from exile, opposed the war, and their anti-war stance gained traction as the conflict dragged on. Military failures, coupled with scandals surrounding the Imperial Court, particularly after Tsar Nicholas II assumed command of the army in 1915, undermined the regime's legitimacy. Grigori Rasputin's influence at court further discredited the monarchy. The Tsarina Alexandra's German heritage also fuelled suspicion and accusations of treason.
Liulevicius details the February Revolution, highlighting the establishment of the Provisional Government and the parallel emergence of the Petrograd Soviet, reflecting a dual power structure. The Provisional Government's decision to continue the war, driven in part by treaty obligations to the Entente powers and a desire to retain territorial integrity, proved unpopular and created an opening for the Bolsheviks. Alexander Kerensky's June Offensive in 1917 ended in disaster, further discrediting the Provisional Government.
The argument regarding Lenin's return from exile and the April Theses is presented, emphasising the role of German support in facilitating Lenin's return to Russia. While accusations of Lenin being a German agent persist, it is more accurate to portray it as a marriage of convenience, with both parties seeking to destabilise the Russian war effort. Lenin's April Theses, advocating for the transfer of power to the Soviets, resonated with war-weary soldiers, workers, and peasants. The slogan "Bread, Peace, and Land" was particularly effective in capitalising on popular discontent.
Liulevicius then discusses Lenin's background and the development of the Bolshevik party as a vanguard party. Lenin's early life, marked by the execution of his brother for revolutionary activities, shaped his radical political views. His commitment to Marxist socialism led him to develop a highly centralised and disciplined party structure, designed to lead the proletariat to revolution. The split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903 reflected fundamental differences in their approach to achieving socialist revolution, with the Bolsheviks advocating for a more revolutionary and centralised approach.
Liulevicius in this lecture makes the case that Lenin's primary challenge was adapting Marxist theory to the Russian context. Russia's predominantly agrarian society and relatively small industrial working class presented a challenge to classical Marxist predictions. Lenin's theory of imperialism, outlined in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, argued that capitalism had evolved into a global system, with imperialist powers exploiting weaker nations. He believed that Russia, as the weakest link in this system, was ripe for revolution. Lenin's concept of the vanguard party was crucial in overcoming the perceived lack of revolutionary consciousness among the Russian working class.
The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, coordinated by Trotsky, is detailed. The storming of the Winter Palace, while later mythologised, was a relatively bloodless affair, reflecting the weakness of the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks' claim to be acting in the name of the Soviets provided a veneer of legitimacy. The Second Congress of Soviets, convened immediately after the seizure of power, approved the formation of a new government, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom).
The initial measures implemented by the Bolshevik government are presented, including the suppression of opposition parties, the nationalisation of industry and land, and the establishment of the Cheka. The Decree on Land, which legitimised peasant seizures of land, was a tactical move to gain peasant support, despite contradicting the Bolsheviks' long-term goal of collectivised agriculture. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, while controversial, allowed the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power and focus on internal threats.
The lecture discusses the Bolsheviks' expectation of a global revolution and the establishment of the Comintern to promote communist revolutions worldwide. The Comintern aimed to unite communist parties under Moscow's leadership and promote a global socialist revolution. The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, led by Béla Kun, was an early attempt to establish a communist state outside Russia, but it was short-lived.
Finally, Liulevicius considers the direct and indirect influence of the Bolshevik Revolution. The revolution inspired communist movements worldwide, but it also provoked strong opposition from capitalist powers. The Russian Civil War, which pitted the Bolsheviks against a coalition of anti-communist forces, was a direct consequence of the revolution. The ideological conflict between communism and capitalism shaped the course of the 20th century. The revolution's impact extended beyond politics, influencing art, literature, and social thought. The constructivist art movement, for example, embraced the revolution's ideals and sought to create art that served the needs of the new socialist society.
Liulevicius now examines the period following the First World War, arguing that the war's end in 1918 did not bring lasting peace. Instead, the lecture posits that the Treaty of Versailles created conditions for future conflict. It explores the displacement of millions of refugees, the decline of initial hopes for democracy, and the rise of radical revolutionary movements and militarized politics in the interwar period. The lecture highlights the Treaty of Lausanne between Greece and Turkey as a model for population transfers, setting a precedent with significant consequences. One key argument is that the First World War brutalised European societies and militarised politics. The sheer scale of death and destruction, with an estimated 10 million dead and double that number wounded, had a profound impact on European culture and intellectual life. The erection of monuments to the Unknown Soldier reflected the anonymous mass death characteristic of the conflict. The war led to an expansion of government power, which undermined liberal ideals of limited states and individual rights, curtailing civil liberties in the name of national security. The Defence of the Realm Act in Britain, for example, granted the government broad powers to control the press and restrict personal freedoms.Liulevicius also examines the concept of a "Lost Generation," disillusioned by the war's horrors and sceptical of traditional values. Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front captured the sense of disillusionment and the psychological trauma experienced by soldiers. Some veterans advocated for a "trenchocracy," believing that the values of the trenches – discipline, camaraderie, and a willingness to sacrifice – should be applied to civilian life. Ernst Jünger's writings, such as Storm of Steel, celebrated the experience of war and promoted a militaristic worldview. Liulevicius then discusses the redrawing of borders and the creation of new states following the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. This process resulted in significant refugee flows and the creation of stateless populations. Hannah Arendt's analysis of statelessness as a defining feature of the 20th century is mentioned. The emergence of new frontiers left an estimated 20 million people as ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, creating potential flashpoints for future conflict. The Minorities Treaties, intended to protect the rights of these minorities, proved largely ineffective.
Liulevicius focuses on "population transfer," highlighting the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty mandated the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, resulting in the displacement of approximately 1.3 million Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey to Greece and 400,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey. The operation, although overseen by international bodies, involved violence, massacres, and ethnic cleansing. The League of Nations played a role in administering the population exchange, but its resources and authority were limited. The Nansen passport, introduced by the League, provided identity documents for stateless refugees. Liulevicius argues that despite the human cost, the population transfer was hailed by some European politicians as a successful model of problem-solving, establishing a precedent for later forced migrations. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, promising a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, led to increased Jewish migration to the region and growing tensions with the Arab population.
Liulevicius then examines the rise of democratic ideals following the war, focusing on Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the creation of the League of Nations. Wilson's vision of a world "safe for democracy" resonated with many Europeans, but the Treaty of Versailles ultimately undermined his ideals. The Fourteen Points included principles such as self-determination, open diplomacy, and the establishment of a League of Nations to prevent future wars.
Liulevicius discusses the emergence of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe, including Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. However, these new democracies faced numerous challenges, including economic instability, ethnic tensions, and the legacy of authoritarian rule. The Weimar Republic in Germany, established in November 1918, struggled with political polarisation, economic hardship, and the burden of reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
Liulevicius explores the impact of Americanisation and Taylorism on European societies. The adoption of American methods of industrial organisation, such as Ford's assembly line, was seen as a way to increase productivity and improve living standards. However, Taylorism, with its emphasis on scientific management and efficiency, was also criticised for dehumanising workers. Charlie Chaplin's film Modern Times satirised the alienating effects of factory work.
Liulevicius argues that the Treaty of Versailles was a deeply flawed agreement that contributed to instability in Europe. The treaty imposed harsh terms on Germany, including territorial losses, military restrictions, reparations payments, and the "War Guilt Clause." The exclusion of Germany from the negotiations and the imposition of a dictated peace fueled resentment and contributed to the rise of extremist ideologies. John Maynard Keynes, in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, criticised the treaty for its punitive economic provisions, arguing that they would destabilise the European economy. Liulevicius also notes the rejection of the treaty by the US Senate, the exclusion of Soviet Russia from the League of Nations, and the dissatisfaction of Italy with the territorial settlement. The absence of the United States and Russia weakened the League of Nations and undermined its ability to maintain peace. The Paris Peace Conference also failed to address the concerns of non-Western peoples, who hoped for independence and self-determination.
Liulevicius explores the surge of radical revolutionary movements in Europe, inspired by the Soviet example and often supported by the Comintern. Communist uprisings and attempted revolutions occurred in Finland, Germany, Hungary, and other countries. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, leaders of the Spartacus League in Germany, were murdered by government forces in January 1919. The Hungarian Soviet Republic, led by Béla Kun, lasted only a few months before being overthrown.
Liulevicius then discusses the rise of Freikorps and the White Terror in Germany. The Freikorps, paramilitary units composed of ex-soldiers and right-wing volunteers, were used by the Weimar government to suppress communist uprisings and maintain order. However, the Freikorps were often brutal and undisciplined, and many of their members harboured anti-democratic sentiments. The Kapp Putsch in 1920, an attempted coup by Freikorps units, demonstrated the fragility of the Weimar Republic.
Liulevicius concludes by noting the period of relative stability in Europe from 1924 to 1929, based on economic recovery and international cooperation. However, this stability proved fragile, and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 created opportunities for extreme movements and undermined democratic institutions. The Locarno Treaties of 1925, which aimed to normalise relations between Germany and its neighbours, represented a high point of international cooperation during this period. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, was another attempt to promote peace and security, but it lacked effective enforcement mechanisms.
Liulevicius' lecture on Communism provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath. The expectations of the revolutionaries were disappointed as a worldwide workers' revolution did not materialise, and instead, a civil war broke out in the summer of 1918. This civil war was marked by incredible ferocity and atrocities on all sides, resulting in an estimated 7 to 10 million deaths, with some estimates suggesting that all Russian deaths by violence, hunger, and disease between 1918 and 1922 could be as high as 20 million.The Whites, a loose coalition of anti-Bolshevik forces, lacked coordination and mutual agreement about strategy or political aims, which ultimately led to their defeat. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were better organised and more disciplined, with a centralised government and a strong Red Army, which was created by decree on January 28, 1918. The Cheka secret police organszation, established in 1918, used terror as an accepted weapon, following the September 5, 1918 decree on Red Terror.
The Soviet regime's plans were propagated through innovative use of media, including posters, cinema, and Agitprop trains with films sent out into the country. The regime also focused on electrification, with Lenin announcing that "Communism is electrification plus the power of the Soviets!" The State Planning Commission, established in February 1921, set goals for a planned economy, and the Cheka continued to operate, headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, a former Polish aristocrat.
The Kronstadt revolt in March 1921 was a major shock to the Soviet regime, as sailors at the Kronstadt naval base, who were earlier supporters of the Bolsheviks, demanded economic reforms, true soviets free of Bolshevik control, free speech, and an end to political dictatorship. The revolt was brutally suppressed by Trotsky and General Tukhachevsky, which was a serious ideological blow to the regime.
The New Economic Policy (NEP), announced in March 1921, reintroduced elements of a market economy, allowing agriculture, smaller shops, and factories to produce for the market, for profit, after meeting tax obligations to the state. However, the government retained control over the "commanding heights" of the economy, including large industry, major factories, mines, transportation, and banks.
The struggle to succeed Lenin, who died on January 21, 1924, was between Leon Trotsky and Josef Stalin. Stalin's bureaucratic and organisational activity, as General Secretary of the Party since 1922, gave him many supporters in key party positions. He advanced the slogan "Socialism in One Country," urging consolidation and strengthening of the state as a first priority. Stalin engineered Trotsky's expulsion from the party in 1927, and eventually, Trotsky was exiled to Central Asia and later assassinated in Mexico by a Stalinist agent.
The experience of the civil war had a profound effect on the Bolshevik regime, leading to a more centralised and militarised state. The regime's use of terror and repression of internal dissent also had a lasting impact on Soviet society. The factors that contributed to Stalin's rise to power included his bureaucratic and organisational activity, his ability to maneuver and form alliances, and his willingness to use violence and repression to eliminate his opponents.
Further research suggests that the civil war had a profound impact on the Russian people, leading to widespread poverty, famine, and displacement. The war also had a significant impact on the Russian economy, leading to the destruction of infrastructure and the loss of industrial capacity. The Bolsheviks' use of terror and repression during this period also had a lasting impact on Soviet society, leading to a culture of fear and mistrust that would persist for decades.
The establishment of the Cheka secret police organisation and the Red Army also had a significant impact on Soviet society, leading to a culture of militarism and repression. The Cheka's use of terror as an accepted weapon also contributed to a culture of fear and mistrust, which would persist for decades.
The Kronstadt revolt and the subsequent suppression of the revolt also had a significant impact on Soviet society, leading to a further centralisation of power and a repression of dissent. The New Economic Policy, while intended to revitalise the Soviet economy, ultimately failed to address the underlying structural issues and contributed to a culture of corruption and inefficiency.
The rise of Stalin to power also had a profound impact on Soviet society, leading to a further centralisation of power and a repression of dissent. Stalin's use of violence and repression to eliminate his opponents also contributed to a culture of fear and mistrust, which would persist for decades. Liulevicius concludes with how the Russian Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath had a profound impact on Soviet society, leading to a more centralised and militarised state, a culture of fear and mistrust, and a repression of dissent. The factors that contributed to Stalin's rise to power, including his bureaucratic and organisational activity, his ability to manoeuver and form alliances, and his willingness to use violence and repression to eliminate his opponents, ultimately led to a regime that was characterised by terror, repression, and a complete disregard for human rights.
Here Liulevicius argues that Josef Stalin, born Iosef Dzhugashvili in Georgia in 1879, meticulously constructed his power within the Bolshevik movement and subsequently imposed a brutal transformation upon Soviet society. Liulevicius highlights Stalin's obscure beginnings and his early involvement in revolutionary activities, including bank robbery, under the pseudonym Koba. His later adoption of the name Stalin, meaning "man of steel," coincided with a period of Siberian exile where he cultivated a reputation for toughness. Liulevicius notes that Stalin's administrative skills as party general secretary, earning him the nickname "Comrade Card-Index," were crucial to his accumulation of power.Liulevicius contends that a deliberate cult of personality was fostered around Stalin, despite his unprepossessing physical appearance – being short, pockmarked, and possessing a strong Georgian accent – and his relatively minor role in the 1917 October Revolution. This cult was built upon the existing veneration of Lenin, with Petrograd being renamed Leningrad and a mausoleum constructed for Lenin's body. Liulevicius points out that criticisms of Stalin made by Lenin before his death were suppressed. The creation of this cult involved manipulating historical records, such as retouching photographs and creating fictionalised paintings to exaggerate Stalin's proximity to Lenin and his importance in the revolution. Liulevicius describes how Stalin was presented in idealised portraits and statues, and how public displays of adulation, such as prolonged applause, became commonplace. He also notes Stalin's interest in films about himself, a trait shared by other dictators. According to Liulevicius, this cult was effective, particularly among newer party members who owed their advancement to Stalin's removal of Old Bolsheviks. The remote leader became a figure of almost religious devotion, receiving thousands of letters from ordinary citizens. iLiulevicius argues that Stalin implemented a system of "Stalinisation" aimed at achieving total control over Soviet society, at immense human cost. After consolidating his power by eliminating rivals, Stalin initiated campaigns to restructure the Soviet Union. Liulevicius details the policy of collectivisation of agriculture, starting in 1928, which aimed to bring food supplies under state control by replacing independent farms with large collective farms. This process involved the forced elimination of more prosperous peasants, termed kulaks, through arrests and deportations. Liulevicius explains that peasant resistance led to a significant drop in agricultural production. Despite a temporary halt in 1930, the drive for collectivisation resumed, with food being declared state property and severe penalties imposed for theft. In Ukraine, Liulevicius asserts, these policies resulted in the Terror Famine of 1932–1933, where grain was forcibly seized from starving regions. Estimates of the death toll vary, with Liulevicius citing figures between five and seven million in Ukraine alone, and noting that the Soviet government denied the famine's existence. The introduction of internal passports in 1932 further restricted movement.
Alongside collectivisation, Liulevicius examines the implementation of the Five-Year Plans, beginning in 1928, which aimed to rapidly industrialise the Soviet Union. He argues that this emphasis on heavy industry and forced progress represented a departure from classical Marxism, focusing instead on the power of will. Liulevicius describes the rapid expansion of industry, with new factories and cities like Magnitogorsk emerging. Propaganda celebrated figures like the miner Alexei Stakhanov, whose record-breaking output, though staged, inspired the Stakhanovite movement of shock workers. However, Liulevicius also points to the internal contradictions and inefficiencies of the planned economy, where shortcomings were often attributed to sabotage. The First Five-Year Plan was declared complete ahead of schedule in 1932, followed by a Second Five-Year Plan.
Liulevicius dedicates significant attention to the Great Purge of the 1930s, which he portrays as a massive campaign of terror orchestrated by Stalin to eliminate perceived and potential opposition. He notes that while the secret police and camp system were established under Lenin, Stalin oversaw their vast expansion, with the secret police being renamed the NKVD in 1934. Liulevicius cites estimates suggesting millions of deaths during the Stalinist era, with around 600,000 executions during the Great Purge of 1936–1938. The murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934 served as a pretext for launching the purges, leading to mass arrests of party officials, Old Bolsheviks, and ordinary citizens. Liulevicius describes the Moscow show trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938, where prominent Communists were forced to confess to fabricated charges before being executed. The purges extended to the military in 1937, severely weakening the Red Army's leadership, including the removal of Marshal Tukhachevsky. Liulevicius explains that the NKVD operated with quotas for arrests, and family members of those accused were also targeted. He mentions the existence of an NKVD research unit studying public opinion. Liulevicius discusses the ongoing debate about the causes of the Great Terror, including Stalin's paranoia, the ambition of officials, and the psychological factors that inhibited resistance. He argues that Stalin used terror to enact broad social change within the party and the country.
Finally, Liulevicius examines the Gulag, the extensive system of prison and labour camps. He states that prisoner labour became a significant component of the planned economy, accounting for a substantial portion of economic output by the late 1930s. Liulevicius mentions the existence of hundreds of camps across the Soviet Union, citing examples like Magadan and Kolyma. Based on archival evidence, he suggests prisoner numbers reached 1.5 million by the end of the 1930s and rose to 2 to 2.5 million by the late 1940s and early 1950s. Despite propaganda presenting the camps as institutions for rehabilitation, Liulevicius underscores the prevalence of high mortality rates and mistreatment, as documented by writers like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Here Liulevicius argues that the Soviet Union under Stalin consciously sought to create a radically new and modern society, producing a "new man" and "new woman." This involved a complete restructuring of social life and the arts, all directed towards building a communist utopia. He highlights Stalin's directive to Soviet artists to become "engineers of human souls." This concept underpinned the Proletkult movement, which advocated for new art forms created collectively by workers, reflecting proletarian experience and rejecting bourgeois art. The official doctrine of Socialist Realism, established in 1932, mandated that art should depict reality not as it was, but as it was becoming under Socialism. This art had a clear political purpose: to motivate the masses, be easily understandable, and praise the party, state, and Stalin. This led to what Liulevicius describes as art of "astonishing banality," falsifying the present for a promised future. Deviation from this was severely punished, as exemplified by the case of poet Osip Mandelstam, who was imprisoned and died for criticising Stalin.Liulevicius details the social reorganisation under Stalin, emphasising gigantism and mass participation. Women were encouraged to work in factories and professions, leading to the establishment of mass nurseries and orphanages. Young people were organised into the Young Pioneers, engaging in mass exercises to instil collectivity. Party cells and informers were used for surveillance. Liulevicius mentions the story of Pavlik Morozov, a young boy lauded for denouncing his father and subsequently murdered, his story used to enforce loyalty to the state above family ties. The regime enforced militant atheism, closing or destroying religious institutions and persecuting clergy. The party controlled the historical narrative. Those purged from the party, most famously Trotsky, were erased from historical records, becoming "non-persons".
Liulevicius focuses on monumental projects as demonstrations of the regime's claims to modernity. Magnitogorsk, a massive metallurgical city intended to surpass its American counterpart in Gary, Indiana, was constructed from 1929 using both enthusiastic volunteers and prison labour. Another key project was the Palace of the Soviets, planned to be a colossal ceremonial building in Moscow, taller than the Empire State Building, and topped with a statue of Lenin dwarfing the Statue of Liberty. However, it was never built. The Moscow Metro, opened in 1935, was a major showcase, built rapidly and involving significant loss of life. The Great Dnieper Dam, a large hydroelectric project, involved foreign companies and forced labour, displacing many farmers. The Baltic-White Sea Canal, built by prisoners in the early 1930s, resulted in many deaths. The Gulag system, a vast network of labour camps, was not hidden, as Liulevicius explains. Magadan, in the Far East, served as a Gulag capital, where prisoners mined gold and other minerals, with over a million prisoners sent there to mine gold managed by the Far Northern Construction Trust, Dal'stroi.
Liulevicius discusses aspects of daily life, such as communal apartments, or "komunalkas," where multiple families shared living spaces with minimal privacy. He mentions the "Punkt" radio, a loudspeaker in public and private spaces that broadcast a single, unchangeable station, representing the controlled flow of information.
Liulevicius highlights the contrast between outside perceptions and internal realities. Sympathetic visitors, like American journalists John Reed and Lincoln Steffens, often presented a romanticised view of the revolution and the Soviet system, proclaiming it "the future that works." Visitors were given carefully managed tours, and Socialist Realist depictions resonated with many Westerners during the Great Depression. Writers like George Bernard Shaw and reformers Sidney and Beatrice Webb praised the Soviet Union as a "land of hope" and a "new civilisation," often overlooking or rationalising negative aspects.
Finally, Liulevicius presents Yevgeny Zamyatin's dystopian novel "We" as a starkly contrasting internal perspective. Written in 1920, the novel depicts a future society, OneState, where life is rigidly controlled, individuality is suppressed, and citizens are identified by numbers. A revolt against this system is crushed, and the novel concludes with the chilling idea that many humans embrace tyranny for the sake of certainty. Zamyatin, allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1931, became a key figure in anti-utopian literature.
Liulevicius outlines Fascism as a significant new ideology that emerged from the disruption and suffering caused by the First World War. Initially manifesting in post-war Italy, its influence subsequently spread. Liulevicius notes that Fascism, as conceived by the former Socialist Benito Mussolini, rejected parliamentary democracy, liberalism, Socialism, and Communism. Mussolini organised paramilitary groups, known as Blackshirts, who engaged in political violence with the stated aim of creating a revitalised national community. According to Liulevicius, the Fascist ascent to power in 1922, epitomised by the largely fabricated narrative of the March on Rome, involved the suppression of opponents and the purported mobilisation of society towards a "total state", characterised by the slogan "Believe, Obey, and Fight". Liulevicius points out that Mussolini, styled as Il Duce, served as a model for aspiring dictators globally, reflecting a decline in the acceptance of democratic principles.Liulevicius explains that although the term Fascism is now used more freely, its genesis was specific to post-First World War Italy. While Fascist ideas were adopted and adapted elsewhere, they rarely achieved the same level of dominance as in Italy. Liulevicius highlights the Nazi regime's derivation of inspiration from Italian Fascism, but also notes ongoing historical debate regarding whether Nazism should be considered a subset of Fascism or a distinctly German phenomenon. A key difference Liulevicius identifies is Italian Fascism's initial absence of the explicit racism and anti-Semitism central to Nazism, with these elements being adopted later under the influence of Hitler.
Generally, Liulevicius argues, despite its often ill-defined nature, Fascist ideology was anti-Socialist, anti-Communist, opposed to parliamentary governance and liberal thought. It promoted order, the supremacy of the state over the individual, and a culture of aggressive heroism, achievable through revolutionary action and violence.
Tracing Mussolini's background, Liulevicius describes his birth in a poor village, his Socialist blacksmith father, and a somewhat erratic early life involving expulsion from school, a period in Switzerland with a claimed encounter with Lenin, and a return to Italy where he taught and became involved in Socialist journalism. Liulevicius emphasises Mussolini's view of violence as a driving force of historical change. When the First World War began, Liulevicius recounts Mussolini's break with the anti-war Socialist stance, arguing instead for Italian intervention, viewing the war, like Lenin, as an opportunity. After being ousted from the Socialist Party, Mussolini, with French financial support, advocated for war and subsequently served in the conflict.
Liulevicius details Italy's experience in the First World War following its entry in 1915, which was marked by significant casualties, including around half a million deaths. Special forces, the Arditi, were valorised. However, Liulevicius explains that the peace settlement was considered a failure. At the Versailles conference, Italy did not receive the territorial concessions promised by the Allies, leading to widespread resentment and the characterisation of the outcome as a "mutilated peace". The post-war period, Liulevicius notes, was turbulent, featuring industrial strikes, agricultural unrest, political instability, and the formation of veteran groups similar to the German Freikorps. Adding to this climate, in 1919, the poet Gabriele D'Annunzio led an expedition to seize the disputed city of Fiume, demonstrating a spirit of nationalist defiance. Liulevicius contends that Mussolini aimed to exploit this instability by creating a new political movement that merged nationalist and revolutionary concepts. This movement was presented as a bulwark against Communist revolution, yet Liulevicius also records Mussolini's admiration for Lenin's pragmatic approach to political action. The movement, initiated in Milan in March 1919, was named Fasci di Combattimento. Liulevicius explains the etymology of "fascio" as a league and its reference to the ancient Roman symbol of state authority. These squads, often comprising former Arditi, adopted the Arditi's anthem, black shirts, the Roman salute, and had leaders known as Ras. Liulevicius describes their activities as involving violent attacks on political adversaries and the disruption of strikes, all under the guise of restoring order.
The seizure of power in October 1922, as Liulevicius describes it, was prefaced by claims of an impending Communist revolution. Fascist leaders organised a march on Rome, a convergence on the capital to intimidate the political establishment. Concurrently, King Victor Emmanuel III invited Mussolini to form a government. Liulevicius stresses that the theatrical march was subsequently mythologised as an act of decisive action. Once in power, Liulevicius states, Mussolini consolidated his authority gradually, becoming a dominant dictator by 1929. The Blackshirts were integrated into the state apparatus. Although the Fascist regime was shaken by the murder of Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, Mussolini survived the crisis. The OVRA secret police was established in 1926, elections were suspended, and rule by decree became standard. In 1929, the Lateran Accords were signed with the Vatican, resolving the long-standing Roman Question. Despite Mussolini's description of his regime as "totalitarian", Liulevicius asserts that its control was, in reality, incomplete, with the monarchy and the Catholic Church retaining some independent influence.
Liulevicius identifies "action" as the core of Fascist ideology, with an emphasis on vigorous activity and violence. The aim, according to Liulevicius, was to reshape the Italian population through war and imperial expansion, encapsulated by the slogan "Believe, obey, fight". The state was presented as superior to the individual, embodying a higher form of unity, with Mussolini as Il Duce, the leader meant to command the populace. Liulevicius notes the Fascist claim of inaugurating a new era, with the 1922 March on Rome designated as year zero of a new Fascist calendar. Fascist propaganda, Liulevicius explains, was infused with a nostalgia for ancient Rome, evident in the cult of Romanita and the mimicking of Roman architectural styles. Simultaneously, there was a projection of progress, technological advancement, and the modernisation of Italy, including celebrated initiatives like improving railway punctuality, constructing autostrade, draining the Pontine Marshes, and the "Battle for Grain" to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. Even leisure activities were organised through the Dopolavoro.
Liulevicius highlights Fascism's emphasis on youth, projecting an image of renewal and a break from tradition to create a "new man". Italian youth were enrolled in organisations such as the Balilla and Figli della Lupa. Mass physical training and sports were used for both propaganda and military preparation. Economically, Liulevicius notes, Fascists proposed corporatism as a system that would overcome class divisions. This involved the creation of corporate bodies representing different economic sectors, integrated into the state, theoretically to achieve economic harmony, though in practice it served to control labour.
Finally, Liulevicius discusses the broader "illiberal wave" of the interwar period, with numerous dictatorships arising worldwide, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and South America, that emulated Mussolini's persona and Fascist aesthetics. However, Liulevicius clarifies that most of these regimes were more akin to traditional authoritarian conservative states rather than purely Fascist. Examples include regimes in Hungary under Miklós Horthy, Austria under Engelbert Dollfuss, Poland under Józef Piłsudski, and various South American dictatorships. Fascist movements existed in other countries, such as the French Cross of Fire and the British Union of Fascists led by Sir Oswald Mosley, but Liulevicius points out they generally remained marginal. The appeal of the Fascist model, Liulevicius suggests, was amplified by the economic hardships of the Great Depression after 1929, leading to a significant proportion of European nations being governed by authoritarian regimes by 1939. Liulevicius concludes by stating that the Fascists provided a direct inspiration for the Nazis, who would establish a regime of considerably greater force and violence.
Liulevicius characterises the 1930s as a profoundly troubled period, marked by a deepening global economic crisis, the erosion of liberal ideals, and a growing sense of impending ideological conflict, a sentiment captured by W. H. Auden's description of a "low dishonest decade" and William Butler Yeats's observation about conviction and intensity. He notes the battering liberal ideas received from the First World War and subsequent disillusionment with democratic processes, particularly within Europe. He further details the social crisis precipitated by the Great Depression, which had worldwide repercussions after 1929. Liulevicius highlights the severe impact on the United States, where unemployment reached 25% and industrial output significantly declined by 1932, and on Germany, which saw six million unemployed in the same year, fostering support for both Nazi and Communist parties.According to Liulevicius, this period saw a resurgence of imperialist thought, paradoxically strongest in nations with limited or lost colonial possessions. Fascist Italy, he observes, actively sought an imperial role in Africa. In Germany, Liulevicius describes the rise in popularity of geopolitics as a pseudoscience, promoting ideas of national economic self-sufficiency (autarky), a world divided into spheres of influence dominated by superpowers, and the concept of Lebensraum, or "living space", for the German people. Historically, the pursuit of Lebensraum was not a new concept, having roots in pre-World War I German thought, but it gained renewed traction and racial connotations under the Nazis, advocating for the acquisition of territory in Eastern Europe. Liulevicius contrasts this renewed imperial drive with the simultaneous growth of nationalist movements in colonised regions, such as that led by Mahatma Gandhi in India, which imperial powers attempted to suppress through force, as exemplified by the 1919 Amritsar Massacre, where British Indian Army troops fired upon a peaceful gathering, killing hundreds.
Liulevicius also discusses the widespread popularity of eugenics, presented as a biological solution to social problems, advocating for state intervention to improve the genetic quality of the population. He notes its acceptance across the political spectrum, leading to legislation for the sterilisation of individuals deemed mentally unfit in countries like Sweden and the United States. Liulevicius points out that the Nazi regime, upon gaining power, swiftly implemented extensive eugenic programmes, including the 1933 "Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring", which mandated the forced sterilisation of individuals with conditions deemed hereditary.
In addressing contemporary visions of the future, Liulevicius references Aldous Huxley's 1932 novel "Brave New World". He presents Huxley's depiction of a dystopian society, founded on principles attributed to Henry Ford, where stability is paramount, achieved through chemical means like the drug "soma" for emotional control, and a genetically engineered caste system eliminating natural human variation. Liulevicius suggests this reflected anxieties about the potential for excessive social ordering in response to the period's uncertainties.
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia (Abyssinia) in 1935 is presented by Liulevicius as a key event demonstrating the feebleness of collective security. Mussolini's aim, as Liulevicius explains, was to establish an African empire reminiscent of ancient Rome and to avenge the Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896. The Italian military employed modern weaponry, including aircraft and poison gas, against Ethiopian forces. Following the annexation in 1936, the Italian King was proclaimed Emperor. Liulevicius highlights the League of Nations' condemnation but its inability to implement effective sanctions, particularly an oil embargo, which undermined its credibility. He notes Hitler's approval of Mussolini's actions, which fostered closer ties between Germany and Italy, culminating in the Rome-Berlin Axis agreement of October 1936.
Turning to Japan, Liulevicius outlines its rapid industrialisation and Westernisation following the 1868 Meiji Restoration. He describes Japan's subsequent imperial expansion, marked by victories against China in 1894-95 and Russia in 1904-05, leading to the annexation of Korea in 1910. During the First World War, Japan furthered its aims in China. Liulevicius explains that Japanese imperialism employed the slogan "Asia for the Asians" to mask its control over non-Japanese populations, alongside a doctrine of Japanese racial superiority and the divine authority of the Emperor. The 1931 Manchurian crisis, triggered by the staged Mukden incident, served as a pretext for the Japanese military to occupy Manchuria and create the puppet state of Manchukuo. Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, following criticism, according to Liulevicius, indicated its defiance of international opinion. Subsequent military actions against China escalated with the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, initiating a prolonged war. Liulevicius recounts the resistance from both Chinese Nationalists and Communists, despite their internal conflict. The capture of Nanking in 1937 was followed by the "Rape of Nanking", a period of extensive atrocities against civilians. Liulevicius also mentions the activities of Unit 731, a covert biological warfare research unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, which conducted lethal experiments on Chinese civilians.
Liulevicius views the Spanish Civil War, from 1936 to 1939, as a conflict with significant international dimensions. General Francisco Franco's military revolt against the Spanish Republic, supported by the Fascist Falange, was opposed by a Popular Front comprising various left-wing and democratic groups. Liulevicius describes the intervention of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, providing troops and materiel to Franco's forces, while the Soviet Union supported the Republican side, alongside international volunteer brigades. However, he also notes the internal purges within the Republican forces, where Communist elements suppressed their Anarchist allies, as recounted by George Orwell in "Homage to Catalonia". The war, which Liulevicius states cost approximately 500,000 lives, included atrocities such as the 1937 aerial bombing of Guernica by the German Condor Legion. Franco's victory in 1939 led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Liulevicius concludes that the Spanish Civil War, with its ideological clashes and brutality, appeared as a precursor to the Second World War.
Finally, Liulevicius points to the significant electoral gains of the Nazi Party in Germany in 1930 and their subsequent rise to power in 1933, promising order, unity, and the abolition of democracy. He asserts that the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party, alongside the international crises of the 1930s, directly contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Liulevicius's lecture examines the origins of Nazism, its ideological foundations, and its ascent to power in Germany, all heavily influenced by the First World War's devastating impact. He argues that the war's mobilisation served as a blueprint for the Nazis' envisioned societal reorganisation after 1933, based on racial principles. The S.A. storm troopers, a paramilitary wing of the Nazi party, saw themselves as political soldiers under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, a former soldier. He highlights that defeat in 1918 fostered resentment among many Germans who struggled to accept the loss. The Weimar Republic, associated with this defeat, the Treaty of Versailles, and economic hardship, lost credibility despite a period of relative stability in the mid-1920s. Nationalists disseminated the "stab-in-the-back" myth, alleging that internal enemies had betrayed Germany. The German Workers' Party (DAP), a small nationalist group, was formed in Munich in January 1919. Hitler joined in September 1919, eventually becoming its chairman in 1921 and renaming it the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP).
Hitler, according to Liulevicius, presented himself as the archetypal trench soldier, aiming to rally a new political movement against democracy. His oratory skills, coupled with his organisational and propaganda abilities, made him increasingly indispensable to the Nazis, who often referred to their movement as the "Hitler movement". His followers called him Führer, meaning leader. The S.A., established in 1921, reflected the influence of the First World War. They drew inspiration from Italian Fascist Blackshirts and were led by Ernst Röhm, a former Freikorps officer, and operated within a wider context of paramilitary violence that pervaded Germany in the immediate post-war period. The Freikorps, composed of demobilised soldiers, were instrumental in suppressing leftist uprisings and maintaining order amidst the chaos. Liulevicius describes the failed Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, inspired by Mussolini's March on Rome. Although the revolt failed, Hitler used the subsequent treason trial to gain media attention, which proved essential to relaunching the party in 1925 after his release from prison.
According to Liulevicius, the core tenets of Nazi ideology were racism and anti-Semitism. Hitler's Social Darwinist perspective viewed history as a constant racial battle for Lebensraum (living space). The Nazis promoted the idea of a superior "Aryan" race, contrasted with demonised stereotypes of Jews, portrayed as parasites and contaminants. They promised to create a racial utopia, Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community), through racial purification, the elimination of Jews, and expansionism. Other aspects of Nazism included opposition to democracy, Marxism, pacifism, individualism, capitalism, rationality, and intellectuals. Influenced by the First World War, the Nazis valued a strong state, military mobilisation, and war.
Whilst in prison, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf, outlining a "legal route to power" through a mass party and innovative propaganda techniques. The Nazis excelled in organisation and activity, establishing a nationwide party network. However, they received less than three per cent of the vote in the 1928 parliamentary elections. The Great Depression accelerated their rise to power, as the Weimar democracy was already faltering. In the 1930 elections, the Nazis became the second-largest party, and in July 1932, they became the largest.
Liulevicius notes that Nazi rallies generated excitement and projected an image of dynamism. They used modern technology, like aeroplanes, to coordinate campaigns and emphasised the youthfulness of their members. The coordinated marches were designed to have an exhilarating effect. The Social Democrats and Communists failed to collaborate against Nazism. The Comintern, under Stalin's direction, instructed German Communists to denounce Social Democrats as "Social Fascists." The Communists believed they could seize power after the Nazis and Social Democrats collapsed. The Nazis presented themselves as the only alternative to Communism. According to Liulevicius, an antagonistic relationship emerged between the Nazis and Communists. Despite Hitler's goal of gaining power through elections, Liulevicius states that the Nazis came to power in January 1933 through political manoeuvring. In the November 1932 elections, their vote share declined, suggesting waning support. Nevertheless, on January 30, 1933, Hitler became chancellor in a coalition with conservative Nationalists who intended to control him.
Once in power, Hitler circumvented his Nationalist allies by seizing control of the police and passing the Enabling Act on March 23, 1933, after the Reichstag fire on February 27. This Act granted Hitler dictatorial powers. In the following six months, the Nazis pursued Gleichschaltung (coordination) to consolidate control. They purged the civil service, outlawed other political parties, shut down labour unions, and terrorised political opponents.
The Nazis promised to create a national community where "the common good comes before individual good." They presented their quest for total power as a transcendence of previous divisions. In the August 1934 plebiscite, 85 per cent of voters approved the Nazi regime. Liulevicius argues that the Nazis openly used terror to suppress resistance. In 1934, the S.A. numbered four million men. Concentration camps, supposedly for "re-education" and "protective custody", were openly established, with Dachau serving as a "model camp." Although not yet death camps, they foreshadowed the later horrors.
The Nazis announced vast public works projects, including the Autobahn, and planned the Volkswagen, while initiating rearmament. In 1936, they announced the Four-Year Plan, mirroring Stalin's industrialisation drives. By 1939, the regime claimed full employment. Nazi propaganda promoted an idealised Volk, with images of communal meals (Eintopf) and winter relief campaigns. In March 1933, the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, led by Josef Goebbels, was established to shape public opinion. The regime subsidised the production of Volkssender (people’s radios) and set up loudspeakers in public places.
Liulevicius observes that the regime intervened in family life, promoting women's role as breeders of soldiers and awarding medals for large families, similar to policies in the Soviet Union. They prioritised young people, replacing traditional education with induction into the Hitler Youth and the League of German Maidens.
He highlights Victor Klemperer, a German-Jewish philologist, who studied the Nazi distortion of the German language. He noted the transvaluation of terms like fanaticism into high praise. The Nazi racial utopia defined itself against outsiders, including Jews, gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals, and other minorities, who were increasingly targeted.
Hitler, according to Liulevicius, presented himself as the archetypal trench soldier, aiming to rally a new political movement against democracy. His oratory skills, coupled with his organisational and propaganda abilities, made him increasingly indispensable to the Nazis, who often referred to their movement as the "Hitler movement". His followers called him Führer, meaning leader. The S.A., established in 1921, reflected the influence of the First World War. They drew inspiration from Italian Fascist Blackshirts and were led by Ernst Röhm, a former Freikorps officer, and operated within a wider context of paramilitary violence that pervaded Germany in the immediate post-war period. The Freikorps, composed of demobilised soldiers, were instrumental in suppressing leftist uprisings and maintaining order amidst the chaos. Liulevicius describes the failed Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, inspired by Mussolini's March on Rome. Although the revolt failed, Hitler used the subsequent treason trial to gain media attention, which proved essential to relaunching the party in 1925 after his release from prison.
According to Liulevicius, the core tenets of Nazi ideology were racism and anti-Semitism. Hitler's Social Darwinist perspective viewed history as a constant racial battle for Lebensraum (living space). The Nazis promoted the idea of a superior "Aryan" race, contrasted with demonised stereotypes of Jews, portrayed as parasites and contaminants. They promised to create a racial utopia, Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community), through racial purification, the elimination of Jews, and expansionism. Other aspects of Nazism included opposition to democracy, Marxism, pacifism, individualism, capitalism, rationality, and intellectuals. Influenced by the First World War, the Nazis valued a strong state, military mobilisation, and war.
Whilst in prison, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf, outlining a "legal route to power" through a mass party and innovative propaganda techniques. The Nazis excelled in organisation and activity, establishing a nationwide party network. However, they received less than three per cent of the vote in the 1928 parliamentary elections. The Great Depression accelerated their rise to power, as the Weimar democracy was already faltering. In the 1930 elections, the Nazis became the second-largest party, and in July 1932, they became the largest.
Liulevicius notes that Nazi rallies generated excitement and projected an image of dynamism. They used modern technology, like aeroplanes, to coordinate campaigns and emphasised the youthfulness of their members. The coordinated marches were designed to have an exhilarating effect. The Social Democrats and Communists failed to collaborate against Nazism. The Comintern, under Stalin's direction, instructed German Communists to denounce Social Democrats as "Social Fascists." The Communists believed they could seize power after the Nazis and Social Democrats collapsed. The Nazis presented themselves as the only alternative to Communism. According to Liulevicius, an antagonistic relationship emerged between the Nazis and Communists. Despite Hitler's goal of gaining power through elections, Liulevicius states that the Nazis came to power in January 1933 through political manoeuvring. In the November 1932 elections, their vote share declined, suggesting waning support. Nevertheless, on January 30, 1933, Hitler became chancellor in a coalition with conservative Nationalists who intended to control him.
Once in power, Hitler circumvented his Nationalist allies by seizing control of the police and passing the Enabling Act on March 23, 1933, after the Reichstag fire on February 27. This Act granted Hitler dictatorial powers. In the following six months, the Nazis pursued Gleichschaltung (coordination) to consolidate control. They purged the civil service, outlawed other political parties, shut down labour unions, and terrorised political opponents.
The Nazis promised to create a national community where "the common good comes before individual good." They presented their quest for total power as a transcendence of previous divisions. In the August 1934 plebiscite, 85 per cent of voters approved the Nazi regime. Liulevicius argues that the Nazis openly used terror to suppress resistance. In 1934, the S.A. numbered four million men. Concentration camps, supposedly for "re-education" and "protective custody", were openly established, with Dachau serving as a "model camp." Although not yet death camps, they foreshadowed the later horrors.
The Nazis announced vast public works projects, including the Autobahn, and planned the Volkswagen, while initiating rearmament. In 1936, they announced the Four-Year Plan, mirroring Stalin's industrialisation drives. By 1939, the regime claimed full employment. Nazi propaganda promoted an idealised Volk, with images of communal meals (Eintopf) and winter relief campaigns. In March 1933, the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, led by Josef Goebbels, was established to shape public opinion. The regime subsidised the production of Volkssender (people’s radios) and set up loudspeakers in public places.
Liulevicius observes that the regime intervened in family life, promoting women's role as breeders of soldiers and awarding medals for large families, similar to policies in the Soviet Union. They prioritised young people, replacing traditional education with induction into the Hitler Youth and the League of German Maidens.
He highlights Victor Klemperer, a German-Jewish philologist, who studied the Nazi distortion of the German language. He noted the transvaluation of terms like fanaticism into high praise. The Nazi racial utopia defined itself against outsiders, including Jews, gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals, and other minorities, who were increasingly targeted.
Liulevicius presents an analysis of Adolf Hitler that begins with an examination of his formative years and personal development. Liulevicius observes that although Hitler was born into a middle‐class environment and had an unremarkable, somewhat aimless youth – marked by failures such as being rejected by the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna – his time in the imperial capital exposed him to strong currents of anti-Semitism, extreme nationalism and radical artistic ideas. These influences, particularly the nationalist and racial ideologies circulating in Vienna, contributed significantly to shaping his later political outlook.Liulevicius then examines Hitler’s experience during the First World War, noting that the conflict provided him with a vital sense of purpose and belonging. His service on the Western Front, where he was awarded a rare Iron Cross First Class, and subsequent personal crisis upon learning of Germany’s armistice, are presented as crucial in fostering the conviction that he had a unique political mission for Germany.
Progressing to Hitler’s political career, Liulevicius describes how the former soldier joined the German Workers’ Party in 1919 and rapidly ascended within its ranks to become its leader. By renaming it the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, he widened its appeal across diverse political groups. Liulevicius details how, following the failed Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler adopted a strategy of gaining power through the legal framework of the Weimar Republic, ultimately leading to his appointment as chancellor in 1933.
In his discussion of Hitler as a dictator, Liulevicius highlights the contradictory nature of his leadership style. On one hand, Hitler’s management was unsystematic and characterised by chaotic delegation of authority, a system which some historians have described as “bureaucratic Darwinism”. On the other hand, when it came to issues of ideological significance, he intervened decisively. Liulevicius also explains how a carefully constructed cult of personality, largely orchestrated by figures such as Goebbels, portrayed Hitler as an infallible leader. This cult, imbued with religious and even erotic elements, not only enhanced his authority but also shielded him from public criticism by transferring dissent onto the broader apparatus of the state and party.
Liulevicius identifies several keys to Hitler’s effectiveness. One of these is the extent to which he was underestimated by both domestic opponents and international observers. His clear willingness to use ruthless violence, as demonstrated in events such as the Night of the Long Knives, complemented his propaganda efforts. Furthermore, his strategic use of the SS, under the leadership of Himmler, served to both secure his regime and implement the racial policies that became a central feature of Nazi governance.
On the international front, Liulevicius presents Hitler’s foreign policy as a revolutionary attempt to overturn the postwar order. Central to this ambition was the concept of Lebensraum – the need for additional “living space” to secure the future of the German people, according to his racial ideology. Liulevicius recounts how Hitler systematically broke the constraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty by rearming Germany, reoccupying the Rhineland, annexing Austria and eventually provoking the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The formation of alliances with Italy and Japan, including the Pact of Steel and the anti-Comintern Pact, are examined as further steps in his plan to redraw the map of Europe.
Concerning anti-Semitic policies, Liulevicius places Nazi racial hatred in the broader context of long-standing European anti-Semitism. He outlines how earlier forms of religious anti-Judaism evolved into a radical, biological anti-Semitism that rejected integration in favour of segregation and elimination. Starting with measures designed to restrict the rights of Jews – such as the 1935 Nuremberg Laws – and progressing to acts of organised violence like Kristallnacht, the lecture tracks how initial intimidation gradually escalated into systematic persecution and, eventually, genocide.
Overall, Liulevicius’s lecture provides a dispassionate and detailed exploration of the interplay between Hitler’s background, his personal characteristics and the political and ideological strategies he employed. His analysis suggests that a combination of personal ambition, skilful propaganda, opportunistic exploitation of political structures and an inherent ruthlessness allowed Hitler to consolidate power and steer Germany towards a radical reordering of both its internal society and its international relations.
Progressing to Hitler’s political career, Liulevicius describes how the former soldier joined the German Workers’ Party in 1919 and rapidly ascended within its ranks to become its leader. By renaming it the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, he widened its appeal across diverse political groups. Liulevicius details how, following the failed Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler adopted a strategy of gaining power through the legal framework of the Weimar Republic, ultimately leading to his appointment as chancellor in 1933.
In his discussion of Hitler as a dictator, Liulevicius highlights the contradictory nature of his leadership style. On one hand, Hitler’s management was unsystematic and characterised by chaotic delegation of authority, a system which some historians have described as “bureaucratic Darwinism”. On the other hand, when it came to issues of ideological significance, he intervened decisively. Liulevicius also explains how a carefully constructed cult of personality, largely orchestrated by figures such as Goebbels, portrayed Hitler as an infallible leader. This cult, imbued with religious and even erotic elements, not only enhanced his authority but also shielded him from public criticism by transferring dissent onto the broader apparatus of the state and party.
Liulevicius identifies several keys to Hitler’s effectiveness. One of these is the extent to which he was underestimated by both domestic opponents and international observers. His clear willingness to use ruthless violence, as demonstrated in events such as the Night of the Long Knives, complemented his propaganda efforts. Furthermore, his strategic use of the SS, under the leadership of Himmler, served to both secure his regime and implement the racial policies that became a central feature of Nazi governance.
On the international front, Liulevicius presents Hitler’s foreign policy as a revolutionary attempt to overturn the postwar order. Central to this ambition was the concept of Lebensraum – the need for additional “living space” to secure the future of the German people, according to his racial ideology. Liulevicius recounts how Hitler systematically broke the constraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty by rearming Germany, reoccupying the Rhineland, annexing Austria and eventually provoking the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The formation of alliances with Italy and Japan, including the Pact of Steel and the anti-Comintern Pact, are examined as further steps in his plan to redraw the map of Europe.
Concerning anti-Semitic policies, Liulevicius places Nazi racial hatred in the broader context of long-standing European anti-Semitism. He outlines how earlier forms of religious anti-Judaism evolved into a radical, biological anti-Semitism that rejected integration in favour of segregation and elimination. Starting with measures designed to restrict the rights of Jews – such as the 1935 Nuremberg Laws – and progressing to acts of organised violence like Kristallnacht, the lecture tracks how initial intimidation gradually escalated into systematic persecution and, eventually, genocide.
Overall, Liulevicius’s lecture provides a dispassionate and detailed exploration of the interplay between Hitler’s background, his personal characteristics and the political and ideological strategies he employed. His analysis suggests that a combination of personal ambition, skilful propaganda, opportunistic exploitation of political structures and an inherent ruthlessness allowed Hitler to consolidate power and steer Germany towards a radical reordering of both its internal society and its international relations.
Liulevicius argues that World War II was fundamentally Hitler's war, driven by fascist and Nazi ideologies that glorified war as a positive force. He highlights the surprising alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union through the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a move that initially baffled the world due to the apparent ideological chasm between the two regimes. Liulevicius explains that this pact, facilitated by figures like Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, included secret protocols that divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. This agreement allowed Hitler to invade Poland without the threat of a two-front war, effectively enabling the start of World War II with Stalin's co-operation who sought to redirect Hitler westward against the capitalist powers to buy the USSR more time. Stalin provided Germany with essential raw materials.Liulevicius delves into Stalin's motives, suggesting that Stalin believed Nazism represented the final, most brutal phase of capitalism, and that a war between capitalist powers would weaken them all, allowing the Soviet Union to later dominate. He also suggests Stalin sought time to recover from the damage inflicted by his purges.
Liulevicius then examines the concept of totalitarianism, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, particularly her book "The Origins of Totalitarianism". He defines totalitarianism as a regime that seeks total control through terror, ideological indoctrination, and mandatory enthusiasm. Arendt, a German-Jewish refugee, argued that totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, shared key characteristics: a cult of the leader, claims of ideological infallibility, the use of violence to enforce these claims, concentration camps, hierarchies of believers, secret police, atomised populations, and similar propaganda. Liulevicius acknowledges the debate surrounding the concept of totalitarianism, noting that while it was criticised as a Cold War tool, it has been embraced by Eastern Europeans who experienced such regimes firsthand.
Moving on to the war itself, Liulevicius describes the German "Blitzkrieg" strategy, designed for rapid territorial gains to exploit enemy territory. The invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of World War II. The SS Einsatzgruppen systematically murdered Polish intellectuals and leaders. Stalin moved to seize his share of Poland, annexing the Baltic states and carrying out mass deportations. The Soviet Union's invasion of Finland in the Winter War exposed the weaknesses resulting from Stalin's purges.
Liulevicius argues that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Operation Barbarossa, was a war of ideologies and racial enemies, free of civilised constraints. The Kommissar Order instructed soldiers to kill Soviet political officers, and Soviet prisoners of war were treated with extreme brutality, leading to the deaths of millions. Liulevicius stresses that this war saw an intensification of trends from World War I, including the targeting of civilians, the use of slave labour, and the bombing of civilian centres, escalating from Warsaw and Rotterdam to Dresden. The war culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. Liulevicius concludes that the Nazi regime made the deliberate murder of civilians a central aim.
Liulevicius's lecture explores the Nazis' programme of genocide against the Jewish people and their broader vision for a racially pure future. He traces the steps leading to mass murder, beginning with eugenics, a concept popular worldwide in the early 20th century, which advocated for selective breeding to improve the population. Liulevicius notes that German eugenics had roots predating the Nazi regime and even drew inspiration from American eugenic practices. The Nazis quickly enacted laws authorising the sterilisation of individuals deemed to have hereditary illnesses, including mental health conditions and alcoholism. Nazi schools also promoted eugenic ideas, using lessons to illustrate the economic burden of those considered "useless eaters".Liulevicius continues by discussing the Nazi "euthanasia" programme, initiated in 1939 under the guise of "mercy killing," which targeted children and adults with disabilities and mental illnesses. This programme, overseen by SS experts, resulted in the deaths of an estimated 100,000 people before being halted in 1941. The SS played a central role in the Third Reich's racial policies, with SS medical personnel gaining experience in mass murder through the euthanasia programme. Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer SS, aimed to create a racial elite, and under Reinhard Heydrich, the SS pursued the "removal of Jews" from Germany, resulting in the emigration of a significant proportion of German Jews by 1939.
SS Einsatzgruppen were deployed in Poland to eliminate intellectuals and leaders, and to deport tens of thousands of Polish Jews. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, these units carried out the mass murder of Jewish communities, killing one million by the end of 1941. Finding this method inefficient, the Nazi leadership devised new plans, formalised at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, where the "final solution" was systematically organised. This involved shipping Jews to the East for extermination, marked by the introduction of the yellow star for Jews in Germany in 1941.
Liulevicius addresses the debate surrounding Hitler's direct involvement in launching the genocide, noting the lack of explicit written orders due to Hitler's aversion to leaving a paper trail. However, he emphasises that Hitler's role was pivotal in setting the regime's goals and endorsing its escalating radical policies. He also highlights the vast circle of complicity, involving officials at all levels of the state and party, as well as collaborators in various countries.
The lecture then focuses on the "factories of death," the extermination camps established in occupied eastern territories, such as Auschwitz, Belzec, Treblinka, Chelmno, Majdanek, and Sobibor. Jews were transported to these camps and murdered in gas chambers disguised as showers. Secrecy was paramount to prevent news from affecting world opinion or provoking resistance. Despite this, millions of Germans and others were involved, directly or indirectly. The Nazis killed an estimated six million Jews during the Holocaust, and millions of others died due to abuse, slave labour, and executions.
Liulevicius then discusses the Nazi vision for the future, in which Germany would dominate Europe, colonising the East and expanding its population to 250 million. The Generalplan Ost, a blueprint for Eastern Europe, outlined the removal and decimation of 31 million non-Germans, along with slave labour and colonisation. Nazi architecture, with grand plans for rebuilding Berlin, reflected the regime's ambitions and served as ideological statements in stone.
Finally, Liulevicius explores the Nazis' ambitions for world domination, evidenced by plans for invading India and developing advanced warships and bombers capable of reaching America. Hitler declared war on the United States in December 1941. The war turned against Germany, with the Battle of Stalingrad marking a turning point. Despite total mobilisation, the Soviet army and Allied forces advanced, leading to Hitler's retreat to a bunker in Berlin. After ordering the "scorched earth" destruction of Germany, Hitler committed suicide in April 1945. The war ended with Japan's defeat following the atomic bombings.
Liulevicius argues that the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, despite efforts towards international cooperation and the articulation of human rights, rapidly devolved into the Cold War, an ideological confrontation dominated by the nuclear threat and characterised by extensive manipulation and oppression within the Soviet sphere. He outlines how the immense cost of the war, with over 50 million dead, approximately half of whom were civilians, set the stage for a new era defined by the advent of atomic weapons. The United States' development of the atomic bomb, followed by the Soviet Union's successful nuclear test in 1949, partly facilitated by espionage efforts like those of Klaus Fuchs who passed Manhattan Project secrets to the Soviets, ushered in the "atomic age". Liulevicius notes that initial hopes for continued international collaboration, embodied in the founding of the United Nations Organisation in 1945, were soon undermined by stark ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. The UN, designed to promote peace, self-determination, and human rights, was frequently hamstrung by Cold War tensions, particularly through the use of the veto power in the Security Council by its permanent members, including the Soviet Union which also secured additional seats for Soviet republics like Ukraine and Belorussia.Liulevicius highlights the contemporaneous Nuremberg war crime trials, from 1945 to 1947, as a significant step in emphasising human rights, holding Nazi leaders accountable for crimes against humanity. However, he also points out the criticisms regarding the inclusion of Soviet judges despite the Soviet Union's own unacknowledged atrocities, such as the Katyn massacre of Polish officers in 1940, which was only officially admitted by the Soviet Union in 1990. The subsequent United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, a concept championed by Raphael Lemkin, aimed to make genocide an international crime, though Liulevicius observes that its definition remains controversial and its impact was slow to materialise.
Drawing a parallel, Liulevicius discusses George Orwell's 1948 dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four as a reflection of contemporary totalitarian trends, influenced by earlier works like Yevgeny Zamyatin's We. Orwell's portrayal of a state dominated by "Big Brother," employing methods like historical revisionism by the "Ministry of Truth" and the thought-controlling language "Newspeak," resonated with the realities of regimes like the Soviet Union, which actively suppressed dissent and manipulated information.
Liulevicius then details the extensive forced population movements in Europe after the war, affecting approximately 11 million refugees, termed "displaced persons." He particularly focuses on the expulsion of around 15 million ethnic Germans from areas like Poland and Czechoslovakia, sanctioned by the Potsdam Conference in 1945, which cited the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne concerning the Greco-Turkish population exchange as a precedent. Despite the agreement's call for a "humane and orderly transfer," Liulevicius states the process was violent, resulting in an estimated three million deaths. He also mentions the forcible repatriation of over two million refugees from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, where many faced death or imprisonment.
Central to Liulevicius's argument is Stalin's consolidation of power through both an "outer empire" of satellite states in Eastern Europe and an "inner empire" within the Soviet Union. After a period of coalition governments, Communist regimes were firmly established, exemplified by the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. Within the Soviet Union, Liulevicius describes the harsh treatment of returning Soviet prisoners of war, deemed traitors by Stalin and sent to Gulag labour camps, a reality famously depicted in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Furthermore, Liulevicius outlines the mass deportations of entire ethnic groups suspected of disloyalty, such as the Chechens, Ingush, and Crimean Tartars in 1944, where hundreds of thousands were forcibly relocated to Central Asia with significant loss of life. Similar deportations occurred in the Baltic states, impacting approximately 15 percent of the population by 1950, alongside a protracted guerrilla resistance known as the Baltic Forest War.
Liulevicius observes that the revival of the Comintern as the Cominform in 1947 signalled a hardening of the Soviet stance. He notes the significant support for Communist parties in Western Europe, such as in Italy and France, due to their anti-Nazi resistance. Towards the end of his life, Stalin appeared to be initiating another wave of purges, marked by the announcement of the "Doctors' Plot" in January 1953, which Liulevicius suggests indicated a radical anti-Semitic turn in the regime.
After Stalin's death in 1953, Liulevicius points to Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech at the 20th Party Congress denouncing Stalin's crimes as a turning point, although the Soviet Union continued to suppress dissent in its sphere, as seen in East Germany (1953), Poland and Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). Despite the image of progress presented by achievements like Sputnik in 1957, Liulevicius mentions persistent developmental failures, such as the adherence to Trofim Lysenko's scientifically flawed agricultural theories which hampered Soviet agricultural output.
Liulevicius uses the example of the division of Germany and the subsequent construction of the Berlin Wall on 13th August 1961 as a stark physical manifestation of the Cold War divide. The wall, officially an "anti-Fascist protection wall," became a symbol of the separation between East and West, with around 900 people dying attempting to cross it.
Finally, Liulevicius addresses the concept of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD) as a defining feature of the nuclear age. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where the world stood on the brink of nuclear war over Soviet missiles in Cuba, a nation that had seen Fidel Castro come to power in 1959, highlighted the precariousness of the situation. Whilst the crisis led to some attempts at détente, the underlying "balance of terror," where a nuclear attack would guarantee a devastating retaliatory strike, became the uneasy guarantor of peace between the superpowers.
Liulevicius argues that Mao Zedong's rise to power and subsequent rule over the People's Republic of China, established in 1949 after decades of conflict, was characterised by a distinct ideological framework, "Mao thought," which adapted Marxist principles to the Chinese context, leading to massive social and political campaigns with devastating consequences.He outlines the context of the Communist victory, beginning with the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and the subsequent period of warlordism. Sun Yat-Sen's Kuomintang (KMT) initially allied with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921, but this alliance fractured by 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek attacked the Communists, driving them from urban centres. Liulevicius positions Mao Zedong, born in 1893, as a key figure who understood the importance of mobilising peasant unrest, a departure from classical Marxist emphasis on the industrial proletariat. The Long March of 1934–1935, a strategic retreat from KMT encirclement during which tens of thousands perished, became a foundational myth for the CCP, highlighting perseverance against material odds and solidifying Mao's leadership. Mao's belief that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" underpinned his approach. Unlike contemporaries like Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping who had international experience, Mao's formative experiences were solely within China.
Liulevicius describes the Communist victory over the KMT, who retreated to Taiwan in 1949, leading to Mao's declaration of the People's Republic of China on 1st October 1949. He notes Mao's later admission that approximately 800,000 people were "liquidated" in the initial years. Following a brief period of "New Democracy," Mao initiated collectivisation, mirroring Stalin's campaigns but aiming to surpass them. Rural populations were organised into communes, and radical social changes were pursued, including efforts to eradicate illiteracy, foot binding, and traditional practices, alongside a concerted attack on traditional culture, banning cultural expressions and destroying historical sites. The first Five-Year Plan, launched in 1953, took the Soviet Union as its developmental model, with the slogan "The Soviet Union's today is our tomorrow," though Liulevicius stresses Mao's ambition to outdo the Soviets.
Despite initial alignment, Liulevicius highlights the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Stalin's pressure on Mao during the Korean War and Mao's resentment at being treated as a subordinate contributed to this rift. After Stalin's death and Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation, Mao openly criticised the Soviet Union, asserting China's leadership of the communist world. The split became evident by 1958, culminating in border clashes in the late 1960s and China's detonation of a nuclear bomb in 1964, demonstrating its independent trajectory. Liulevicius also discusses the 1956–1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign, where Mao seemingly encouraged intellectual freedom only to subsequently purge those who voiced dissent, resulting in an estimated half a million deaths.
Liulevicius then focuses on the Great Leap Forward, initiated in 1958, as a radical attempt to rapidly transform China through sheer willpower, embodied in slogans like "hard work for a few years, then a thousand years of happiness." Collectives were merged into larger "people's communes," and flawed agricultural methods, reminiscent of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union, were implemented. These measures led to catastrophic harvest failures, and by 1960, a devastating famine was underway, with widespread starvation and even recorded instances of cannibalism. Liulevicius states the famine resulted in an estimated death toll of up to 40 million people, making it one of the deadliest famines in history. Though the project was abandoned by 1960, the commune structure persisted.
The subsequent Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, is presented by Liulevicius as Mao's attempt to reignite revolutionary fervour, targeting party officials, intellectuals, and traditional authorities. Supported by a faction including Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, the campaign mobilised millions of young people into Red Guard units. They were tasked with purging society of "enemies of the people" accused of taking the "capitalist road." Millions were killed or sent to laogai re-education camps, and ordinary citizens were subjected to self-criticism rituals. The "Four Olds"—old thought, old culture, old customs, and old habits—were targeted for destruction. Liulevicius points to the Little Red Book, a collection of Mao's sayings, as a symbol of the era, replacing formal education, alongside the adoption of standardised "Mao suits." Mao eventually used the army to suppress the Red Guards when their actions threatened to spiral out of control.
Liulevicius characterises Mao's ideology as less orthodox Marxism and more a belief in the transformative power of will, seeing the common people as a "blank page" for revolutionary inscription. He notes the puritanical public image contrasting with Mao's personal indulgences. After Mao's death on 9th September 1976, Deng Xiaoping rose to power, and Mao's wife and her allies, the Gang of Four, were put on trial. Liulevicius concludes that despite subsequent pragmatic reforms, the Chinese government continued to uphold "Mao Zedong thought," and a full, honest reckoning with the period's atrocities has been slow to emerge within China.
Liulevicius uses this lecture to outline how the Khmer Rouge, led by the French-educated Pol Pot, seized power in Cambodia in 1975 and initiated a radical social experiment to create a rural utopia, resulting in the deaths of approximately two million people, or over a quarter of the population, in just over three years. He provides historical context, noting the Khmer empire's earlier dominance and subsequent periods under Thai and French influence, with Cambodia gaining independence as a kingdom in 1955. During the Cold War, despite declaring neutrality, Cambodia became entangled in the Vietnam conflict, with the Viet Cong using its territory and the Cambodian Communists, known as the Khmer Rouge, gaining prominence from 1963. Liulevicius explains that American bombing campaigns, intended to target Communist forces, destabilised the Cambodian government, contributing to the Khmer Rouge's rise. When the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh in April 1975, renaming the country Democratic Kampuchea.Liulevicius profiles Pol Pot, born Saloth Sar in 1925, who became involved in radical politics during his time ostensibly studying radio electronic engineering in France from 1949 to 1953. Failing his studies, he returned to Cambodia, becoming a key figure in the Cambodian Communist Party, which he helped found in 1960, and serving as its general secretary from 1963. He became prime minister under the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979. Liulevicius contrasts Pol Pot with other dictators, noting the absence of a significant personality cult around him.
The Khmer Rouge regime, upon taking power, declared "Year Zero," aiming to surpass even Mao's Great Leap Forward. Ordinary Cambodians initially hoped for peace, but the secretive, black-clad Khmer Rouge, often composed of very young recruits, implemented radical policies under the enigmatic ruling body known as Angkar. Liulevicius details the immediate and brutal emptying of cities, with 60 percent of the population, including the two million residents of Phnom Penh, forcibly exiled to the countryside within 24 hours. These "new people" were segregated and subjected to harsh conditions and repeated deportations.
Liulevicius highlights the systematic targeting of "enemies of the people," including those with education, foreign language skills, or even those wearing spectacles, alongside Buddhist monks and ethnic and religious minorities, who were summarily executed, often with basic tools like hoe blades. The regime's extensive use of mass graves led to the term "killing fields." An estimated two million people died due to the Khmer Rouge's policies, through executions, starvation, and disease.
In pursuit of a purified, autarchic society, Liulevicius describes how the regime abolished money, implemented total land collectivisation, forced communal eating, mandated black clothing, and suppressed religion, writing, and education. Marriages were strictly controlled, and individualism was suppressed with slogans like "Losing you is not a loss; keeping you is not a gain." Agricultural and construction projects were characterised by irrationality, leading to agricultural collapse, famine, and instances of cannibalism. The regime also turned on itself, purging alleged saboteurs and filling prisons with former members.
Liulevicius explains that the Khmer Rouge's reign ended when Communist Vietnam, after border skirmishes, invaded in 1978 and overthrew the government by January 1979, installing a puppet regime. Despite this, Khmer Rouge forces continued a guerrilla war until 1992. Pol Pot was arrested by his own faction in 1997 and died in 1998 before facing an international trial. Liulevicius notes that news of the atrocities emerged slowly due to the regime's secrecy, and Cold War politics led countries like Thailand, China, and the United States to support the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam after their overthrow. Today, memorials in Cambodia display the skeletal remains from the killing fields, and extensive documentation, including photographs of victims, serves as evidence of the genocide, although Liulevicius observes that resistance to trials for surviving leaders persists.
Liulevicius examines the diverse forms of socialist and communist regimes during the Cold War, using East Germany, the Soviet Union, and North Korea as specific case studies to illustrate both common themes and divergent trajectories, particularly concerning the erosion of ideological confidence.In the case of East Germany, founded in 1949, Liulevicius notes a period of "stabilisation" after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, where citizens adapted to the perceived permanence of the regime. Despite claims of egalitarianism, a privileged party elite emerged, enjoying superior access to resources and opportunities under leaders like Erich Honecker, who led from 1971 until 1989. Youth were regimented through organisations like the Free German Youth, and religious institutions faced suppression. Liulevicius emphasises the pervasive role of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi), which operated an extensive surveillance network, employing a vast number of official and unofficial collaborators, reaching a ratio of one security operative for every 6.5 citizens when informers were included. The Stasi maintained detailed files, operated notorious prisons like Hohenschönhausen, and engaged in international activities with the KGB. While the GDR sought legitimacy through rhetoric like "really existing Socialism" and investment in areas like the Olympics (marred by doping scandals) and technology, Liulevicius argues that technologies like Western television ultimately undermined the regime's propaganda. Planners even envisioned a fully mechanised border by the year 2000, a utopian vision that was never realised.
Turning to the Soviet Union, Liulevicius describes a state projecting an image of strength through its space programme and nuclear arsenal, yet some observers likened it to "Upper Volta with rockets," highlighting its economic deficiencies. He points out the significant military expenditure, estimated at a quarter of the GDP in the 1980s, alongside subsidies to satellite states. Following de-Stalinisation, ideological fervour waned, and a privileged "Nomenklatura" elite contradicted socialist ideals. Under Leonid Brezhnev, who declared the USSR had reached "developed Socialism," repression of dissidents continued, albeit without the scale of Stalinist purges, and the Brezhnev Doctrine justified interventions like the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Liulevicius highlights economic stagnation, evident in empty shops despite official statistics, and environmental disasters resulting from flawed agricultural projects like the Virgin Lands scheme. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and the initial denial by Soviet authorities, significantly damaged the state's credibility. Liulevicius suggests that a loss of political confidence, difficult to measure but vital, spread through society, evident in the proliferation of jokes about the system's absurdities, eventually leading to the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.
Regarding North Korea, Liulevicius discusses its establishment in 1948 under Soviet patronage, contrasting with South Korea under American influence, following Japanese annexation in 1910. Kim Il-Sung's invasion of the South in 1950, with Stalin's approval, led to the Korean War, involving UN and Chinese forces, resulting in three million deaths and a lasting, tense armistice. North Korea became a highly militarised state, dedicating an estimated 30 percent of its GDP to its military, while simultaneously experiencing devastating famines in the 1990s, possibly killing millions. Liulevicius details the ideology of juche or "self-reliance," crafted by Kim Il-Sung (the "Great Leader"), which promoted autarchy and isolation. His son, Kim Jong Il (the "Sun of the Twenty-First Century"), succeeded him in 1994, continuing these policies. Elaborate personality cults were constructed around both leaders, featuring statues, mass displays, and even specially bred flowers. State control included mandatory radio receivers broadcasting propaganda, a network of prison camps resembling the Soviet Gulag, and past kidnappings of foreign nationals. Despite limited economic reforms, North Korea faced ongoing crises and refugee flows. In the 21st century, Liulevicius notes North Korea's continued isolation and aggressive posture, including arms sales and nuclear weapons development, possibly as a means to extract aid.
Liulevicius concludes by observing that ideological dictatorships rely on compelling visions of the future to maintain momentum. When confidence in these visions wanes, as he argues happened to varying degrees in East Germany and the Soviet Union, the regimes become vulnerable to stagnation and eventual collapse. The durability of the North Korean regime, despite its extreme isolation and internal hardships, presents a contrasting case, potentially due to the complete saturation of its society with its unique ideology and the exceptionally intense level of state control.
Here Liulevicius's now examines the contrasting events marking the late 20th century, specifically the simultaneous collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the escalation of violence in the Balkans. He begins by observing the wave of democratisation sweeping Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, the end of an era where a significant portion of the world’s population lived under communist rule. He highlights the roles of individuals, the influence of the 1975 Helsinki Accords on human rights, the circulation of dissident literature (such as Solzhenitsyn's works) and the impact of figures like Václav Havel and Pope John Paul II in challenging authoritarian states. Factors contributing to the decline of communist regimes included economic failings, political repression, and the disparity between Western economic progress and the Eastern bloc. Technology, though a double-edged sword offering both surveillance and opening, played a role through television, radio (like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America), and fax machines. The Polish trade union Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa, served as a model for peaceful change, followed by Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts, including perestroika and glasnost, that aimed to salvage communism but ultimately led to its demise. This reform programme cut subsidies and improved relations with the West. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 catalysed a chain of events including German reunification, the liberalisation of other Eastern and Central European states, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, which occurred after a hardliner coup in August 1991. Liulevicius notes the remarkable lack of large-scale violence during these transitions, though the process of overcoming ideological mindsets continues. He acknowledges the need for those societies to confront the past and reconcile their histories, and how it continues. Despite the initial euphoria, Liulevicius observes the limitations of the democratic wave. He points to the Tiananmen Square massacre in China as evidence that the democratisation was not inevitable.Liulevicius then shifts his focus to the conflict in Yugoslavia, the disintegration of which was marked by violence and genocide. He describes the historical background, the formation of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent ideological vacuum following the collapse of communism, which Slobodan Milosevic exploited with his nationalist agenda of "Greater Serbia". In this context, he addresses Milosevic's rise to power, his exploitation of historical grievances, and the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Liulevicius describes the role of nationalist propaganda in inciting ethnic hatred and the ensuing conflict in Bosnia, where Serb forces and paramilitaries engaged in ethnic cleansing, mass expulsions, and the establishment of concentration camps. The international community's inaction, citing "age-old hatreds," allowed the atrocities to continue. Liulevicius details the Srebrenica massacre, the NATO intervention that ended the war, and the partition of Bosnia. He discusses the conflict in Kosovo, the brutal repression of ethnic Albanians, and the escalation of violence leading to the NATO bombing of the Yugoslav army, which led to nearly a million refugees. Finally, he notes Milosevic’s eventual handover to The Hague to stand trial.
Liulevicius concludes by arguing that the past does not determine the present or future, but is often manipulated to serve political agendas. He stresses the importance of historical knowledge and a critical perspective.
Liulevicius argues that the 1994 Rwandan genocide, resulting in the mass murder of approximately 800,000 people, primarily Tutsis, by the Hutu-dominated government, was a state-organised event deeply rooted in historical and political contexts. He details that although Hutus and Tutsis share a common language and religious background, historical socio-economic differences, where minority Tutsis were traditionally herders and landowners and majority Hutus were farmers, were rigidified by colonial rule. Belgian administrators, succeeding German control after the First World War, implemented systematic categorisation, including the infamous "nasal index," and issued identity documents specifying ethnic affiliation, thereby exacerbating divisions that some scholars contend were previously more fluid, with intermarriage being common. Upon independence in 1962, Liulevicius explains, a Hutu-dominated republic was established, leading to discrimination against Tutsis and prompting many to flee. Subsequent conflict between Tutsi rebel groups, such as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the Hutu-led government, which received support from France and Belgium, culminated in the Arusha Peace Accords of 1993. This agreement aimed to integrate Tutsi groups into government, with United Nations peacekeepers, coordinated by Kofi Annan, deployed for observation.Liulevicius contends that certain Hutu political leaders, championing "Hutu power," actively cultivated racial hatred, dehumanising Tutsis as "cockroaches" in their publications. Under Juvenal Habyarimana's National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy, this movement manifested as a political religion, exemplified by the "Hutu Ten Commandments" published in 1990, which promoted Hutu ideology, purity through separation, and harsh treatment of Tutsis. Activists formed the Interahamwe militia, acquiring weapons, including over half a million machetes. Liulevicius notes the influence of historical totalitarian regimes, with government documents referencing Lenin and Goebbels on propaganda, Nazi films found at Habyarimana's residence, and local killing units adopting the French Revolution's "Public Safety Committees" moniker.
Language was manipulated, according to Liulevicius, to disguise the preparations for mass killing, with "work" referring to massacre, "umuganda" (traditionally communal labour) for genocide, "tools" for weapons, and the Nazi term "final solution" for the overall plan. The government propagated its message through newspapers and especially radio, distributing free radios to increase reach. Hate-filled songs were broadcast, and propaganda meetings included performances promoting hatred, alongside the ubiquitous display of President Habyarimana's image.
The assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, under unclear circumstances, served as the catalyst. Liulevicius highlights the immediate murder of the moderate vice president and Belgian peacekeepers, followed by the United Nations' withdrawal of most troops on 21 April 1994. Liulevicius describes the ensuing genocide as a campaign primarily occurring in April 1994, claiming 800,000 lives within 100 days. He emphasises that while government-organised, the killers included a broad spectrum of Rwandan society, driven by eagerness, enticement, or coercion, leading to neighbours killing neighbours. The massacres became increasingly brutal, targeting women, children, and even spouses. Churches often failed as sanctuaries, with some clergy implicated in betrayals. Political religion superseded religious affiliation. Radio broadcasts coordinated killings, disseminating names of targets. Figures like singer Simon Bikindi and Minister Pauline Nyiramasuhuko were accused of inciting violence and sexual assault, though Liulevicius also notes instances of individuals providing shelter. The genocide ended with the RPF's victory in July 1994, with many perpetrators escaping among the two million refugees.
Finally, Liulevicius addresses the aftermath, particularly the international community's passivity. He suggests reasons for inaction included stereotypes about Africa, general disinterest, and Rwanda's geographic remoteness, which delayed the dissemination of visual evidence. He points out that diplomats at the United Nations and within the United States deliberately avoided using the term "genocide" to evade the obligation to intervene. Despite this, the UN Security Council approved a resolution in November 1994 for an international court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established in Arusha in 1995, to try those accused of genocide, with trials continuing in various jurisdictions. President Clinton later apologised in March 1998 for the international failure to act.
Liulevicius argues that Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, while initially founded on the secular, pan-Arabist, and socialist ideology of Ba’athism, evolved into a highly personalised dictatorship marked by extreme repression, a pervasive cult of personality, and aggressive expansionism, drawing parallels with both ancient despots and 20th-century totalitarian leaders like Stalin.Ba’athism, as Liulevicius outlines, originated in the 1930s and 1940s from a synthesis of pan-Arab nationalist thought and Marxist socialism, articulated by intellectuals like Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar. Their aim was to forge a unified Arab nation, shedding religious traditionalism for a modern, secular identity, encapsulated in the slogan "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism." Some observers, as noted by Liulevicius, have pointed to similarities between Ba'athist ideology and elements of Nazism, particularly its emphasis on a singular national rebirth and a strong state, as well as Stalinism in its authoritarian approach. When the Ba’ath party seized power in Iraq in 1968, following a period of instability after the end of the British mandate established after the First World War, the ideology served as a foundational framework. However, Liulevicius contends that under Saddam Hussein, who consolidated power by 1979, ideological consistency became subordinate to the establishment of his personal rule. Liulevicius details Hussein’s background, from his impoverished upbringing near Tikrit, a town historically significant as the birthplace of Saladin, to his involvement in street violence and a failed coup attempt in 1959. His subsequent exile and alleged fascination with Stalin, as Liulevicius mentions, informed his methods of control. Upon his rise within the Ba’ath party after 1968, and his ultimate seizure of leadership, Hussein constructed a power base centred on relatives and associates from Tikrit, supported by the elite Republican Guard and the feared Mukhabarat security services. Liulevicius highlights the systematic purges, reminiscent of Stalin's purges, and the pervasive surveillance that characterised Hussein’s rule, creating an atmosphere of terror. Furthermore, a carefully constructed cult of personality, as Liulevicius describes, presented Hussein in ubiquitous portraits and propaganda, rewriting his past and celebrating him as the "Great Son of the Arabs," while he himself remained largely hidden from public view, possibly employing body doubles due to paranoia.
Liulevicius then turns to the regime's use of armed action. The Iran-Iraq War, initiated by Hussein in 1980 following the Iranian Revolution, is presented as a clash of revolutionary ideologies, with Liulevicius drawing a comparison to the attritional warfare of the First World War, resulting in immense casualties. The US, at the time, viewed Iraq as a strategic counter to Iran. Domestically, Liulevicius discusses the brutal campaign against the Kurdish population, particularly the Anfal campaign of 1988. This involved the destruction of thousands of villages and the mass execution of an estimated 100,000 Kurds, aimed at reshaping society. Liulevicius specifically notes the use of chemical weapons, ordered by "Chemical Ali" Hassan al-Majid, culminating in the Halabja massacre of March 1988, where thousands died from mustard gas and nerve agents.
Hussein’s ambitions, according to Liulevicius, were framed by a desire to emulate historical figures like Nebuchadnezzar II and Hammurabi, evidenced by symbolic construction projects in Babylon incorporating bricks bearing his name alongside those of Nebuchadnezzar. He also sought to position himself as the leader of the Arab world, aiming for regional hegemony, demonstrated by the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, annexing it as Iraq's "19th Province." Liulevicius points out that despite defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, where a UN coalition led by the United States expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein remained in power, brutally suppressing subsequent uprisings.
Following the Gulf War, Liulevicius argues, the regime underwent a tactical shift towards incorporating religious rhetoric, despite its secular origins. The phrase "God is great" was added to the Iraqi flag, and campaigns promoting Islamic belief were launched, banning alcohol and gambling. Public executions of women accused of prostitution were carried out, and Hussein increasingly championed the Palestinian cause, even offering financial support to families of suicide bombers. This religious gloss, Liulevicius suggests, mirrored Stalin’s wartime alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church, serving as a means to bolster support. Despite international sanctions, Hussein embarked on lavish construction projects, including numerous presidential palaces and grand mosques, such as the Mother of Battles Mosque, rich in symbolic detail linking the regime to religious and historical narratives. The personal cult of Hussein was further intensified, with referendums claiming near-unanimous support and the publication of a book of his "commandments."
Finally, Liulevicius describes the regime's increasing isolation and miscalculations in international politics, attributing this partly to the closed circle surrounding Hussein. The ending of cooperation with UN weapons inspectors in 1998, despite evidence from defectors regarding weapons of mass destruction programmes, led to escalating tensions. By 2003, with the UN unable to enforce disarmament resolutions, the stage was set for the US-led invasion. Liulevicius concludes that the rapid collapse of the Iraqi regime during the 2003 conflict, and the subsequent discovery of mass graves, revealed the brutal and ultimately fragile nature of Hussein's personal dictatorship.
In his last lecture, Liulevicius argues that the 20th century's experiences with utopian ideologies leading to terror have contemporary resonance, with new forms of religiously infused political extremism presenting ongoing threats, necessitating vigilance and a re-evaluation of human nature and institutional responses.He begins by observing that whilst the "political religions" of the 20th century have faded, explicit fusions of politics, religion, and ideology are now prominent. Liulevicius cites the example of Aum Shinri Kyo, the Japanese cult that executed a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground system in 1995, killing 12 and injuring thousands. Their leader, Shoko Asahara, blended Buddhist teachings with apocalyptic predictions, and the group actively sought to accelerate the end times, even attempting to develop an "earthquake machine." Liulevicius also points to the rise of suicide bombers, particularly within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, noting that groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, alongside secular factions, have adopted this tactic, sometimes reinterpreting long-standing Islamic prohibitions against suicide. Polls suggest considerable support for these actions within certain communities.
The core of Liulevicius's argument regarding contemporary terror lies in the emergence of radical Islamist ideology. He distinguishes Islamism from traditional Islam, describing it as a synthesis of religious fervour and modern ideological concepts. Radical Islamists, though a minority among the global Muslim population, view themselves as bearers of a comprehensive ideology superior to Western thought. Liulevicius notes that despite their desire to restore a 7th-century caliphate, Islamists often significantly deviate from traditional Islamic practices, redefining the relationship between Islam and state power and transforming personal faith into political dogma. He highlights the incorporation of the idea of progress as a departure from traditional Islam. Interestingly, adherents often come from relatively affluent backgrounds and may be educated in scientific or technical fields, effectively utilising modern technology like the internet and advanced weaponry. Liulevicius emphasises that despite their anti-Western rhetoric and advocacy of jihad, Islamist thought is deeply influenced by the Western ideologies it seeks to replace. He references Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian intellectual from the Muslim Brotherhood, who, after studying in the United States, adopted a Marxist historical framework, adding an Islamic triumph as the final stage. Qutb's writings advocated for a unitary state and classless society achieved through violence. Similar tendencies, Liulevicius notes, were evident in Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary Iran after 1979. Thus, Islamism is presented not as a reversion to the past but as a distinctly modern ideological construct.
Liulevicius then focuses on the September 11th attacks orchestrated by al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden as a prime example of this phenomenon. The destruction of the World Trade Center towers was, he argues, intended not only as a physical attack but also as an act of propaganda. Al Qaeda texts, such as a booklet found in Afghanistan praising suicide missions as "The Solution," underscore this ideological motivation. Liulevicius provides background on bin Laden, from his privileged Saudi Arabian origins and inheritance to his involvement with radical groups in Central Asia and his leadership of al Qaeda from 1989. Bin Laden's 1996 declaration of jihad against the West and the 1998 fatwa issued with Ayman al-Zawahiri, declaring a World Islamic Front to target "Crusaders" and "Zionists," are presented as key steps. Liulevicius quotes bin Laden's justifications for the September 11th attacks as "self-defence" aimed at achieving a "balance of terror," and his reference to "blessed terror." Evidence of al Qaeda's experimentation with chemical weapons, found after the fall of the Taliban, further illustrates the convergence of terror and ideological objectives.
Reflecting on the broader implications, Liulevicius seeks to explain the 20th century's violence. He suggests that scientific and material progress fostered a belief in the possibility of radical social reorganisation. This optimism, paradoxically, led to frustration with obstacles, justifying extreme measures to achieve utopian ends. The rise of mass politics, both democratic and totalitarian, injected new dynamics, while the decline of traditional religions created a void filled by political ideologies. Ultimately, Liulevicius argues, the willingness to engage in utopian experiments and terror stemmed from a view of human nature as malleable, exemplified by Mao Zedong's metaphor of humans as "blank pages." Conversely, the resistance witnessed throughout the century, according to Liulevicius, relied on a belief in the inherent inviolability and dignity of the individual.
Considering institutional solutions, Liulevicius is sceptical of the United Nations' effectiveness, noting its composition of diverse states, including those that sponsor terrorism, as highlighted by Libya chairing the Human Rights Committee in 2002. He suggests that appeals to an "international community" can sometimes absolve individual nations of responsibility, as seen in crises like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Regarding the International Criminal Court established in 2002, Liulevicius notes concerns about national sovereignty, particularly from countries like the United States, which did not join. He posits that the deeper issue lies in the perception of individual human rights.
The question of human nature, whether enduring or a product of environment, is central to Liulevicius's analysis. He invokes Isaiah Berlin's adoption of Immanuel Kant's phrase "the crooked timber of humanity," suggesting that human individuality is too complex to be perfectly shaped. He also raises the question of whether technological advancements, such as genetic engineering, might enable the alteration of human nature, potentially leading to a "posthuman" future, echoing Aldous Huxley's fictional concerns about cloning.
In terms of lessons, Liulevicius stresses the importance of genuine individuality within communities as a defence against the "marching impulse" of mass movements. Whilst technology can be used for control, it also has potential for liberation. He highlights the dangers of a "mobster mentality" in elites and the need for an active citizenry. The historical record, he argues, clearly demonstrates the failure of grand ideological master plans. Liulevicius warns against historical amnesia, citing the lack of accountability for leaders of collapsed regimes like the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge, and the resurgence of Communist symbols and even positive views of figures like Stalin in contemporary Russia. The planned East German Communist theme park in Germany is presented as another example of potentially problematic historical remembrance. Despite these concerns, Liulevicius concludes by suggesting that the heroism of those who resisted 20th-century terror offers a real, non-utopian basis for cautious optimism, underscoring the need for vigilance against the resurgence of totalitarian ideologies and for humility in utopian thinking.
