Whig Economic Policies during the Irish Potato Famine
To what extent were the British Whig government’s economic policies culpable for the effects of the Potato Famine on the Irish population from 1846 to 1852?
Word count: 4,000 words
Introduction
When compared to the 7 million deaths of the Holodomor or the tens of millions of victims of the Great Chinese Famine, the ‘mere’ 1 million deaths and 2 million citizens who emigrated during the Irish Potato Famine may not seem significant. However, proportionately the fatalities of the Irish Famine were much larger, resulting in the island of Ireland losing a quarter of its population in just seven years (Kelly 2).
During the 1800s, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, and Britain’s government was in charge of all domestic affairs within Ireland. The majority of the Irish were poor farmers who grew crops on small pieces of land which they rented from English landlords. Potatoes were the main crop grown in Ireland, as they were cheap and easy to grow, however this dependency left millions of people starving and helpless when the potato blight struck in 1945. The Irish had nothing left to eat, and could only look to the British government for help.
The research question which this essay will explore is:
“To what extent were the British Whig government’s economic policies culpable for the effects of the Potato Famine on the Irish population from 1846 to 1852?”
This topic is important to investigate because it is the worst catastrophe in Ireland’s history, and it is crucial to understand what could cause and exacerbate such a devastating event. People who would be interested in this topic would include, Irish and British citizens, the Irish diaspora, and more specifically, politicians and economists who wish to expand their knowledge of how certain national crises, such as famines, should (or should not) be dealt with.
Furthermore, the Irish Famine’s legacy still plays a role in modern day politics. This is most evident in towns such as Belcoo in Northern Ireland, which lost 25% of its population during the Famine. Belcoo lies next to the town of Blacklion in the Republic of Ireland, and the inhabitants of these villages are bound tightly together by their shared history of the Famine. As Brexit negotiations continue, these towns fear nothing more than being divided by a hard border between them, as they are so tightly bound by their history (McDonald).
Three concepts which are key to exploring this historical topic are cause, consequence and perspective. This research question explores factors which caused the effects of the famine – which include the Whig laissez-faire economic policies. Consequence is evident as the topic requires understanding of the devastating effects of the famine. However, perspective is perhaps the most significant concept, as this particular topic is highly debated between various historians. One group, often named Irish nationalist historians, argue that the Whig government’s inaction was a major contributor to the effects of the famine. Meanwhile, a second group named revisionist historians, tend to play down the government’s role. Counter-revisionist historians blend the two perspectives together by recognising the government should have done more, but also acknowledging the relief efforts that were made. To enrich my analysis further, I will be gathering primary sources including diary entries and government documents of the time which give invaluable insight into the views of the Irish public and the British government.
In 2012, nationalist historian Tim Pat Coogan published ‘The Famine Plot: England's Role in Ireland's Greatest Tragedy’. The publication claimed that the Whig government’s policies were nearly entirely culpable for the Famine. While its publication was met with praise from some Irish historians and politicians, others were outraged by the argument presented, and were quick to counter Coogan’s claims, causing the Famine debate to resurface (Gray). Due to the discussion’s re-emergence, this essay will use Coogan’s argument as a focus, and will analyse his views by challenging them with other historians and authors, and evaluating these perspectives.
The Economic Policies of The Whig Government
Food Exports
From 1846 onwards, the British Whig government allowed exports to continue coming out of Ireland. Tim Pat Coogan argues that these unregulated food exports were a major cause leading to the devastation of the Famine. Hundreds upon thousands of tons of grain left Irish ports between the years 1846-48, and additionally 83% of beef and 86% of pork was being exported to Britain (70). Furthermore, Coogan emphasises the psychological impact of seeing these goods leave the country, which is well captured in one starving inhabitant’s exclamation ‘“Would to God the government would send us food instead of soldiers” (Woodham-Smith 134). This demonstrates the confusion of the Irish people when they saw exported food being guarded by British soldiers, while they simply starved to death. Due to these exports, families across Ireland were left with little to nothing in the form of foodstuffs, and this leads Coogan to claim that exports had detrimental effects on the Irish population (70).
In response, counter-revisionist historian Cormac O’Grada estimates that exported food amounted to only a seventh of the failed potato crop. He claims 430,000 tons of grain were exported from 1846-47, while 20 million tons of potatoes were lost during this time (Coogan 69). Therefore, preventing these exports would not have prevented much starvation, meaning the Whig government was not completely to blame. It is important to note that the number of tons of grain exported are not 100% accurate in any statistics as the official documents from the time were somewhat flawed (Kineally Food Exports from Ireland). Nevertheless, O’Grada is among the most respected historians of the Famine, so we may assume that these figures are a well-informed estimation. By profession O’Grada is actually an economist, and this only adds to his value as the matter of exports is an economic matter in nature.
Nonetheless, Coogan counters O’Grada’s argument by pointing out that while exports only amounted to the value of a seventh of the potato crop, this means that hundreds of thousands of Irishmen still died due to these exports (69). Just because the exports from Ireland had a small economic effect, does not imply that they had a negligible humanitarian effect. Moreover, it was morally incorrect to let thousands die in the name of free trade, when this could easily have been avoided through regulation.
One must also take into account that food was also
imported into Ireland during the famine years. John Mitchell, a prominent
nationalist figure in Ireland at the time, believed that the volume of grain
exported, vastly outnumbered the amount which was imported. 
In his publication,
The Last Conquest of Ireland, he
claimed “a government ship sailing into any harbour with Indian corn, was sure
to meet half a dozen sailing out with Irish wheat and cattle” (Mitchell 112). However,
Mitchell’s claim here is simply false as imports actually outnumbered exports,
as shown in the table. Mitchell was one of the leading figures in Irish
nationalist journalism during the Famine and for this reason, his publications
and views are of significant value. Despite this, one must be aware, that much
of his work aimed to incite anger towards the British government, rather than give
an accurate and balanced report. For this reason, his views were often very
biased, even Anglophobic, and at times simply incorrect (Kelly 309-310).
The revisionist view of Robert Dudley Edwards underlines the fact that food exports outnumbered imports 5 to 1 from September 1st 1846 to July 1st 1847. He goes on to say that Indian Corn imports were three times greater than Ireland’s total cereal exports, and that the import of wheat dwarfed the exports of oats during this period. This evidence would lead one to believe that the Whig administration’s laissez-faire policy was largely successful. R.D. Edwards also defends Prime Minister John Russel, as he claims there were to many political forces at work, for Russel to send direct aid to Ireland even if he had wanted to (p.353-354).
To explore why exports were still responsible for mass starvation, we must look further. Most food exports left Irish ports in early autumn of 1946, while imports did not arrive until the beginning of the following year. This left a four-month gap in which the Irish people had nothing to eat, leading to thousands of deaths (Kelly 143). If the government had prohibited the export of food until early 1847 this period of mass starvation may have been avoided. A policy of free trade may have been effective at times; however, there were periods during the Famine when the Whig government had a moral obligation to intervene. While free trade benefited Ireland in the long term, it is clear that Coogan’s claim that exports exacerbated the effects of the Famine is a valid assertion.
When discussing the success of the public works scheme, Tim Pat Coogan claims ‘Overall, the work schemes were in shambles’ (109). The works schemes were indeed a mess, as the economic theory behind the policy did not function in practice. According to Coogan, only 10 pence per day was being paid to each worker, which was not nearly sufficient to feed a family. Rising food prices exacerbated the problem, as one stone of Indian meal would cost 2 pound 2 shillings by November 1846. One report written by a relief official reads “Ten pence a day will, I believe, only give one meal a day to a family of six persons” (Coogan 112). These type of reports are of immense value, as they indicate that the British government was aware that their policies were not functioning. Their refusal to change their approach, remaining undecided on the matter of fair wages, while knowing the program did very little to prevent starvation, suggests the administration was considerably culpable (Harzallah 92).
Cormac O’Grada offers an alternative view however. He argues that the public works program was a success in bureaucratic terms, as 90% of money provided for the program went to the labourers as wages. Furthermore, by Mid-March of 1847, one man per family was employed in the public works in the west of Ireland (58), and by this time there were over 700,000 Irishmen employed in the public works (Harzallah 87). This was a substantial number, considering Ireland’s population in 1841 had been 8.1 million (Population of Ireland 1841-2011). As Irish families often consisted of up to 8 or 9 children (Kelly 148), there was nearly one adult in every family earning money on the public works.
Nevertheless, the wages earnt were rarely enough to support a family of 8 or 9 children, as food prices continued to rise. John Kelly claims that in some areas wages were as low as 8 pence per day, which would barely support a family of 4 (148). Moreover, at the beginning of October 1946, only 26,000 workers were employed in the works scheme. Kelly extensively criticises the inefficiency and lack of organisation. In September of 1846, the Board of Works agency only had 125 members, and had millions of applications to sort through, which was an impossible task. Other issues included funding of the scheme – as there was a shortage of construction tools and at times there was not enough currency for workers to be paid (Kelly 147). However, Kelly does not utilise these facts to conclude that the scheme was a complete disaster, rather, he simply presents the evidence. While as a writer Kelly may be limited in his credibility due to being only an author – not a historian – his novel ‘The Graves are Walking’ is valuable in its content as it provides a balanced and factual discussion of the Famine, and does not attempt to persuade the audience into agreeing with any particular perspective.
One of the most prominent, and often hated, figures of the Famine, Charles Trevelyan, claims the public works scheme was successful as new infrastructure was built throughout Ireland. These roads would make transportation more efficient and benefit Irish society in general (Trevelyan 180). As Trevelyan was the chief administrator for relief in Ireland, he attempts to paint Whig polices in a very positive light, regardless of the particular policy. Therefore, his writing is often considerably biased, yet in this case Robert Dudley Edwards supports Trevelyan’s claim to an extent. He argues that the improvement of road communication was an essential part of economic development. Moreover, schemes of local development, especially in waste lands would have had great success. Nevertheless, Edwards, having the benefit of hindsight and taking several other perspectives into account, acknowledges that these projects were limited in their success due to many being left unfinished and others being planned poorly (Edwards 233). Roads often began nowhere and led to nowhere and were simply not suitable for communication or transportation (Griffiths 638). While Edwards is a revisionist historian, he considers both sides of the argument, and comes to a somewhat balanced conclusion. Furthermore, his book ‘The Great Famine’ is of further value as it is written together with nearly a dozen other authors, some of which are historians, some economists (including Cormac O’Grada), and even Medical and English professors. Therefore, the content of the publication is relatively balanced through taking numerous perspectives into account.
Considering all these points, it would be fair to conclude that Coogan’s claim of the work schemes being in shambles has a great degree of truth in it, due to the lack of organisation and the government’s failure to regulate wages.
Soup Kitchens and Workhouses
The only relief program which Tim Pat Coogan gives much credit to were the soup kitchens, as they were the most effective solution to preventing starvation. While the quality of soup varied significantly, any soup was an improvement for the Irish population during the Famine. Coogan explains that the kitchens had widespread success; providing soup with a piece of bread or biscuit for 3 million people every day at its peak in August 1847 (146). Edwards pursues this matter, adding that in May 777,884 persons had received rations from the kitchens, and in June this number had already shot up to 2,729,684 (241). These numbers indicate that this relief method was successful in its far-reaching effects, and the fact that nationalist and revisionist historians agree on this matter underline the achievement of the soup kitchens.
John Kelly, nevertheless, points out that there were still problems. Although nearly a million people were receiving soup during May 1847, only half of the 2000 planned soup kitchens in Ireland had opened (Kelly 252). The areas which did not yet have access to kitchens, were often the most isolated regions of the country, where the people had also struggled to find employment at the public works. These families had hardly any foodstuff available to them, and this led to mass starvation. Another criticism is the Whig administration’s plan to shut down the soup kitchens later that year, due to their belief that the free market would solve the food crisis thereafter. The Whigs expected that farmers would plant their potato seed once again in the new year, however, Kelly explains that as most of the potato seed had been eaten during the winter when food was scarcest, there was no seed to plant (253). As a result, the potato market did not re-emerge, and Ireland continued to suffer in a state of famine.
Regarding the workhouses, Coogan states ‘The workhouse system neither could, nor was designed to, cope with the conditions in famine-stricken Ireland’ (132). He claims the Whig government drastically misjudged the practicality of the workhouses, as the poor law commissioner who had suggested the use of workhouses, had done so assuming only 1% of the Irish population were in need of aid. Nevertheless, Trevelyan was still determined to administer workhouses throughout Ireland leading to disastrous consequences (Coogan 132-133). Coogan points out roughly 45% of Ireland’s population at the time were in need of relief (Population of Ireland 1841-2011), from which he concludes that the workhouses would be incapable of dealing with the famine.
Cecil Woodham-Smith, an expert on Victorian era history, agrees with Coogan on this matter, and furthers it through investigating the conditions in the workhouses. She argues that life inside was no better than outside, as food quickly ran out as a result of overcrowding, and diseases such as fever and flu spread quickly in the cram-full environment (193). In addition to there being food and even water shortages, there was also a lack of clothing (238), which added to the diseased atmosphere. Woodham-Smith, a greatly respected historian, rejected the British revisionist view, and instead chose to bring to light the horrific effects of Whig administration’s policies in her publication The Great Hunger. This was seen as a major step in Irish Famine historiography, and her publication has become the most read Irish history book of all time, making her work an invaluable source (Donnelly). Another source tells us of conditions at one of the workhouses; a charity worker described the floor as being ‘strewn with a little dirty straw’ and said that children were ‘littered down as close as close might be’ (Irish Potato Famine Exhibition). This primary source gives us further insight into the dreadful conditions, and clearly suggests to us that the people in these workhouses were living like animals.
Meanwhile, members of the government insisted that the workhouses were successful. In his memoirs ‘The Irish Crisis’, Charles Trevelyan claimed that ‘Large supplies of clothing were … sent to Ireland for the use of the workhouses’ (93). He goes on to claim that sums of money were lent in order to help workers in the workhouses provide food and clothing (Trevelyan 93). While some supplies and support may have been sent, the descriptions which modern historians have put forward clearly indicate that this support was in no way sufficient for those inside the workhouses. This account given by Trevelyan reveals his pro-government bias once again, which is evidently a massive limitation to the information he provides.
Considering these factors, Coogan’s views of the soup kitchens being a success and workhouses being quite a disaster are shared by the majority of historians, and are justifiable positions.
Regarding the government’s role in emigration from Ireland, Tim Pat Coogan states ‘What was needed to avert an inevitable disaster was a humane system of assisted emigration’ (32). Considering the disastrous land system, the failing administration and inadequate infrastructure, the British government had a responsibility to help millions flee from Ireland during the Famine. The alternative options of workhouses or public works had been organised and facilitated in such a poor manner, that anyone who wished to emigrate from Ireland should have been aided in doing so, to ensure they had a safe and healthy journey (Coogan 32). Furthermore, even when the possibility of assisted emigration was brought up in government, the administration chose instead to cut expenditure on aid (Coogan 201). This resulted in an increase in the number of deaths by starvation during the early months of 1947.
Christine Kinealy supports Coogan on this matter by claiming that the government’s refusal to intervene by regulating emigration led to the potato blight being ‘transformed into one of the most lethal famines in modern history’ (Kinealy The Great Irish Famine 220). Kinealy is a highly respected English-born Irish historian whose extensive knowledge of the Great Famine is demonstrated by the fact she was invited to speak during Tony Blair’s (UK Prime Minister 1997-2007) well-known apology for the British government’s actions during the Famine. She provides statistics to support her point, which include 33 emigrants who had died due to cholera in just the space of 49 days on a coffin ship sailing to New York. On another trip, from Sligo to Liverpool, 72 of the passengers died due to suffocation, after being moved below deck and receiving no food or water (Kinealy The Great Irish Famine 59). Had the government regulated these vessels to avoid disease and severe lack of space, tragedies such as these could have been avoided, thousands of resulting deaths avoided too (Kelly 289).
Nevertheless, Charles Trevelyan saw the issue of emigration in a very different manner. He claimed if persons who wished to emigrate did not have the strength or skills to organise emigration on their own they would be unfit for work in a foreign country. Therefore, the government would be wasting their money by transporting these people, as they would be no better off in another country. Those who wished to emigrate and could organise it themselves, would need no government assistance, and therefore the free market could help these people instead (Trevelyan 132-133). Through this theory, the Whig administration believed its policy of inaction would not exacerbate the effects of the Famine.
However, there were thousands more in Ireland who wished to emigrate but never had the opportunity to, due to the high emigration fees. By 1847, the cost to travel across to the Americas was £5 (Kinealy The Great Irish Famine 99). The vast majority of households could obviously not afford this, so it was up to their landlords to provide them with the money. Many landlords did, as this was easier than evicting their tenants, however there were also many who did not (Kelly 256). Diaries from the time show that some farmers had to sell their entire plot of land, just to pay the fare to cross the Atlantic (Clarke 35). If the government had chosen to fund emigration, many more people could have escaped the hunger plaguing Ireland, and thousands of lives would have been saved.
After the first period of mass emigration in 1847, the British government defended its inaction by claiming that that no one could have foreseen what was to come and that they did not have the administrative machinery to regulate or even prohibit the emigration (Edwards 347). Robert Edwards states that the first part of the British government’s defence is simply untrue, as the government must have been aware that mass emigration was very likely to occur during the Famine. Edwards points out that although the government didn’t have the statistical information and administrative techniques to avoid this mass emigration, they could have increased the number of emigration officers and used government transport as hospital hulks at large ports (348). While these are good points too, the government could have done even more; such as use their own ships for emigration. On these ships all factors would remain regulated and the process of emigration would be much more successful. The points which Edwards makes are valid, however his revisionist bias is somewhat evident here, as he fails to acknowledge that the Whig administration could have done much more if it had not been so obsessed with the concept of laissez-faire. Therefore, when reviewing Coogan’s original claim, one would conclude that a system of assisted emigration would indeed have limited the devastating effects of starvation and disease to a significant extent.
Taking all factors into account, this essay has demonstrated that the British Whig government’s economic policies were indeed largely culpable for the effects of the Potato Famine on the Irish population from 1846 to 1852. Overall Coogan’s view that the administration was culpable to a great extent seems to be quite accurate considering the findings of this essay. The magnitude of the effect of the Whig administration’s policy of market based solutions and ideological fixation on laissez-faire was disastrous and led to over a million Irishmen starving to death. Although food imports did outnumber exports during the famine, the government’s refusal to prevent exports during the 1846/47 winter resulted in the deaths of thousands upon thousands of people. The wages paid at the public work schemes relative to the rising prices of food significantly limited the success of this program, which left many families without food. The soup kitchens were the only relief system policy which amounted to any real success, nevertheless the workhouses were limited in their effect as they were disease-filled, short of food supplies and overcrowded. Lastly, the Whig’s inactive policy on emigration led to thousands dying on board unregulated vessels, and left thousands more simply stranded in Ireland. If the government had chosen to intervene and supply more relief aid to Ireland, they may have lost support from the British public, as the public’s taxes were being spent on a foreign country. Therefore, the British public’s will possibly influenced the amount of relief the British government was prepared to supply to Ireland, however we cannot know if this would be the case on hindsight. In conclusion, it is clear that the Whig government policy was largely responsible for the disastrous effects of the Famine and therefore, John Mitchell was quiet possibly correct when he said, “The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but the English created the Famine” (219).
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