More Nazi-era sites around Munich (5)

Staatskanzlei and Munich War Memorial

The Bavarian State Chancellery serves as the personal offices of the chancellery staff. It serves to coordinate the activities of the state ministries and prepares the resolutions of the state government.was created in 1933. During the Weimar Republic, the Prime Minister was also the Bavarian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Ministry, which had hardly any powers of its own, effectively represented the authority of the Prime Minister. It was only after the Nazis had taken power in Bavaria in March 1933 that the Foreign Ministry was abolished and replaced by the State Chancellery. During the Nazi era the State Chancellery was of little importance because, on the one hand, Germany had become a unified state in which the states were only Reich provinces and, on the other hand, they were associated with the Gau leadership of Munich-Upper Bavaria and the authority of the Reich governor Franz von Epp (the so-called Reichsstatthalterei). After the war, Anton Pfeiffer took over the management of the Bavarian State Chancellery, first as State Councillor.

Photos taken by the men of the American 14th Armoured Division here on the steps of the building upon their entry into Munich and below from the side.  The partial encirclement of Munich by the 45th Division moving in from the north, the 42nd Division from the north­ west, and the 3rd Division along the Isar River from the south was almost complete by April 29, although it wasn't until the next day that the city was wholly clear. Just before noon the next day forward troops of the 3rd and 42nd Divisions poured into the centre without meeting any resistance but instead encountering small groups of cheering civilians waving both white and Bavarian flags.  This wasn't the case for the 45th Division which faced a far less friendly reception from resistance mostly from ϟϟ battalions entrenched in prepared defensive positions centred around their college and barracks in the northern outskirts of the city as outlined below. As for the building itself, after their destruction in the war the two side wings were demolished, and the central building was a ruin for decades. The central dome of the former Bavarian Army Museum, which had been built in 1905 at the site of the Hofgartenkaserne barracks and was demolished during the war when the two side wings were torn off, left the central building a ruin for decades. By 1982, however, the 52 metre high dome with its copper coverage was restored by the team of architects J. Diethard Siegert and Reto Gansser, but not after considerable controversy due to the modernity of the project since it was located very close to the Residenz and would impact the visual integrity of the Hofgarten. There were also demonstrations to protect the remains of the arcades of the perimeter galleries on the north side that remained standing. Art historian Gunter Schweikhart said in May 1987 that an exact reconstruction of the original building should be given "in terms of its historical and architectural importance as an especially valuable monument." Nevertheless, the Bavarian state office for monuments and their preservation defended the project which was finally completed in 1993. The sides are supposed to appear like stairs that seem to rise to the sky, covered by two completely glazed façades, creating a contrast with the ruin that remained standing. The arcades of the north side were respected, but given a more modern form using a metal structure and glass cover. The final area of the building was 8,800 m2 and the access plaza was dedicated to all those killed in the war.

 

The remnants of some renaissance arcades of the Hofgarten in the north were integrated to the building. The two new wings are covered in full length with glazed stairs in the style of Jacob's Ladders, giving the impression of ship stairs. At the request of then-Prime Minister Max Streibl an intimate space with wood panelling and furnishings, ("Zirbelstube") was inserted after the reception room of the Prime Minister, who caused a stir because of the high costs involved. The building comprises about 8,800 m². To the east of the building the Köglmühlbach stream flows past above ground. In front of the west side of the courtyard is the war memorial and the equestrian statue for Duke Otto I Wittelsbach.

From 1905-1945, this housed the Bavarian Army Museum, founded by Ludwig II. Destroyed during the war with only the dome remaining, it has since been rather impressively reconstructed and is now used by the Bavarian government. In front of the building, beneath a Travertine slab, is a crypt commemorating the unknown soldier. The mausoleum, adorned with the names of the dead and the dedication “To Our Fallen” on one side of the chamber and the assurance “They Will Rise Again” on the other, leads down to a sunken crypt-like space enclosing the full-size sculpture of a soldier in battle-dress laid out upon the altar of the fatherland.  

All the names have become a sign for men of one fate, as it were traces of the mythos of the fallen. . . . The view upon all the names of one mission [Berufenheit] of itself awakens in us the need for a figure in which the fate of the many, who have become one, is allegorically [gleichnishaft] embodied. We are prepared to descend into the crypt located below the altar-tomb-block. In it is the sought-for image of the one who represents all: a young warrior in his repose of death...

 [T]he way in which the Munich memorial addresses [anspricht] the individual is fundamentally different from the effect that the individualistic figurative memorial [of the nineteenth century] exerts on the individual. For one comes to the single figure after having crossed the chamber of the community, whose walls hold the columns of names of the sacrifices [Opfer] and the supporters of a new national community [Volksgemeinschaft]. And the individual, whose image the crypt harbours, is indeed not an individual, but rather a symbol of all who fell . . . that is why we feel the symbol always as a person . . . in the ordinary sense proper to the concept. Persona comes from personare and that means “to sound through.” The whole sounds through the one, through whom he existed and for whose sake he fell: his nation [Volk].

 Hubert Schrade, Das deutsche Nationaldenkmal

David Lloyd George visiting the tomb in September 1936 before meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Although wartime Prime Minister and shaper of the Treaty of Versailles, Lloyd George had been consistently pro-German after 1923, in part due to his growing conviction that Germany had been treated unfairly at Versailles. He supported German demands for territorial concessions and recognition of its Great Power status, paying much less attention to the security concerns of France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium. In a speech in 1933, he warned that if Hitler were overthrown, communism would take over Germany. In August 1934, he insisted Germany could not wage war and assured European nations that there would be no risk of war during the next ten years. After his meeting with Hitler, the latter said he was pleased to have met "the man who won the war"; Lloyd George was moved, and called Hitler "the greatest living German".  Lloyd George also visited Germany's public works programmes and was impressed. On his return to Britain, he wrote an article for the Daily Express praising Hitler, stating that "[t]he Germans have definitely made up their minds never to quarrel with us again."  He declared Hitler "the George Washington of Germany"; that he was rearming Germany for defence and not for offensive war; that a war between Germany and the Soviet Union would not happen for at least ten years; and that Hitler admired the British and wanted their friendship but that there was no British leadership to exploit this. However, by 1937, Lloyd George's distaste for Neville Chamberlain led him to disavow Chamberlain's appeasement policies.

GIF: The tomb of the Unknown Soldier during the war and today. Originally erected in front of the former Army Museum (now the Bavarian State Chancellery) in the Hofgarten in 1924 to commemorate the two million dead of the Great War, the 'Dead Soldier' sculpted by Bleeker now dedicated to the dead of both world wars. It was also used as a backdrop for nationalist and militaristic propaganda during the Nazi era. Annual remembrance days for war heroes were organised here by both the Wehrmacht and the Nazi party from 1934 onwards. This war memorial modelled on a megalithic tomb was already one of the most visited war memorials in Germany even during the Weimar Republic. Its centrepiece is a crypt in which Bernhard Bleeker’s idealised figure of the “dead soldier” is laid out, representing the 13,000 Munich soldiers who fell in the Great War and whose names were once engraved on the walls of a further walkway that circumscribed the memorial. Damaged during the war, the war memorial was restored on the orders of the American military government, albeit without the names of the 13,000 dead. In the 1950s an inscription was added commemorating the fallen soldiers and civilian victims of the years 1939 to 1945. This dedication reflects the desire of the population to continue commemorating the war dead even after 1945, although its portrayal of both the city and its population exclusively as victims represents a very one-dimensional view. To this day military ceremonies in honour of the dead are still held regularly at the war memorial. Directly in front is the Memorial for the Resistance

Leo Kornbrust’s memorial was unveiled on July 24, 1996 by the Bavarian Minister president Dr. Edmund Stoiber. It is engraved on one side with a line of block letters reading "Zum erinnern zum gedenken" ("To Recall and to Commemorate") under which is a reproduction of a handwritten letter by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben who was arrested the day after the attempted July plot. 

We will not pass judgement on the various possible forms of government as only one will be raised clear and unambiguously: every person has a right to a useful and just state that guarantees the freedom of the individual and to he general welfare. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the protection of individual citizens from the arbitrary will of criminal regimes of violence. These are the foundations of the new Europe.

During his trial he was forced to appear in court without his belt and false teeth. On August 8, 1944 he was executed by being hanged by piano wire from a meat hook. 

In the centre of the Hofgarten is its pavilion, the Diana temple- or Hofgartenbavaria- designed by Heinrich Schön the Elder in 1615 shown after the war and today. Its roof is adorned with a copy of the Tellus Bavaria bronze statue by Hubert Gerhard from 1623; the original is now set up as part of the bronze collection in the Vierschäftesaal of the Munich Residenz. The goddess Bavaria is used an allegory with the five attributes that symbolise the wealth of the state- a salt cellar for the important international trade, a deerskin for the hunts with their abundance of meat, the trap for the abundance of fish in the waters, the sheaf of grain for the well-behaved the peasants who paid the tithe and the Kurapfel for political power in the circle of princes. The copy was made in 1594 by Hans Krumpper. From July to November 1937, the "Degenerate Art" propaganda exhibition organised by the Nazis took place in the northern Hofgartenarkaden shown just behind. After the war when the Hofgarten was destroyed, a compromise was found between the stylistic elements of an English landscape garden and the original design of the 17th century.

Another Munich temple, the Monopteros in the English Garden, where the infamous Unity Mitford shot herself the day England declared war on Germany; a few yards away is the Chinesischer Turm, the original structure having burned down when a phosphorus bomb was dropped on July 13, 1944 and reconstructed in 1952 by the architect Franz Zell.

 Hitler had gifted Mitford a box at the Olympic Games and had her chauffeured to the Richard Wagner Festival in Bayreuth. When he announced the annexation of his homeland to the German Reich, she was allowed to stand next to him leading her to write home to her sister that “I think I am the happiest girl in the world.” As her father David Bertram Ogilvy Freeman-Mitford, second Baron Redesdale complained, "I'm normal, my wife is normal - but one of my daughters is crazier than the other." One married a duke, two became writers, Diana left an heir to the Guinness brewery to live with Sir Oswald Mosley, leader of the fascist British Union, Jessica married a red nephew of Churchill and fought with the communists in the Spanish Civil War and Unity- born in Swastika, Ontario!- became a Hitler groupie. 

In 1933 Unity, accompanied by her older sister Diana, came to Germany for the first time to attend the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg. Unity soon settled in Munich and began to learn German. In February 1935 she met Hitler for the first time in his regular pub, the “Osteria Bavaria” on Schellingstrasse. Hitler was enthusiastic about the 20-year-old, six foot, elegant blonde beauty, as she fully corresponded to his Aryan ideal of beauty. According to Michaela Karl, Hitler and Mitford met more than 140 times between 1935 and 1939 - every ten days on average which continues to give rise to speculation. Winifred Wagner admitted her jealousy when she described Mitford as having “looked like a baby, so innocent. But somehow it was terribly annoying." Nazi foreign press chief Ernst“ Putzi ”Hanfstaengl was even more biting, damning her as a "beautiful, blond cow with a measure of malice." Leni Riefenstahl, who is also said to have close ties to the dictator, is said to have even spoken to him about the rumours only to be told that whilst she was beautiful, his feelings were such that he could only marry a German girl. No doubt Hitler saw in her a strategic signal to hoped-for ally England, whilst being well aware of the fact that his effect on female followers mainly depended on the fact that he was a bachelor. Mitford's enthusiasm for Hitler and Nazism did not arise simply from naive enthusiasm but would see her describing herself as a “Jew hater” in a letter to the editor of the Nazi propaganda paper “Der Stürmer”. She justified Hitler's war plans by the racial theory that Poles and Czechs were "not a superior race, and therefore they unfortunately have to be ruled by other nations". But on September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war on Germany, she put a photo of herself, a letter to Hitler and the party badge he had given her in an envelope and shot herself in the head. She survived, was relocated to Switzerland and even overcame her partial paralysis before she died in Scotland in 1948 from the effects of meningitis. Michaela Karl claims it was not a suicide, but murder. Unity Mitford had little reason to kill itself, whilst their opponents had every reason to get rid of "the English whisperer". Such enemies included Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop who blamed Unity Mitford for the failure of German-English relations, which the former ambassador to the Court of St. James regarded as his own domain. And in Joseph Goebbels's diary also gives cause for thought: “The Führer very much regrets the fate of Lady Mitford, who is paralysed on one side as a result of her suicide attempt. But nevertheless the Führer must of course protect himself against any possibility of espionage. And that's what he did in this case." In fact, it's been established that Unity Mitford was being monitored. Although the files of the Munich Gestapo were lost, a resident registration card dated September 2, 1939 reads "currently in custody at Gestapo, Brienner Str. 50." An act of desperation by Mitford to forestall permanent internment would also be conceivable. But there's also a lack of solid evidence for this theory according to Karl who points out that a theatrical suicide attempt would have suited the British woman's exalted character. After the war, Unity Mitford's sisters tried to forget about their affair with Hitler's ideology with Unity was reduced to the role of the apolitical enthusiast.  There are in fact rumours that she was taken to a private maternity hospital in Oxford where, in absolute secrecy, she gave birth to Hitler’s love child. 

Formerly the ϟϟ-Deutschland-Kaserne the monumental main building of today's Ernst-von-Bergmann barracks at Neuherbergstraße 11 was built for the ϟϟ-Standarte 1 Deutschland between 1934 and 1938, according to plans by Oswald Bieber. This was an armed union of the so-called "ϟϟ-Einsatzgruppe", which later appeared in the "Waffen-ϟϟ" which served primarily as a representative and guardian of the regime before the war. The ϟϟ-Standarte 1 Deutschland was permanently outside the barracks as a result of the Sudeten crisis from October 1938 onwards, and from the beginning of the war was involved several times in war crimes. The "ϟϟ Barracks Freimann" served as an accommodation and training place for the ϟϟ during the war; ϟϟ-Flak units were also stationed here. Whilst the ϟϟ men were housed in the barracks, ϟϟ leaders and sub-leaders lived with their families in a settlement built south of the barracks which can still be seen in the residential buildings on today's Kleinschmidtstraße. During the war, an external camp of the Dachau concentration camp, whose relatives had to work for  ϟϟ administration, was placed within the barracks. Other concentration camp prisoners were housed in a concentration camp outside the barracks and had to carry out labour for the Dyckerhoff & Widmann construction company.

View of the parade ground with the eight-storey tower next to the former main guard at Ingolstädter Strasse in 1939. The externally plain and spacious barracks construction, also known as the ϟϟ Barracks Freimann, was erected in reinforced concrete. The functional architecture of the ϟϟ barracks differed in terms of the costly materials used, the elaborate construction techniques and the renouncement of any façade ornamentation, which were mostly constructed as brick buildings and had decorative elements. The ϟϟ-Standarte 1 Deutschland had taken part in the annexation of Austria and later the occupation of the Sudetenland before contributing to the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939. It was ordered by Hitler that it should be expanded to a division but the war interrupted this plan. It took part in the invasion of Poland attached to Panzer-Division Kempf and following that campaign it was used to form ϟϟ-Division Verfügungstruppe, later renamed Das Reich. It was as this division which is notorious for having descended on the village of Oradour-sur-Glane in France on June 10, 1944 in reprisal for partisan attacks. After assembling the villagers, the troops separated the men from the women and children, then shot the men as their families looked on. After this, the troops herded the women and children into a local church, locked the doors, and set the structure ablaze with hand grenades. A total of 642 died.

Rather ironically these barracks served for three months during this time from April 1944 as the home of the the FLAK Company of the French ϟϟ-Sturmbrigade consisting of one officer, 36 NCOs, and 111 men. Once formed, the FLAK Company began its training here but its personnel, as a direct consequence of the defeat of 1940’, didn't want to serve under former French Army officers and so

 [o]n 1st April 1944, the 3rd Company left Sennheim to join the ϟϟ-Sturmbrigade. After journeying for three days, it arrived at Neweklau. The 3rd Company came with the tag of 'a sort of disciplinary unit'. This was not unfounded. In its ranks were a number of ‘hotheads’ whose exploits while on leave in France that Christmas and New Year had not gone unpunished. Nevertheless, this company, for all its ills, was well trained. It became the 6th Company of the Sturmbrigade.'’ After some permutations, the 6th Company was designated the FLAK Company of the French ϟϟ-Sturmbrigade. German instructor ϟϟ-Ustuf. Jauss then asked Ostuf. Maud’huit to take command of this unit, and to organise its recruitment and training. In a matter of days, he set up the FLAK Company. And although some volunteers left to join the companies formed before their arrival, others did their utmost to fill the posts made vacant. 

Robert Forbes (56) For Europe: The French Volunteers of the Waffen-ϟϟ

 The GIFs shown here are from photos taken of the building in the late afternoon of April 30, 1945 by First Lieutenant Clifford E. Conner, 3rd Platoon Commander, D CO., 20th Tank Battalion. The photo on the right shows battle damage and a knocked-out German .88-mm gun which had, for a time, protected the building's perimeter wall. An armoured division of the American Army, which entered the country on April 30, 1945, took the barracks after fierce fighting in the Lohhof Panzerwiese area. From 1948 the barracks "Warner Kaserne", used by the Americans until 1968, was named after Henry F. Warner, who had fallen in the Ardennes on December 21, 1944, to which the Congress of the United States posthumously awarded the Medal of Honour, the highest American award for bravery. In addition to military use, UNESCO used the buildings to accommodate dispersed persons and the headquarters of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) on the site until 1951. The international refugee organisation supported the approximately 3,800 DPs of different nationalities living here as of October 1950 during the intended departure.

 

Standing in front of the Funk-Kaserne, dating from 1936, now used by the Bundespolizeiinspektion für Kriminalitätsbekämpfung München who have the chutzpah to use Nazi premises which openly displays a Nazi symbol on property open to the public yet will demand that tax-paying citizens are forbidden from taking photographs of it. The funkkaserne was erected as a Luftwaffe news barracks in the course of the armament of the Wehrmacht from 1936 to 1938. The buildings survived the war largely without damage.  In the post-war years until May 1955, the American army and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) operated the largest southern German Resettlement Centre for Displaced Persons, a transitional accommodation for predominantly Eastern European forced labourers, who were sent to Germany during the  war. Pioneer barracks of the Bundeswehr  From 1956 to 1992 the area was a barracks of the army of the Bundeswehr. Despite the sole use as a pioneer barracks, the name Funkkaserne was retained. Lastly, it was the pioneer battalion 210, the pioneer battalion 220 - a training unit a few kilometres away in the Prinz Eugene barracks, and the Panzerpionierkompanie 560. The pioneer battalion 210 (heavy pioneer battalion of the 2nd corps) was intended to make blasting shafts with  drill vehicles in the event of a war. According to rumours, it was planted for the use of Atom mines stored at the US 10th Special Forces Group in the Flint Barracks in Bad Toelz. The military use of the barracks ended with a final meeting in March 1992 in the presence of the then Secretary of State and later Bavarian Minister-President Günther Beckstein, the first major Munich Bundeswehr property to be abandoned in the course of the reduction of troops. After a canal and an old canal restoration and a dismantling of the rail connection from military times to the railway line from Freimann to Schwabing, the demolition work for the former barracks building began at the end of 2010 and a new construction is planned for the year 2016. An area of 8.72 hectares in the north-east corner of the former barracks area was excluded from the urban transformation and remained the property of the federal government. It is still used by the Federal Police for accommodation and services buildings and is to be compacted in favour of additional residential buildings.

Just outside the reichsadler remains, shorn of its swastika (although traces are left). Even though it is allowed to openly appear outside the walls of the former base, I was told not to take photos of it (which of course I ignored).

Formerly the Karl-Liebknecht-Kaserne before being renamed the Adolf-Hitler-Kaserne, this is where Hitler stayed after returning to Munich after the Great War during his affiliation to the infantry in the Lothstraße 29 and stayed there officially until May 1, 1920. By that time from the summer of 1919, in addition to the 2nd Infantry Regiment, there were also a number of companies from the Bavarian Army which were being liquidated. Eventually however the engineer battalion and the first battalion of the 19th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr were housed in the Oberwiesenfeld barracks. 

As a result on the occasion of Hitler's birthday in 1934 the Reichswehr sent birthday greetings in which Blomberg wrote that the barracks of the First Battalion of Infantry Regiment 19 (Munich), one of the traditional troops of the famous List Infantry Regiment in which Hitler had fought as a volunteer, was to be given the name “Adolf-Hitler-Kaserne.” Until denazification in 1945, the barracks in Lothstraße therefore held the name Adolf-Hitler-Kaserne.

 In the foreground is the war memorial erected in 1923 by Hermann Broxner, dedicated to those of the Königlich Bayrisches Infanterieregiment Nr.2 Kronprinz who fell 1682-1918 on the corner of Winzererstrasse, Lothstrasse and Georgenstrasse at what had formerly been Vimyplatz. Today a block of flats, the buildings behind had served as the Adolf Hitler Kaserne. The barracks themselves date from the typhoid epidemic of 1893 when the Hofgarten and Seidenhaus barracks subsequently closed, making it necessary to move the infantry body regiment stationed there to the Türkenkaserne barracks. Battalions of the 1st "König" Infantry Regiment and the 2nd "Kronprinz" Infantry Regiment were housed in the Turkish barracks as well as on the Marzplatz. During the Nazi era in connection with the marshalling yard planned further to the northwest, there were unrealised plans to build a new freight yard with a wholesale market hall, slaughterhouse and cattle yard and a thermal power plant here.

      

 The barracks as seen at the end of the war in photographs taken by the 14th Armoured Division.

 The barracks buildings at Oberwiesenfeld were largely spared by the wartime bombs, although many were later demolished. In addition to barracks, there were numerous other military facilities here, such as the former clothing office of the 1st Army Corps with the associated living quarters and the military housing complex along Barbarastraße, the St. Barbara Garrison Church and the municipal Wehramt (today the Munich City Archive) at Winzererstraße 68. The eastern part of the barracks in this area which includes ​​Infanteriestrasse, Barbarastrasse, Elisabethstrasse, Winzererstrasse, and Lothstrasse received residential and commercial development in the 1950s and 1960s and the area today is used by the Munich Federal Police Directorate. From this section of the former barracks, listed buildings still exist on the corner of Elisabethstrasse/Theo-Prosel-Weg and on the corner of Lothstrasse/Winzererstrasse.Some remaining sites include two buildings in the north-west of the former barracks currently are used by various Munich companies. The former officers' riding arena is now the venue. The former administration building at Lothstraße 29 at the corner of Winzererstraße serves as the headquarters of a publishing house. In addition, there administration building with the officers' mess at Elisabethstraße 79 on the corner of Theo-Prosel-Weg is a listed building. Apartments that used to belong to the pioneer department were rented to Munich families until the beginning of 2010. The demolition of the three-story row of houses near the former casino began in April 2010.

Currently serving as the Bundesfinanzhof, the highest tax court, from 1933 the judgements here provided the legal justification for the expropriation of political opponents and Jews, the latter through the "Reichsfluchtsteuer". As the Reichsfinanzhof, under the Nazis it was the supreme court in tax matters. In final appeal proceedings it hands down decisions in cases especially referred to it by law. The Senate of the Reich Finance Court, composed of five members, including the chairman, decided in legal complaint cases. At the final vote the case was decided by the votes of at least three members, including the chairman. The Reich Finance Court was the supreme authority in respect to real property taxes, in so far as the taxes are administered by state offices and Oberfinanzpräsidenten. In addition, upon application of a state government, the Reich Finance Minister could designate the Reich Finance Court as the supreme court for the taxes of the states, communes, communal associations and religious societies.

On the right: Looking towards the site from Herkomerplatz located in Bogenhausen where Scheinerstraße, Ismaninger Straße, Montgelasstraße, Oberföhringer Straße , Bülowstraße and Denninger Straße meet. It was named after the painter and sculptor Sir Hubert Ritter von Herkomer in 1927; it had previously been called Gebeleplatz. After the war one of Munich's first supermarkets, called "Supermarkt", was built on the corner building on Ismaninger Strasse.The building shown here caught my eye as I cycled past given the eagle that adorns the entrance.

The former site of the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Dozentenbund (NSDDB). One of the responsibilities of the National Socialist Association of German Lecturers, founded in 1935 as a professional association of university lecturers designed to keep them in line with Nazi ideology and located at what is today Max-Joseph-Straße 4. It was to push for the dismissal of politically undesirable university lecturers, to run the universities according to dictatorial principles and to make the curriculum conform with Nazi ideology. The conditions for bringing the universities into line were favourable in Munich, for even before 1933 the National Socialist German Students’ Association at the Technical University had held almost half the seats on the Students’ Committee. Students eventually had to be members of the Nationalsozialistischen deutschen Studentenbund. The NSDStB, headed from 1928 to 1933 by Baldur von Schirach, served to promote the Nazi way of life through indoctrination with Nazi philosophy, and included physical training and military drills. Universities were purged of Jewish, liberal, and social-democrat personnel who were harassed, dismissed, forced into exile and retirement, and even imprisoned and replaced by inexperienced and unqualified but reliable Nazi professors. This was a terrible loss for Germany which had held a position of world leadership in science but gave Britain and America many scientists, such as Albert Einstein, who were forced into exile. 

University teachers were controlled by the NSDDB. The new curriculum emphasised the basic elements of Nazi ideology- racism, nationalism, Germanic culture, duty, loyalty to the Führer, soldierly spirit, obedience and discipline. Students were often required to put aside their books and spend months in military training and labour camps. With continual rounds of marches, rallies and other party activities, the desperate professors had to ease their requirements drastically in order to graduate sufficient numbers.

The educational reforms instituted by the Nazi regime had catastrophic results. The traditional German humanism was replaced with politico-racial institutions dedicated to militarism, racial hatred and aggressive expansionism. Many young people began to question the value of obtaining the once-prestigious Abitur—the graduation certificate needed to enter a university. By the late 1930s, many students were dropping out of school to work as craft apprentices or industrial trainees. Education—from elementary schools to the universities—became merely an appendage of the Propaganda Ministry, intellectual standards declined precipitously and a whole generation was the victim of odious indoctrination. 

LePage  (93)  Hitler Youth

The main building of the Reichszeugmeisterei, built by Paul Hofer and Karl Johann Fischer, in Tegernseer Landstraße 210 with Nazi flags and a Reichsadler over the entrance portal. The Nazi leadership demonstrated power and rule with the monumental building in the "rot Giesing". In 1934, the Nazis bought the site between Tegernseer Landstrasse, Peter-Auzinger- and Soyerhofstrasse, which had once belonged to the car body builder Beißbarth. Two years later, the party bought the Warthof, which had been used as an evangelical orphanage since 1911. The buildings of the Reichszeugmeisterei, the Reichsautozugs Deutschland and the Bavarian auxiliary railway were built on the huge, traffic-heavy situated area from 1935 onwards. In addition to service buildings and housing blocks for the accommodation of the employees, a remote heating installation with a widely visible roof was also installed. The Reich General Ordnance Depot "was one of the largest concrete skeleton constructions erected during the Nazi period" (Kopleck, 73) which housed party vehicles. Today can be seen the traces of the reichsadler above the entrance and, along the sides, surviving reliefs depicting German enterprise. The Reichszeugmeisterei was the Nazis' central procurement office and developed into its largest service centre, inspecting the production and distribution of all official equipment and uniforms, such as the brown shirt, Nazi flag and party badge. After the war, the Americans Army confiscated the largely indestructible buildings as a barracks, and in 1948 it was named after corporal Francis X. McGraw, who had fallen in the Rhineland in 1944. The McGraw barracks were the seat of the military government for Bavaria.

Nazi uniforms and regalia were designed, manufactured, controlled and sold by the Reichszeugmeisterei, literally the National Material Control Office, which can be thought of as a government procurement office. The Reichszeugmeisterei was established at almost the moment that Hitler took over the government of Germany. By July 1934, the RZM was in place with a director, staff and offices in Munich at Tegernseer Landstrasse 210. Officially, it had the solitary purpose of selecting suppliers and sellers of certain NSDAP uniform-related products. It had exclusive legal authority to design and control quality and costs of uniforms, badges, medals and other regalia. Since its mission was on behalf of the Nazi Party as a branch of the Treasury Department, its jurisdiction included material for use by both the Gliederungen der NSDAP and Angeschlossende Verbände. Secondarily, the RZM was charged with making sure that the production of all that they ordered was carried out in “Aryan” manufacturing plants, with materials of German origin whenever possible. Producers authorised by the RZM were not allowed to employ “non–Aryan” workers, and had to give preference to Nazi Party members when promoting workers and dealers. Each firm authorised to produce or sell RZM material was issued an RZM registration number and it was required that the number appear on all finished products they made or sold.

Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage, Hitler Youth, 1922-1945, pp50-51

In 1895 Josef Schülein established the Unionsbrauerei in Haidling which quickly developed into one of the largest breweries of Munich. Because Schülein was a Jew, its beer was often defamed as “Jew beer” and he himself was forced to sacrifice his position on the Supervisory Board of Löwenbräu in 1933 and retired to his Kaltenberg estate, where he died on September 9, 1938. He was buried at the New Israelite Cemetery in the north of Munich.  Five of his children had already emigrated with their families in 1938, including his son Hermann, who had become manager in the Liebmann Breweries in New York. The youngest son Fritz was arrested on the evening of Kristallnacht in Kaltenberg and was able to flee to the United States after undergoing "protective custody" in the Dachau concentration camp; the Kaltenberg Castle family estate was "aryanised" and only returned in 1949. In Berg am Laim, a district in Munich, a small street and a square (where the Schülein fountain, donated in 1928, stands) were named after Schülein. Schüleinstraße and Schüleinplatz were renamed into Halserspitzstraße and Halserspitzplatz by the Nazis. On August 7, 1945 the name after Schülein was given again.

 

 Ehemaliger Flughafen Oberwiesenfeld

 The airport administration buildings with a Junkers D 1758 in 1931. As early as the late 19th century, the military field at Oberwiesenfeld was identified as a suitable location for the emerging air traffic. In 1890 the "Luftschiffer-Lehrabteilung" of the Bavarian army was founded. On the drill field, hot air balloons and zeppelins took off and landed as did, from 1909, simple aircraft. After the First World War its use was limited to civil aviation. The equipment of the airfield was very modest, as there were missing buildings for the repair of the airplanes and for waiting passages. In 1927, the city council of Munich issued a planning contract, which envisaged the expansion of Oberwiesenfeld as an "airport of the first order". After completion of the hangar and the modern administration building, the aeroport was opened on May 3, 1931 by Lord Mayor Karl Scharnagl. Due to the rapidly increasing number of passengers, it was already clear shortly after the opening that the airport on the Oberwiesenfeld would soon be too small. Due to the adjacent development, the airport could not be extended. After the completion of the new Munich-Riem traffic lane in 1939, the Luftwaffe used the Oberwiesenfeld airport. After the war it was confiscated by the American armed forces and then used by private pilots until the airport buildings were demolished in 1968 in the course of the design of the Olympics park for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.

Standing outside Reinhard Heydrich's former home at Zuccalistraße 4 near Nymphenburg castle. In September 1932 the Security forces had its seat at this small villa as well. Of this house his wife Lina wrote "[w]hen unexpected visitors arrive, the architecture of the house makes it possible for us to make everything disappear in time. Our dog gives us plenty of warning."
At the end of the war, Heydrich's widow returned to the island of Fehmarn with her surviving children. She owned and ran a hotel and restaurant. The Finnish theatre director and poet Mauno Manninen was a frequent guest at the hotel. He took pity on the difficulties she experienced as a result of her infamous name and offered to marry her to enable her to change it. They married in 1965 but did not live together. She died on August 14, 1985.
See the special Prague section on Operation Anthropoid

Schloss Nymphenburg

Huge Nazi flags in front and the wife at the site today. Within walking distance of Heydrich's house is this, the biggest Baroque palace in Germany, and site of the 1938 Nazi production of "De Nacht van de Amazonen"seen during the 1930s and today. The opulent façade and intricate interiors of Schloss Nymphenburg, a Baroque palace in Munich, Germany, belie its complex historical significance, particularly during the Nazi era. Far from being a mere architectural marvel, the palace served as a potent symbol and a functional space for the Nazis. Hobsbawm argues that symbols and architecture often serve as "invented traditions," created or repurposed to establish a sense of continuity with a selectively interpreted past. In the case of Schloss Nymphenburg, the Nazis sought to connect their ideology with the grandeur and authority symbolised by the palace, thereby legitimising their regime. The palace, originally built as a summer residence for the rulers of Bavaria, was transformed into a space that hosted important Nazi meetings and events. The appropriation of such a historically significant site allowed the Nazis to project an image of power and historical continuity, aligning themselves with the perceived greatness of the German past. Indeed, the palace wasn't merely a backdrop but an active participant in the shaping of Nazi ideology; its halls and rooms were the settings for discussions, decisions, and proclamations that would have far-reaching consequences. Evans notes that the palace served practical purposes, including hosting foreign dignitaries and serving as a locale for party functions. The grandeur of the palace was exploited to impress and intimidate, a tactic that was part of the larger Nazi strategy of using spectacle as a means of control. The Nazis were keenly aware of the power of aesthetics and used Schloss Nymphenburg as a stage on which to perform their political theatre. The palace was more than a symbol; it was a tool, repurposed to fit the needs of a regime keen on using every available resource to propagate its ideology.

This transformation of Schloss Nymphenburg into a Nazi stronghold also had implications for the German populace and the international community. On the right the site is shown during the so-called Day of German Art Festival during the weekend of July 14-16, 1939. The appropriation of a cultural landmark for political purposes served as a powerful propaganda tool. By associating themselves with the palace, the Nazis were not just claiming a physical space but were also staking a claim to German history and culture. This association wasn't lost on Germans, for whom Schloss Nymphenburg was a symbol of national heritage. The palace's new role as a Nazi edifice made it complicit in the regime's actions, turning it from a neutral architectural marvel into a politically charged site. Mazower contends that the Nazis were masters of manipulating public opinion through carefully orchestrated displays of power and authority. Schloss Nymphenburg, with its historical significance and architectural grandeur, provided the perfect setting for such displays. The palace became a stage where the Nazi vision for Germany was articulated and performed, a vision that was disseminated through propaganda to reach even those who had never set foot in the palace. The use of such a culturally significant site for political purposes had a profound impact on how the Nazi regime was perceived, both domestically and internationally.

Whilst the symbolic and utilitarian roles of Schloss Nymphenburg have been well-documented, the palace's influence on Nazi ideology and policy-making is an area that merits further exploration. The palace was not merely a venue for official functions and propaganda; it was also a space where key decisions were made and ideological tenets were formulated. Arendt posits that totalitarian regimes often use grand settings to create an aura that enhances the gravity of their ideological pronouncements. In the case of Schloss Nymphenburg, the palace's historical weight and architectural splendor provided an ideal setting for the formulation and dissemination of Nazi policies. The palace's grand halls and opulent rooms were more than mere venues; they were spaces that lent an air of authority and legitimacy to the Nazi regime's ideological constructs.

The palace also served as a meeting place for high-ranking Nazi officials, including Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels. On the left is shown Rudolf Heß at the site and today with Drake Winston. These meetings were not mere social gatherings but were instrumental in shaping the policies and strategies of the Nazi regime. The choice of Schloss Nymphenburg as a meeting place was not arbitrary; it was a calculated move designed to lend an air of historical gravitas to the regime's decisions. Moreover, the palace was a space where international diplomacy was conducted. Shirer notes that Schloss Nymphenburg was often used to host foreign dignitaries and diplomats, serving as a stage where the Nazi regime could present itself as a legitimate and authoritative government. The palace's grandeur was not just for domestic consumption but was also intended to impress and intimidate the international community. The choice of such a historically significant venue for diplomatic activities was a clear signal of the regime's aspirations for international recognition and respect.

Furthermore, the palace was not just a passive setting but was actively used to propagate Nazi ideology. Artworks and historical artefacts within the palace were carefully curated to reflect the regime's worldview. This was part of a broader strategy to rewrite history and redefine German culture in terms that were consistent with Nazi ideology. The palace, with its rich history and cultural significance, was an ideal venue for this revisionist exercise.

Kershaw observes that the Nazi regime was keen on cultivating a sense of national pride and unity, and historical sites like Schloss Nymphenburg were instrumental in this endeavour. The palace was not just preserved as a relic of the past but was actively incorporated into the Nazi narrative. Its history was rewritten to emphasise aspects that were in line with Nazi ideology, such as martial prowess and Aryan heritage, whilst downplaying or erasing elements that did not fit this narrative. This selective curation was not an isolated act but part of a larger strategy to reshape German identity in accordance with Nazi principles. The palace also served as a repository for artworks and cultural artifacts that were deemed to be of significant value to the German people. These items were not just preserved but were also displayed in a manner that reinforced the Nazi worldview. Burleigh notes that the regime was highly selective in its choice of artworks, favouring those that depicted themes of heroism, struggle, and racial purity. This curation was not a mere aesthetic choice but a calculated move to influence public perception and to instill a sense of national pride that was aligned with Nazi values. Moreover, the palace was used as a venue for cultural events that were designed to propagate Nazi ideology. These events were not mere entertainments but were imbued with political significance. They were carefully staged to convey specific messages and to elicit emotional responses that would reinforce the regime's ideological tenets. The choice of Schloss Nymphenburg as the venue for these events was deliberate, leveraging the palace's historical significance to lend an air of authenticity and gravitas to the proceedings.

Rarely seen amateur colour footage filmed in Friedberg and Munich in 1938 showing the night masquerade "De Nacht van de Amazonen." The mayor of Munich obtained from the local Gauleiter the permission for the girls on the chariots to parade with sexy costumes. It took place on July 27, 1936, July 31, 1937, July 30, 1938, and July 29, 1939. In the post-war years, it was concealed and forgotten, until in 1989 Herbert Rosendorfer's novel of the same title brought the event back into the public consciousness. 

New York correspondent Ernest R. Pope described the two and a half hours of scene after scene in the park behind the Nymphenburg Castle in 1936 consisting of over one hundred practically naked girls took part, 700 horses and 2,000 performers - including many ϟϟ guards, wearing costumes of the 17th century. The women, clad in the tightest pair of panties, held spears in their hands and sat dispassionately as Amazons on horses. Others, also in panties with butterfly wings on their arms, danced in the grass in the glare of searchlights set up by Wilhelm Hindelang. Under the motto "The festival stands and falls with the lighting" he worked out the lighting plans and provided lighting effects, in particular the coloured lighting of the water features and groups of trees by underwater floodlights and mercury vapour lamps. The installed power cables at Nymphenburger Park doubled to more than 7000 metres. In the western half of the stage, 38 towers measuring 40 x 40 cm and nine metres in height were built. In addition, four towers were built for large floodlights in the size of 1.90 x 2.50 metres and eighteen metres height and sixteen pieces about twenty metres high light power masts on the ground floor paths. Along the linden-lined high avenue on the central canal 103 further headlights were installed. Much of the lighting and the telephone system for the direction and lighting instructions were provided by the Wehrmacht. 

 Other women still wore nothing but silver paint on their bodies, posing on horse-drawn carriages as naked goddesses- Diana, the goddess of the hunt; the Amazon queen, wearing a large feathered helmet; Venus, the goddess of love, painted silvery in front of a shell; even a Chinese temple goddess. Christian Weber increasingly turned to his knowledge, which he had won in 1937 when visiting the Paris World's Fair that "the naked German girls look better than the French." For the Night of the Amazons he concluded that "all we have to do is take them off and put them in the spotlight." From 1938, the number increased only with skin-coloured briefs-dressed girls. For the first time, 150 bronzed male and female participants were deployed, who under significant health risks from top to bottom were painted with gold-coloured theatrical make-up. The police were at times unable to restrain the masses outside the area. Every year members of the Gestapo meticulously searched the spacious area of the Nymphenburg Palace. Finally, the presence of Hitler was hoped for although he preferred instead the Bayreuth Festival that took place at the same time. Prince Adalbert of Bavaria who lived with his family in Nymphenburg Palace, described the prevailing excitement. His family and he was forbidden to open window during this period or to receive visitors.

 

The palace was one of the location sites for Last Year at Marienbad (another covered here being Schließheim palace) including the iconic scene where the people cast long shadows but the trees don't because the shadows were painted and the scene shot on an overcast day.

Grünwalder Stadion 

Grünwalder Stadion einst und jetzt. It was built in 1911 and was the home ground for TSV 1860 München until 1995. In 1937, 1860 Munich had to sell the stadium to the city, which later bought it after it was destroyed during the war when, in the autumn of 1943, the stadium was heavily hit by two Royal Air Force bombs. During the first attack on September 7, an explosive bomb destroyed the western half of the seat base. Parts of the hall were destroyed by two more explosive bombs. The second attack on October 2 left behind seven large bombs on the field, the caster and the ramparts. The eastern part of the main tribune was now also destroyed. The wooden roof of the hall was completely burnt down, the western part of the grandstand was closed, the eastern part had survived the attacks with only slight damage. TSV 1860, FC Bayern and FC Wacker were moved to the Dantestadion after the first attack. When this was also hit by bombs, the clubs had to look for other places.  

Aerial photograph on the left showing the result of two air raids on July 19, 1944 leaving a crater circled in yellow and today. Whilst the air war was increasingly affecting the people of Munich and turning their hometown into a landscape of ruins, FC Bayern celebrated its only two Gauliga championships during the Nazi era. By now the league was reduced to southern and upper Bavaria. During construction work inside the stadium began the day after the last home game of the A-Jugend der Sechzger on May 20 2012, the discovery of a dud from the war, which lay under the penalty area in front of the east curve, caused a stir. The 225 kilogramme bomb was found only one metre under the turf of the penalty area last week. Police closed off the site and evacuated surrounding buildings before a team of experts got down to work defusing and removing the bomb. Thirty minutes later the scare was over. Until the opening of the Olympic Stadium in 1972 and the moving of FC Bayern to its new ground, the Grünwalder Stadion was home to both Munich clubs and served as venue for fourteen international games. For decades, stars like Franz Beckenbauer, Gerd Müller, Sepp Maier or even Brazilian legend Pelé literally ran only a few inches above a fully functioning bomb.

TSV 1860 München giving the Hitler salute. Alongside Werder Bremen and VfB Stuttgart, 1860 Munich was one of the first major German football clubs to show a clear sympathy for the Nazis even before 1933. In the case of 1860, Nazi Party and SA members such as Fritz Ebenböck, Sebastian Gleixner and Emil Ketterer took over almost all important posts in the association. As early as September 1933, the club decided to adopt the so-called Führerprinzip at a general meeting of the gymnastics club and in March 1934 all departments joined the Nazi "Turn- und Sportverein München von 1860". Under the new head of the association, SA-Sturmbannfuhrer Fritz Ebenböck, a new uniform statute was also passed, which also included the "Aryan paragraph" which meant the end for the few remaining Jewish members of the club. In 1942, TSV won its first national title with the Tschammerpokal (forerunner of the DFB-Pokal), named after Reichssportführer Hans von Tschammer und Osten who, from 1933, served as Reich sports leader and commissioner in the German Reich and as chairman of the "German Reich Association for Physical Exercise" (DRL) and the " National Socialist Reich Association for Physical Exercise." Whilst 1860 was initially able to prevent itself from being occupied by the Nazis, Nazi city council member Sebastian Gleixner, "one of the most ruthless ringleaders of the Nazi Party in Munich", took over as head of the football department as a high-ranking NS functionary. The club's relationship with the Nazi Party allowed it to save itself from bankruptcy in the 1930s. The last game of the war took place as late as April 23 1945, when FC Bayern Munich, ‘Gaumeister’ of 1945, beat their local rivals TSV 1860 Munich 3–2. Below, . 1860 has always had problems with neo-Nazis amongst their fan scene, gathering in Block 132 of Allianz Arena in the middle of the north curve where one can find stickers emblazoned with the slogan "National Socialists - Nationwide Action" or "Shit §86a" - a reference to the article banning unconstitutional symbols. Neo-Nazis groups such as the "Feldherren" or "Kraken" have also distributed leaflets promoting "Heroes' Memorial March"

Playing amateur team composed of members of ϟϟ

Amongst the hundred or so who make up these groups include well-known neo-Nazis such as convicted right-wing terrorist Martin Wiese who, in 2003, planned a bomb attack on the Jewish centre in Munich. They can be recognised wearing Thor Steinar or other Nazi cult brands, either bald or have their hair cropped short, and have been heard singing songs such as "Ajax is a Jewish club" or "Augsburger Zigeuner [gypsy]." To this day, TSV 1860's Nazi-related role during the Nazi era is still not mentioned on it's official website. However, the association now supports the fan group "Lion Fans Against the Right" in existence since 1995 , and also the time-sensitive book project "The Lions Under the Swastika".
TSV 1860 München had no problem cleansing itself from the Jews and non-Germans at the time they were asked to, which gives FC Bayern the claim to enjoy a clear advantage today, in the pride that they should have over the resistance to the movement but which they downplay apparently fearing financial blowback from Arab countries.

 

The stadium is immortal for serving as the site of The Philosophers' Football Match, a Monty Python sketch originally featured in the second Monty Python's Fliegender Zirkus, one of two 45-minute Monty Python German television comedy specials produced by WDR for West German television. The two episodes were first broadcast in January and December 1972 and were shot entirely on film and mostly on location in Bavaria where the Pythons attended Oktoberfest and Olympiastadion in Munich, and also visited the nearby Dachau concentration camp.This sketch depicts a football match supposedly in the Olympiastadion at the 1972 Munich Olympics between philosophers representing Greece and Germany. With just over a minute of the match remaining Archimedes cries out "Eureka!", takes the first kick of the ball and rushes towards the German goal. After several passes through a perplexed German defence, Socrates scores the only goal of the match in a diving header off a cross from Archimedes. The Germans dispute the call, with the match commentator stating that "Hegel is arguing that the reality is merely an a priori adjunct of non-naturalistic ethics, Kant via the categorical imperative is holding that ontologically it exists only in the imagination, and Marx is claiming it was offside." In fact, the replay shows that Socrates was indeed offside but, nevertheless, the Greeks win.

 

The Grünwald Sportschule still appears to have its Nazi-era statues at its entrance

With Drake Winston at Allianz Arena, home of the rival Munich team, Bayern München, whose history is quite different. In 1900, the “Männerturnverein München 1879” was turned into “Fußball-Club Bayern München e.V.”. The founders wanted to be pioneers, creating this team with the idea of making it a tolerant, liberal and cosmopolitan club. In order to name it in a way relating to the region the headquarters were going to be, the name “FC Bayern München” seemed suitable. The founders on the other hand, were not from Munich, instead originating from Baden, Sachsen, Berlin or Dortmund. They were a team made up of students, artists and/or merchants. Four of the members, Benno Elkan, Josef Pollack, Walter Bensemann and Gus Manning were of Jewish heritage. They were essential to the planning and execution of founding this soccer club.  

Drake on the right in front of the recreated boardroom with its trophy cabinet at the Bayern Munich museum, made to appear as if it continues to look out over the training facilities at Sabener Strasse. Bayern had been founded in the Bohemian quarter of Schwabing; of the club's founding charter from 1900, two out of seventeen signatories were Jewish- and were very much a Jewish club before the second world war, with a Jewish president, Kurt Landauer, and a Jewish manager. The club’s trainer, Richard Bombi, and the youth leader, Otto Beer, were also Jewish as were other coaches and football instructors Izidor Kürschner, Kalman Konrad and Leo Weisz. Landauer professionalised the club by investing in professional coaches, sports facilities and youth work, creating the basis for the German football championship in 1932. A player at the club at the time, Josef Mauder, was an artist who began creating mocking caricatures of the men who came to the club, asking for background checks of the members in order to rid the club of any non-Germans, or more importantly Jews. Landauer was powerless, as he was Jewish, so the players decided to take action. In his poems, he claims that ancient Greeks and Romans would have been ashamed of these men, and would have “spanked” them. Trainers from the United Kingdom and Jewish physical coaches from Austria-Hungary such as Richard "Little" Dombi, who went on to manage Barcelona and Feyenoord, helped Bayern Munich develop the Scottish flat and short pass as well as the technical refinements of the "Donaufußballs". In addition, Landauer, in conflict with the the German Football Association (DFB), drew up the introduction of professional football together with Walther Bensemann, the Jewish founder of the magazine "Der Kicker". Landauer had to resign, along with a number of other Jewish members and officials, when Hitler seized power a few months later and fled to Switzerland after 33 days in the Dachau concentration camp. 

The Nazis' expectations were later published in the book “Vereinsdietwart”, describing the guidelines that the club had to follow. Bayern were discredited as a Judenklub by the Nazis but resisted its coercion, even though it nazified its club logo seen left. In 1934, Bayern players were involved in a brawl with Nazi brownshirts. Two years later, the Bayern winger Willy Simetsreiter made a point of having his picture taken with Jesse Owens, who enraged Hitler by winning four gold medals at the Berlin Olympics. Willy Simetsreiter, left wing for Bayern at the time, met Jesse Owens at the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Simetsreiter saw Owens as a role model and icon at the time, taking a picture with him, which he decided should be his autograph card. The full-back Sigmund Haringer whilst walking home, encountered a group of young Nazis, who were on their way home from a “Schweigemarsch” (silent march). Haringer asked them whether all this “Kasperltheater” (puppet theatre). A woman walking by reported him, and he was arrested. He narrowly escaped gaol due to his reputation as an outstanding player for the German national team. Captain Conny Heidkamp managed to hide Bayern's trophies when other clubs heeded an appeal from Göring to donate metal for the war effort. 

Drake Winston in front of an exhibit at the Bayern Munich museum at Allianz Arena commemorating this action. In 1945 when the Second World War finally drew to a close, Conny Heidkamp ended his career as an FC Bayern player at the age of forty. In the words of the museum, 

The preceding decade had been a nightmarish era for the club, which would undoubtedly not have survived without the commitment of its long-serving captain and driving force. The Nazis regarded liberally-inclined Bayern with enmity and hostility, but Heidkamp preserved the club's soul and repeatedly defied the dictatorship. The captain of the 1932 championship-winning team ran enormous personal risks but did everything in his power to preserve the club's traditions and values and prevent the team breaking up in the war years. He rescued the club's trophies on two separate occasions. With war raging around him, Heidkamp reacted to the aerial bombardment of Munich and a call by the Nazis for metals to be donated to the war effort by hiding the trophies in a barn. Later, he buried the cups and medals in a forest, fearing the advancing American forces might take them as souvenirs. Heidkamp performed his most valuable service towards the end of the war, when call-ups to the front and saturation bombing made normal club activities all but impossible. Using great imagination and dogged persistence, the veteran captain managed to maintain match operations up until the Nazi capitulation. For example, he would cycle through the smouldering ruins after air raids and enquire of every individual player whether he would be fit to appear in the weekend match. And in the immediate post-war period, the time of the Kalorien- und Kartoffelspiele (calorie and potato matches), Heidkamp remained a leading and inspirational figure at FC Bayern as coach and chairman of the match organisation committee. 

The most symbolic act of defiance occurred in Zurich in 1943 when, after a friendly against the Swiss national team, the Bayern players lined up to wave at the exiled Landauer in the stands. Nevertheless, it also attracted people who were very much against the party as well. Quickly the club gained over a thousand new members. Not only that, but it also attracted sponsors, the majority of these being Jewish-owned stores, mainly in the Textile industry.  In 1936 FC Bayern was declared “Judenfrei” (free of Jews), but to the Nazi regime, this club always remained the “Judenklub” (club of Jews), because of the Jewish roots of the club, and history of its pride of including Jewish people in their club, rather than shutting them out. This always gave them disadvantages, especially because most of their pride lied with the youth teams, who were promoted to the first team. However, the kids of the time had to join the Hitler Youth, so they were unable to come to training. Their member numbers sank drastically, people’s ideology changing into supporting the regime and turned against the Club as they did not want to be associated with the “Judenklub”. Only in 1956 did the clubs' numbers return to what they were before the Nazi era. Landauer returned to Munich after the war and once again became Bayern president until 1951 whilst club publications simply mentioned that he had to leave Germany "on political-racial grounds" with the word 'Jew' assiduously avoided. Such reticence is suspected to stem from Bayern's current commercial interests in Asia leading the team to play down its Jewish heritage and admirable history. Indeed, Kurt Landauer was long forgotten at FC Bayern and it wasn't until the Ultras drew attention to their own club history with a choreography for Kurt Landauer's 125th birthday that he became recognised again. Before that, hardly anyone in the club knew the name of the president under whom FC Bayern celebrated its first championship. The Jewish team in Munich today, TSV Maccabi München, honours the club and a page on their website dedicated to them. However, Markwart Herzog argues that the self-image Bayern Munich has of its role in the Nazi era is, demonstrably, an historical myth. "In FC Bayern’s marketing, this myth aims to enhance its reputation in the national and international media and to claim moral superiority in competition with other football clubs."

Allianz itself claims to have recognised “its moral responsibility and stands up to its history" and has produced an overview of Allianz during the Nazi era in English.

Here in the Munich suburb of Trudering, on the corner of Karotschstraße and Emplstraße, is a small wooden memorial decorated by a stone trough filled with flowers.  It marks the site of the Munich air disaster of February 6, 1958 which saw British European Airways Flight 609 crash on its third attempt to take off from a slush-covered runway at Munich-Riem Airport. On board was the Manchester United football team, nicknamed the "Busby Babes", along with supporters and journalists. Twenty of the 44 on the aircraft died at the scene. The injured, some unconscious, were taken to the Rechts der Isar Hospital where three more died, resulting in 23 fatalities with 21 survivors. The team was returning from a European Cup match in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, having eliminated Red Star Belgrade to advance to the semi-finals of the competition. The flight stopped to refuel in Munich because a non-stop flight from Belgrade to Manchester was beyond the "Elizabethan"-class Airspeed Ambassador's range. After refuelling, pilots James Thain and Kenneth Rayment twice abandoned take-off because of boost surging in the left engine. Fearing they would get too far behind schedule, Captain Thain rejected an overnight stay in Munich in favour of a third take-off attempt. By then, snow was falling, causing a layer of slush to form at the end of the runway.

 After the aircraft hit the slush, it ploughed through a fence beyond the end of the runway and the left wing was torn off after hitting a house. Fearing the aircraft might explode, Thain began evacuating passengers while Manchester United goalkeeper Harry Gregg helped pull survivors from the wreckage, including teammates Bobby Charlton and Dennis Viollet. Manchester United were trying to become the third club to win three successive English league titles; they were six points behind League leaders Wolverhampton Wanderers with 14 games to go. They also held the Charity Shield and had just advanced into their second successive European Cup semi-finals. The team had not been beaten for 11 matches. The crash not only derailed their title ambitions that year but also virtually destroyed the nucleus of what promised to be one of the greatest generations of players in English football history. It took a decade for the club to recover, with Busby rebuilding the team and winning the European Cup in 1968 with a new generation of "Babes". This more recent memorial was inaugurated on September 22, 2004. A dark blue granite plaque set in a sandstone border was unveiled in the vicinity of the old Munich Airport on the corner of Rappenweg and Emplstraße, it is just metres from the wooden memorial. With a design in the shape of a football pitch, it reads, in both English and German, "In memory of all those who lost their lives here in the Munich air disaster on 6 February 1958". Underneath is a plaque expressing United's gratitude to the municipality of Munich and its people. The new memorial was funded by Manchester United themselves and the unveiling was attended by club officials, including chief executive David Gill, manager Alex Ferguson and director Bobby Charlton, a survivor of the disaster himself. On April 24, 2008, the Munich city council decided to name the site where the memorial stone is placed "Manchesterplatz. In addition, on the 57th anniversary of the crash, February 6, 2015, Sir Bobby Charlton and FC Bayern Munich chairman Karl-Heinz Rummenigge opened a new museum exhibit commemorating the disaster at the German club's stadium, Allianz Arena, shown here with Drake Winston. “I’m very proud to be here today,” said Charlton as the permanent exhibit in the FC Bayern club museum will now ensure the memory lives on. “This is a good day,” said Dieter Reiter: “It’s important we maintain this memory and we shall continue to do so in the future. The memorial at the centre of the exhibition commemorates an important event in Munich’s contemporary and footballing history and also exemplifies the special relationship between FC Bayern and Manchester United: “It’s an important part of our lives,” Sir Bobby concluded.
Another dark milestone on Munich's 20th century: 31 Connollystraße- site of the Israeli Olympic team's apartments where, on September 5th, 1972, eight armed members of the Palestinian group Black September, breached the Olympic compound by scaling the surrounding six foot fence and entered. Israeli wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund saw armed masked men enter as he yelled at the others, throwing his weight against the door allowing two athletes to escape and another eight to hide. Weightlifter Joseph Romano and coach Moshe Weinberg were both shot and killed.  The Palestinian terrorists were  With their remaining nine hostages the terrorists demanded the release of 234 Palestinians gaoled in Israel and two in Germany. Both the Munich police chief and the head of the Egyptian Olympic team negotiated directly with the kidnappers, offering them unlimited amounts of money. The Tunisian and Libyan ambassadors to Germany also tried unsuccessfully to make progress through negotiations with the kidnappers. The terrorists demanded transportation

The memorial now placed at the site

to Cairo following more than twelve hours of unsuccessful negotiations. Authorities led the terrorists to believe they would comply while in truth they were planning to ambush them at the airport. Shortly after 22.00 two helicopters transported the terrorists and their hostages to nearby Fürstenfeldbruck airbase, where a Boeing 727 aircraft was waiting. What resulted was a fiasco as the German snipers chosen had no sharpshooting experience, could not communicate with each other, and believed there were only five terrorists. On top of that they police were not properly outfitted, lacking helmets, bulletproof vests, night-vision scopes or long-range sights on their rifles, and had not requested back-up in time. Lastly, the flight crew, made up of German police who had volunteered for the assignment to overpower the terrorists when they boarded the plane, abandoned their post as the helicopters arrived carrying the terrorists and their hostages. 

Jeremy Corbyn honouring the terrorists in 2014

Six of the Palestinian terrorists disembarked from the helicopters with the four pilots held at gunpoint. When two of the terrorists inspected the plane and found it empty, they sprinted back toward the helicopters and the police snipers opened fire. As the shots flew several of the terrorists were killed. Those still alive attempted to flee, returned fire, and attempted to shoot out airport lights that were illuminating them. A German policeman in the control tower was killed by the gunfire. The pilots fled, but the hostages, who were bound inside the helicopters couldn't escape.  Just after midnight one of the terrorists opened fire into one of the helicopters killing three hostages and wounding a fourth in the leg. It is believed that another terrorist opened fire in the second helicopter killing the rest. One had died after a terrorist tossed a grenade into the helicopter causing an explosion. Terrorist leader Luttif Afif Issa and another terrorist were killed as they fired at police. Three of the remaining terrorists, two of whom were wounded, were captured by police. Yusuf Nazzal, second in command for the hostage taking, escaped and was tracked by dogs. He was shot after an exchange of gunfire.  The rescue attempt was over and in every way it had failed. Amazingly, with the world watching the seige unfold on their television sets, the initial news reports, published all over the world, indicated that all the hostages were alive, and that all the terrorists had been killed. As recently as 2014 Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn travelled to a cemetery in Tunisia specifically to honour members of Black September with one photo showing him near the grave of Atef Bseiso, intelligence chief of the Palestine Liberation Organisation who has a been directly linked to the Munich atrocity. Thankfully voters overwhelmingly repudiated him and his party in the 2019 general election.

The Munich Massacre: A New History Eppie Briggs (aka Marigold Black) A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of BA (Hons) in History University of Sydney October 2011   1 Contents Introduction and Historiography Part I – Quiet the Zionist Rage 1. The Burdened Alliance 2. Domestic Unrest Part II – Rouse the Global Wrath 3. International Condemnation 4. The New Terrorism Conclusion   2 Acknowledgments I would like to thank first and foremost Dr Glenda Sluga to whom I am greatly indebted for her guidance, support and encouragement. Without Glenda‟s sage advice, the writing of this thesis would have been an infinitely more difficult and painful experience. I would also like to thank Dr Michael Ondaatje for his excellent counsel, good-humour and friendship throughout the last few years. Heartfelt thanks go to Elise and Dean Briggs for all their love, support and patience and finally, to Angus Harker and Janie Briggs. I cannot adequately convey the thanks I owe Angus and Janie for their encouragement, love, and strength, and for being a constant reminder as to why I was writing this thesis. 3 Abstract This thesis examines the Nixon administration’s response to the Munich Massacre; a terrorist attack which took place at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. By examining the contextual considerations influencing the administration’s response in both the domestic and international spheres, this thesis will determine the manner in which diplomatic intricacies impacted on the introduction of precedent setting counterterrorism institutions. Furthermore, it will expound the correlation between the Nixon administration’s response and a developing conceptualisation of acts of modern international terrorism. 4 Introduction and Historiography Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic Maximilien Robespierre 17931 Maximilien Robespierre articulated his conception of terrorism as a „virtuous‟ political weapon in 1793, during the „reign of terror‟ after the French Revolution. The sentiment has surprisingly endured to become a defining tenet of conflict in the modern world. In the wake of the Munich Massacre in 1972, renowned French philosopher, John Paul Sartre offered this same justification for the slaughter of 11 innocent Israeli athletes by the Fedayeen („men of sacrifice‟), of the Black September Organisation, a militant arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Sartre declared that „terrorism is a terrible weapon but the oppressed poor have no others.‟2 When the Black September Organisation executed an incursion of the Olympic Village in Munich,3 seizing nine members of the Israeli Olympic team and killing two others, they were armed with their own validation as „subdu[ing] by terror the enemies of liberty‟ in deliberate echo of Robespierre.45 The operation ended in 1 Maximilien Robespierre, „Justification of the Use of Terror,‟ Fordham University, Internet Modern History Sourcebook: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.html [accessed 10/6/2011] 2J.P. Sartre, „”About Munich” La Cause du peuple‟, J'accuse, No. 29, du 15 (October, 1972), translated by Elizabeth Bowman in „Sartre on Munich 1972‟, Sartre Studies International, Vol. 9, (December, 2003). 3 The code name for the Munich Massacre was „Operation Iqrit and Biri‟m‟. The reference was to two ancient Arab Christian Villages that the Israeli Army had evacuated in 1948 because of „security reasons‟. See S. Reeve, One Day in September, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), p.43-44. 4 Robespierre, „Justification of the Use of Terror,‟ http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.html [accessed 10/6/2011] 5 After the Munich Massacre, radio announcers on the „Voice of Palestine‟ read a letter supposedly the last words of the terrorists (many claim that it was written afterwards in order to gain sympathy) We are neither killers nor bandits, we are persecuted people who have no land and no homeland... We will the youth of the Arab nation to search for death so that life is given to them, their countries and their people. Each drop of blood spilled from you and from us will be oil to kindle this nation with flames of victory and liberation cited in Reeve, One Day in September, p.147.  5 tragedy when a flawed rescue attempt by West German authorities culminated in a gunfight that took the lives of all of the nine hostages and all but three of the terrorists.6 The Munich Massacre profoundly affected the international community. A new form of terrorism had been born; it had no regard for borders or for the innocence of its targets. Despite the aforementioned rationalisations of terror, the Black September Organisation‟s operation did not trigger sympathetic appreciation of the plight of the Palestinian freedom fighters among the main powers, but instead generated a course of international condemnation led by the administration of United States President, Richard Nixon. The attack prompted an international legal debate on the issue of terrorism and the development of permanent institutional counterterrorism measures.7 The Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre was the beginning of a conceptual turn in the history of political violence that we now know as „international terrorism‟.8 This thesis revisits the history of the Munich Massacre in order to bringing into closer focus that conceptual turn. It explores the variety of contextual elements that shaped the Nixon administration‟s response and galvanised an impetus for the United States to fight terrorism on the global battlefield. It then goes on to read the Munich Massacre back into the history of American foreign policy and explore the significance of the Nixon administration‟s response in the history of international terrorism and counterterrorism. The Munich Massacre‟s importance in the longer history of terrorism has received significant attention from scholars. As Walter Laqueur, a heavyweight in the study of the theoretical history of terrorism, declares, the Munich Massacre was the „most spectacular‟ of 6 S. Reeve, One Day in September, introduction. See also L. Sonneborn, Murder and the 1972 Olympics, (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003). 7 W. Tapley Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, International Lawyer, 7, No.4 (1973), p.760. 8 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 66-67.  6 the „massive scale‟ terrorism that began to occur after the Six Day War in 1967.9 None of these studies, however, take into account the Nixon administration‟s reaction to the attack and the implications of that response. As well as establishing the significance of the American response to the Munich Massacre to the broader history of terrorism; this thesis also revitalises the role of individuals, by investigating the complex and varied contexts in which individual political decisions are made. The analysis focuses primarily on the personal perceptions, decisions and actions of President Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. This approach is required because both Nixon and Kissinger deliberately centralised foreign policy in the White House, rather than leaving it to an autonomous State Department. As a result of Nixon‟s and Kissinger‟s „advanced megalomania,‟10 most diplomatic operations were managed by them directly. Circumvention of the Department of State and bureaucratic machinery became standard form.11 The core source for this analysis is the diplomatic cables between the primary decision makers and official White House memoranda. This empirically driven analysis provides a rich tableau from which to consider how diplomatic intricacies contributed to the Nixon administration‟s response and investigate the intersecting contexts that shaped, and influenced policy making. The historiography of the Munich Massacre divides into two main strands of analysis that remain largely divorced from each other. The most comprehensive of these strands is the theoretical history of modern terrorism which is primarily concerned with the conceptual or ideological underpinnings of incidents like the Munich Massacre. Analysts such as Stefan Aubrey in, The New Dimension of International Terrorism, David Rapoport in The Four Waves of 9 W. Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004), p.101. 10 J. Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Winter, 1996), p.107, See also A. Summers, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon, (New York: Phoenix Press, 2000), p.330. 11 R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.110-111.  7 Modern Terrorism, Denis Piszkiewicz in Terrorism’s war with America and Walter Laqueur in his various texts such as A History of Terrorism, New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction and No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century12 have provided thematic histories of modern terrorism by isolating political, ideological or religious motivations driving particular terrorist trends. The Munich Massacre has featured in these histories primarily as representative of what Denis Piszkiewicz has described as „terrorism‟s war on America.‟13 Piszkiewicz has made reference to a phenomenon throughout the 1960s and 1970s identified by David Rapoport in The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism as the „revolutionary wave‟ or „third wave‟ of terrorism. Rapoport claims that the Vietnam War had caused societal rupture and the effectiveness of the Viet Cong‟s „primitive weapons‟ against the „American Goliath‟ stimulated hope in radical organisations across the world that the existing system was vulnerable.14 Groups such as the Weather Underground, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), the Italian Red Brigade, the Japanese Red Army and the French Action Directe were activated. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) became the heroic model for revolutionary activism, replacing the position once held by the Viet Cong. The strength of the PLO motivated the formation of numerous offshoot organisations. Terrorist attacks become more frequent, more violent and began to transcend national boundaries.15 The Munich Massacre was the peak of this terrorist trend. Rapoport has observed that after the Munich Massacre „for good 12 W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also by Laqueur; A History of Terrorism, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001); No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004). 13 D. Piszkiewicz, Terrorism’s war with America: A History, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003), p.21. 14 D. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, UCLA International Institute, p.56. available online, http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf [accessed 31/01/2010] 15 Rapoport, „The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, pp.56-57.  8 reason‟ the term ‟international terrorism‟ was revived and Stefan M. Aubrey, in The New Dimension of International Terrorism, has declared the Munich Massacre a „quintessential act of international terrorism.‟16 The terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism has made a similar claim but his thesis accentuates the Munich Massacre as „the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks which fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the media‟s attention.‟17 Expanding on Hoffman‟s point, Brian Jenkins in The Study of Terrorism, has argued that terrorism should be defined „by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of their cause‟18 and in his article The New Age of Terrorism has isolated the distinguishing characteristics of incidents of international terrorism and identified them in the Munich Massacre. Understanding the theoretical aspects of modern terrorist attacks provides an important backdrop for determining how the Munich Massacre relates to other acts of terrorism but it leaves us without a sense of how those attitudes to terrorism were actually shaped on a practical as well as conceptual level. The second, more neglected, strand of the history concerns international reactions to this brutal attack. When the response to the Munich Massacre has been discussed at length, it has been viewed primarily through the lens of the retaliatory actions of the Israeli intelligence organisation, Mossad. George Jonas‟ pioneering work on the topic, Vengeance, focuses on Mossad‟s controversial covert retaliatory attacks known as „Operation Wrath of God.‟19 Jonas‟ depiction of the Munich Massacre became cemented in the public memory when 16 S. Aubrey, The New Dimensions of International Terrorism, (vdf Hochschulverlag AG, 2004), p.34. 17 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.73. For Hoffman the Munich Massacre was „the premier example of terrorism‟s power to rocket a cause from obscurity to renown.‟ 18 B. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, (Santa Monica: California, RAND Corporation, P6563, December, 1980), p.2. 19 G. Jonas, Vengeance, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).  9 Steven Spielberg adapted Vengeance for his 2005 film Munich.20 His book triggered a number of subsequent detailed histories of the covert Israeli response including Aaron Klein‟s Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response21 and Simon Reeve‟s award winning documentary and book One Day in September the full story of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the Israeli revenge operation 'Wrath of God.'22 By contrast, the response of Israel‟s powerful Cold War ally the United States, has attracted minimal attention. Many historians including Mark Bowden in Guests of the Ayatollah: the First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam and David Farber in Taken Hostage have overlooked the significance of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre because of a belief that the story of American counterterrorism began in the 1980s when Reagan declared that he would rid the world of „the evil scourge of terrorism.‟23 This view is also adopted by Noam Chomsky in International Terrorism: Image and Reality. While Chomsky has cautioned that there were acts of international terrorism before the 1980s, he states that it was not until the 1980s that „terrorism became a major public issue‟ when „concern over international terrorism reached the level of virtual frenzy.‟24 The Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre has also been of passing interest in studies which survey the strategic and tactical counterterrorism measures adopted by the United States government since the 1960s. David Tucker in Skirmishes on the Edge of Empire, and G. Davidson Smith in Combating Terrorism describe the Nixon 20 Munich, Directed by Steven Spielberg, 2005; Universal Studios and Dreamworks Pictures 21 A. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (Random House, 2005). 22 Reeve, One Day in September, Introduction. 23 M. Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: the First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2006), p. 597. and D. Farber Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam, (Princeton University Press, 2006). 24 N. Chomksy, „International Terrorism: Image and Reality‟, in Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism, (Routledge, December, 1991), available online,        http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199112--02.htm#n1 [accessed 17/8/2011] 10 administration‟s counterterrorism measures as historical points of reference for the history of American counterterrorism, but both scholars have not comprehensively explored the context or ramifications of the initiatives. Kumamoto in International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976 has complemented Tucker and Smith‟s studies by highlighting some of the contentious political and diplomatic issues faced by the Nixon administration in the establishment of international counterterrorism measures25 but without any explanation of the rationale behind the establishment of these measures or the process that brought them into being. Timothy Naftali, director of the Nixon Presidential Library provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre in Blind spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. Naftali, with his relatively unfettered access to the primary documentation of the administration, has been able to construct a valuable preliminary history of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre based around the contextualisation of these sources. Naftali‟s study provides the starting-point for this thesis. His analysis is by no means complete however. In the opening of Naftali‟s chapter on the Munich Massacre he declares that the attack „finally defined the new menace of international terrorism‟26 but does not consider the conceptual implications of the Nixon administration‟s response. This thesis attempts to fill the space between histories of the Munich Massacre as a turning point in the history of international terrorism and the conceptual implications of the Nixon administration‟s enactment of permanent counterterrorism measures. It links the theoretical analysis of the attack with the story of its aftermath, the administration‟s counterterrorism 25 R. D. Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976, (Northeastern University Press, 1999), p.152. 26 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.54.  11 response to the salient features of the terrorist act itself. It draws together these disparate histories of the Munich Massacre, relating them back to the history of American foreign policy. Part One of this thesis investigates the contextual factors that shaped the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre. Chapter one focuses on the international considerations and how they shaped the Nixon administration‟s initial reading of the incident and the subsequent response. It looks primarily at how Nixon and Kissinger‟s existing policies toward the Middle-East interfaced with the pressures the Munich Massacre placed on American geopolitical and diplomatic interests within the region, which were, at the time, significant. Chapter Two follows the impact of the Munich Massacre into the domestic sphere. It analyses the interplay between the administration‟s Middle-East policy and pressure, perceived or real, from various interest groups. The Nixon administration was under pressure to balance pro-Israeli pressures with that of the international Arabian-American oil companies and a hostile Congress. The importance of dealing with domestic pressures was intensified by the pending presidential election. Part Two of this thesis takes up the question of how the Munich Massacre became, as Stefan M. Aubrey has declared it, a „quintessential act of international terrorism.‟27 It explores the relationship between the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre and the evolving conceptualisation of the terrorist threat. Chapter Three looks at how the prevalence of international acts of violence against states necessitated engagement with multilateral solutions and how that process provoked contentious international political debate. It  27 S. Aubrey, The New Dimension of International Terrorism, p.34. 12 expounds the rationale behind Nixon‟s appeal to the United Nations and his decision to take the fight against terrorism to a global battlefield. Chapter Four analyses the Nixon administration‟s introduction of the „Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟; a permanent executive branch which would systematically deal with incidents of terrorism.28 It examines the establishment of this unprecedented mechanism and its connection to a shift in the conceptualisation of the threat posed by terrorism to America and international society. In effect, this thesis aims to identify the features which differentiated the Munich Massacre from previous actions and to consider how the Massacre contributed to changing the Nixon administration‟s perception of terrorism so substantially. This thesis outlines the history of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre, the most significant act of non-state violence on behalf of state aims during this period. This analysis reveals the manner in which diplomatic intricacies and contextual considerations contributed to the conceptualisation of an international terrorist threat and to the Nixon administration‟s paradigmatic approach to terrorism.  28 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross, p.2. 13 PART I QUIET THE ZIONIST RAGE Chapter ONE The Burdened Alliance Now, and this thing could turn easily now. My fear is, World War 1 started because the Austrians had been frustrated for 15years, had the Archduke assassinated, the Germans and the whole world was outraged. And they thought that for once they would have a free shot, and they were going to settle the Serbian problem once and for all’.29 (Henry Kissinger, Sept 1972) These are the words expressed by Henry Kissinger in response to reports of the tragedy unfolding at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Although imbued with the hyperbole for which Kissinger was renowned,30 they beg the question as to the contextual issues that stimulated such grave concern over this incident. The Munich Massacre was a product of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, a set of hostilities that had raged between Israel and the Arab world for decades. United States‟ involvement in the Middle-East and any subsequent concern over hostilities in the region were primarily associated with Cold War geopolitics. The geopolitical interests of the United States had been established after the Second World War, when containment of 29 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 30 W. Isaacson, Kissinger, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p.211. R. Dallek, R. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp.50-51, 102-103.  14 the international Communist threat began to define American foreign policy. The United States established relationships with countries in the Middle-East in order to ensure access to petroleum resources, lines of communication, and military bases and thus deny the Soviet Union similar access.31 Successive American governments continued to commit to the objective of securing US interests in the region by keeping the Soviet Union out. As the Cold War conflict of powers entered the Middle-East, a calculated alliance with Israel emerged.32 When Nixon came to power he continued this approach to Middle-East policy and maintained the strategic alliance with Israel. In the wake of the Munich Massacre however, the US-Israeli alliance was tested. In 1972, the geopolitical foundations upon which the alliance was built continued to shape American policy toward the Middle-East but responding to the Munich Massacre was made complicated by the uncertain detente that Nixon and Kissinger had established with the Soviet Union and Nixon‟s overarching foreign policy objectives. The Nixon administration has been endorsed by historians including Spiegel, Quandt and Hahn as a markedly pro-Israeli government. Indeed, William Quandt in his comprehensive work on American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict from 1967-1974, Peace Process, claims that in 1972, the Nixon administration‟s Middle-East policy „consisted of little more than open support for Israel.‟33 Other commentators such as Edward Said emphasise the United States resolve to preserve „internal balance‟34 as a mode of maintaining interests. For this perception too, cultivating a friendship with Israel had significant strategic value.35 It 31 P. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2004), pp.67-68. 32 E. Said, US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East, Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), p.33. 33 W.B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press: 2005), p.94. 34 Said, „US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East‟, p.36. 35 Said, „US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East‟, p.36.          15 was the underlying conditions behind the Nixon administration‟s support for Israel that is of significance in this context, however. An explication of Israel‟s role in Nixon‟s world-view, a construction that defined the overall configuration of his foreign policy structure, will elucidate the reasons why the administration attributed such import to the Munich Massacre. The consensus among historians is that for Nixon, Israel was primarily seen as a buffer against Soviet expansion in the region. Nixon and Kissinger were not in pursuit of a friendship with the Israeli nation but rather to thwart Soviet designs in the Middle-East.36 As Gilbert Achcar highlights in his conversation with Noam Chomsky in Perilous Power, during this period Israel had acquired the status of „aircraft carrier of the United States.‟37 Nixon and Kissinger conceived of the world and the practice of foreign policy through the lens of Realpolitik; „that blend of cold realism and power-oriented statecraft that tended to be, to use Kissinger's description of Bismarck, "unencumbered by moral scruples."38 Foreign policy processes were understood in terms of strength assessment rather than sentiment or ideology and objectives were achieved through the manipulation of contending forces.39 Nixon and Kissinger‟s diplomatic creed resulted in the subordination of Middle-East policy to other issues that were considered imperative to the maintenance of their grand international strategy.40 Policy pertaining to Israel would have to be compatible with the more central elements of their platform and thus, the Nixon administration‟s approach to 36 W.B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-1976, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.127; H. Kissinger, The White House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), pp.618, 631; M. Kalb, and B. Kalb, Kissinger, (Little Brown and Company, 1974), p. 208. 37 G. Achcar, and N. Chomsky, Perilous power: The Middle-East and US Foreign Policy: Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2007), p.64. 38 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.139. 39 J.L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (Penguin Books, 2006), p. 155. 40 J. Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, (Winter, 1996), Vol. 26, No. 1, p.120.  16 the Munich Massacre would suffer the same fate. The crux of the Nixon/Kissinger world system was managing the United States‟ relationship with the Soviet Union41 and it therefore determined the core of the administration‟s policy on the Middle East. In his memoirs, Nixon has explained it thus Since US-Soviet interests as the whole world‟s two competing superpowers were so widespread and overlapping, it was unrealistic to separate or compartmentalise areas of concern. Therefore, we decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade with progress in areas that were important to us-Vietnam, the Mid-East, and Berlin. This concept became known as „linkage.‟42 The prioritisation of issues necessitated by the policy of „linkage‟ ensured that for the greater part of Nixon‟s first term, the Middle-East was not a contender for top tier policy attention.43 Indeed, presidential historian, Robert Dallek asserts that when Nixon entered the presidency he was adamantly opposed to becoming embroiled directly with the burden of infertile Middle-East negotiations.44 The Middle-East was dismissed as a quagmire and as Nixon conceded in the statement above, was seen as only one element woven into the network of issues constituting his foreign policy platform. Nixon‟s grand plan for his first term in office was to enter into an „era of negotiation‟45 a strategy which would enable him to create international system where contending powers ensured stability and peace. Such conditions would facilitate détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China and allow for 41 S. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle-East Policy, From Truman to Reagan, (University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.170. 42 R. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: MacMillan, 1978), p.346. 43 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, p.169. 44 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, p.169. 45 R. Nixon, Inaugural address, January 20, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941. [accessed 17///7/2011]  17 America‟s honourable extrication from Vietnam.46 Joan Hoff, in her analysis of Nixon‟s foreign policy platform has appealed his position. Nixon could not have equally addressed all diplomatic fronts at once and he clearly chose to concentrate on Vietnam, China and the USSR during his first term. It made sense for him to have to put the Middle-East on the back burner until some of his other foreign policy objectives were achieved.47 Nixon‟s method of putting the Middle-East on the „back burner‟ was to delegate relevant policy decisions to the Department of State. This gave Nixon scope to concentrate on Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. It also meant that the White House was not associated directly with the impasse characterising Arab-Israeli settlement negotiations and was, to some degree, insulated from denigration of unsuccessful initiatives.48 Nixon was also aware of the potential problems that could arise from having Kissinger weigh in heavily on Middle-East policy at this point. This was in part due to his heritage. Kissinger grew up a persecuted Jew in Nazi Germany and although Kissinger‟s biographer Walter Isaacson has claimed that Kissinger minimised his heritage as an adult49 Isaacson also asserts that the holocaust left a „lasting imprint on him.‟50 This claim was also made by Kissinger‟s mentor in the US army, Fritz Kraemer. Kraemer said of Kissinger, that despite his strength, „the Nazis were able to damage his soul.‟51 Leaving Middle-East policy to the Department of State prevented Kissinger‟s personal sentiment from influencing decision making. As Nixon told Haldeman, 46 J. Hanhimaki, „An Elusive Grand Design‟ in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations 1969-1977, Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds), (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008) p34. 47 Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ p.120. 48 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.171. 49 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.26. 50 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.29. 51 Fritz Kraemer, May 14, 1988, quoted in Isaacson, Kissinger, p.29.  18 Anybody who is Jewish cannot handle Middle-East policy. Henry might be as fair as he can possibly be [but] he can‟t help but be affected by it. Put yourself in his position. Good God... his people were crucified over there. Jesus Christ! Five-six million of them popped into big ovens! How the hell is he to feel about all this?52 Nixon was sympathetic to Kissinger‟s overall reading of the Arab-Israeli conflict but he did not want the public relations problems inherent with having someone of Jewish descent involved in the determination of policy towards Israel. He was content for Secretary of State, William Rogers, to handle Middle-East policy and pursue his initiatives for the moment.53 In the wake of the Munich Massacre, the ambivalence that Nixon adopted towards Middle- East policy was altered abruptly by the provocative nature of the attack both militarily and diplomatically. The Munich Massacre was a trigger for the White House to focus direct attention on the Middle-East, taking over the primary responsibility for policy from the Department of State. The Munich Massacre marked the advent of a renewed and comprehensive engagement with the Middle-East policy initiatives.54 Kissinger‟s comparisons with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand prior to the First World War, and the hell that followed this event as a result, illumines not just the significance of the attack for the administration but also the core driver of early policy response. The Nixon administration feared that the Munich Massacre could prompt a substantial conflict in one of the most volatile regions in the world. The slaughter of Israeli citizens in such a blatant manner was strong justification for Israeli aggression against the Arab states. In a phone call between Nixon and Kissinger on 6 September, 1972, both men acknowledged the probability that rage fuelled vengeance would shape any Israeli response and that it 52 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.273. 53 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p.189. 54 Quandt, Peace process, p.104.  19 could manifest in hasty, provocative and disproportional retaliatory action.55 „I don‟t want them to go conquer Beirut,‟ Nixon said to Kissinger. „I don‟t mind them going in and knocking off a few camps, but even that‟s bad right now.‟56 Vengeance had become characteristic of the Israeli response. Israeli reprisals for attacks committed by activist Arab liberation organisations throughout the course of the Six Day War, the War of Attrition and other smaller skirmishes stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict had been extensive.57 An editorial comment in Israel‟s most popular newspaper Ma‟ariv illustrated the Israeli resolve on the issue of national retribution. The time has come for a major stocktaking, settling the one and only account we have with the guerrillas and the dispatchers... we shall hit them at home. We shall settle our account with them and their dispatchers, with those who sheltered them in Munich, assisted them in infiltrating their Olympic Village and bringing their weapons there 58 Golda Meir had also fearlessly declared in an address to Knesset (Israel‟s Legislature) that „we will smite them wherever they may be‟59 and Chief of Staff, General Elezar spoke of Israel waging a „continuous war‟ not one „started today and finished tomorrow‟ using „many 55 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2 56 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 57 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p.189. Such intransigence in the Israeli position had been exemplified by constant and deep penetration raids into Egyptian territory during 1970, had resulted in the unintended and tragic destruction of an Egyptian factory, killing 150 innocent people 58 Editorial comment in Ma-ariv the nation‟s top selling newspaper, quoted in S. Reeve, One Day in September, p.152. 59 Prime Minister Golda Meir quoted in S. Reeve, S. One Day in September (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), p.152.  20 and various means.‟60 The CIA took these threats seriously and noted in the Weekly Review that Tel Aviv had declared „open season on the fedayeen.‟61 Of immediate concern was an attack on Lebanon.62 Kissinger predicted that Israel was planning an incursion into Lebanon to detain the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.63 Nixon and Kissinger decided that Israel would have to be restrained. The risk of serious conflict was too great and both Nixon and Kissinger were worried that the long term historical alliance between America and Israel could lead to a presupposition of US military support.64 Kissinger, particularly, was concerned that the environment was ripe for Israel to initiate a war with Arab world, telling Nixon that „They are in the best position they‟ve ever been in. No Russians there.‟65 Egyptian President, Anwar al-Sadat had ordered a surprise exodus of Soviet advisers from Egypt in mid July, 1972 and re-established Egyptian control over military installations.66 As Kissinger observed, the exit of the Russians from Egypt provided Israelis with an improved position from which to execute their reprisals and for Israel, the brutality of the Munich Massacre was justification for a severe revenge attack.67 Nixon and Kissinger felt it was imperative that Israel be encouraged to proceed with caution; the United States could not become embroiled, in any capacity, in another messy 60 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 15 September, 1972, Weekly Review, „After Munich‟, available online, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000656074/DOC_0000656074.pdf [accessed 17/8/2011] 61 CIA, 15 September, 1972, Weekly Review, „After Munich‟. 62 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 63 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.56. 64 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 65 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 66 A. Al-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, (Sydney: Williams Collins Publishers, 1977), p.230. 67 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2.  21 war. They were still struggling with the process of extricating the United States from involvement in Vietnam. The Vietnam War had dominated policy discussion in America throughout Nixon‟s first term and strongly influenced Nixon and Kissinger‟s foreign policy designs. Nixon unequivocally relates the primacy of the issue in American political affairs in his memoirs stating that „a settlement in Vietnam was the key to everything.‟68 Domestic and international unrest over American involvement in the war was proving detrimental to the resolution of peripheral issues69 and in response to building pressure on 25 July, 1969 Nixon announced the introduction of the „Nixon Doctrine.‟70 The core tenet of the doctrine was that the United States would „furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.‟71 With the Nixon Doctrine, the administration espoused a non-interventionist set of principles but regardless of the doctrinal rhetoric, both Nixon and Kissinger recognised that the Munich Massacre had the potential to draw America into an undesirable conflict in the Middle-East. The perils of the region were an existing concern for the Nixon administration. Nixon had commented in an interview in 1970 that the Middle-East was „terribly dangerous‟. Suggesting, like Kissinger, that it was akin to „the Balkans before World War One- where the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.‟72 68 Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p.391. 69 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, p.168. 70 Also called the „Guam Doctrine‟ announced it in Guam, July 25, 1969, see J. Kimball, „The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2006), pp.59-74. 71 R. Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2303#axzz1ZyjAA7C9 72 N. Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p.113.  22 Any suggestion of an increase in American support of Israel as a result of the Munich Massacre would likely reactivate the Soviet Union‟s relationship with the Arab states.73 Despite the exodus of Soviet advisers from Egypt, the Soviet Union continued to have significant interests in the Arab world. Brezhnev saw the Middle-East as part of a global strategy. Moscow had fostered strategic alliances with Arab states throughout the 1960s as part of „calculations relating to East-West relations.‟74 According to Galia Golan in Soviet Policies in the Middle-East, Brezhnev, considered the Middle-East a „convenient vehicle for Soviet competition with the West and an easy one for providing aid, especially in arms in a way the US was unwilling to provide to either side of the conflict at that time.‟75 When Israel achieved a swift victory against the Soviet proxies- Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six Day War in 1967, David Kimche in The Last Option: the Quest for Peace in the Middle-East, has claimed that that for Brezhnev, Israel‟s success was „a personal humiliation which had to be avenged.‟ Brezhnev was resolute that the outcome of the Six Day War would not diminish hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis and instituted a policy of total confrontation, waging an aggressive six year war against Israel.76 Moscow continued to provide massive 73 Ginat, Rami and Bar-Noi, Uri 'Tacit support for terrorism: The Rapprochement between the USSR and Palestinian Guerrilla Organizations following the 1967 War', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2007), p.266. 74 G. Golan, „The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude towards the Arab Israeli Conflict‟ in N. Ashton (ed.), The Cold War in the Middle East: regional conflict and the superpowers, 1967-73 (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.59. 75 G. Golan, Soviet policies in the Middle East: from World War Two to Gorbachev, (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.58. See also Golan, „The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude towards the Arab Israeli Conflict,‟ p.60. 76 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 20 June, 1967, Intelligence Memorandum, Special Assessments on the Middle-East situation, Soviet Premier Kosygin‟s UN Speech, 19 June, 1967. http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000233691/DOC_0000233691.pdf This was articulated by Prime Minister Kosygin at the special emergency session of the UN general assembly on 19 June 1967. Kosygin called for urgent steps to be taken to „eliminate the consequence of Israel‟s aggression‟.  23 quantities of supplies to Egypt and Syria throughout 1972 even after Egyptian President Sadat had expelled Russian advisers from Egypt in July that year.77 Kimche claims that by the early 1970s both Egypt and Syria, bolstered by the massive military aid which Brezhnev had so generously bestowed upon them, were ready to start the countdown for their next war with Israel. This time it, however, it would be a very different affair from the previous debacle in 1967, because the Soviet Union was to be involved in all planning and preparatory stages78 Rami Ginat and Uri Bar-Noi also claim that the Soviet Union engaged in the funding of Palestinian terrorist groups throughout much of this period.79 In this climate, Nixon and Kissinger did not want to antagonise the Soviet leadership. At the time of the Munich Massacre, the United States and the Soviet Union had accepted a „détente‟ or „easing of tensions‟ but the volatility of the Middle-East meant that there was a constant risk of conflict in the region. Altercations on the periphery also impacted negatively on negotiation processes. The „linkage‟ that was the core of the Nixon/Kissinger Cold War foreign policy canon meant that if any element in their interconnected web of issues started to corrode, the process was undermined.80 They could not damage their hitherto diplomatic progress with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger had been encouraged by advancements during the Moscow and Beijing Summits but were patently aware that the relationship possessed an underlying instability as a consequence of its essentially hostile 77 G. M. Bonham, M. J. Shapiro and T. L. Trumble, „The October War: Changes in Cognitive Orientation toward the Middle East Conflict‟, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, (March, 1979), p.5. 78 D. Kimche, The Last Option, (New York: Macmillan, 1991), p.17. 79 Ginat, Rami and Bar-Noi, Uri. 'Tacit support for terrorism,‟ p.266. 80 Memorandum From Presidential Assistant Kissinger to President Nixon, February 18, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President‟s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Pt. 2  24 foundations.81 A significant resurgence of conflicts in the Middle-East could ignite the deep set antagonisms at present dormant in the Cold War rivalries. The Munich Massacre was a potential trigger for a war in the Middle-East. Controlling a belligerent Israel was the key to retaining international stability and ensuring continued progress on negotiations. The Nixon administration would have to develop a series of measures which would contain Israeli anger and diminish the risk of igniting further conflict. In the first instance, the suffering of the Israeli people had to be recognised. Nixon conveyed his sympathies to Prime Minister Golda Meir directly. Dear Madame Prime Minister: The heart of America goes out to you, to the bereaved families and to the Israeli people in the tragedy that has struck your Olympic athletes. This tragic and senseless act is a perversion of all the hopes and aspirations of mankind which the Olympic Games symbolize. In a larger sense, it is a tragedy for all the peoples and nations of the world. We mourn with you the deaths of your innocent and brave athletes, and we share with you the determination that the spirit of brotherhood and peace they represented shall in the end persevere. Sincerely, RICHARD NIXON82 In his correspondence with Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, Nixon made the assurance that the United States „was working diligently on the terrorist problem.‟83 The 81 Kissinger to Nixon, February 18, 1969, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Box 489, President‟s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, [Pt. 2] 82 Message to Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel About the Deaths of Israeli Athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany September 6, 1972, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3561 [accessed 12/5/2011]  25 administration also engaged in careful discussion over how to demonstrate American sympathy for Israeli losses. Kissinger stated in a Memorandum to Nixon that the gesture had to convey „meaning‟ and „human compassion‟ but in political terms, it had to unambiguously relate the American position without involving „the presidency of the United States in an official act.‟84 Secretary of State, William Rogers suggested that period of silence during the funeral of the Israeli athletes would be appropriate. In his communications with the Israeli government, Rogers had been informed by Ambassador Rabin that the Israeli government did not want high level delegations present at the funeral as it would make the event overtly political.85 Beyond symbolic displays of grief and compassion, discussion in the White House centred on designing a practicable response that would serve American interests. Nixon and Kissinger knew it was essential to communicate that the administration was dismayed and concerned by the tragedy yet there must be a concerted effort to contain rather than fuel the outrage felt by Israelis. They felt The American-Israeli alliance must be maintained but also exist concurrently in a system of international and domestic dynamics conducive to American interests. Nixon and Kissinger recognised the strategic value of utilising the United Nations; it could appease the Israelis and simultaneously buy the administration time to design a longer term response to the issue.86 The President instructed Secretary of State, William Rogers, to „see what sort of game plan we can come up with for the UN.‟87 The Department of State expressed initial reservations on the utilisation of the UN for this 83 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 84 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 85 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 86 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 87 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972  26 issue but Nixon and Kissinger were adamant that it could prove valuable in their diplomatic strategy.88 Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers communicated closely with Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin in devising an official course of action. Records of conversations between Ambassador Rabin and Secretary of State, William Rogers show that the Israeli government voiced firm opposition to any overtures toward the United Nation‟s Security Council.89 Ambassador Rabin instead encouraged the United States government to put pressure on those states with known associations and support mechanisms for Arab terrorist groups.90 Rabin suggested that America address Cairo, Beirut and Damascus and make it patently clear that if these governments were prepared to condone the use of their territory by anti-Israeli terrorist groups or as proxy battlegrounds for actions in other states, they would have to bear responsibility.91 Rabin also suggested that the United States government engage with western European countries to promote effective actions against Arab organisations with known connections to terrorist groups and establish security systems with the express purpose of exchanging views on terrorist acts.92 Aside from the difference of opinion on the value of utilising the UN, many of Rabin‟s aforementioned suggestions were viewed as reasonable by the administration. Yet, the outrage felt by the Israeli government also manifested in impracticable propositions 88 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 89 Telegram 164170 From the Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stackhouse (NEA/IAI) on September 7 and approved by Atherton, Bremer, and Eliot. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Kuwait, Jidda, Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Tripoli, and USUN, p2. 90 Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.2. 91 Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.2. 92Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.3.  27 which would not be acceptable under global conditions at this time. The primary point of divergence between the two nations was on the continuation of the Olympic Games. The Israeli government was applying pressure to the United States government to announce their withdrawal from participation in the remainder of the Games as a show of support.93 Memoranda from the Department of State show that the notion of withdrawal was unanimously rejected by the primary decision makers: Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers and General Haig.94 Nixon was irritated by the Israeli pressure to withdraw from the Olympic Games and grumbled to Kissinger, It‟s like these assholes that tried to stop us running the government. ... If we‟d stopped like some of the softheads around here or gone over and prayed at the Lincoln Memorial, that‟s what they want. So the thing to do is to do it the other way.95 To consent to Israel‟s proposed course of action would present multiple problems for American relations with friendly states. The administration worried that withdrawal from the event would be damaging to relations with West Germany. The Germans were already under intense scrutiny due to the flawed rescue attempt at the NATO airbase and, at that time, were seen as a positive force in the region.96 Rogers also argued that cancellation of the Olympic Games would send the wrong message to terrorist groups and would be exploited. The Black September Organisation had already declared the attack a victory and as evidence that the world was not in support of Israel.97 Rogers raised concerns that it would give 93Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. 94 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. 95 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 96Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. 97 Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.3.  28 credibility to other planned actions by the terrorist organisations.98 Maintaining control over the public relations problem was central to keeping the situation from becoming further inflamed. There was also disagreement within the administration. A matter of contention between the Department of State and the White House was the impact the Munich Massacre would have on peace settlement negotiations in the Middle-East. The Department of State viewed the crisis as an opportunity to resume negotiations with the Israeli government on the terms of a settlement.99 Representative from the Department of State, Sam Hoskinson stated that the administration should „ identify with Israeli sorrow and bitterness, but it would not be in our interest to do this in a way that closes off our options to work with both Arabs and Israelis to produce a peace settlement.‟100 Nixon was wary of the pushing settlement talks on the Israelis in the wake of this tragedy, however.101 He was convinced that the situation in Munich would not diminish resolve on the part of Israel but would rather fortify their position.102 Rabin had conceded that „after Egyptian expulsion of Russians there seemed to be a sense of relaxation and broadening of chances for peace‟ but that after the Munich Massacre „things were taken back to where they were.‟ Rabin highlighted the fact that with the existence of Arab terrorist groups like the Black September Organisation „who could guarantee to Israel that once there was a political settlement that Israel would not be in a 98 Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.6. 99 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. 100 Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. 101 S. Yaqub, „The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‟ in F. Logevall and A. Preston (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008), p.234. 102 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972.  29 worse position?‟103 Key decision makers in the administration concluded that it would be prudent „to keep a lid on things for the present.‟104 An analysis of documents pertaining to the initial response of the Nixon administration to the Munich Massacre shows that the principal concern was the containment of Israel. This undermines the general endorsement amongst many historians of wholesale American support for the Israel throughout much of this period. The volatility of the region meant that the US-Israeli alliance was subject to the flexibility that strategy formulation in an antagonistic Cold War world required; the notion of US support for Israel had to have some fluidity and restrictions. The Munich Massacre produced an international relations conundrum for the United States; the historical alliance with Israel was fundamental to American interests in the Middle-East, yet an open endorsement of support for Israel would rouse a possible resurgence of hostilities and would place the United States in a precarious position. The administration realised poor diplomacy could bring to the fore those sensitive issues lying suppressed within the system. Retaliation from Israel would send shivers through the lines of US interests existing within the web of diplomacy, which had so far kept the Cold War from becoming „hot.‟  103 Telegram 164170 Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972, p.5. 104 quoted in Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.416. 30 Chapter TWO Domestic Unrest You really don’t know, Henry, what the Jewish community will do on this. It’s going to be the goddamnedest thing you ever saw...105 (Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 6 Sept, 1972) The Nixon administration‟s policies toward the Middle-East in the wake of the Munich Massacre would not just have international ramifications. The entanglement of the international sphere with the domestic sphere was a matter of serious consideration in the formation of the United States‟ foreign policy, particularly on the question of Israel. Balancing the interests of the two spheres was difficult to achieve. Domestic and foreign policy were awkward bedfellows during Nixon‟s administration, primarily due to his and Kissinger‟s prioritisation of issues. Both have proclaimed in various articles and books penned since their time in the White House, that they were first and foremost world statesmen106 and were concerned principally with the conduct of foreign affairs. Nixon remained relatively uninspired by the domestic enterprise. He saw domestic issues as obstructive to his designs on the world stage107 and attempted to conduct foreign and domestic policy completely independent of each other. In his memoirs, Kissinger justified 105 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 106 H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); The White House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), see also R. Nixon, R. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: MacMillan, 1978); M. Howard, „The world according to Henry: from Metternich to Me‟, (May-June, 1994), Foreign Affairs, available online, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49890/michael- howard/the-world-according-to-henry-from-metternich-to-me 107 D. Caldwell, „Going Steady: The Kissinger-Dobrynin Channel‟, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 1, (January 2010), p.220. See also R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp.99-100.  31 this conduct as an effort to protect policy making from the passions of everyday partisanship.108 For the American people, it simply appeared that Nixon and Kissinger had unashamedly and consistently prioritised issues of foreign policy above domestic issues. In the words of a Time Magazine article written in 1972 „it does not seem to be Nixon‟s nature to offer bold leadership at home.‟109 The Munich Massacre was a provocative foreign policy issue however, and Nixon‟s distaste for domestic policy was tempered by his almost purely pragmatic approach to politics, a predilection he shared with Kissinger. Robert Dallek, in Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, claims that both Nixon and Kissinger knew that in order to succeed in responding to international affairs, they had to appease Congress and the media, and still appeal to public opinion. They did not, as Dallek has noted „intend simply to reflect domestic sentiment‟ but „were mindful of the need to enlist back by all possible means, including stealth or misleading information, for any major foreign policy initiative.‟110 This was particularly true during a presidential election campaign. In September 1972, the Nixon administration‟s campaign was in full-swing and serious engagement with domestic issues was inevitable because it was, and continues to be, an area where elections are won and lost.111 As has been considered in the first chapter of this thesis, Nixon and Kissinger‟s Middle-East policy calculations were ostensibly informed by the conception of the region in terms of global strategy. Engagement with domestic pressures was clearly unavoidable however. The administration‟s Middle-East policy was particularly vulnerable to pressure from the pro- 108 Kissinger, The White House Years, p914. 109 „The Presidency: And now, Why Not a Domestic Summit‟, Time Magazine, (12 June, 1972), available online, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906016,00.html 110 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p135. 111 F. Logevall, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, F Logevall and A. Preston (eds) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.11.  32 Israel lobby, a sector of American society that Robert H. Trice has defined as „seventy-five112 separate organisations-mostly Jewish-that actively support most of the actions and policy positions of the Israeli government.‟113 The actual influence possessed by the Jewish community and the pro-Israel lobby in the formation of foreign policy is a matter of some contention. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt they have allegedly formed a powerful, vocal and committed sector of American society. In the controversial book The Israel Lobby and Foreign Policy, Walt and Mearsheimer claim that the Jewish community have manipulated the lobbying process that occurs within the United States system of democracy with great success.114 Steven Rosenthal, too, has claimed in Long distance nationalism, American Jews, Zionism and Israel, that „since 1967, there has been no other country whose citizens have been as committed to the success of another country as American Jews have been to Israel‟.115 George Schultz116 in The ‘Israel Lobby’ Myth and Abraham Foxman in The deadliest lies: the Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, refute many of the claims of Walt and Mearsheimer, but have conceded that various Jewish groups in America do have political influence and largely advocate US support for Israel. Schultz and Foxman insist, however that that the Jewish groups do not constitute a homogenous lobbying group within American society. They contend that governmental support for Israel has come from agreeance among the American people and the Democratic and Republican parties that to pursue pro-Israeli policy is „politically sound and morally just.‟ They claim that American 112 Trice‟s calculation of seventy five organisations was made in 1967 113 R. Trice, „Domestic Interest Groups and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‟ in E. Said, Ethnicity and Foreign Policy, (1967), pp.121-122. 114 J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, The Israel Lobby: US Foreign Policy, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007), introduction. 115 S. T. Rosenthal, „Long distance nationalism, American Jews, Zionism and Israel‟ in Dana Evan Kaplan (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to American Judaism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.209. 116 George Schultz was United States Secretary of the Treasury during Nixon‟s first term  33 support for Israel is the result of geopolitical factors and the moral imperative of Israel as a homeland for the Jews.117 Despite contention over the degree of clout held by Jewish groups in relation to the formation of foreign policy, the pertinent factor is Nixon‟s perception of their power and their objectives. On this matter there is little disputation. Nixon was convinced of their prominent position within American society. He believed that the Jewish community had formed a powerful cohesive group in American society, which displayed disloyalty toward the American nation (sometimes referring them as „Jewish traitors‟) and had a high level of involvement in the American media, which made them „dangerous adversaries.‟118 Recently surfacing from the Nixon Tapes is a conversation that took place between the president and Reverend Billy Graham in February 1972. During this conversation Nixon candidly expressed his concerns regarding Jewish media penetration, declaring that „Newsweek; it‟s all run by Jews and dominated by them in their editorial pages... The New York Times, The Washington Post; totally Jewish too.‟119 David Greenberg, in Nixon’s Shadow, has contended that Nixon made no effort to conceal his detestation of what he labelled the „liberal media‟ even embarking on a „crusade‟ against the American press.120 According to Nixon‟s speech writer, William Safire, Nixon had once had told him that „the press is the enemy... to be hated and beaten‟121 and that it was „a biased, out of touch liberal elite.‟122 After the Munich 117 G. Schultz, „The Israel Lobby Myth‟, US News and World Report, (9 September, 2007), available online, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2007/09/09/the-israel-lobby-myth [accessed 9/3/2011] See also A. Foxman, The deadliest lies: the Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p.107. 118 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.170. 119 Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixonand Reverend Billy Graham, Oval Office, February 1, 1972. 120 D. Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image, (New York: Norton and Company, 2003), pp.126-127. 121 W. Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House, (Garden City: New York, 1975), pp.342-343. 122 Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow, p.128. See also D. Moynihan, „The presidency and the Press‟, Commentary, Vol. 51, (March, 1971), pp.41-52; R. Price, With Nixon, (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), pp.175-191.  34 Massacre, Nixon‟s perception of the media was conspicuous during a meeting with Kissinger, Rogers and Haig. Nixon used it as additional evidence that the administration should not capitulate to Israeli pressure and the desires of the broader Jewish community, commenting that to withdraw from the Olympic Games „would be the New York Times approach.‟123 Nixon believed that Jewish groups considered the interests of Israel to be of far greater importance than any other issue and regarded this intense preoccupation with some distaste. In 1969, Nixon declared to fellow White House administrators that „under no circumstances will domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the Mideast.‟124 Historian, Dominic Sandbrook has claimed that the „domestic political considerations‟ Nixon referred to most particularly, was Jewish support for Israel.125 Nixon‟s relationship with this sector of American society was not as clear-cut as it seems, however. Remarks captured on the „Nixon Tapes‟ and documented in the records show an unequivocal antipathy towards the Jewish community which have motivated many overzealous historians to label Nixon an anti-Semite.126 Nixon‟s advisor, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman has recounted an incident in his diaries where Nixon identified the enemies of the government as „youth, black, Jew‟ and recalls him stating in an Oval Office meeting that „most Jews are disloyal... generally speaking, you can‟t trust the bastards. They turn on you...‟127 Yet it should also be noted that Nixon appointed Kissinger to the second most 123 National Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, Washington, September 6, 1972, 8:30 a.m. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11. 124 Quoted in R. Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p.42. 125 D. Sandbrook, „Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate‟ F. Logevall and A. Preston (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, (New York: Oxford University Press: 2008), p.89. 126 Illustrations of Nixon‟s anti-Semitic outbursts during that period abound. See „New Nixon Tapes Are Released: Depth of President‟s Anti-Semitism Detailed,‟ Washington Post, (6 October, 1999). 127Quoted in A. Summers, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon, (New York: Phoenix Press, 2000), p. 353.  35 powerful post in the administration and also selected many other figures of Jewish heritage to serve in important positions. Nixon‟s counsel, Leonard Garment countered claims of Nixon‟s anti-Semitism saying that on a scale of one to one hundred he would rate him „somewhere between fifteen and twenty-better than most, worse than some, much like the rest of the world.‟128 Although many of Nixon‟s remarks have revealed an underlying hostility toward the Jewish community, it is important to acknowledge that the first term of his presidency also coincided with a particularly intense period of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Walt and Mearsheimer claim that as a corollary to heightened tensions in the Middle-East caused by the War of Attrition during 1969-1970 and attacks like the Munich Massacre, concern over the security of Israel reinforced and intensified the Israel-centric view of many Jewish community-relations groups.129 Nixon‟s remarks, although improper, are also a reflection of resentment towards increasing demands to display strong support for Israel. Nixon‟s sentiments toward the Jewish community were also a product of his belief that they were principally sympathetic to the Democratic Party and he was thus reluctant to court the Jewish vote.130 In The White House Years, Kissinger reported that Nixon „considered himself less obligated to the Jewish constituency than any of his predecessors had been and was eager to demonstrate that he was impervious to its pressures‟.131 „The small percentage of Jews who voted for him, he would joke, had to be so crazy that they would probably vote for him even if he turned on Israel.‟132 Kissinger also claims that Nixon rarely practiced that which he preached. „For on almost all practical issues his unsentimental geopolitical analysis 128 Summers, The Arrogance of Power, p.353. 129 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, pp.118-119. 130 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.169. 131 Kissinger, The White House Years, p.559. 132 Kissinger, The White House Years, p.564.  36 finally led him to positions not so distant from ones others might take on the basis of ethnic politics‟.133 Any personal resentment would become secondary to political pragmatism. Nixon‟s pragmatic approach to politics was particularly evident during the 1972 election campaign as emerging political conditions began to turn in his favour. The presumptive nominee for the Democratic Party, George McGovern caused some apprehension amongst the Jewish community.134 There was some uncertainty about McGovern‟s commitment to the security of Israel.135 Nixon although generally disliked by the Jewish community, was considered to have shown his wherewithal in relation to the support of Israel. Thus Nixon, like a modern-day Dostoevsky,136 assumed the paradoxical position of being labelled an anti-Semite, yet the preferred candidate because he was considered an ardent supporter of Israel. This was an electoral advantage that Nixon would not neglect to capitalise upon and he revised his earlier reluctance to cater to the Jewish vote. Nixon recognised that the American Jews were a key political constituency. He felt that their antagonistic views towards his administration could be ameliorated through strategic political manoeuvring. Salim Yaqub has highlighted a host of domestic and international concerns that emerged throughout the 1970s such as crime, busing and the mistreatment of Soviet Jews which prompted many people in the Jewish community to question their traditional liberalist ideology.137 This provided the Republican Party with an opening, a chance to increase its 133 Kissinger, The white House Years, p.564. 134 „The Voters: The Jewish Swing to Nixon‟, Time Magazine, (21 August, 1972). http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877982-2,00.html [accessed 9/4/2011 135 „The Voters: The Jewish Swing to Nixon‟, Time Magazine, (21 August, 1972) 136 In his book A Writers Diary, Fyodor Dostoevsky is noted to have expressed anti-Semitic sentiment frequently but he is also noted to have stood up for equal rights of the Russian Jewish population. See S. Cassedy, Dostoevsky’s Religion, (Stanford University Press, 2005); D. I Goldstein, Dostoevsky and the Jew, (University of Texas Press, 1981). 137 S. Yaqub, „The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‟ in F. Logevall and A. Preston (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008), p.230.  37 support within the Jewish community and its share of the Jewish vote.138 The development of this important facet of Nixon‟s electoral game plan would best be served by showing measured partiality to Israel after the tragedy in Munich. Yaqub has emphasised how a display of support for Israel would lead the Israeli government to effectively endorse Nixon for re-election, and the support would filter through to the American Jewish community. 139 Merely showing partiality for Israel was problematic, however. The Munich Massacre had inspired intense anger in champions of the Israeli cause and many pro Israeli groups were making unreasonable demands and using violent and vengeful language. The New York Times, reported that members of The Jewish Defense League had engaged in a hunger strike at the West German Embassy in Washington and the National Chairman Bert Zweibon issued a statement that the United States and the broader community were guilty of being „the silent witness of Arab barbarity‟. The League made claims that Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon „harbor, train and finance‟ Arab „butchers‟ and that retaliation should take the form of „the assassination of Arab diplomats all over the world‟.140 In response to the protests of the Jewish community, Nixon complained to Kissinger „the trouble with the Jews is that they‟ve always played these things in terms of outrage.141 The Nixon administration had to subdue the Jewish community‟s indignation but not give any sense that the administration 138 Yaqub, „The Weight of Conquest,‟ p.230. See also W.B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press: 2005), p.59; Kissinger, The White House Years, p564; Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, pp.169-171; R. Medoff, Jewish Americans and political Participation: A reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Inc., 2002), pp.193-196; Safire, Before the Fall, pp.564-575. 139 Yaqub „The Weight of Conquest,‟ p.234. Nixon won the 1972 election in a landslide. Nixon received 34 percent of the Jewish vote, up from 17 percent in 1968. See I. N. Forman, „The Politics of Minority Consciousness: The Historical Voting Behaviour of American Jews,‟ in Jews and American Politics, ed L. Sandy Maisel (Lanham, Md, 2001), p.153. 140 B. Zweibon, quoted in „Leaders around the World Express Horror at the Guerrilla Attack at Olympics‟ by Martin Arnold, New York Times, (6 September, 1972), p.19. 141 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.56.  38 was unconditionally pro-Israel. There was firm opposition within the administration to letting American policy be dictated by an outraged and radical Jewish community. The Nixon administration decided that the Jewish Community‟s outrage would best be calmed by a public acknowledgement of their anguish; with a delicate and measured display of compassion. Secretary of State, William Rogers, proposed that Nixon issue an executive order for a national day of mourning, perhaps even flying flags at half mast.142 Rogers‟ proposal was rejected out of hand however as it was considered by Nixon and Kissinger to be letting policy be dictated by the „radical Jewish community.‟143 The Munich Massacre was one of many tragic incidents taking place on the world stage at the same time and Nixon and Kissinger felt that it must be placed within international perspective. They stressed that Ireland was facing a near civil war which should not be reduced in import by efforts to appease an outraged Israel. „Why don‟t you order the flag when some Irish nationalists get killed?‟ Nixon queried in response to Rogers‟ proposal. „What will Irishmen say if you didn‟t lower it when the school children got killed in Belfast...?‟144 Both Nixon and Kissinger felt that by lowering the flag, the administration would be demonstrating a double standard. But it was merely a matter of getting the level of conciliation right. „We‟ve got to show we care on this one‟ Nixon acknowledged in a private phone call to Kissinger. „You really don‟t know, Henry, what the Jewish community will do on this. It‟s going to be the 142 Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, Washington, September 6, 1972, 8:30 a.m. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11. 143 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 144 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2.  39 goddamnedest thing you ever saw‟.145 Kissinger felt that the administration should be particularly cautious when appeasing the Jewish community however warning Nixon that It‟s not our day of mourning, Mr President. It‟s easy enough now to do a number of grandstanding... And also, God I am Jewish. I‟ve had 13 members of my family killed. So I can‟t be insensitive to this. But I think you have to think also of the anti-Semitic woes in this country146 Running parallel to the competition in the Middle-East between the Arab world and Israel was a similar clash within the United States lobbying system. Both constituencies possessed significant internal domestic leverage.147 Since the Six Day War, major Arab-American international oil companies had been increasingly pushing for Arab support from the American government.148 Representatives of the international oil companies in America were being pressured by their Arab partners to become more aggressive in their articulation of Arab interests. The consortium of companies forming the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)149 were particularly forthright in expressing their discontent stating that „the image of the US has more or less collapsed in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war‟ and that „as a direct consequence of our [American] identification with Israel, Soviet influence in the Middle-East-which was practically non-existent in the mid fifties-has burgeoned.‟150 Although American oil interests in the Middle-East did not become pressing until 1973 when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 145 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 146 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 147 G. Achcar and N. Chomsky, Perilous power: The Middle-East and US Foreign Policy: Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2007), p.65. 148 S. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle-East Policy, From Truman to Reagan, (University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.170. 149 Now called Saudi Aramco 150 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy (94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975), pt 7 pp517-528.  40 proclaimed an oil embargo,151 the United States had implemented measures to ensure accessibility to Middle-East oil in the tightly integrated energy market since World War Two. The United States built friendly relations with many Arab states and prevented any one state from establishing hegemony in the region, establishing a local balance of power. This strategy would ensure that Middle-East oil would not become the possession of unfriendly states and would dissuade hostile states from obstructing oil flow.152 Nixon continued these efforts to form good relationships with the major international oil companies. Such amicable relations were reflected in the significant campaign contributions Nixon received in the run-up to his 1968 election win and the generous contributions he received throughout 1971 and 1972.153 Even so, Nixon and Kissinger were not substantially influenced by Arab-American oil interests in the formation of Middle-East policy.154 An executive of the Mobil Oil Company remarked that „we could always get a hearing, but we felt we might as well be talking to the wall‟. Despite their largesse, the major international oil companies had limited influence in Washington during this period.155 For the most part, the major international oil companies did not apply significant pressure throughout Nixon‟s first term, however. They recognised the benefits of tending to their interests independently of the government as a means to prevent poor publicity or get involved in messy diplomacy.156 151 This was ostensibly in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military during the Yom Kippur war 152 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, pp.142-143. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the importance of middle-east oil led the US to become a close ally of Saudi Arabia after WW2 and is one reason why Washington backed the Shah of Iran. 153 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p.171. 154 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p.171. Spiegel asserts that American oil interests in the region started to take precedence in 1973 with the oil shocks 155 A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (New York: Viking, 1975), pp.205-6; R. Engler, The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.63. 156 R. Engler, The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest, p.63.  41 Admittedly though, the impact of terrorist attacks like the Munich Massacre was the cause of some apprehension. The implications of the Munich Massacre and more specifically, any indication of US support for Israel had the capacity to cause severe disruption to business interests. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, American businesses in the Middle- East had been subject to multiple terrorist attacks from Fedayeen groups aiming to obstruct Western access to Arab oil.157 Kissinger, in a memo to Nixon, outlined his concerns that in the wake of the Munich Massacre radical Arab terrorist groups would be inspired to engage in a campaign of destruction aimed at businesses perceived as representing US imperialism.158 there is no doubt that the Fedayeen groups have carried out coordinated attacks against US business firms and the likelihood is for increased terrorist actions against both official and private US interests over the next several months in the light of the Arab guerrilla‟s belief that the Black September Organisation‟s Munich operation was a success Terrorist attacks of this nature would interrupt transit and communications in through the region.159 Nixon‟s claim that he was not impeded by domestic constraints was not necessarily reflected by reality. The United States Congress was also a terminal difficulty for Nixon, particularly in his 157 Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. 158 Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, See also Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 1, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. Secret. 159 (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310.  42 pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Sandbrook has described Nixon‟s relationship with Congress as „simply dreadful‟.160 When Nixon had taken office in 1969, he was the first President since 1853 to have done so without a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. The democratic majorities obstructed Nixon‟s policy initiatives frequently, a situation worsened by the fact that he was loath to cultivate relationships with congressional Democrats and Republicans alike.161 Nixon took pains to conceal his foreign policy intentions from Congress believing that he was in a better position to deal with international issues. In President Nixon: Alone in the White House, Richard Reeves has claimed to have viewed a handwritten note by the president which reveals the extent to which he considered himself responsible for the conduct of foreign policy processes. The note read Foreign policy = strength... Must emphasise - Courage. Stands alone... Knows more than anyone else. Towers above advisers. World Leader162 Nixon felt that Congress was „cumbersome, undisciplined, isolationist, fiscally irresponsible, overly vulnerable to pressures from organised minorities and too dominated by the media‟.163 In the wake of the Munich Massacre, Congress was a beast that he would have to deal with, despite his reservations. The righteous anger of Jewish Americans over the attack on innocent Israelis was increasingly filtering into congressional policy debates. Nixon had concerns over Israeli links in the United States Congress exploiting the tragedy in Munich as 160 Sandbrook, „Salesmanship and Substance,‟ p.86. 161 Sandbrook, „Salesmanship and Substance,‟ p.86. 162 Quoted in Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House, p.22. 163 R. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: MacMillan, 1978), p.770.  43 a rallying point for voicing objections to US-Soviet détente.164 There was already significant criticism coming from both the left and the right of Congress over Nixon and Kissinger‟s policy of détente with the Soviet Union. In August, 1972 Leonid Brezhnev had imposed the „diploma tax‟ on would-be emigrants to combat the growing emigration of Soviet Jews to the West. The policy caused great offence within the American Jewish community and throughout the world.165 Noam Kochavi, in Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Emigration and the Demise of Détente’ observed that after the tragic events of the Munich Massacre it would appear justified for Israel to pressure the administration on emigration rights for Soviet Jews. There would be a Congressional push from members with links to Israel for emigration rights to be made a feature of détente with the Soviet Union.166 The Munich Massacre had considerable political reach, it had the potential to threaten Nixon and Kissinger‟s highly prioritised initiative of US-Soviet détente. As was consistent with Nixon and Kissinger‟s overarching foreign policy approach, political pragmatism determined how the domestic affects of the Munich Massacre were managed. The administration‟s decisions in the international field were tempered by domestic obligations and vice versa. As in almost all of Nixon‟s policy calculations, the position the administration would adopt when dealing with the American Jewish community would be determined by a manipulation of contending forces based on power assessment rather than sentiment or ideology. The overriding concern in relation to the Munich Massacre was containing Israeli ire and, as in the international sphere, the Nixon administration sought to show measured support for the Jewish Community without endorsing unreasonable action. The administration could not show open partiality for the domestic Jewish population as it would be read as support for Israel internationally. Support for American Jews would anger 164 N. Kochavi, „Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the Demise of Détente‟, Diplomatic History, Vol. 29. No. 3, (June, 2005), p. 514. 165 Kochavi, „Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost‟, p.514. 166 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.57.  44 the same constituencies as an open display of support for the nation of Israel and have similar international ramifications. Maintaining the precarious balance was made more complicated by other domestic constraints such as Arab-American business interests, Congressional concerns over Soviet Jewish emigration and the pending presidential election. For Nixon, it was simply a matter of manipulating these issues so that the administration could continue to pursue their foreign policy objectives and preserve national interests. 45 PART II ROUSE THE GLOBAL WRATH Chapter THREE International Condemnation O men of arms, why do you love injustice? You must live in law and order Get up, wake up, or be forever regretful, Don't be infamous among the nations167 (Yemeni poet, Amin al Mashreqi) As Part One of this thesis has illustrated, containing Israel was integral to US interests both in the international and domestic spheres. There was also another dimension to the Munich Massacre that had to be addressed; the international nature of the attack. The Arab-Israeli conflict had gone beyond state boundaries in deliberate and frightening way. It had been thrust into the homes of millions of people around the world and had incited fear and anger in the international community. The Munich Massacre was the most visible and brutal exemplar of a new but increasingly prevalent phenomenon of international political attacks. Most commonly manifesting in hijackings, the Nixon administration and broader international community had to determine how to effectively deal with transnational 167 Amin al Mashreqi, quoted by James Brandon in „In poetry-loving Yemen, tribal bard takes on Al Qaeda - with his verse‟, The Christian Science Monitor, p2, available online, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0512/p01s02-wome.html/(page)/2 Amin al Mashreqi declared that „Other countries fight terrorism with guns and bombs, but in Yemen we use poetry, through my poetry I can convince people of the need for peace who would never be convinced by laws or by force.‟  46 offences. The Nixon administration recognised that the Munich Massacre, as such a visible act of international terrorism, would require an equally visible international response. An appeal to the United Nations to engage on the issue of international terrorism and denounce the actions in Munich would also speak to their Israel problem. It would allow the United States to show a degree of support for Israel without involving America directly. The use of multilateral institutions also had the potential to fuel controversial international politics however. Although little study has been undertaken on Nixon‟s perception of, and interaction with, the United Nations,168 Edward Keefer has observed Nixon‟s general aversion to seeking multilateral solutions in achieving his foreign policy objectives. Keefer asserts that in Nixon‟s realist view of international relations „national self-interest and major power relations were the only real considerations for foreign policy.‟169 In 1971, Nixon offered his blunt opinion in a private conversation with the American Ambassador to the People‟s Republic of China, Walter McConaughy saying I‟d just say to hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It‟s a damned debating society. What good does it do? Very little.... They talk about hijacking, drugs, the challenges of modern society, and the rest of it is to give hell to the United States.170 168 Nixon‟s policy towards the United Nations is covered only very superficially. References to Nixon‟s relationship with the UN appear primarily in relation to the issue of Chinese representation, the proximity of the Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement with China, and a general acceptance of Nixon‟s contempt for the institution. For example, see W. P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 53, 103, 514; C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), p.10, 33-4; R. Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York, Touchstone, 2001), pp. 386-7, 550. Reeves hints at political motivations for some of Nixon‟s UN policy and personnel decision. 169 E. Keefer, „The Nixon Administration and the United Nations,‟ p.1, available online, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/ONU_edward_keefer.pdf [accessed 10/2/2011] 170 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Nixon and McConaughy, Oval Office, June 30, 1971, Conversation 532-17.  47 Nixon‟s thinly veiled anti-UN sentiment stemmed from his assessment of the United Nations as an „old institution‟ he considered „obsolete and inadequate‟ and „set up to deal with a world of twenty years ago.‟171 According to Jeremi Suri in Henry Kissinger and the American Century, Kissinger had a better sense than Nixon of how engagement with the international community could benefit the United States. Kissinger was aware of the limits of unilateral power and promoted the idea of a world system where power was dispersed hierarchically allowing for „more centres of decision.‟172 This system would produce terms favourable to the United States; it would encourage innovative diplomatic conduct between states and promote consensus building while legitimising America‟s role as a world superpower.173 Suri has explained that within Kissinger‟s „federalist‟ approach to foreign relations, the United States was the central diplomatic actor in a community of states; the international mediator.174 Kissinger rejected both the imperialist impulse for a single state‟s dominance over a distant landscape and at the other extreme, the assumed equality of all nations in an institution like the United Nations General Assembly‟.175 Keefer and Suri have observed that Nixon and Kissinger recognised the value of the United Nations in monitoring ceasefires, separating parties in conflict and passing resolutions reflecting decisions already made in other less public channels176 but this did not dissuade the two men from their general aversion to the institution. Nixon and Kissinger‟s lack of enthusiasm for the United Nations should be contextualised however. 171 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1972, Doc 2; From Nixon‟s first major foreign policy speech to the Bohemian Club of San Francisco in July 1967. 172 J. Suri Henry Kissinger and the American Century, (Harvard University Press, 2007), pp.180-184. 173 Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, pp.169, 180. 174 Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, p184. 175 Suri Henry Kissinger and the American Century, p184. 176 Keefer, „The Nixon Administration and the United Nations,‟ p1.  48 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations underwent a series of major changes both in orientation and in membership. The UN engaged in active promotion of decolonisation and as a result, an influx of newly independent states gained a political voice within the forum.177 Paul Kennedy, in The Parliament of Man has observed that the „world community‟ became predominantly African, Asian and Latin American. The former colonies dominated both in population and in General Assembly votes.178 The newly independent states also brought their own set of agendas to UN debates. Kennedy has claimed that the existing systems became subject to broad criticism and as a corollary, there was a significant increase in anti-Western sentiment.179 The United Nations was also weakened by financial pressures, mounting claims of institutional impotency and an ongoing but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to keep the People‟s Republic of China out of the assembly. China gained membership in 1971.180 According to Peter Romaniuk in Multilateral Counterterrorism, preoccupation with these issues meant that although there was a surge of international terrorist activity and hijackings throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, terrorism was not addressed in any considerable way by the United Nations.181 This is not to say that the terrorist acts throughout this period were not deemed significant by the international community or by the Nixon administration however. In 1969, in his address before the 24th Session of the General Assembly, Nixon stated that „there are at least five areas in particular of great concern to everyone here with regard to which there should be no national differences, in which our interests are common and on which there should be unanimity.‟ 182 177 Yassin El-Ayouty, „The United Nations and Decolonisation, 1960-70‟, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, (October, 1970), p.463. 178 P. Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government, (London, Allen Lane, 2006) p86. 179 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, p186. 180 Keefer, „The Nixon Administration and the United Nations‟, p.3. 181 P. Romaniuk, Multilateral Counterterrorism: the Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation, (New York, Routledge, 2010) p.34. 182 R. Nixon, Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 18, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon,  49 One of these five areas was „securing the safety of international air travel.‟ Nixon went on to say By any standards, aircraft hijackings are morally, politically, and legally indefensible. The Tokyo Convention has now been brought into force, providing for prompt release of passengers, crew, and aircraft. Along with other nations, we also are working on a new convention for the punishment of hijackers. But neither of these conventions can be fully effective without cooperation; sky piracy cannot be ended as long as the pirates receive asylum. Consequently, I urge the United Nations to give high priority to this matter. This is an issue which transcends politics; there is no need for it to become the subject of polemics or a focus of political differences. It involves the interests of every nation, the safety of every air passenger, and the integrity of that structure of order on which a world community depends.183 In 1970, in Organisation of American States (OAS) policy discussions, the need for an international approach to the terrorist problem was acknowledged in a number of recommendations. These recommendations included: specific condemnation of the acts (which would include hijacking), member states facilitation of the extradition of terrorists, the establishment of an international instrument declaring terrorist acts international crimes plus an appeal to the international community to condemn such acts and those countries and organisations maintaining connections with terrorist elements.184 Even though Nixon had urged for the terrorist issue of hijacking to be prioritised in 1969 and again in 1970, it Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2236#axzz1Vbtqfy3T [accessed 10/8/2011] 183 Nixon, Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 18, 1969, PPP, The American Presidency Project. 184 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President‟s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 24, 1970, U.S. Department of State.  50 was not until a more potent example of terrorism confronted the international community that dealing with the threat became urgent. The Munich Massacre filled that void. For Nixon, the Palestinian violence exemplified in the attack in Munich was „precedent setting.‟ It was an indication of a shift in the psyche of the terrorist. Terrorist elements had demonstrated that they would go to considerable lengths, including killing civilians in blatant sight of the world to pursue their agenda.185 Nixon heatedly denounced the terrorists as „international outlaws‟ stating that „they are unpredictable and all the rest.‟186 The overriding concern of the Nixon administration continued to be the prevention of Israeli retaliation but Nixon also recognised that the world faced a formidable security challenge. The anarchic nature of the threat necessitated the enactment of preventive measures in order to thwart any future attacks on vulnerable targets. This was a job for the United Nations. Nixon and Kissinger recognised that by appealing to the international community to condemn the attack and debate the establishment of international security measures, the United States could also show Israel that they were sympathetic to their position without jeopardising national interests.187 Early discussion of the utilisation of the United Nations met with firm opposition from the Department of State. Secretary of State, William Rogers held the view that obtaining effective measures against incidents of international terrorism through an UN Security Council Resolution would likely be greeted with negligible success. Rogers noted that the strength of the loss would send a clear message as a win for the terrorist cause, which would 185 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.34. 186 Naftali, Blind Spot, pp.56-57. 187 Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, Washington, September 6, 1972, 8:30 a.m. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11.  51 work against their own interests and promote terrorist confidence.188 Department of State officials were also concerned that utilisation of an institution like the UN could „exacerbate rather than ease‟ tensions arising from the attack. The airing of Arab grievances within debate would likely intensify Israeli embitterment and could potentially be used as justification for Israel to engage in an independent action.189 The Israeli government had also voiced their reluctance to make any moves toward engagement with the UN. Rogers believed that direct contact with Israel was likely to bear more fruit in terms of negotiations.190 Officials from the Department of State were also conscious that the United Nations was increasingly being criticised as an impotent institution. They worried that a failed resolution would be yet another demonstration of its limitations.191 Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council staff told Kissinger that the hard reality, however, is that there is really very little we, or any major power, can do to rectify this situation or make sure that it will not happen again. We can attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter international security measures but we will remain vulnerable to the dedicated extremist192 Nixon‟s actions mirrored Hoskinson‟s advice. He made moves toward focussing world moral indignation and pushed for the implementation of international security measures. 188 Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. 189 Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon to (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368. 190 Haig for the President's File, NARA- NMP, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972 191 Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon to (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368. 192 Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon to (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972, NARA-NMP, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368.  52 Nixon issued a presidential directive to „mobilise the international community to take action to combat terrorism in the wake of the Munich tragedy.‟193 Nixon was also prompted to push for some sort of action to be taken against those Arab states condoning the existence of terrorist forces in their territories. It was clear to the President that his administration, and the international community would have to act decisively on this issue and put measures in place to secure the safety its citizens. Since September 1970, in the wake of Arafat‟s expulsion from Jordan, when Lebanon accepted the Palestinian Liberation Organisation use of Lebanese territory, Nixon had been becoming increasingly frustrated with Arab states that provided safe havens for terrorist elements.194 Nixon declared in a phone call to General Haig that „we have to be awfully tough... any nation that harbours or gives sanctuary to these international outlaws we will cut off economic support.‟195 Kissinger also suggested to Nixon that they should push the UN to enact „some international rules on harbouring guerrillas and so forth. That is a concrete measure that affects the world. That‟s a statesmanlike thing.‟196 The administration began immediate consultations with the Ambassadors and Charges of almost fifty countries in order to solicit additional views and suggestions on the problem of international terrorism and to manoeuvre the international voice to condemn those nations complicit in the efforts of terrorist groups.197 Despite the Department of State‟s reluctance, Nixon was adamant in his desire to pursue the UN line of strategy. „It will be good to put the goddam UN on the 193 Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 194 S. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle-East Policy, From Truman to Reagan, (University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.171. 195 „Editorial Note,‟ September 5, 1972, U.S. Department of State, Available online, online at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45434.htm [accessed 10/3/2011] 196 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 197 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross, p2.  53 spot. We want to put them on the spot on this issue, because we think we got them by the balls here.‟198 Nixon cast aside his aversion to the United Nations and embraced its value as a mechanism for condemnation of the Munich Massacre but for this approach to be viable, he needed to get the support of the world community. Nixon recognised that any American appeals to Arab governments to confront terrorism on their own soil were hampered by the perception that America was in Israel‟s hip pocket. Nixon therefore designed a diplomatic strategy to be carried out by the Department of State in an order to circumvent the problem. Nixon directed Rogers to encourage nations with the capacity to provide more leverage over Arab states to vocalise their concerns.199 These nations should make clear to the leaders of Arab states that the credibility of Arab governments was diminishing as they consistently failed to denounce or deal with terrorist attacks. The international community had no reason to believe the innocence of Arab governments when those who executed the attacks carried Arab passports, were based in Arab states and expressed their views from Arab capitals.200 Rogers should also encourage these friendly nations to advise Arab leaders that the vague position they adopted towards terrorism was causing detriment to their national interests; it tarnished their international image201 and dominated their policy dialogue making it captive to terrorist issues.202 Finally, they should emphasise the fact that the Munich Massacre and similar attacks raised antagonisms within the Middle-east and rendered any movement on peace settlements redundant. So long as a terrorist war was maintained on Israel, there 198 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation among President Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771- 5. 199 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164. 200 Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 201 Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 202 Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8.  54 would be brutal counter attacks and any diplomatic efforts by Arab states would be deemed insincere.203 The Nixon administration would also capitalise on the outrage building among international community.204 Denunciations of the terrorist actions were coming from around the globe. On the morning after the attack, the New York Times reported that „people spoke of it to strangers on street corners, expressing horror. A taxi driver, forgetting to complain about Paris traffic for once, turned to his fare and said, in summing up the general feelings, “But they‟re crazy; the world is going crazy.”205 King Hussein of Jordan called it a „horrible crime‟ in a message to Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. Stating that „In the name of the Jordanian government and people, I convey to you our affliction and our anger at this act of violence perpetrated against the civilised world‟, that it was the work of sick minds who are opposed to humanity, the Palestinian people and Jordan and opposed to Arabism, its traditions, its values and its cause.‟206 Dr Cynthia Wedel, president of the National Council of Churches said that „until this abuse of human freedom disappears from the world scene, it is imperative that effective security measures be maintained so that international meetings may be encouraged and continued without the threat of such atrocities.‟207 Condemnation came from the Vatican too as it described the attack as „a betrayal of the Olympic spirit and an unjust injury to the West German Government.‟208 An editorial on the front page of L’Osservatore Romano, said that the attack had broken the political truce traditionally 203Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 204 Telegram 169556 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 15, 1972, 2354Z, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Routine. Repeated to 21 additional posts. Drafted by Armitage, and cleared by De Palma, Stevenson, Atherton, and Sisco. 205 „Leaders around the World Express Horror at the Guerrilla Attack at Olympics‟ by Martin Arnold, New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 206 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 207 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 208 New York Times, Sept 6, p19.  55 represented by the Olympic Games.„209 The Jewish Service Organisation, B‟nai B‟rith made a statement that „the murderers and barbarism are not isolated acts but are a repeated consequence of the over and tacit support and encouragement, and the comfortable sanctuary which Arab governments have given to terrorist groups.‟210 In a memorandum to Nixon, Rogers reported that the actions which had been taken with other governments had been successful in „imparting a sense of urgency‟ on the terrorist issues within the international community and that efforts would be made by the Department of State to maintain the momentum that had been generated. Rogers informed Nixon that focus had shifted to designing a strategy for the United Nations General Assembly where the issue of terrorism was expected to be a priority item.211 On September 8, 1972 Waldheim appealed to the international community that the UN could not be a `mute spectator' to the acts of terrorist violence and proposed that an item be included in the 27th General Assembly to address the growing problem of international terrorism. The item was entitled „Measures to Prevent Terrorism and other forms of violence which engender or take innocent human lives or Jeopardise Fundamental Freedoms.‟212 The motion was encouraged and welcomed by the Nixon administration.213 In order to emphasise the level of importance the United States government attributed to the terrorist issue, Rogers focussed on the issue of international terrorism in his opening address to the United Nations General 209 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 210 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 211 Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. 212 Telegram 167911 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 14, 1972, 1941Z, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Norton Moore (L) and cleared by Sisco and De Palma, p1-2. 213 Telegram 167911 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 14, 1972, 1941Z, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Norton Moore (L) and cleared by Sisco and De Palma, p1-2.  56 Assembly and encouraged the foreign ministers of other nations to do the same.214 On 25 September, 1972, when Rogers addressed the 27th UNGA, he said of the terrorist threat The issue is not war-war between states, civil war or revolutionary war. The issue is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence. Rather, it is whether millions of air travellers can continue to fly in safety each year. It is whether a person who receives a letter can open it without the fear of being blown up. It is whether diplomats can safely carry out their duties. It is whether international meetings-like the Olympic Games-like this assembly-can proceed without the ever –present threat of violence. In short, the issue is whether the vulnerable lines of international communication-the airways and the mails, diplomatic discourse and international meetings-can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together. All who have a stake in this have a stake in decisive action to suppress these demented acts of terrorism.215 The US circulated a Draft Convention to the assembly which they proposed would „deal with the dangerous recent trend to internationalise terrorism and civil violence as evidenced in the recent Munich tragedy.‟216 The United States outlined the intention of the Convention as a mechanism which would identify acts of political violence „both outside the State of nationality of the perpetrator and outside the State against which the act is directed‟. The 214 Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. 215 LXVII Bulletin, Department of State, No. 1378 at 425-430 (Oct, 16, 1972); USUN Press Release 104(72), Sept 25, 1972 216 Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking. Drafted by Moore.  57 draft also stipulated that for an act to be covered under the Convention it would have to have been directed against civilians rather than at armed forces during military conflict.217 Within the scope of the covered acts the Convention then declares that anyone who unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or kidnaps another person commits an offense of international significance. State party to the Convention would be required to extend their jurisdiction over such offenses, make such offenses crimes punishable by severe penalties, and to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders found in their territory218 The Draft Convention did not endeavour to establish an internationally accepted definition of „terrorism‟ however. In preparation of the draft, Nixon had noted in his correspondence with Rogers that to dwell on the matter of definition at that point would impede progress on dealing with the terrorist acts and focussing on „the common interest of all nations in preventing the spread of violence from areas involved in civil or international conflict‟ would better serve the issue.219 Categories of offences would be identified which could be condemned by all states regardless of ideological persuasion or alliance status.220 As Rogers outlined in his address to the General Assembly, the political aspect would become secondary to the protection of innocent lives or preventing the disruption of processes necessary for the effective function of relations between states. The offences that would be condemned were „hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft; kidnapping and assassination of foreign diplomats and other foreign officials; and the export of international terrorism to 217 (Stevenson) to Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 218 (Stevenson) to Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 219 (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 220 (Stevenson) to Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8.  58 countries not involved in the underlying conflicts.‟221 The Nixon administration had carefully worded the resolution in order to prevent it becoming, what Romaniuk has described as, „a lightning rod of dissension‟ but were ultimately unable to avoid the political potency of the document. While there was significant support from many UN member states for the United States proposals, various legal and political impediments emerged in the ensuing debate in the assembly‟s legal committee. Some representatives expressed reservations as to viability and utility of the American approach, stating that a secure and exact definition of terrorism was required. American diplomat Joseph Sisco and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Samuel De Palma claimed that many African states, with the encouragement of a selection of Arab states, twisted the argument to take a lofty position on issues such as „the inalienable right to self-determination‟ and „the legitimacy of national liberation struggles.‟222 The delegates claimed that genuine liberation movements would be labelled „terrorism‟ by the regimes they challenged. Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism has observed that according to these delegates any condemnation of „terrorism‟ in the UN was, in essence, an endorsement of the status quo whereby the powerful could continue to subjugate the weak.223 The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, William Tapley Bennett Jnr noted that there were also several Arab states that resented the proposals and rejected them, sensing 221 (Stevenson) to Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 222 Information Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs (De Palma) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September, 21, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by Fessenden, L, Ross, EA, Atherton, and ARA. 223 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998)  59 that their own states were the targets of the criticism.224 Within this disputatious minority, there were states openly condoning and championing the use of terrorist methods as an integral part of their revolutionary philosophy.225 In other cases, commercial and political interests prevented governments from taking a firm stance and further, many countries articulated their attachment to the historically traditional legal institution of diplomatic or territorial asylum.226 According to Ambassador Bennett the discussion was effectively derailed by a group of delegates who concluded that to address „terrorism‟ was to neglect dealing with the root cause of the phenomenon. These delegates claimed that terrorist acts were simply a reflection of the subjugation of liberty and social injustices caused by military occupation, loss of territory, poverty and lack of human rights and that until the sources of discontent were eradicated, any international legal measures would be ineffective.227 Ambassador Bennett noted the criticism of the developed world that underscored this argument; that the suffering of the peoples of the „Third World‟ was of limited interest until terrorist elements internationalised their violent acts and threatened the security of the developed world.228 The American proposals to the UN were dependent upon broad international approval and uptake of the obligations outlined in these treaties but the issue of terrorism was infused with so many political agendas that the legal and humanitarian aspects were overpowered. Although there was a widespread sense of horror amongst the international community in relation to the Munich Massacre, the United States encountered significant difficulties (at the 27th Assembly) in drawing together such disparate sovereign states to uphold a cohesive 224 W. Tapley Bennett Jnr, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1973), p.758. 225 Bennett Jnr, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, p.758. 226 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism,’ p.753. 227 A. Goswami, Combating Terrorism: The Legal Challenge, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2002), p.57. 228 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism,’ p.759.  60 approach. When the resolution emerged from extended debate and negotiation, the United States voted against it, declaring it impotent in preventing acts of terrorist violence and ineffective in addressing the terrorist problem.229 What is significant however is that despite the failure to establish any concrete measures within this forum, there was conviction from the international community to pursue the issue beyond the 27th Assembly. An ad hoc committee, which the United States was prepared to serve on,230 was established to continue the process, leading up to the 28th General Assembly.231 Although originally motivated by the pragmatic political concern of containing Israel, Nixon‟s overtures towards the United Nations in response to the Munich Massacre, constituted a noteworthy step in the history of counterterrorism. The prevalence of acts of international terrorism in conjunction with Nixon‟s fondness for the manipulation of international issues had inspired him to brush aside his aversion to the use of multilateral solutions in foreign policy. The Nixon administration‟s utilisation of the United Nations became the crux of a diplomatic strategy that would tend to US interests while at the same time allow strong denunciation of terrorist attacks like the Munich Massacre. They brought the fight against terrorism to the global battlefield by exploiting the network of antagonisms and interests defining state relations.232 Although there was a clear divergence of views within UNGA, the inclusion of the item and the debate that ensued marked the first time 229 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, p.759. 230 Telegram 227601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, December 16, 1972, 1825Z, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Routine. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and NATO. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by De Palma. 231 Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Sixth Committee 3034, XXVII, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty Seventh Session, available online, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r27.htm [accessed on 4/3/2011] 232For a further example of manipulation of the international community in pusuit of national interests see also M. Connelly A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).  61 that the international community had grappled with the terrorist issue seriously and as a united community.233  233 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, p.760. 62 Chapter FOUR The New Terrorism The Nixon administration had brought the fight against terrorism to the global battlefield; they had stimulated international debate and simultaneously made in-roads into addressing their primary concern of preventing Israeli retaliation. However, Nixon considered the containment of Israel of such integral importance to national interests and the stability of the world system that he felt it necessitated a complementary line of attack in the domestic sphere. At the same time as pursuing his efforts in the UN, the President formed the „Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.‟ The Cabinet Committee was a permanent executive branch which would coordinate information sharing between US security departments, solicit counterterrorism suggestions from other nations and systematically manage issues of terrorism. It was pivotal in the preparation of the draft resolution which was submitted to the 27th United Nations General Assembly but would also function as a domestic counterterrorism force which would ensure the security of the American nation and its people. The Cabinet Committee would indicate to the world, and most particularly to Israel, that America was committed to fighting against the proliferation of terrorist acts like the Munich Massacre. Beyond the political rationale however, the establishment of a permanent executive branch to fight terrorism revealed a fundamental shift in the administration‟s conceptualisation of terrorism. The attack in Munich was not an isolated terrorist event. The Nixon administration had been facing acts of „terrorism‟ since its very first days in office. Within the first five weeks, Nixon had to deal with the seizure and diversion of nine American 63 commercial aircraft (and three from various other nations) to locations in Cuba.234 The hijackings caused minimal concern within the White House however. These acts of terrorism were not initially considered to pose a significant threat to either national or international security. A frequent occurrence since the early 1960s, hijackings were predominantly committed by American citizens who wanted, for various reasons, to make their way to Cuba.235 In response to the hijacking epidemic, the American government simply put procedures in place in order to minimise inconvenience. The American government, the American people, the airlines and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) considered hijackings during this period to be an irritating disruption to air travel but they were not deemed a serious threat. Naftali suggests that Americans viewed the incidents as „something akin to bad weather in Chicago.‟236 At much the same time, Nixon‟s administration was confronted by countless acts of domestic terrorism which occurred as a result of an American society in flux and plagued by significant civil unrest. The civil rights movement had swept through the United States and had incited significant dissent and anarchy amongst large sectors of the population. Some black liberation groups, most notoriously the „Black Panther Party,‟ engaged in protests, typified by guerrilla warfare against the police, factional feuds between rival groups and many racially motivated attacks.237 Strong opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War and ambivalence toward the values of the existing system also motivated various left-wing political extremists such as the „Weather Underground‟ to engage in 234 „Memorandum from the President‟s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,‟ Washington, February 7, 1969, US Department of State. 235 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.67. 236 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.37. 237 C. Hewitt „The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 12, Issue 3-4, 2000 Special Issue: The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, p.331.  64 violent actions across America, often using bombings as the preferred mode of attack.238 Nixon condemned these as acts of „revolutionary terrorism.‟ He remarked angrily to Kissinger that „they are reaching out for the support- ideological and otherwise- of foreign powers and they are developing their own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism.‟239 In his various speeches to his constituents across the country the President spoke of „a rising tide of terrorism, of crime, and on the campuses of our universities we have seen those who instead of engaging-which is their right-in peaceful dissent, engage in violence.‟240 A revolutionary wave, David Rapoport claims in The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, had swept through the developing world and the Western heartland.241 During Nixon‟s first term in office, the proliferation of the violent actions of radical political organisations and the frequency of hijackings steadily increased but Nixon continued to deal with the various manifestations of terrorism, domestic and international by way of reactive policy.242 The attacks were considered to be an irritating inconvenience but not a serious threat. In the words of historian Timothy Naftali, they were an „annoying little gnat that buzzed around the superpower while it was trying to handle truly dangerous matters.‟243 It was these 238 Hewitt „The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them‟, p.331. 239 Dallek, R. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.208. 240Remarks in the Ohio State House, Columbus, Ohio. October 19, 1970 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2738 Remarks at East Tennessee State University. October 20, 1970 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2748 Remarks in Kansas City, Missouri. October 19, 1970 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2744 [accessed 17/7/2011] 241 Rapoport, D. ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, UCLA International Institute, p.56. available online, http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf [accessed 31/01/2010] Rapoport claims that the development of the „new left‟ wave of terrorism was resultant of „enormous ambivalence about the values of the existing system‟ and that the „terrorists‟, as well as many outside observers, saw themselves as „freedom fighters.‟ 242 S. H. Teahan, „Nuisance to Crisis: Conceptualising Terrorism during the Nixon Administration‟, unpublished MA thesis, University of Waterloo, 2008, p 60. 243 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.68.  65 incidents; the bombings, the hijackings and the violent crime that initially shaped Nixon‟s conceptualisation of „terrorism.‟ The revolutionary ethos common to the majority of the terrorist groups was infectious however and throughout late 1969 and 1970, there was a sharp increase in the number of serious hijackings.244 These attacks were predominantly executed by the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) and one of its offshoot organisations, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).245 Of particular significance was the hijacking of TWA (TransWorldAirlines) flight 840. This was the first hijacking incident where Palestinian hostility was specifically directed at an American target and it was the first incident that grabbed the full attention of the Nixon administration.246 In conjunction with the increase in serious hijackings there was also a shift in terrorist methods. The hijackers of TWA flight 840 were specifically targeting passengers on the aircraft they claimed were „responsible for the death and misery of a number of Palestinians.‟247 Terrorist groups began to go beyond simply diverting the aircraft, they engaged in hard line political statements. As G. Davidson Smith has observed, „terrorism began to emerge as a tactic of politically motivated dissent and militancy.‟248 The nationality of the airline was no longer a primary consideration; the aircraft was simply a mechanism to be exploited in the pursuit terrorist goals. Innocent civilians would be taken hostage and threatened if demands were not met.249 Rapoport has claimed that terrorist organisations began to employ a new logic whereby the act became a form of punishment as well as a strategy in the pursuit of particular objectives.250 The frequency of hijackings throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s was cause for the Nixon 244 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.67. 245 Teahan, „Nuisance to Crisis: Conceptualising Terrorism during the Nixon Administration‟, p.53. 246 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.35. 247 Quoted in Naftali, Blind Spot, p.35. 248 G.D. Smith, Combating terrorism, (London: Routledge, 1990), p.53. 249 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.68. 250 Rapoport, „The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, pp.56-57.  66 administration to principally equate terrorism with hijackings but with the terrorists employing a new and dangerous logic, the administration began to re-evaluate the methods for dealing with these incidents. Nixon started to utilise the power of the international voice. As was noted in Chapter Three of this thesis, Nixon appealed to the 24th United Nations General Assembly in 1969, to give „high priority‟ to the issue of „sky piracy.‟251 He also rallied support for several historic international conventions addressing civil aviation.252 Under pressure from the Nixon administration, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) achieved the ratification of The Tokyo Convention253 and the Hague Convention254 and introduced the Montreal Convention.255 There was only modest commitment to these measures however as an incident had not yet occurred which posed a fundamental threat to either international or American security. The Munich Massacre changed this. Although the revolutionary ethos of the Black September Organisation was ultimately consistent with that of many earlier attacks, the Munich Massacre also possessed particular features which distinguished it as a new class of threat and prompted Nixon to mobilise the world community to fight against 251 R. Nixon, Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 18, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2236#axzz1Vbtqfy3T [accessed 10/8/2011] 252 J.D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism, Second Edition, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p.108. 253 United Nations Treaty Series, No. 10106, Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Signed at Tokyo on 14 September, 1963, came into force 4 December, 1969, (also called the „aircraft convention), http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv1- english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011] 254 United Nations Treaty Series, No. 12325, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Signed at The Hague on 16 December, 1970, came into force 14 October, 1971, (also called the „unlawful seizure convention‟), http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv2-english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011] 255 United Nations Treaty Series, No. 14118, 1973, (also called the „civil aviation convention‟), http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv3- english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011]   Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against  the safety of civil aviation, Concluded at Montreal on 23 September, 1971, came into force 26, January 67 the menace of terrorism. Brian Jenkins, in The New Age of Terrorism has emphasised the terrorist‟s determination to internationalise their struggle. The Black September Organisation executed an operation that not only transcended the national frontier, but deliberately and brutally violated the sacred international precinct of the Olympic Games.256 Jenkins has highlighted how attracting international attention, ensured that the terrorists were able to gain leverage over various institutions and provide them with a strong position for making their demands.257Jenkins and Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism also stress the manner in which the Black September organisation exploited the surge in technological advancements that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Terrorist groups were furnished with a whole new suite of weapons and mechanisms to use in their operations.258 Recognising how dramatic events, particularly involving innocents could scare governments into communicating directly with them for fear of being held responsible for the potential loss of life, the terrorists were able to manipulate the ubiquity of television, communications satellites, advanced recording equipment and international news networks. The Black September Organisation was able to reach a worldwide audience instantaneously.259 Their incursion into the Olympic Village and their capture of the Israeli athletes was comprehensively broadcast throughout the world which increased the impact and terror of their attack and raised the profile of their cause.260 As Peter Taylor observed in States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence „an estimated 900 million persons in at least a hundred different countries saw the [Munich] 256 B. M. Jenkins, „The New Age of Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Islam‟, RAND Corporation, (2006), p. 124. available online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1215.pdf [accessed 31/01/2010] 257 Jenkins, „The New Age of Terrorism‟, p.124. 258 Jenkins, „The New Age of Terrorism‟, p.125; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.68. 259 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp.67-68; Jenkins, „The New Age of Terrorism‟, p.125. 260 Jenkins, „The New Age of Terrorism‟, p.125.  68 crisis unfold on their television screens.‟261 The Munich Massacre had successfully internationalised the violence stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Over a quarter of the world had been watching in horror as the Black September Organisation executed an attack on a historical symbol of international unity and reconciliation.262 Stefan Aubrey has said of the Munich Massacre, the particularly despicable act of terrorism against a previously immune target group violated all the norms of theretofore-terrorist behaviour... A previously sacrosanct mould was broken in Munich, allowing the bar to be raised on acceptable levels of violence employed by terrorist organisations against non combatants and the resultant casualties incurred.263 The blatant violation of state boundaries along with the brutality and visibility of the Munich Massacre had caused the international community to feel as if they, not just the Israelis, were vulnerable to attack. In his account of the incident in One Day in September, Simon Reeve claims that with their actions in Munich, „the Palestinians had changed the rules of conflict‟264and thus the rules of reply were also altered. As Rapoport states, „for good reason, the abandoned term, „international terrorism‟ was revived after the attack in Munich.265 Up until that point, the term „international terrorism‟ and significantly, the term „counterterrorism‟ had not formally entered the Washington 261 P. Taylor, States of terror; Democracy and Political Violence, (London: Penguin, 1993), p.8. 262 G. R. Sanan, „Olympic Security 1972-1996: Threat Response and International Co-operation‟, unpublished PHD thesis, (St Andrews University, 1997), p.77. 263 S. Aubrey, The New Dimensions of International Terrorism, (vdf Hochschulverlag AG, 2004) p.35. 264 S. Reeve, One Day in September (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), p.161. 265 Rapoport, „The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, p.58.  69 lexicon.266 The new language being used by the Nixon administration indicated not only a shift in the methods of terrorist elements but also a turning point in the development of the conceptualisation of terrorism. Nixon had moved on from simply conceiving of terrorism as either hijacking or a policing issue. Terrorism was a threat that defied borders and established norms; it was unpredictable and dangerous.267 Nixon declared that The use of terror is indefensible. It eliminates in one stroke those safeguards of civilisation which mankind has painstakingly erected over the centuries. But terror threatens more than the lives of the innocent. It threatens the very principles upon which nations are founded... If the world cannot unite in opposition to terror, if we cannot establish some simple ground rules to hold back the perimeters of lawlessness, if, in short, we cannot act to defend the basic principles of national sovereignty in our own individual interests, then upon what foundations can we hope to establish international comity?268 Nixon recognised that the response would have to be multifaceted; the threat could not simply be tamed by reactive policing, appeasing various constituencies or making broad denunciations at the UN. Nixon was not an idealist; he believed that „idealism without pragmatism is impotent. Pragmatism without idealism is meaningless. The key to effective leadership is pragmatic idealism.‟269 Any action taken in response to the new international threat would have to be consistent with the administration‟s interests. It would be a product of the intersection of world interests, national interests and the interests of Nixon and 266 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.55. 267 Naftali, Blind Spot, pp.56-57. 268 Nixon, R. Statement about Action to Combat Terrorism, 27 September, 1972 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602 [accessed 8/11/2010] 269 R. Nixon, In The Arena, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p.301.  70 Kissinger. The exigency of dealing with the issue of terrorism intensified when Nixon accessed information from an unorthodox source. A psychic Nixon occasionally consulted, Jeanne Dixon, prophesied a major terrorist attack on American soil, targeting either an Israeli official or a prominent American political figure.270 This odd source caused domestic security concerns to make their way to the fore of the post-Munich discussion. The alliance between the United States and Israel became strained as a result of the alleged threats to American security. Nixon began to view Israeli actions as responsible for creating the conditions whereby the United States had become acutely vulnerable to a terrorist attack.271 The Nixon administration‟s relationship with Israel was already under pressure as Israel exploited its links within Congress to push Nixon on the issue of the free emigration of Soviet Jewry and undermine the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nixon resented Israeli efforts to manipulate the tragedy in Congressional debates in order to pursue their anti-détente agenda.272 US-Israeli tensions were further exacerbated, on September 8, 1972 when the Israeli air force, despite Nixon‟s efforts to mollify and prevent belligerent reprisals, executed strikes on ten bases in Syria and Lebanon. During this operation, three Syrian jets were shot down, the rail line between Syria and Beirut was bombed and destroyed and some 200 civilians lost their lives.273 These attacks were followed a week later by an Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon where the homes of 130 suspected PLO operatives were destroyed. 274 Nixon 270 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Rose Mary Woods, Oval Office, September 19, 1972, Conversation 783-25. 271 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.58. 272 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.58. 273 Reeve, One Day in September, pp.152-153. 274 Reeve, One Day in September, p.153.  71 became increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the Israelis. Despite his irritation, Nixon recognised that if there was risk to United States security as a result of circumstances resulting from the Munich Massacre he was under an obligation to protect American citizens and foreign diplomats in the United States. He contacted General Haig to find out whether the FBI had contingency plans for dealing with a significant terrorist attack on American soil.275 Nixon‟s newfound domestic concerns were still seen by Kissinger as secondary to the threat posed by an Israeli military overreaction276 but Nixon was convinced of the validity of his new threat assessment. We have got to have a plan. Suppose they kidnap [Israeli Ambassador] Rabin, Henry, and demand that we release all blacks who are prisoners around the United States, and we didn‟t and they shoot him?... What, the Christ, do we do? We are not going to give in to it... We have got to have contingency plans for hijacking, for kidnapping, for all sorts of things that [could] happen around here277 It was as a remedy to both concerns that Kissinger suggested the establishment of a highly visible domestic institution created with the express purpose of fighting terrorism. A „gesture‟ indicating that the United States was ready to engage in a systematic approach to counterterrorism would both appease the Israelis and concurrently stall the Jewish community‟s anti-détente drive.278 Nixon felt that the establishment of prominent counterterrorism institution could be useful beyond placating Israel and the American 275 Naftali, Blind spot, 276 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.58. 277 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 21, 1972, Conversation 784-7. 278 As Haig stressed in a memo to Nixon‟s top aide, John Ehrlichman that „the reasons for this [Cabinet Committee] involve the Soviet Jewry issue and our need to keep the Israelis cooperative on this issue.‟ Naftali, Blind Spot, p.58.  72 Jewish community. Nixon wanted the highest level membership on the committee not „a bunch of jerks from State‟ he told Kissinger.279 On September 25, 1972, Nixon circulated a Memo to the heads of nine different governmental departments and agencies and informed them of his plan to establish an interagency counterterrorism institution that would, according to Nixon, serve as the world leader in combating the international menace. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ was formed. Its five key functions would be to 1) Co-ordinate among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of US personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States. 2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation. 3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur 4) make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs, 5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.280 The Cabinet Committee would be headed by Nixon‟s Secretary of State, William Rogers with the broader membership comprising the Secretaries of Treasury, Defense and Transportation, the Attorney General, the US Ambassador to the UN, the Director of the 279 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 25, 1972, Conversation 786-5. 280 Memorandum establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, 25 September, 1972, Public Papers of the President, The American Presidency Project, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3596 [accessed 8/11/2010]  73 CIA, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger), the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and the Acting Director of the FBI.281 Nixon expressed to the heads of these departments and agencies that he considered the terrorist problem to be of the utmost importance and urged them to act efficiently in their respective efforts to deal with this international concern.282 The main objective of the Committee would be to consider effective solutions to the prevention of domestic and international terrorist acts while also becoming a leading force in the establishment of procedures that would enable the government to react swiftly, appropriately and efficiently to terrorist acts. The last point would be considered in concert with the governments of others states and international organisations. The Cabinet Committee‟s first task would be to prepare the draft resolution on terrorism for the 27th United Nations General Assembly. Nixon ordered each of the contributing departments and agencies to be „fully responsive to the requests of the Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to coordinate government wide actions against terrorism.‟283 Nixon also pushed for movement on House legislation for the protection of foreign officials in the US, action on the air piracy bill S2567 and implemented a series of new measures in dealing with foreign visitors to the United States. The existing program, which allowed up to 600 000 visitors annually to stay on American soil for ten days without prior authorisation or screening if they claimed they were in transit was deemed inadequate and was 281 Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism-Sept 25, 1972, 319- Public Papers of the President, The American Presidency Project. 282 Memorandum From President Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies, Washington, September 25, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. 283 Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies, Washington, September 25, 1972, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8.  74 scrapped.284 On September 27, 1972, it was replaced by a program stipulating that foreign travellers (excepting Canadians) must be in possession of a visa in order to be granted entry into the United States. These measures were implemented alongside „Operation Boulder,‟ the purpose of which was to create a system of safeguards preventing foreign terrorists or terrorist sympathisers from gaining entry into the United States. Any travellers from Arab countries who sought visas had to submit to a five day waiting period. The waiting period also applied to nationals coming from territories with known active terrorist organisations.285 Nixon also implemented a system for screening the names of applicants against CIA, FBI, INS and Secret Service records before issuance of the visa. The INS also provided the FBI with a list of the names and locations of Arab students of concern living within the United States at that time.286 The American government took pains to send the message to the American people and the international community that it was taking action against the terrorist menace. Nixon‟s tour de force, the „Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ only ever had one official meeting but as G. Davidson Smith notes in Combating Terrorism, „the solitary meeting was not as unremarkable as it may appear however, as several important and lasting decisions were achieved at the gathering.‟287 Particularly significant was the introduction of an affiliated interagency Working Group headed by Ambassador Armin Meyer. This Working Group was established to „coordinate intelligence data regarding terrorist organisations and their activities and to improve exchanges of such information with other 284 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross, p2. 285 „Arabs are hardest hit in US Visa screening‟, Washington Post, Times Herald, (17 October, 1972). 286 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164. No classification marking 287 Smith, Combating terrorism, pp.113-114.  75 governments‟.288 The Working Group would regularly interact with the intelligence and enforcement agencies of the Executive Branch; the FBI, CIA, INS, NSA, Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Secret Service and Treasury. It would conduct reviews relating to intelligence flow from international sources to domestic agencies as well as to local police jurisdictions and the various mechanisms utilised in the exchange of pertinent information.289 The Working Group also had a significant long term influence as it created a number of fundamental guidelines for dealing with terrorist acts which Davidson Smith has claimed were „followed by every US administration since 1972.‟290 The „no concessions‟ policy that has become enshrined in the modern American counterterrorism doctrine291 was a policy that first emerged from the Working Group. Up until the early 1970s, American governments had dealt with hostage crises through negotiation with the terrorist elements. The American government had negotiated the release of the hostages in the case of the hijacked TWA flight in 1969 and had granted concessions to the PFLP in order to ensure the safe release of hostages at the Dawson Field crisis in September 1970.292 When the Black September Organisation detained ten hostages, including two US Ambassadors, at the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum in 1973, Nixon‟s declaration that „we will do everything we can to get them released but we will not pay black mail‟293 exemplifies his administration‟s new policy. The prevailing opinion has been that Nixon‟s comment was impulsive and, as Naftali 288 Rogers to Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. p2. 289 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 21, 1972, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Donelan on September 20. 290 Smith, Combating Terrorism, p.114. 291 R. D. Lyons „President Declares Killers must be brought to Justice‟, New York Times, (3 March, 1973) 292 J. Simon, The Terrorist Trap, pp.102-103. 293 Nixon at press conference, quoted in Naftali, Blind Spot, p.70.  76 suggests, a result of the president „blowing off steam.‟294 Armin Meyer, however, has since claimed that the Working Group, at the urging of Kissinger had developed and advocated a „no negotiations, no deals and no concessions‟ policy some time before the incident in Khartoum.295 The Working group was also responsible for the introduction of the principle that host governments had responsibility for anti-terrorist protection measures and also that terrorist actions should be dealt with as criminal matters and terrorists prosecuted as criminal.296 It provided a forum for the discussion of counterterrorism issues and a point of reference for a number of subsequent presidents.297 Nixon had created a new paradigm in the United States‟ response to terrorism. Beyond its political ramifications, the Cabinet Committee and the affiliated interagency action group also constituted a clear shift in the Nixon administration‟s conceptualisation of terrorism. 298 With the introduction of a permanent executive arm to systematically deal with terrorist activity, the Nixon administration had effectively redefined the threat posed by international terrorism. Terrorism had transformed from an inconvenience to be dealt with via reactive policing to a fundamental challenge for national and international security. When Nixon resigned the presidency in 1974, Gerald Ford continued Nixon‟s efforts to form an international coalition against terrorism but did not think that the terrorist threat necessitated measures beyond those enacted by Nixon in response to the surge in hijackings between 1968 and 1972. In 1977 President Carter dismantled the Cabinet Committee to 294 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.70. 295 D. Tucker, Skirmishes at the edge of empire: the US and international terrorism (Westport Connecticut, Praeger, 1997); D. A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 296 Smith, Combating Terrorism, p.114. 297 Smith, Combating Terrorism, p.53. 298 Tucker, Skirmishes at the edge of empire, p.7.  77 Combat Terrorism only to replace it with a different executive counterterrorism organisation which performed similar fundamental functions and operated under the same rationale.299 The Nixon administration was a counterterrorism pioneer. It was the first government of the United States to conceive of terrorism as a national issue. Throughout Nixon‟s presidency, the United States counterterrorism procedures evolved from the endorsement of the international community‟s efforts in the deterrence of international hijacking to the establishment of a permanent executive branch with the express purpose of enabling comprehensive and effective cooperative procedures and information sharing in countering terrorist threats.300 The Munich Massacre was a key factor in this evolution. It was a tragic demonstration that terrorism posed a serious threat to national and international security. Institutional measures needed to be established to meet this new challenge. The „Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ and the affiliated Working Groups became the antecedents to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism which is active today.301 An institutional legacy was created. As the international community continues to be plagued by terrorist incidents comparable to that which occurred at the 1972 Olympic Games, fundamental aspects of Nixon‟s counterterrorism measures continue to be relevant today.  299 G. D. Smith, Combating Terrorism, p.115. 300 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.33. 301 R. Horowitz, „Understanding U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: Background And Resources‟, Research Institute for European and American Studies, available online, http://www.rhesq.com/Terrorism/Understanding%20U.S.%20Counterterrorism%20Policy.html#2 78 This thesis opened with Maximilien Robespierre‟s pronouncement in 1793 to „subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic.‟ This revolutionary ethos, espoused by Robespierre and almost 200 years later by members of the Black September Organisation manifested in a form of terrorism, embodied by the Munich Massacre, that the international community would not condone. The Munich Massacre changed the way the international community conceptualised terrorism and unleashed a counterterrorism force against terrorist actions like those committed by the Black September Organisation in Munich. This was not an organic development however. It was a corollary to the Nixon administration‟s response to the incident, a response determined by the negotiation of the intersection of multiple volatile state relations and domestic considerations. By reading the Munich Massacre back into the history of the Nixon administration‟s foreign policy, this thesis has uncovered those steps which caused both Nixon and the world to see international terrorist acts like the Munich Massacre as a menace to international society rather than as part of a revolutionary fight. Geopolitical considerations in the Middle-East were integral to the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre. The United States had significant interests in supporting Israel in order to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union in the Middle-East. The Soviet Union formed the crux of their foreign policy objectives and was also the shadow behind their response to the Munich Massacre. The Nixon administration‟s immediate concerns were that Israel would enact harsh reprisals against the Arab world. Vengeance from the Israelis had the potential to upset the intricate foreign policy platform that Nixon and Kissinger had constructed around détente with the Soviet Union and furthermore, had Conclusion 79 the potential to draw the superpowers into a proxy war in the Middle-East. Israel would have to be contained. The Nixon administration‟s resolve to contain Israel was made more complicated by various domestic considerations, however. Nixon and Kissinger, first and foremost world statesman, were ostensibly impervious to the pressures of domestic in the formation of foreign policy but the Munich Massacre was a provocative incident which triggered unrest in powerful sectors of American society. In the midst of a presidential election campaign, Nixon was especially sensitive to the pressures of interests groups. The vocal and powerful pro-Israeli groups were particularly forthright in the wake of the attack and Nixon came under increasing pressure to support Israel. Nixon and Kissinger‟s answer to this problem was to design measures that would show support for Israel, while distancing the United States from any direct intervention on involvement. The Munich Massacre was not an isolated act of terrorism however. It was the most visible instance of a new but increasingly prevalent phenomenon of international attacks. Since the late 1960s, national and transnational offences had proliferated under a revolutionary banner and caused mounting concern within the world community. Thus, in concert with their efforts to maintain geopolitical interests, the Nixon administration took the issue of international terrorism to the United Nations. Championing the lofty proposition that the world should „unite in opposition to terror‟,302 Nixon had recognised that by appealing to the United Nations to, the administration could effectively show their support for Israel without risking national interests. It was the pragmatic politics for 302 Nixon, R. Statement about Action to Combat Terrorism, 27 September, 1972 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602 [accessed 8/11/2010]  80 which Nixon and Kissinger were renowned. Showing pro-Israeli forces that the administration was serious about fighting the menace of international terrorism was also one of the key considerations in the formation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. This was an historic institution. The establishment of a permanent executive branch to systematically deal with terrorism was unprecedented in American history. For Nixon, the Cabinet Committee and its affiliated working groups were not purely about appeasing Israel however. In the Munich Massacre, a sacred symbol of international unity and reconciliation had been violated. This action caused fear and anger to breed throughout the world. Nixon recognised that terrorist actions like the Munich Massacre posed a serious threat to national and international security and necessitated an institutional response. The meeting of these two major concerns, containing Israel and dealing with the threat of increasing incidents of international terrorism, prompted the Nixon administration to implement a paradigmatic response to terrorism. It is a legacy that has awarded him surprisingly little acknowledgement however. The world has not moved on from dealing with acts of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors and furthermore, the counterterrorism institutions that exist today have been modelled on the measures implemented by Nixon in the wake of the Munich Massacre. The Nixon administration‟s response to the attack appears to be as relevant today as it was in 1972 and deserving of a new and comprehensive history. 81 Bibliography Primary Sources  Memoir/Autobiography  Kissinger, H. Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). __________ The White House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979). Nixon, R. 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Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2236 [accessed 10/8/2011] Print Media „Arabs are hardest hit in US Visa screening‟, Washington Post, Times Herald, (17 October, 1972). „Leaders around the World Express Horror at the Guerrilla Attack at Olympics‟ by Martin Arnold, New York Times, (6 September, 1972). „The Voters: The Jewish Swing to Nixon‟, Time Magazine, (21 August, 1972), available online, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877982-2,00.html [accessed 9/4/2011] „The Presidency: And now, Why Not a Domestic Summit‟, Time Magazine, (12 June, 1972), available online, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906016,00.html [accessed 9/4/2011] Other Bennett, Jnr. W. Tapley, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1973), pp.752-760.  89 „Editorial Note,‟ September 5, 1972, U.S. Department of State, Available online, online at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45434.htm [accessed 10/3/2011] LXVII Bulletin, Department of State, No. 1378 at 425-430 (16 October, 1972); USUN Press Release 104 (72), 25 September 25, 1972. Memorandum establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, 25 September, 1972, Public Papers of the President, The American Presidency Project, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3596 [accessed 8/11/2010] Message to Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel About the Deaths of Israeli Athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany 6 September, 1972, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3561 [accessed 12/5/2011] Nixon, R. Statement about Action to Combat Terrorism, 27 September, 1972 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602. [accessed 8/11/2010] 90 Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Sixth Committee 3034, XXVII, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty Seventh Session, available online http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r27.htm [accessed on 4/3/2011] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy (94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975), pt 7. United Nations Treaty Series, No. 10106, Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Signed at Tokyo on 14 September, 1963, http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv1-english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011] No. 12325, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Signed at The Hague on 16 December, 1970, came into force 14 October, 1971, http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv2-english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011] No. 14118, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of civil aviation, Concluded at Montreal on 23 September, 1971, came into force 26 January 1973, http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv3-english.pdf [accessed 5/5/2011]    91 Monographs/Books Secondary Sources  Achcar, G. and N. Chomsky, Perilous power: The Middle-East and US Foreign Policy: Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2007). Aubrey, S. The New Dimensions of International Terrorism, (vdf Hochschulverlag AG, 2004) Bowden, M. Guests of the Ayatollah: the First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2006). Bundy, W.P. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). Cassedy, S. Dostoevsky’s Religion, (Stanford University Press, 2005). Connelly, M. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Dallek, R. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008). Engler, E. The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 92 Farber, D. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006). Ferguson, N. Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). Foxman, A. The deadliest lies: the Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). Gaddis, J.L. The Cold War: A New History, (Penguin Books, 2006). Golan, G. Soviet policies in the Middle East: from World War Two to Gorbachev, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Goldstein, D.I. Dostoevsky and the Jew, (University of Texas Press, 1981). Goswami, A. Combating Terrorism: The Legal Challenge, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2002). Greenberg, D. Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image, (New York: Norton and Company, 2003). Hahn, P. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2004). 93 Hoffman, B. Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Isaacson, W. Kissinger, (New York: Simon and Schuster: 2005). Jonas, G. Vengeance (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Kalb, M. and B. Kalb, Kissinger, (Little Brown and Company, 1974). Kennedy, P. The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government, (London: Allen Lane, 2006). Kimche, D. The Last Option, (New York: Macmillan, 1991). Klein, A. Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (New York: Random House, 2005) Korn, D. Assassination in Khartoum, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 1993). Kumamoto, R. D. International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976, (Northeastern University Press, 1999). Laquer, W. A History of Terrorism, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1977). __________ The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of Mass Destruction, (Oxford University Press, 1999). 94 __________ No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003). Little, D. American Orientalism: the US and the Mid-East since 1945, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2008). Mearsheimer, J. and S. Walt, The Israel Lobby: US Foreign Policy, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007). Medoff, R. Jewish Americans and political Participation: A reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Inc., 2002). Naftali, T. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005). Piszkiewicz, D. Terrorism’s war with America: A History, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003). Price, R. With Nixon, (New York: Viking Press, 1977). Quandt, W.B. Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967- 1976, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1977). __________ Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press: 2005). 95 Reeve, S. One Day in September (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000). Reeves, R. President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Touchstone, 2002). Romaniuk, P. Multilateral Counterterrorism: the Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation, (New York: Routledge, 2010). Safire, W. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (Garden City: New York: DoubleDay, 1975). Sampson, A. The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (New York: Viking, 1975). Simon, J. D. The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism, Second Edition, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). Smith, G.D. Combating terrorism, (London: Routledge, 1990). Sonneborn, L. Murder and the 1972 Olympics, (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003). Spiegel, S. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle-East Policy, From Truman to Reagan, (University of Chicago Press, 1985). Sulzberger, C. The World and Richard Nixon, (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987). 96 Summers, A. The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon, (New York: Phoenix Press, 2000). Suri, J. Henry Kissinger and the American Century, (Harvard University Press, 2007). Taylor, P. States of terror; Democracy and Political Violence, (London: Penguin, 1993). Tucker, D. Skirmishes at the edge of empire: the US and international terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997). Articles Bonham, M. Michael J. Shapiro, Thomas L. Trumble, „The October War: Changes in Cognitive Orientation toward the Middle East Conflict‟, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, (March, 1979), pp Caldwell, D. „„Going Steady‟: The Kissinger-Dobrynin Channel‟, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 1, (January, 2010), p.220. Hewitt, C. „The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, Special Issue: The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, Vol. 12, No. 3-4, (2000), pp.325-344. Hoff, J. „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Winter, 1996), pp.107-129.  97 Howard, M. „The world according to Henry: from Metternich to Me‟, (May-June, 1994), Foreign Affairs available online, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49890/michael-howard/the-world- according-to-henry-from-metternich-to-me [accessed 10/9/2011] Jenkins, B.M. The New Age of Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Islam, RAND Corporation, (2006) available online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1215.pdf [accessed 31/01/2010] __________ „Thirty Years and Counting‟, RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/thirtyyears.html [accessed 31/01/2010] Keefer, E. „The Nixon Administration and the United Nations,‟ available online, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/ONU_edward_keefer.pdf [accessed 10/2/2011] Kimball, J. (2006). „The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp.59–74. Kochavi, N. „Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the Demise of Détente‟, Diplomatic History, Vol. 29. No. 3, (June, 2005), pp.503-530. 98 Large, D.C. ‘Massacre in Munich: The Olympic Terror Attacks of 1972 in Historical Perspective‟, Historically Speaking, Vol. 10, No. 2, (April, 2009), pp.2-5. Rami, G. and Bar-Noi, Uri 'Tacit support for terrorism: The Rapprochement between the USSR and Palestinian Guerrilla Organizations following the 1967 War', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2007). Rapoport, D. ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, UCLA International Institute, available online, http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern- Terrorism.pdf [accessed 31/01/2010] Said, E. US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East, Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), pp.30-50. Sartre, J.P. „”About Munich” La Cause du peuple‟, J'accuse, No. 29, du 15 (October, 1972), translated by Elizabeth Bowman in „Sartre on Munich 1972‟, Sartre Studies International, Vol. 9, (2003). Schultz, G. „The Israel Lobby Myth‟, US News and World Report, (9 September, 2007) available online, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2007/09/09/the-israel-lobby-myth [accessed 9/3/2011] Trice, R. „Domestic Interest Groups and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‟ in E. Said, Ethnicity and Foreign Policy, (1967), pp.121-122. 99 Yassin El-Ayouty, „The United Nations and Decolonisation, 1960-70‟, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, (October, 1970), pp.462-468. Compilations/Chapters Chomksy, N. „International Terrorism: Image and Reality‟, in Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism, (New York: Routledge, 1991), available online http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199112--02.htm#n1 [accessed 17/8/2011] Forman, I. „The Politics of Minority Consciousness: The Historical Voting Behaviour of American Jews,‟ in Jews and American Politics, ed L. Sandy Maisel (Lanham, Md, 2001). Golan, G. „The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude towards the Arab Israeli Conflict‟ in N. Ashton, The Cold War in the Middle East: regional conflict and the superpowers, 1967-73 (New York, Routledge, 2007). Hanhimaki, J. „An Elusive Grand Design‟ in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations 1969-1977, Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds), (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008). Logevall, F. Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, F Logevall and A. Preston (eds) (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008).  100 Rosenthal, S. „Long distance nationalism, American Jews, Zionism and Israel‟ in The Cambridge Companion to American Judaism, ed. Dana Evan Kaplan (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2005). Sandbrook, D. „Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate‟ in F. Logevall and A. Preston (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008). Yaqub, S. „The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‟ in F. Logevall

 

On the left is the old town hall in the Munich district of Pasing which was taken over by the Nazis in May 1938 and made the site of an Haus der NSDAP after the municipal administration had moved to the new building on Landsberger Strasse. It currently serves as the Munich Volkshochschule.
Nearby are other locations associated with the Nazi era in Pasing, including the war memorial on Dorfstraße, the former Adolf-Hitler-Platz (now Avenariusplatz) and the high bunker hidden in the centre of Pasing. Hiterplatz enjoyed a large area which allowed for celebrations and parades that were intended to demonstrate their full strength. Located on the site was a  teacher training institute that the Nazis renamed the “Hans Schemm College for Teacher Education” after the Nazi Minister of Culture in Bavaria who had enjoyed a preferred position in Nazi education policy. Whilst the majority of the teachers came to terms with the new circumstances after the “seizure of power”, some educators stood out and both personally and professionally refused to accept the new ideology, including senior student councilor Hugo Fey, who was also a city councilor for the Bavarian People's Party, and Dr. Paul Diehl. For their resistance, they had to suffer considerable intimidation.

The new town hall in Pasing was inaugurated on November 14, 1937. By then well-known labour movement activists such as the communist Franz Stenzer and the social democrat Hans Nimmerfall, had paid for their attitude with their lives. In June 1933 the Bavarian People's Party was also expelled from the Pasing town hall. Representatives of the Catholic bourgeois opposition such as the BVP city council and editor-in-chief of the “Bavarian Courier”, Josef Osterhub, were taken into so-called 'protective custody.' The council chamber today remains controversial due to the 4.20 by 5.25 metre tapestry which has covered the niche where the bust of Hitler once sat shown here. The tapestry itself comes from the workshop of Bruno Goldschmitt, a painter, graphic artist and illustrator who had studied with Stuck at the Academy in Munich. In 1932 he joined the Nazi Pasrty and ended up as one of the painters who were allowed to advertise Hitler's Reichsautobahn on a large scale. And in 1934 he was supposed to produce a twelve-part tapestry cycle for the old Munich council chamber that dealt with the history of the city. According to Evelyn Lang, the tapestry that now hangs in the Pasing meeting room is the first and only completed one from this planned series, or the only one that survived the war. It is supposed to represent Munich founding legend when, in 1158 Henry the Lion had the Bishop of Freising's market bridge near Oberfoehring destroyed. From then on, the lucrative salt trade led upstream via a river crossing over the Isar, and Munich was allowed to thrive. However, according to Freimut Scholz, a former art teacher, museum educator witha doctorate in philosophy, it is a "characteristic work of propagandistic Nazi art" that follows the pictorial conventions of the time and which is allowed to hang "in the council chambers of a democratic community." In the centre stands Henry the Lion, larger than life in armour, whose "gaze is directed far into the distance to the east," interprets Scholz, for whom the attack on Poland is alluded to. Some more Nazi symbolism can be discovered: the bridge, for example, which is currently being put together, reminds him of a lying swastika. 

Nearby at schloß Blutenburg, beside a memorial to the April 1945 Death March by the sculptor Hubertus von Pilgrim, one of 22 that remember those who, in the winter of 1944-45, the ϟϟ had evacuated from the concentration camps that were threatening to fall into the hands of the Allied forces. Weak or ill prisoners were left behind or killed, whilst the rest were taken on foot or by train to other camps. Those who collapsed on the road or tried to escape were summarily killed on the spot whilst others starved or froze to death. Of the more than 700,000 prisoners who were registered in early January 1945, at least 250,000 were killed on the death marches.

Stadelheim Gaol

Outside the main entrance at Stadelheimer Straße 12 in the Giesing district of Munich, one of the largest prisons in Germany with fourteen hectares of usable space. Hitler had been imprisoned for a month in 1922 here for assaulting Otto Ballerstedt on September 14, 1921 when Hitler, Hermann Esser, Oskar Körner (later to die in the Beer Hall Putsch) and some other Nai supporters stormed a Ballerstedt meeting in the Löwenbräukeller in order to prevent him from giving a lecture. Hitler reached Ballerstedt, then assaulted and injured him severely. Ballerstedt was then forcibly dragged out of the Hall. As a result, Hitler was on trial from January 27 to 29, 1922 on charges of a breach of the peace, public indecency and assault. He and Esser were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 100 days and payment of 1,000 Reichsmarks. The prison sentence was served from 24 June to 27 July 1922. In total, at least 1049 prisoners were executed in Stadelheim, of which only thirteen took place in the period between 1895 and 1927, including Eugen Leviné in 1919. Most of the executions took place during the Nazi period when Stadelheim, together with the Stuttgart Detention Centre and the Bruchsal Penitentiary, was designated as the "central execution site for the Execution District VIII." Johann Reichhart acted as the executioner. Among the at least 1035 people killed this time were found, inter alia, Ernst Röhm and the members of the White Rose. The executed were partially buried in the neighbouring cemetery at Perlacher Forst. In the suppression of the Munich Soviet Republic at the beginning of May 1919 there were numerous unlawful killings in the Stadelheim prison by the victorious Soldierska . According to the testimony of Ernst Toller , who was imprisoned in Stadelheim, a slogan within scrawled in white chalk read: "Here is blood and liver sausage made of Spartakistenblut, here are the Reds carried free of charge to death."  One peculiarity is that Kurt Eisner , Count Arco-Valley , Adolf Hitler and Ernst Röhm had all been serving in the same prison cell (Cell No. 70) at different times.

Hitler, in a final act of what he apparently thought was grace, gave orders that a pistol be left on the table of his old comrade. Roehm refused to make use of it. ”If I am to be killed, let Adolf do it himself,” he is reported to have said. Thereupon two S.A. officers, according to the testimony of an eyewitness, a police lieutenant, given twenty-three years later in a postwar trial at Munich in May 1957, entered the cell and fired their revolvers at Roehm point-blank. ”Roehm wanted to say something,” said this witness, ”but the S.S. officer motioned him to shut up. Then Roehm stood at attention – he was stripped to the waist – with his face full of contempt.”

Shirer, 197

Also executed at Stadelheim were Hans and Sophie Scholl, who lie together in a grave with their comrade Christoph Probst, executed with them. The graves are to be found within Neu-Perlach cemetery nearby. The execution chamber at Stadelheim apparently was converted into an automobile repair shop (right) before being destroyed in 1968. A memorial for the members of the White Rose, designed by the sculptor Wilhelm Breitsameter, was built in 1974 and can be visited by groups within the prison after registration. On the 65th anniversary of the execution (February 22, 2008) of Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christoph Probst in Stadelheim, the memorial was opened to the public for the first time.

On Dachauerstraße 128 is this memorial to Bavarian railwaymen who died in the Great War. Erected 1922, destroyed in 1945 and replaced in 1962, it reads they "died for Germany's fame and honour / The dead of the Bavarian railway group / in the World War of 1914-18."
It has been the subject of attack from two men who have been fined 6,300 euros for defacing it with a mere board reading how "We mourn for all who lost their lives in the cruel and senseless World War 1914-1918. To ensure peace and to prevent wars." The men, Hans-Peter Berndl and Wolfram P. Kastner, describe it an "unspeakable scandal that every year on memorial day the Bundeswehr present dazzling wreaths financed from tax money." They point out that those who claim "that the soldiers of the First World War were killed for fame and honour" is consciously twisting the truth, if not lying.
The memorial is located at the former site of the Railway Battalion barracks; today the Bundeswehr Administration Centre Munich occupies the area on the western edge of the Olympic Park, including the Munich branch of the SÜD military area administration, the Bundeswehr Medical Service (since 2002), the South Military Service Court, the Munich Military Service Agency, the Munich Army Service Centre, and other such agencies. Some of the original barracks buildings north of Hedwig-Dransfeld-Allee have been preserved to this day and are among the last remnants of Munich military buildings of the 19th century. 

Every party in Germany had its own paramilitary force and this is the SPD's Eiserne Front, marching in front of the Gebsattelbrücke on July 3, 1932 before the national elections. In the centre with the raised fist is the Landtag deputy Rosa Aschenbrenner (SPD). Aschenbrenner was in the USPD from 1920 to 1922 and then for the KPD from 1924 to 1928 and finally from 1930 to 1932 and from 1946 to 1948 a member of the SPD. The Eiserne Front was an anti-Nazi, anti-monarchist, and anti-communist paramilitary organisation formed from a union of the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, the General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB), the General Free Workers 'Union (Afa-Bund), the SPD and the Workers' Gymnastics and Sports Federation (ATSB) in opposition to national socialism . Their political opponents included the KPD. The KPD chairman, Ernst Thälmann, characterised the Iron Front as a "terror organisation of social fascism." In his call for the founding of the Iron Front, Reichsbanner chairman Karl Höltermann stated:  

The year 1932 will be our year, the year of the final victory of the Republic over its opponents. Not a day, not an hour more, we want to remain on the defensive - we are attacking! Attack down the line! Our deployment already has to be part of the general offensive. Today we call - tomorrow we will beat! 

 The symbol of the union were three arrows, which were interpreted differently. They stood for the opponents of the Iron Front, the three enemies of democracy: Communists, monarchists and national socialists, but also for the three pillars of the workers' movement: the party, the union and the Reichsbanner as symbols of the political, economic and physical power of the Iron Front. The three arrows of Carlo Mierendorff and Sergei Tschachotin were developed. The Iron Front ceased to exist with the suppression of the workers' movement and the destruction of the trade unions on May 2, 1933.

Other Munich Pages
Odeonsplatz

Around Königsplatz
Various sites in central Munich (1)
Sites around central Munich (2)
 Sites around central Munich (3)
Nazi locations around Munich (4)
Around Dachau